openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c - Issue 2072073002: Delete bundled copy of OpenSSL and replace with README.

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Issue 2072073002: Delete bundled copy of OpenSSL and replace with README. (Closed) Base URL: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/deps/openssl@master

Patch Set: Delete bundled copy of OpenSSL and replace with README. Created 4 years, 6 months ago

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1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -- */

2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)

3 * All rights reserved.

4 *

5 * This package is an SSL implementation written

6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).

7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.

8 *

9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as

10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions

11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,

12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation

13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms

14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).

15 *

16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in

17 * the code are not to be removed.

18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution

19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.

20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or

21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.

22 *

23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without

24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions

25 * are met:

26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright

27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.

28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright

29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the

30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.

31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software

32 * must display the following acknowledgement:

33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by

34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"

35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library

36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).

37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from

38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:

39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"

40 *

41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND

42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE

43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE

44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE

45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL

46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS

47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)

48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT

49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY

50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF

51 * SUCH DAMAGE.

52 *

53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or

54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be

55 * copied and put under another distribution licence

56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]

57 */

58 /* ====================================================================

59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.

60 *

61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without

62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions

63 * are met:

64 *

65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright

66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.

67 *

68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright

69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in

70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the

71 * distribution.

72 *

73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this

74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:

75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project

76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"

77 *

78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to

79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without

80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact

81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.

82 *

83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"

84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written

85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.

86 *

87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following

88 * acknowledgment:

89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project

90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"

91 *

92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY

93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE

94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR

95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR

96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,

97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT

98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;

99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)

100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,

101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)

102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED

103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

104 * ====================================================================

105 *

106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young

107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim

108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).

109 *

110 */

111 /* ====================================================================

112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

113 *

114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by

115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.

116 *

117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source

118 * license provided above.

119 *

120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by

121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.

122 *

123 */

124 /* ====================================================================

125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.

126 *

127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by

128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source

129 * license.

130 *

131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of

132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites

133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.

134 *

135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in

136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received

137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.

138 *

139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not

140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third

141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights

142 * to make use of the Contribution.

143 *

144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN

145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA

146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY

147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR

148 * OTHERWISE.

149 */

150

151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG

152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG

153

154 #include <stdio.h>

155 #include "ssl_locl.h"

156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"

157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>

158 #include <openssl/rand.h>

159 #include <openssl/objects.h>

160 #include <openssl/ec.h>

161 #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>

162 #include <openssl/evp.h>

163 #include <openssl/hmac.h>

164 #include <openssl/sha.h>

165 #include <openssl/x509.h>

166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH

167 #include <openssl/dh.h>

168 #endif

169 #include <openssl/bn.h>

170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5

171 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>

172 #endif

173 #include <openssl/md5.h>

174

175 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);

176

177 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)

178 {

179 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)

180 return(SSLv3_server_method());

181 else

182 return(NULL);

183 }

184

185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP

186 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL s, int al)

187 {

188 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;

189

190 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;

191

192 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&

193 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))

194 {

195 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)

196 {

197 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,

198 we do so if There is no srp login name */

199 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;

200 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;

201 }

202 else

203 {

204 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);

205 }

206 }

207 return ret;

208 }

209 #endif

210

211 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,

212 ssl3_accept,

213 ssl_undefined_function,

214 ssl3_get_server_method)

215

216 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)

217 {

218 BUF_MEM *buf;

219 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);

220 void (cb)(const SSL ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;

221 int ret= -1;

222 int new_state,state,skip=0;

223

224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);

225 ERR_clear_error();

226 clear_sys_error();

227

228 if (s->info_callback != NULL)

229 cb=s->info_callback;

230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)

231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;

232

233 /* init things to blank */

234 s->in_handshake++;

235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) \|\| SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);

236

237 if (s->cert == NULL)

238 {

239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);

240 return(-1);

241 }

242

243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS

244 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we

245 * already got and don't await it anymore, because

246 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.

247 */

248 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)

249 {

250 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;

251 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;

252 }

253 #endif

254

255 for (;;)

256 {

257 state=s->state;

258

259 switch (s->state)

260 {

261 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:

262 s->renegotiate=1;

263 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */

264

265 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:

266 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:

267 case SSL_ST_BEFORE\|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:

268 case SSL_ST_OK\|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:

269

270 s->server=1;

271 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);

272

273 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)

274 {

275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

276 return -1;

277 }

278 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;

279

280 if (s->init_buf == NULL)

281 {

282 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)

283 {

284 ret= -1;

285 goto end;

286 }

287 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))

288 {

289 ret= -1;

290 goto end;

291 }

292 s->init_buf=buf;

293 }

294

295 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))

296 {

297 ret= -1;

298 goto end;

299 }

300

301 s->init_num=0;

302 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;

303

304 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)

305 {

306 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that

307 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :- )

308 */

309 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }

310

311 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);

312 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;

313 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;

314 }

315 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&

316 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGO TIATION))

317 {

318 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with

319 * client that doesn't support secure

320 * renegotiation.

321 */

322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RE NEGOTIATION_DISABLED);

323 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE _FAILURE);

324 ret = -1;

325 goto end;

326 }

327 else

328 {

329 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,

330 * we will just send a HelloRequest */

331 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;

332 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;

333 }

334 break;

335

336 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:

337 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:

338

339 s->shutdown=0;

340 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);

341 if (ret <= 0) goto end;

342 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;

343 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;

344 s->init_num=0;

345

346 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);

347 break;

348

349 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:

350 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;

351 break;

352

353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:

354 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:

355 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:

356

357 s->shutdown=0;

358 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)

359 {

360 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);

361 if (ret <= 0) goto end;

362 }

363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP

364 {

365 int al;

366 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)

367 {

368 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */

369 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;

370 goto end;

371 }

372 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)

373 {

374 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);

375 /* This is not really an error but the only mean s to

376 for a client to detect whether srp is support ed. */

377 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)

378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHEL LO_TLSEXT);

379 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;

380 ret= -1;

381 goto end;

382 }

383 }

384 #endif

385

386 s->renegotiate = 2;

387 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;

388 s->init_num=0;

389 break;

390

391 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:

392 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:

393 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);

394 if (ret <= 0) goto end;

395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT

396 if (s->hit)

397 {

398 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)

399 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;

400 else

401 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;

402 }

403 #else

404 if (s->hit)

405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;

406 #endif

407 else

408 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;

409 s->init_num=0;

410 break;

411

412 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:

413 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:

414 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */

415 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */

416 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)

417 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL _kPSK)

418 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL _aKRB5))

419 {

420 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);

421 if (ret <= 0) goto end;

422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT

423 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)

424 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;

425 else

426 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;

427 }

428 else

429 {

430 skip = 1;

431 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;

432 }

433 #else

434 }

435 else

436 skip=1;

437

438 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;

439 #endif

440 s->init_num=0;

441 break;

442

443 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:

444 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:

445 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;

446

447 /* clear this, it may get reset by

448 * send_server_key_exchange */

449 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)

450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5

451 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)

452 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */

453 )

454 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary R SA key

455 * even when forbidden by protocol specs

456 * (handshake may fail as clients are not requir ed to

457 * be able to handle this) */

458 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;

459 else

460 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;

461

462

463 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or

464 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate

465 *

466 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints

467 *

468 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange

469 * message only if the cipher suite is either

470 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the

471 * server certificate contains the server's

472 * public key for key exchange.

473 */

474 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp

475 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity

476 * hint if provided */

477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK

478 \|\| ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)

479 #endif

480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP

481 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */

482 \|\| (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)

483 #endif

484 \|\| (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr\|SSL_kDHd\|SSL_kEDH))

485 \|\| (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)

486 \|\| ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)

487 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL

488 \|\| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)

489 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY _RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)

490 )

491 )

492 )

493 )

494 {

495 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);

496 if (ret <= 0) goto end;

497 }

498 else

499 skip=1;

500

501 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;

502 s->init_num=0;

503 break;

504

505 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:

506 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:

507 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */

508 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) \|\|

509 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,

510 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */

511 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&

512 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) \|\|

513 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites

514 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 d rafts

515 * and in RFC 2246): */

516 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aN ULL) &&

517 /* ... except when the application insists on v erification

518 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts th is for SSL 3) */

519 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_C ERT)) \|\|

520 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */

521 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKR B5)

522 /* With normal PSK Certificates and

523 * Certificate Requests are omitted */

524 \|\| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_ kPSK))

525 {

526 /* no cert request */

527 skip=1;

528 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;

529 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;

530 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)

531 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))

532 return -1;

533 }

534 else

535 {

536 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;

537 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);

538 if (ret <= 0) goto end;

539 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG

540 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;

541 #else

542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;

543 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;

544 #endif

545 s->init_num=0;

546 }

547 break;

548

549 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:

550 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:

551 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);

552 if (ret <= 0) goto end;

553 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;

554 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;

555 s->init_num=0;

556 break;

557

558 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:

559

560 /* This code originally checked to see if

561 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO

562 * and then flushed. This caused problems

563 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed

564 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue

565 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING

566 * still exist. So instead we just flush

567 * unconditionally.

568 */

569

570 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;

571 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)

572 {

573 ret= -1;

574 goto end;

575 }

576 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

577

578 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;

579 break;

580

581 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:

582 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:

583 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */

584 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);

585 if (ret <= 0)

586 goto end;

587 if (ret == 2)

588 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;

589 else {

590 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)

591 {

592 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);

593 if (ret <= 0) goto end;

594 }

595 s->init_num=0;

596 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;

597 }

598 break;

599

600 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:

601 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:

602 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);

603 if (ret <= 0)

604 goto end;

605 if (ret == 2)

606 {

607 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when

608 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in

609 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify

610 * message is not sent.

611 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when

612 * the client uses its key from the certificate

613 * for key exchange.

614 */

615 s->init_num = 0;

616 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT;

617 }

618 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)

619 {

620 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;

621 s->init_num=0;

622 if (!s->session->peer)

623 break;

624 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer

625 * at this point and digest cached records.

626 */

627 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)

628 {

629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ ERROR);

630 return -1;

631 }

632 s->s3->flags \|= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;

633 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))

634 return -1;

635 }

636 else

637 {

638 int offset=0;

639 int dgst_num;

640

641 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;

642 s->init_num=0;

643

644 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is

645 * a client cert, it can be verified

646 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVeri fy

647 * should be generalized. But it is next step

648 */

649 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)

650 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))

651 return -1;

652 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_nu m++)

653 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])

654 {

655 int dgst_size;

656

657 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify _mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify _md[offset]));

658 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3- >handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);

659 if (dgst_size < 0)

660 {

661 ret = -1;

662 goto end;

663 }

664 offset+=dgst_size;

665 }

666 }

667 break;

668

669 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:

670 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:

671

672 s->s3->flags \|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;

673 /* we should decide if we expected this one */

674 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);

675 if (ret <= 0) goto end;

676

677 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT;

678 s->init_num=0;

679 break;

680

681 case SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT: {

682 char next_proto_neg = 0;

683 char channel_id = 0;

684 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)

685 # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)

686 next_proto_neg = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;

687 # endif

688 channel_id = s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid;

689 #endif

690 s->s3->flags \|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;

691

692 if (next_proto_neg)

693 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;

694 else if (channel_id)

695 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;

696 else

697 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;

698 break;

699 }

700

701 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)

702 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:

703 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:

704 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);

705 if (ret <= 0) goto end;

706 s->init_num = 0;

707 if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)

708 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;

709 else

710 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;

711 break;

712 #endif

713

714 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)

715 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A:

716 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B:

717 ret=ssl3_get_channel_id(s);

718 if (ret <= 0) goto end;

719 s->init_num = 0;

720 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;

721 break;

722 #endif

723

724 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:

725 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:

726 s->s3->flags \|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;

727 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,

728 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);

729 if (ret <= 0) goto end;

730 if (s->hit)

731 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;

732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT

733 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)

734 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;

735 #endif

736 else

737 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;

738 s->init_num=0;

739 break;

740

741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT

742 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:

743 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:

744 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);

745 if (ret <= 0) goto end;

746 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;

747 s->init_num=0;

748 break;

749

750 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:

751 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:

752 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);

753 if (ret <= 0) goto end;

754 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;

755 s->init_num=0;

756 break;

757

758 #endif

759

760 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:

761 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:

762

763 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;

764 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))

765 { ret= -1; goto end; }

766

767 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,

768 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);

769

770 if (ret <= 0) goto end;

771 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;

772 s->init_num=0;

773

774 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,

775 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))

776 {

777 ret= -1;

778 goto end;

779 }

780

781 break;

782

783 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:

784 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:

785 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,

786 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,

787 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,

788 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);

789 if (ret <= 0) goto end;

790 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;

791 if (s->hit)

792 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CER T;

793 else

794 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;

795 s->init_num=0;

796 break;

797

798 case SSL_ST_OK:

799 /* clean a few things up */

800 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);

801

802 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);

803 s->init_buf=NULL;

804

805 /* remove buffering on output */

806 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);

807

808 s->init_num=0;

809

810 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a He lloRequest */

811 {

812 s->renegotiate=0;

813 s->new_session=0;

814

815 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);

816

817 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;

818 /* s->server=1; */

819 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;

820

821 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);

822 }

823

824 ret = 1;

825 goto end;

826 /* break; */

827

828 default:

829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);

830 ret= -1;

831 goto end;

832 /* break; */

833 }

834

835 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)

836 {

837 if (s->debug)

838 {

839 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)

840 goto end;

841 }

842

843

844 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))

845 {

846 new_state=s->state;

847 s->state=state;

848 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);

849 s->state=new_state;

850 }

851 }

852 skip=0;

853 }

854 end:

855 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */

856

857 s->in_handshake--;

858 if (cb != NULL)

859 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);

860 return(ret);

861 }

862

863 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)

864 {

865 unsigned char *p;

866

867 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)

868 {

869 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

870 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;

871 *(p++)=0;

872 *(p++)=0;

873 *(p++)=0;

874

875 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;

876 /* number of bytes to write */

877 s->init_num=4;

878 s->init_off=0;

879 }

880

881 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */

882 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));

883 }

884

885 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)

886 {

887 int ok;

888 long n;

889

890 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,

891 * so permit appropriate message length */

892 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,

893 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,

894 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,

895 -1,

896 s->max_cert_list,

897 &ok);

898 if (!ok) return((int)n);

899 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;

900 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)

901 {

902 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per

903 * negotiation. */

904 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)

905 {

906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC _RESTARTS);

907 return -1;

908 }

909 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,

910 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too muc h.) */

911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH

912 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)

913 {

914 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);

915 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;

916 }

917 #endif

918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH

919 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)

920 {

921 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);

922 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;

923 }

924 #endif

925 s->s3->flags \|= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;

926 return 2;

927 }

928 return 1;

929 }

930

931 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)

932 {

933 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;

934 unsigned int cookie_len;

935 long n;

936 unsigned long id;

937 unsigned char p,d,*q;

938 SSL_CIPHER *c;

939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP

940 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;

941 #endif

942 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;

943

944 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.

945 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,

946 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.

947 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with

948 * TLSv1.

949 */

950 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A

951 )

952 {

953 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;

954 }

955 s->first_packet=1;

956 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,

957 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,

958 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,

959 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,

960 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,

961 &ok);

962

963 if (!ok) return((int)n);

964 s->first_packet=0;

965 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;

966

967 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header

968 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */

969 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)\|(int)p[1];

970 p+=2;

971

972 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) \|\|

973 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))

974 {

975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);

976 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)

977 {

978 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote v ersion number */

979 s->version = s->client_version;

980 }

981 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;

982 goto f_err;

983 }

984

985 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't

986 * contain one, just return since we do not want to

987 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...

988 */

989 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)

990 {

991 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;

992

993 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

994 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);

995

996 if (cookie_length == 0)

997 return 1;

998 }

999

1000 /* load the client random */

1001 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

1002 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;

1003

1004 /* get the session-id */

1005 j= *(p++);

1006

1007 s->hit=0;

1008 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in rene gotiation.

1009 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumpti on requests

1010 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new f lag rather

1011 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on thi s for security

1012 * won't even compile against older library versions).

1013 *

1014 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request

1015 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): f or servers,

1016 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_ RENEGOTIATION

1017 * setting will be ignored.

1018 */

1019 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_REN EGOTIATION)))

1020 {

1021 if (!s->session_creation_enabled)

1022 {

1023 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );

1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT _BE_CREATED);

1025 goto err;

1026 }

1027 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))

1028 goto err;

1029 }

1030 else

1031 {

1032 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);

1033 if (i == 1)

1034 { /* previous session */

1035 s->hit=1;

1036 }

1037 else if (i == -1)

1038 goto err;

1039 else /* i == 0 */

1040 {

1041 if (!s->session_creation_enabled)

1042 {

1043 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE _FAILURE);

1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION _MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);

1045 goto err;

1046 }

1047 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))

1048 goto err;

1049 }

1050 }

1051

1052 p+=j;

1053

1054 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION \|\| s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)

1055 {

1056 /* cookie stuff */

1057 cookie_len = *(p++);

1058

1059 /*

1060 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the

1061 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it

1062 * does not cause an overflow.

1063 */

1064 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))

1065 {

1066 /* too much data */

1067 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATC H);

1069 goto f_err;

1070 }

1071

1072 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */

1073 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&

1074 cookie_len > 0)

1075 {

1076 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);

1077

1078 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)

1079 {

1080 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd _cookie,

1081 cookie_len) == 0)

1082 {

1083 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,

1085 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);

1086 goto f_err;

1087 }

1088 /* else cookie verification succeeded */

1089 }

1090 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,

1091 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* de fault verification */

1092 {

1093 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,

1095 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);

1096 goto f_err;

1097 }

1098

1099 ret = 2;

1100 }

1101

1102 p += cookie_len;

1103 }

1104

1105 n2s(p,i);

1106 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))

1107 {

1108 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */

1109 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;

1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);

1111 goto f_err;

1112 }

1113 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))

1114 {

1115 /* not enough data */

1116 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);

1118 goto f_err;

1119 }

1120 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))

1121 == NULL))

1122 {

1123 goto err;

1124 }

1125 p+=i;

1126

1127 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */

1128 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))

1129 {

1130 j=0;

1131 id=s->session->cipher->id;

1132

1133 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG

1134 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));

1135 #endif

1136 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)

1137 {

1138 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);

1139 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG

1140 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",

1141 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));

1142 #endif

1143 if (c->id == id)

1144 {

1145 j=1;

1146 break;

1147 }

1148 }

1149 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade

1150 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.

1151 */

1152 #if 0

1153 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_ BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))

1154 {

1155 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may

1156 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to

1157 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server

1158 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not

1159 * enabled, though. */

1160 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);

1161 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)

1162 {

1163 s->session->cipher = c;

1164 j = 1;

1165 }

1166 }

1167 #endif

1168 if (j == 0)

1169 {

1170 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher

1171 * list if we are asked to reuse it */

1172 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;

1173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER _MISSING);

1174 goto f_err;

1175 }

1176 }

1177

1178 /* compression */

1179 i= *(p++);

1180 if ((p+i) > (d+n))

1181 {

1182 /* not enough data */

1183 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);

1185 goto f_err;

1186 }

1187 q=p;

1188 for (j=0; j<i; j++)

1189 {

1190 if (p[j] == 0) break;

1191 }

1192

1193 p+=i;

1194 if (j >= i)

1195 {

1196 /* no compress */

1197 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIE D);

1199 goto f_err;

1200 }

1201

1202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT

1203 /* TLS extensions*/

1204 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)

1205 {

1206 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))

1207 {

1208 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */

1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);

1210 goto f_err;

1211 }

1212 }

1213 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {

1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLS EXT);

1215 goto err;

1216 }

1217

1218 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this

1219 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate

1220 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow

1221 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */

1222 {

1223 unsigned long Time;

1224 unsigned char *pos;

1225 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */

1226 pos=s->s3->server_random;

1227 l2n(Time,pos);

1228 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)

1229 {

1230 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;

1231 goto f_err;

1232 }

1233 }

1234

1235 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)

1236 {

1237 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;

1238

1239 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);

1240 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->sessi on->master_key_length,

1241 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))

1242 {

1243 s->hit=1;

1244 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;

1245 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;

1246

1247 ciphers=NULL;

1248

1249 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */

1250 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_ciph er(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));

1251 if (pref_cipher == NULL)

1252 {

1253 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

1254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHAR ED_CIPHER);

1255 goto f_err;

1256 }

1257

1258 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;

1259

1260 if (s->cipher_list)

1261 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);

1262

1263 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)

1264 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);

1265

1266 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);

1267 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->cip hers);

1268 }

1269 }

1270 #endif

1271

1272 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other

1273 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression

1274 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */

1275 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;

1276 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP

1277 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */

1278 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)

1279 {

1280 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;

1281 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */

1282 /* Can't disable compression */

1283 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)

1284 {

1285 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;

1286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_CO MPRESSION);

1287 goto f_err;

1288 }

1289 /* Look for resumed compression method */

1290 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)

1291 {

1292 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);

1293 if (comp_id == comp->id)

1294 {

1295 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;

1296 break;

1297 }

1298 }

1299 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)

1300 {

1301 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;

1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRES SION_ALGORITHM);

1303 goto f_err;

1304 }

1305 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */

1306 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)

1307 {

1308 if (q[m] == comp_id)

1309 break;

1310 }

1311 if (m >= i)

1312 {

1313 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;

1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRE SSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);

1315 goto f_err;

1316 }

1317 }

1318 else if (s->hit)

1319 comp = NULL;

1320 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)

1321 { /* See if we have a match */

1322 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;

1323

1324 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);

1325 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)

1326 {

1327 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);

1328 v=comp->id;

1329 for (o=0; o<i; o++)

1330 {

1331 if (v == q[o])

1332 {

1333 done=1;

1334 break;

1335 }

1336 }

1337 if (done) break;

1338 }

1339 if (done)

1340 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;

1341 else

1342 comp=NULL;

1343 }

1344 #else

1345 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session

1346 * using compression.

1347 */

1348 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)

1349 {

1350 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;

1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSIO N);

1352 goto f_err;

1353 }

1354 #endif

1355

1356 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must

1357 * pick a cipher */

1358

1359 if (!s->hit)

1360 {

1361 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP

1362 s->session->compress_meth=0;

1363 #else

1364 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;

1365 #endif

1366 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)

1367 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);

1368 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;

1369 if (ciphers == NULL)

1370 {

1371 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;

1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASS ED);

1373 goto f_err;

1374 }

1375 ciphers=NULL;

1376 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,

1377 SSL_get_ciphers(s));

1378

1379 if (c == NULL)

1380 {

1381 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHE R);

1383 goto f_err;

1384 }

1385 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;

1386 }

1387 else

1388 {

1389 /* Session-id reuse */

1390 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG

1391 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;

1392 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;

1393 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;

1394

1395 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)

1396 {

1397 sk=s->session->ciphers;

1398 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)

1399 {

1400 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);

1401 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)

1402 nc=c;

1403 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))

1404 ec=c;

1405 }

1406 if (nc != NULL)

1407 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;

1408 else if (ec != NULL)

1409 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;

1410 else

1411 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;

1412 }

1413 else

1414 #endif

1415 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;

1416 }

1417

1418 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION \|\| !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIF Y_PEER))

1419 {

1420 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))

1421 {

1422 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;

1423 goto f_err;

1424 }

1425 }

1426

1427 /* we now have the following setup.

1428 * client_random

1429 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers

1430 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers

1431 * compression - basically ignored right now

1432 * ssl version is set - sslv3

1433 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.

1434 * s->hit - session reuse flag

1435 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.

1436 */

1437

1438 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */

1439 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)

1440 {

1441 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)

1442 {

1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TL SEXT);

1444 goto err;

1445 }

1446 }

1447

1448 if (ret < 0) ret=1;

1449 if (0)

1450 {

1451 f_err:

1452 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);

1453 }

1454 err:

1455 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);

1456 return(ret);

1457 }

1458

1459 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)

1460 {

1461 unsigned char *buf;

1462 unsigned char p,d;

1463 int i,sl;

1464 unsigned long l;

1465 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT

1466 unsigned long Time;

1467 #endif

1468

1469 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)

1470 {

1471 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

1472 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT

1473 p=s->s3->server_random;

1474 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */

1475 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */

1476 l2n(Time,p);

1477 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)

1478 return -1;

1479 #endif

1480 /* Do the message type and length last */

1481 d=p= &(buf[4]);

1482

1483 *(p++)=s->version>>8;

1484 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;

1485

1486 /* Random stuff */

1487 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

1488 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;

1489

1490 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send

1491 * back in the server hello:

1492 * - For session reuse from the session cache,

1493 * we send back the old session ID.

1494 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)

1495 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"

1496 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).

1497 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new

1498 * session ID.

1499 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,

1500 * we send back a 0-length session ID.

1501 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,

1502 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed

1503 * to send back.

1504 */

1505 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)

1506 && !s->hit)

1507 s->session->session_id_length=0;

1508

1509 sl=s->session->session_id_length;

1510 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))

1511 {

1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERRO R);

1513 return -1;

1514 }

1515 *(p++)=sl;

1516 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);

1517 p+=sl;

1518

1519 /* put the cipher */

1520 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);

1521 p+=i;

1522

1523 /* put the compression method */

1524 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP

1525 *(p++)=0;

1526 #else

1527 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)

1528 *(p++)=0;

1529 else

1530 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;

1531 #endif

1532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT

1533 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)

1534 {

1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TL SEXT);

1536 return -1;

1537 }

1538 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_ LENGTH)) == NULL)

1539 {

1540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR );

1541 return -1;

1542 }

1543 #endif

1544 /* do the header */

1545 l=(p-d);

1546 d=buf;

1547 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;

1548 l2n3(l,d);

1549

1550 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;

1551 /* number of bytes to write */

1552 s->init_num=p-buf;

1553 s->init_off=0;

1554 }

1555

1556 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */

1557 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));

1558 }

1559

1560 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)

1561 {

1562 unsigned char *p;

1563

1564 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)

1565 {

1566 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

1567

1568 /* do the header */

1569 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;

1570 *(p++)=0;

1571 *(p++)=0;

1572 *(p++)=0;

1573

1574 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;

1575 /* number of bytes to write */

1576 s->init_num=4;

1577 s->init_off=0;

1578 }

1579

1580 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */

1581 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));

1582 }

1583

1584 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)

1585 {

1586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

1587 unsigned char *q;

1588 int j,num;

1589 RSA *rsa;

1590 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];

1591 unsigned int u;

1592 #endif

1593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH

1594 DH dh=NULL,dhp;

1595 #endif

1596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH

1597 EC_KEY ecdh=NULL, ecdhp;

1598 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;

1599 int encodedlen = 0;

1600 int curve_id = 0;

1601 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;

1602 #endif

1603 EVP_PKEY *pkey;

1604 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;

1605 unsigned char p,d;

1606 int al,i;

1607 unsigned long type;

1608 int n;

1609 CERT *cert;

1610 BIGNUM *r[4];

1611 int nr[4],kn;

1612 BUF_MEM *buf;

1613 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;

1614

1615 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);

1616 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)

1617 {

1618 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;

1619 cert=s->cert;

1620

1621 buf=s->init_buf;

1622

1623 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;

1624 n=0;

1625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

1626 if (type & SSL_kRSA)

1627 {

1628 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;

1629 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))

1630 {

1631 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,

1632 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),

1633 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cip her));

1634 if(rsa == NULL)

1635 {

1636 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHAN GE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);

1638 goto f_err;

1639 }

1640 RSA_up_ref(rsa);

1641 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;

1642 }

1643 if (rsa == NULL)

1644 {

1645 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

1646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R _MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);

1647 goto f_err;

1648 }

1649 r[0]=rsa->n;

1650 r[1]=rsa->e;

1651 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;

1652 }

1653 else

1654 #endif

1655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH

1656 if (type & SSL_kEDH)

1657 {

1658 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;

1659 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))

1660 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,

1661 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),

1662 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cip her));

1663 if (dhp == NULL)

1664 {

1665 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R _MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);

1667 goto f_err;

1668 }

1669

1670 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)

1671 {

1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_ R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

1673 goto err;

1674 }

1675

1676 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)

1677 {

1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R _DH_LIB);

1679 goto err;

1680 }

1681

1682 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;

1683 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL \|\|

1684 dhp->priv_key == NULL \|\|

1685 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))

1686 {

1687 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))

1688 {

1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,

1690 ERR_R_DH_LIB);

1691 goto err;

1692 }

1693 }

1694 else

1695 {

1696 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);

1697 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);

1698 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) \|\|

1699 (dh->priv_key == NULL))

1700 {

1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHAN GE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);

1702 goto err;

1703 }

1704 }

1705 r[0]=dh->p;

1706 r[1]=dh->g;

1707 r[2]=dh->pub_key;

1708 }

1709 else

1710 #endif

1711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH

1712 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)

1713 {

1714 const EC_GROUP *group;

1715

1716 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;

1717 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))

1718 {

1719 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,

1720 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),

1721 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cip her));

1722 }

1723 if (ecdhp == NULL)

1724 {

1725 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R _MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);

1727 goto f_err;

1728 }

1729

1730 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)

1731 {

1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_ R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

1733 goto err;

1734 }

1735

1736 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */

1737 if (ecdhp == NULL)

1738 {

1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R _ECDH_LIB);

1740 goto err;

1741 }

1742 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)

1743 {

1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R _ECDH_LIB);

1745 goto err;

1746 }

1747

1748 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;

1749 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) \|\|

1750 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) \|\|

1751 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))

1752 {

1753 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))

1754 {

1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,E RR_R_ECDH_LIB);

1756 goto err;

1757 }

1758 }

1759

1760 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) \|\|

1761 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) \|\|

1762 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))

1763 {

1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R _ECDH_LIB);

1765 goto err;

1766 }

1767

1768 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&

1769 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))

1770 {

1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R _ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);

1772 goto err;

1773 }

1774

1775 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH

1776 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For

1777 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.

1778 */

1779 if ((curve_id =

1780 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)) )

1781 == 0)

1782 {

1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R _UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);

1784 goto err;

1785 }

1786

1787 /* Encode the public key.

1788 * First check the size of encoding and

1789 * allocate memory accordingly.

1790 */

1791 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,

1792 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),

1793 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,

1794 NULL, 0, NULL);

1795

1796 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)

1797 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));

1798 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();

1799 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) \|\| (bn_ctx == NULL))

1800 {

1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R _MALLOC_FAILURE);

1802 goto err;

1803 }

1804

1805

1806 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,

1807 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),

1808 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,

1809 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);

1810

1811 if (encodedlen == 0)

1812 {

1813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R _ECDH_LIB);

1814 goto err;

1815 }

1816

1817 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;

1818

1819 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not

1820 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.

1821 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes

1822 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams

1823 * structure.

1824 */

1825 n = 4 + encodedlen;

1826

1827 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message

1828 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs

1829 */

1830 r[0]=NULL;

1831 r[1]=NULL;

1832 r[2]=NULL;

1833 r[3]=NULL;

1834 }

1835 else

1836 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */

1837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK

1838 if (type & SSL_kPSK)

1839 {

1840 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identi ty hint*/

1841 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);

1842 }

1843 else

1844 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */

1845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP

1846 if (type & SSL_kSRP)

1847 {

1848 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) \|\|

1849 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) \|\|

1850 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) \|\|

1851 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))

1852 {

1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R _MISSING_SRP_PARAM);

1854 goto err;

1855 }

1856 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;

1857 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;

1858 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;

1859 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;

1860 }

1861 else

1862 #endif

1863 {

1864 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

1865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN _KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);

1866 goto f_err;

1867 }

1868 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)

1869 {

1870 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);

1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP

1872 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))

1873 n+=1+nr[i];

1874 else

1875 #endif

1876 n+=2+nr[i];

1877 }

1878

1879 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)

1880 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))

1881 {

1882 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md) )

1883 == NULL)

1884 {

1885 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

1886 goto f_err;

1887 }

1888 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);

1889 }

1890 else

1891 {

1892 pkey=NULL;

1893 kn=0;

1894 }

1895

1896 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))

1897 {

1898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);

1899 goto err;

1900 }

1901 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

1902 p= &(d[4]);

1903

1904 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)

1905 {

1906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP

1907 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))

1908 {

1909 *p = nr[i];

1910 p++;

1911 }

1912 else

1913 #endif

1914 s2n(nr[i],p);

1915 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);

1916 p+=nr[i];

1917 }

1918

1919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH

1920 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)

1921 {

1922 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) cur ves.

1923 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:

1924 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]

1925 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by

1926 * the actual encoded point itself

1927 */

1928 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;

1929 p += 1;

1930 *p = 0;

1931 p += 1;

1932 *p = curve_id;

1933 p += 1;

1934 *p = encodedlen;

1935 p += 1;

1936 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,

1937 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,

1938 encodedlen);

1939 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);

1940 encodedPoint = NULL;

1941 p += encodedlen;

1942 }

1943 #endif

1944

1945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK

1946 if (type & SSL_kPSK)

1947 {

1948 /* copy PSK identity hint */

1949 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);

1950 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s-> ctx->psk_identity_hint));

1951 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);

1952 }

1953 #endif

1954

1955 /* not anonymous */

1956 if (pkey != NULL)

1957 {

1958 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])

1959 * and p points to the space at the end. */

1960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

1961 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA

1962 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)

1963 {

1964 q=md_buf;

1965 j=0;

1966 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)

1967 {

1968 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,

1969 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);

1970 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)

1971 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL) ;

1972 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client _random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

1973 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server _random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

1974 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);

1975 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,

1976 (unsigned int *)&i);

1977 q+=i;

1978 j+=i;

1979 }

1980 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,

1981 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)

1982 {

1983 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHAN GE,ERR_LIB_RSA);

1984 goto err;

1985 }

1986 s2n(u,p);

1987 n+=u+2;

1988 }

1989 else

1990 #endif

1991 if (md)

1992 {

1993 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature

1994 * algorithm */

1995 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)

1996 {

1997 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))

1998 {

1999 /* Should never happen */

2000 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;

2001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KE Y_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

2002 goto f_err;

2003 }

2004 p+=2;

2005 }

2006 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG

2007 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",

2008 EVP_MD_name(md));

2009 #endif

2010 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);

2011 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0] ),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

2012 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0] ),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

2013 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);

2014 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),

2015 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))

2016 {

2017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHAN GE,ERR_LIB_EVP);

2018 goto err;

2019 }

2020 s2n(i,p);

2021 n+=i+2;

2022 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)

2023 n+= 2;

2024 }

2025 else

2026 {

2027 /* Is this error check actually needed? */

2028 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R _UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);

2030 goto f_err;

2031 }

2032 }

2033

2034 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;

2035 l2n3(n,d);

2036

2037 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send

2038 * it off */

2039 s->init_num=n+4;

2040 s->init_off=0;

2041 }

2042

2043 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;

2044 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);

2045 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));

2046 f_err:

2047 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);

2048 err:

2049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH

2050 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);

2051 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);

2052 #endif

2053 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);

2054 return(-1);

2055 }

2056

2057 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)

2058 {

2059 unsigned char p,d;

2060 int i,j,nl,off,n;

2061 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;

2062 X509_NAME *name;

2063 BUF_MEM *buf;

2064

2065 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)

2066 {

2067 buf=s->init_buf;

2068

2069 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);

2070

2071 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */

2072 p++;

2073 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);

2074 d[0]=n;

2075 p+=n;

2076 n++;

2077

2078 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)

2079 {

2080 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);

2081 s2n(nl, p);

2082 p += nl + 2;

2083 n += nl + 2;

2084 }

2085

2086 off=n;

2087 p+=2;

2088 n+=2;

2089

2090 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);

2091 nl=0;

2092 if (sk != NULL)

2093 {

2094 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)

2095 {

2096 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);

2097 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);

2098 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))

2099 {

2100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUE ST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);

2101 goto err;

2102 }

2103 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);

2104 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))

2105 {

2106 s2n(j,p);

2107 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);

2108 n+=2+j;

2109 nl+=2+j;

2110 }

2111 else

2112 {

2113 d=p;

2114 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);

2115 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;

2116 n+=j;

2117 nl+=j;

2118 }

2119 }

2120 }

2121 /* else no CA names */

2122 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);

2123 s2n(nl,p);

2124

2125 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;

2126 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;

2127 l2n3(n,d);

2128

2129 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send

2130 * it off */

2131

2132 s->init_num=n+4;

2133 s->init_off=0;

2134 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG

2135 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;

2136

2137 /* do the header */

2138 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;

2139 *(p++)=0;

2140 *(p++)=0;

2141 *(p++)=0;

2142 s->init_num += 4;

2143 #endif

2144

2145 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;

2146 }

2147

2148 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */

2149 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));

2150 err:

2151 return(-1);

2152 }

2153

2154 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)

2155 {

2156 int i,al,ok;

2157 long n;

2158 unsigned long alg_k;

2159 unsigned char *p;

2160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

2161 RSA *rsa=NULL;

2162 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;

2163 #endif

2164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH

2165 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;

2166 DH *dh_srvr;

2167 #endif

2168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5

2169 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;

2170 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */

2171

2172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH

2173 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;

2174 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;

2175 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;

2176 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;

2177 #endif

2178

2179 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,

2180 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,

2181 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,

2182 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2183 2048, /* ??? */

2184 &ok);

2185

2186 if (!ok) return((int)n);

2187 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;

2188

2189 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;

2190

2191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

2192 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)

2193 {

2194 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */

2195 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)

2196 {

2197 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))

2198 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;

2199 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should

2200 * be sent already */

2201 if (rsa == NULL)

2202 {

2203 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);

2205 goto f_err;

2206

2207 }

2208 }

2209 else

2210 {

2211 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;

2212 if ( (pkey == NULL) \|\|

2213 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) \|\|

2214 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))

2215 {

2216 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

2217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);

2218 goto f_err;

2219 }

2220 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;

2221 }

2222

2223 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */

2224 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)

2225 {

2226 n2s(p,i);

2227 if (n != i+2)

2228 {

2229 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))

2230 {

2231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANG E,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);

2232 goto err;

2233 }

2234 else

2235 p-=2;

2236 }

2237 else

2238 n=i;

2239 }

2240

2241 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);

2242

2243 al = -1;

2244

2245 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)

2246 {

2247 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

2248 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_R SA_DECRYPT); */

2249 }

2250

2251 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))

2252 {

2253 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version nu mber as the

2254 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (stran gely, the

2255 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH cipher suites).

2256 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol

2257 * version instead if the server does not support the re quested

2258 * protocol version.

2259 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clie nts. */

2260 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&

2261 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->versio n & 0xff))))

2262 {

2263 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

2264 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL _R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */

2265

2266 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenb acher's attack

2267 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits t he version

2268 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would

2269 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to so me ciphertext

2270 * made up by the adversary is properly formatte d except

2271 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid s uch attacks,

2272 * we should treat this just like any other decr yption error. */

2273 }

2274 }

2275

2276 if (al != -1)

2277 {

2278 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead a s countermeasure

2279 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA p adding

2280 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */

2281 ERR_clear_error();

2282 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;

2283 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;

2284 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;

2285 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_ bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */

2286 goto err;

2287 }

2288

2289 s->session->master_key_length=

2290 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,

2291 s->session->master_key,

2292 p,i);

2293 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);

2294 }

2295 else

2296 #endif

2297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH

2298 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH\|SSL_kDHr\|SSL_kDHd))

2299 {

2300 n2s(p,i);

2301 if (n != i+2)

2302 {

2303 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))

2304 {

2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);

2306 goto err;

2307 }

2308 else

2309 {

2310 p-=2;

2311 i=(int)n;

2312 }

2313 }

2314

2315 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */

2316 {

2317 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_T O_DECODE_DH_CERTS);

2319 goto f_err;

2320 }

2321 else

2322 {

2323 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)

2324 {

2325 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

2326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);

2327 goto f_err;

2328 }

2329 else

2330 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;

2331 }

2332

2333 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);

2334 if (pub == NULL)

2335 {

2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);

2337 goto err;

2338 }

2339

2340 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);

2341

2342 if (i <= 0)

2343 {

2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);

2345 BN_clear_free(pub);

2346 goto err;

2347 }

2348

2349 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);

2350 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;

2351

2352 BN_clear_free(pub);

2353 pub=NULL;

2354 s->session->master_key_length=

2355 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,

2356 s->session->master_key,p,i);

2357 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);

2358 }

2359 else

2360 #endif

2361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5

2362 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)

2363 {

2364 krb5_error_code krb5rc;

2365 krb5_data enc_ticket;

2366 krb5_data authenticator;

2367 krb5_data enc_pms;

2368 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;

2369 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;

2370 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;

2371 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];

2372 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH

2373 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];

2374 int padl, outl;

2375 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;

2376 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;

2377

2378 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);

2379

2380 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();

2381

2382 n2s(p,i);

2383 enc_ticket.length = i;

2384

2385 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))

2386 {

2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2388 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

2389 goto err;

2390 }

2391

2392 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;

2393 p+=enc_ticket.length;

2394

2395 n2s(p,i);

2396 authenticator.length = i;

2397

2398 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))

2399 {

2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2401 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

2402 goto err;

2403 }

2404

2405 authenticator.data = (char *)p;

2406 p+=authenticator.length;

2407

2408 n2s(p,i);

2409 enc_pms.length = i;

2410 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;

2411 p+=enc_pms.length;

2412

2413 /* Note that the length is checked again below,

2414 ** after decryption

2415 */

2416 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)

2417 {

2418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2419 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

2420 goto err;

2421 }

2422

2423 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +

2424 enc_pms.length + 6))

2425 {

2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2427 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

2428 goto err;

2429 }

2430

2431 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,

2432 &kssl_err)) != 0)

2433 {

2434 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG

2435 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",

2436 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);

2437 if (kssl_err.text)

2438 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);

2439 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */

2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2441 kssl_err.reason);

2442 goto err;

2443 }

2444

2445 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,

2446 ** but will return authtime == 0.

2447 */

2448 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,

2449 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)

2450 {

2451 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG

2452 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",

2453 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);

2454 if (kssl_err.text)

2455 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);

2456 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */

2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2458 kssl_err.reason);

2459 goto err;

2460 }

2461

2462 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)

2463 {

2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);

2465 goto err;

2466 }

2467

2468 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG

2469 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);

2470 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */

2471

2472 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);

2473 if (enc == NULL)

2474 goto err;

2475

2476 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */

2477

2478 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))

2479 {

2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2481 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);

2482 goto err;

2483 }

2484 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,

2485 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.l ength))

2486 {

2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2488 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);

2489 goto err;

2490 }

2491 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)

2492 {

2493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2494 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

2495 goto err;

2496 }

2497 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))

2498 {

2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2500 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);

2501 goto err;

2502 }

2503 outl += padl;

2504 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)

2505 {

2506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2507 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

2508 goto err;

2509 }

2510 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->clien t_version & 0xff))))

2511 {

2512 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the

2513 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely , the

2514 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuit es).

2515 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes inste ad of

2516 * the protocol version.

2517 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.

2518 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerb eros cipher)

2519 */

2520 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))

2521 {

2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2523 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);

2524 goto err;

2525 }

2526 }

2527

2528 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);

2529

2530 s->session->master_key_length=

2531 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,

2532 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);

2533

2534 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)

2535 {

2536 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);

2537 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )

2538 {

2539 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;

2540 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->c lient_princ,len);

2541 }

2542 }

2543

2544

2545 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,

2546 ** but it caused problems for apache.

2547 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);

2548 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;

2549 */

2550 }

2551 else

2552 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */

2553

2554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH

2555 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH\|SSL_kECDHr\|SSL_kECDHe))

2556 {

2557 int ret = 1;

2558 int field_size = 0;

2559 const EC_KEY *tkey;

2560 const EC_GROUP *group;

2561 const BIGNUM *priv_key;

2562

2563 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */

2564 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)

2565 {

2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2567 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

2568 goto err;

2569 }

2570

2571 /* Let's get server private key and group information */

2572 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr\|SSL_kECDHe))

2573 {

2574 /* use the certificate */

2575 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;

2576 }

2577 else

2578 {

2579 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when

2580 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.

2581 */

2582 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;

2583 }

2584

2585 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);

2586 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);

2587

2588 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) \|\|

2589 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))

2590 {

2591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2592 ERR_R_EC_LIB);

2593 goto err;

2594 }

2595

2596 /* Let's get client's public key */

2597 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)

2598 {

2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2600 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

2601 goto err;

2602 }

2603

2604 if (n == 0L)

2605 {

2606 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */

2607

2608 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)

2609 {

2610 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

2611 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R _MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);

2612 goto f_err;

2613 }

2614 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))

2615 == NULL) \|\|

2616 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))

2617 {

2618 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client

2619 * authentication using ECDH certificates

2620 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is

2621 * never executed. When that support is

2622 * added, we ought to ensure the key

2623 * received in the certificate is

2624 * authorized for key agreement.

2625 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that

2626 * the two ECDH shares are for the same

2627 * group.

2628 */

2629 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

2630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2631 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);

2632 goto f_err;

2633 }

2634

2635 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,

2636 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0 )

2637 {

2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2639 ERR_R_EC_LIB);

2640 goto err;

2641 }

2642 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */

2643 }

2644 else

2645 {

2646 /* Get client's public key from encoded point

2647 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.

2648 */

2649 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)

2650 {

2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2652 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

2653 goto err;

2654 }

2655

2656 /* Get encoded point length */

2657 i = *p;

2658 p += 1;

2659 if (n != 1 + i)

2660 {

2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2662 ERR_R_EC_LIB);

2663 goto err;

2664 }

2665 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,

2666 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)

2667 {

2668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2669 ERR_R_EC_LIB);

2670 goto err;

2671 }

2672 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer

2673 * currently, so set it to the start

2674 */

2675 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

2676 }

2677

2678 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */

2679 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);

2680 if (field_size <= 0)

2681 {

2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2683 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);

2684 goto err;

2685 }

2686 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecd h, NULL);

2687 if (i <= 0)

2688 {

2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2690 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);

2691 goto err;

2692 }

2693

2694 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);

2695 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);

2696 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);

2697 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);

2698 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);

2699 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;

2700

2701 /* Compute the master secret */

2702 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \

2703 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);

2704

2705 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);

2706 return (ret);

2707 }

2708 else

2709 #endif

2710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK

2711 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)

2712 {

2713 unsigned char *t = NULL;

2714 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];

2715 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;

2716 int psk_err = 1;

2717 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];

2718

2719 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

2720

2721 n2s(p,i);

2722 if (n != i+2)

2723 {

2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2725 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);

2726 goto psk_err;

2727 }

2728 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)

2729 {

2730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2731 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);

2732 goto psk_err;

2733 }

2734 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)

2735 {

2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2737 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);

2738 goto psk_err;

2739 }

2740

2741 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity

2742 * string for the callback */

2743 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);

2744 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);

2745 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,

2746 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));

2747 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);

2748

2749 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)

2750 {

2751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2752 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

2753 goto psk_err;

2754 }

2755 else if (psk_len == 0)

2756 {

2757 /* PSK related to the given identity not found * /

2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2759 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);

2760 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;

2761 goto psk_err;

2762 }

2763

2764 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */

2765 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;

2766 t = psk_or_pre_ms;

2767 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len) ;

2768 s2n(psk_len, t);

2769 memset(t, 0, psk_len);

2770 t+=psk_len;

2771 s2n(psk_len, t);

2772

2773 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)

2774 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);

2775 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);

2776 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)

2777 {

2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2779 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

2780 goto psk_err;

2781 }

2782

2783 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)

2784 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);

2785 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_i dentity_hint);

2786 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&

2787 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)

2788 {

2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2790 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

2791 goto psk_err;

2792 }

2793

2794 s->session->master_key_length=

2795 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,

2796 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, p re_ms_len);

2797 psk_err = 0;

2798 psk_err:

2799 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));

2800 if (psk_err != 0)

2801 goto f_err;

2802 }

2803 else

2804 #endif

2805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP

2806 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)

2807 {

2808 int param_len;

2809

2810 n2s(p,i);

2811 param_len=i+2;

2812 if (param_len > n)

2813 {

2814 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);

2816 goto f_err;

2817 }

2818 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))

2819 {

2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ BN_LIB);

2821 goto err;

2822 }

2823 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)

2824 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);

2825 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);

2826 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)

2827 {

2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2829 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

2830 goto err;

2831 }

2832

2833 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server _master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)

2834 {

2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ INTERNAL_ERROR);

2836 goto err;

2837 }

2838

2839 p+=i;

2840 }

2841 else

2842 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */

2843 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)

2844 {

2845 int ret = 0;

2846 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;

2847 EVP_PKEY client_pub_pkey = NULL, pk = NULL;

2848 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;

2849 size_t outlen=32, inlen;

2850 unsigned long alg_a;

2851

2852 /* Get our certificate private key*/

2853 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;

2854 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)

2855 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;

2856 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)

2857 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;

2858

2859 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);

2860 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);

2861 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same t ype, maybe

2862 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from

2863 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely va lid to use

2864 * a client certificate for authorization only. */

2865 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);

2866 if (client_pub_pkey)

2867 {

2868 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pu b_pkey) <= 0)

2869 ERR_clear_error();

2870 }

2871 /* Decrypt session key */

2872 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE\| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))

2873 {

2874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ DECRYPTION_FAILED);

2875 goto gerr;

2876 }

2877 if (p[1] == 0x81)

2878 {

2879 start = p+3;

2880 inlen = p[2];

2881 }

2882 else if (p[1] < 0x80)

2883 {

2884 start = p+2;

2885 inlen = p[1];

2886 }

2887 else

2888 {

2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ DECRYPTION_FAILED);

2890 goto gerr;

2891 }

2892 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,s tart,inlen) <=0)

2893

2894 {

2895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ DECRYPTION_FAILED);

2896 goto gerr;

2897 }

2898 /* Generate master secret */

2899 s->session->master_key_length=

2900 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,

2901 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret, 32);

2902 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */

2903 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PE ER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)

2904 ret = 2;

2905 else

2906 ret = 1;

2907 gerr:

2908 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);

2909 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);

2910 if (ret)

2911 return ret;

2912 else

2913 goto err;

2914 }

2915 else

2916 {

2917 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

2918 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,

2919 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);

2920 goto f_err;

2921 }

2922

2923 return(1);

2924 f_err:

2925 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);

2926 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) \|\| !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) \|\| !defined(OPENSSL_NO_E CDH) \|\| defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)

2927 err:

2928 #endif

2929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH

2930 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);

2931 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);

2932 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)

2933 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);

2934 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);

2935 #endif

2936 return(-1);

2937 }

2938

2939 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)

2940 {

2941 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;

2942 unsigned char *p;

2943 int al,ok,ret=0;

2944 long n;

2945 int type=0,i,j;

2946 X509 *peer;

2947 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;

2948 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;

2949 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);

2950

2951 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,

2952 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,

2953 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,

2954 -1,

2955 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */

2956 &ok);

2957

2958 if (!ok) return((int)n);

2959

2960 if (s->session->peer != NULL)

2961 {

2962 peer=s->session->peer;

2963 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);

2964 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);

2965 }

2966 else

2967 {

2968 peer=NULL;

2969 pkey=NULL;

2970 }

2971

2972 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)

2973 {

2974 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;

2975 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))

2976 {

2977 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

2978 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_M ESSAGE);

2979 goto f_err;

2980 }

2981 ret=1;

2982 goto end;

2983 }

2984

2985 if (peer == NULL)

2986 {

2987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED) ;

2988 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

2989 goto f_err;

2990 }

2991

2992 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))

2993 {

2994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNIN G_CERTIFICATE);

2995 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;

2996 goto f_err;

2997 }

2998

2999 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)

3000 {

3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);

3002 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

3003 goto f_err;

3004 }

3005

3006 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */

3007 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;

3008 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */

3009 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare

3010 * signature without length field */

3011 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 \|\|

3012 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )

3013 {

3014 i=64;

3015 }

3016 else

3017 {

3018 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)

3019 {

3020 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);

3021 /* Should never happen */

3022 if (sigalg == -1)

3023 {

3024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL _ERROR);

3025 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;

3026 goto f_err;

3027 }

3028 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */

3029 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])

3030 {

3031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SI GNATURE_TYPE);

3032 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

3033 goto f_err;

3034 }

3035 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);

3036 if (md == NULL)

3037 {

3038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ DIGEST);

3039 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

3040 goto f_err;

3041 }

3042 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG

3043 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));

3044 #endif

3045 p += 2;

3046 n -= 2;

3047 }

3048 n2s(p,i);

3049 n-=2;

3050 if (i > n)

3051 {

3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH) ;

3053 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

3054 goto f_err;

3055 }

3056 }

3057 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);

3058 if ((i > j) \|\| (n > j) \|\| (n <= 0))

3059 {

3060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);

3061 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

3062 goto f_err;

3063 }

3064

3065 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)

3066 {

3067 long hdatalen = 0;

3068 void *hdata;

3069 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);

3070 if (hdatalen <= 0)

3071 {

3072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR) ;

3073 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;

3074 goto f_err;

3075 }

3076 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG

3077 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",

3078 EVP_MD_name(md));

3079 #endif

3080 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)

3081 \|\| !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))

3082 {

3083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);

3084 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;

3085 goto f_err;

3086 }

3087

3088 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)

3089 {

3090 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;

3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);

3092 goto f_err;

3093 }

3094 }

3095 else

3096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

3097 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)

3098 {

3099 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,

3100 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,

3101 pkey->pkey.rsa);

3102 if (i < 0)

3103 {

3104 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;

3105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT) ;

3106 goto f_err;

3107 }

3108 if (i == 0)

3109 {

3110 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;

3111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATUR E);

3112 goto f_err;

3113 }

3114 }

3115 else

3116 #endif

3117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA

3118 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)

3119 {

3120 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,

3121 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),

3122 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);

3123 if (j <= 0)

3124 {

3125 /* bad signature */

3126 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;

3127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATUR E);

3128 goto f_err;

3129 }

3130 }

3131 else

3132 #endif

3133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA

3134 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)

3135 {

3136 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,

3137 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),

3138 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);

3139 if (j <= 0)

3140 {

3141 /* bad signature */

3142 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;

3143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,

3144 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);

3145 goto f_err;

3146 }

3147 }

3148 else

3149 #endif

3150 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 \|\| pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_ 2001)

3151 { unsigned char signature[64];

3152 int idx;

3153 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);

3154 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);

3155 if (i!=64) {

3156 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);

3157 }

3158 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {

3159 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];

3160 }

3161 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_veri fy_md,32);

3162 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);

3163 if (j<=0)

3164 {

3165 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;

3166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,

3167 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);

3168 goto f_err;

3169 }

3170 }

3171 else

3172 {

3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

3174 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;

3175 goto f_err;

3176 }

3177

3178

3179 ret=1;

3180 if (0)

3181 {

3182 f_err:

3183 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);

3184 }

3185 end:

3186 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)

3187 {

3188 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);

3189 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;

3190 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;

3191 }

3192 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);

3193 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);

3194 return(ret);

3195 }

3196

3197 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)

3198 {

3199 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;

3200 X509 *x=NULL;

3201 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;

3202 const unsigned char p,q;

3203 unsigned char *d;

3204 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;

3205

3206 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,

3207 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,

3208 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,

3209 -1,

3210 s->max_cert_list,

3211 &ok);

3212

3213 if (!ok) return((int)n);

3214

3215 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)

3216 {

3217 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&

3218 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))

3219 {

3220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_ NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);

3221 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

3222 goto f_err;

3223 }

3224 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 li st */

3225 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)

3226 {

3227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_ DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);

3228 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

3229 goto f_err;

3230 }

3231 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;

3232 return(1);

3233 }

3234

3235 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)

3236 {

3237 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;

3238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYP E);

3239 goto f_err;

3240 }

3241 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;

3242

3243 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)

3244 {

3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

3246 goto err;

3247 }

3248

3249 n2l3(p,llen);

3250 if (llen+3 != n)

3251 {

3252 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

3253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);

3254 goto f_err;

3255 }

3256 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )

3257 {

3258 n2l3(p,l);

3259 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)

3260 {

3261 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

3262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENG TH_MISMATCH);

3263 goto f_err;

3264 }

3265

3266 q=p;

3267 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);

3268 if (x == NULL)

3269 {

3270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB) ;

3271 goto err;

3272 }

3273 if (p != (q+l))

3274 {

3275 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

3276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENG TH_MISMATCH);

3277 goto f_err;

3278 }

3279 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))

3280 {

3281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FA ILURE);

3282 goto err;

3283 }

3284 x=NULL;

3285 nc+=l+3;

3286 }

3287

3288 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)

3289 {

3290 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */

3291 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)

3292 {

3293 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

3294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIF ICATES_RETURNED);

3295 goto f_err;

3296 }

3297 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */

3298 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&

3299 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))

3300 {

3301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_ NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);

3302 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;

3303 goto f_err;

3304 }

3305 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */

3306 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))

3307 {

3308 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;

3309 goto f_err;

3310 }

3311 }

3312 else

3313 {

3314 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);

3315 if (i <= 0)

3316 {

3317 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);

3318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIF ICATE_RETURNED);

3319 goto f_err;

3320 }

3321 }

3322

3323 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */

3324 X509_free(s->session->peer);

3325 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);

3326 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;

3327

3328 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL

3329 * when we arrive here. */

3330 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)

3331 {

3332 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();

3333 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)

3334 {

3335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_F AILURE);

3336 goto err;

3337 }

3338 }

3339 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)

3340 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);

3341 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;

3342 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does not include the

3343 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */

3344

3345 sk=NULL;

3346

3347 ret=1;

3348 if (0)

3349 {

3350 f_err:

3351 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);

3352 }

3353 err:

3354 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);

3355 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);

3356 return(ret);

3357 }

3358

3359 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)

3360 {

3361 unsigned long l;

3362 X509 *x;

3363

3364 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)

3365 {

3366 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);

3367 if (x == NULL)

3368 {

3369 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */

3370 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) \|\|

3371 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))

3372 {

3373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ INTERNAL_ERROR);

3374 return(0);

3375 }

3376 }

3377

3378 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);

3379 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;

3380 s->init_num=(int)l;

3381 s->init_off=0;

3382 }

3383

3384 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */

3385 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));

3386 }

3387

3388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT

3389 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */

3390 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)

3391 {

3392 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)

3393 {

3394 unsigned char p, senc, *macstart;

3395 const unsigned char *const_p;

3396 int len, slen_full, slen;

3397 SSL_SESSION *sess;

3398 unsigned int hlen;

3399 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;

3400 HMAC_CTX hctx;

3401 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;

3402 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];

3403 unsigned char key_name[16];

3404

3405 /* get session encoding length */

3406 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);

3407 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is

3408 * too long

3409 */

3410 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)

3411 return -1;

3412 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);

3413 if (!senc)

3414 return -1;

3415 p = senc;

3416 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);

3417

3418 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */

3419 const_p = senc;

3420 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);

3421 if (sess == NULL)

3422 {

3423 OPENSSL_free(senc);

3424 return -1;

3425 }

3426 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */

3427

3428 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);

3429 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */

3430 {

3431 OPENSSL_free(senc);

3432 return -1;

3433 }

3434 p = senc;

3435 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);

3436 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);

3437

3438 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as

3439 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length

3440 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +

3441 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +

3442 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session

3443 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).

3444 */

3445 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,

3446 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +

3447 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))

3448 return -1;

3449

3450 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

3451 /* do the header */

3452 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;

3453 /* Skip message length for now */

3454 p += 3;

3455 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);

3456 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);

3457 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present

3458 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values

3459 * from parent ctx.

3460 */

3461 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)

3462 {

3463 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,

3464 &hctx, 1) < 0)

3465 {

3466 OPENSSL_free(senc);

3467 return -1;

3468 }

3469 }

3470 else

3471 {

3472 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);

3473 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,

3474 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);

3475 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,

3476 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);

3477 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);

3478 }

3479

3480 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):

3481 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity ),

3482 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long

3483 * as their sessions. */

3484 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);

3485

3486 /* Skip ticket length for now */

3487 p += 2;

3488 /* Output key name */

3489 macstart = p;

3490 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);

3491 p += 16;

3492 /* output IV */

3493 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));

3494 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);

3495 /* Encrypt session data */

3496 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);

3497 p += len;

3498 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);

3499 p += len;

3500 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);

3501

3502 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);

3503 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);

3504 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);

3505

3506 p += hlen;

3507 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */

3508 /* Total length */

3509 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

3510 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;

3511 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */

3512 p += 4;

3513 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */

3514

3515 /* number of bytes to write */

3516 s->init_num= len;

3517 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;

3518 s->init_off=0;

3519 OPENSSL_free(senc);

3520 }

3521

3522 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */

3523 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));

3524 }

3525

3526 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)

3527 {

3528 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)

3529 {

3530 unsigned char *p;

3531 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as

3532 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +

3533 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)

3534 * + (ocsp response)

3535 */

3536 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))

3537 return -1;

3538

3539 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

3540

3541 /* do the header */

3542 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;

3543 /* message length */

3544 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);

3545 /* status type */

3546 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;

3547 /* length of OCSP response */

3548 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);

3549 /* actual response */

3550 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);

3551 /* number of bytes to write */

3552 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;

3553 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;

3554 s->init_off = 0;

3555 }

3556

3557 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */

3558 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));

3559 }

3560

3561 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG

3562 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It

3563 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */

3564 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)

3565 {

3566 int ok;

3567 int proto_len, padding_len;

3568 long n;

3569 const unsigned char *p;

3570

3571 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the

3572 * extension in their ClientHello */

3573 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)

3574 {

3575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EX TENSION);

3576 return -1;

3577 }

3578

3579 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,

3580 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,

3581 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,

3582 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,

3583 514, /* See the payload format below */

3584 &ok);

3585

3586 if (!ok)

3587 return((int)n);

3588

3589 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received

3590 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset

3591 * by ssl3_get_finished). */

3592 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)

3593 {

3594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_C CS);

3595 return -1;

3596 }

3597

3598 if (n < 2)

3599 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */

3600

3601 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;

3602

3603 /* The payload looks like:

3604 * uint8 proto_len;

3605 * uint8 proto[proto_len];

3606 * uint8 padding_len;

3607 * uint8 padding[padding_len];

3608 */

3609 proto_len = p[0];

3610 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)

3611 return 0;

3612 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];

3613 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)

3614 return 0;

3615

3616 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);

3617 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)

3618 {

3619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

3620 return 0;

3621 }

3622 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);

3623 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;

3624

3625 return 1;

3626 }

3627 # endif

3628

3629 /* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */

3630 int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *s)

3631 {

3632 int ret = -1, ok;

3633 long n;

3634 const unsigned char *p;

3635 unsigned short extension_type, extension_len;

3636 EC_GROUP* p256 = NULL;

3637 EC_KEY* key = NULL;

3638 EC_POINT* point = NULL;

3639 ECDSA_SIG sig;

3640 BIGNUM x, y;

3641

3642 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A && s->init_num == 0)

3643 {

3644 /* The first time that we're called we take the current

3645 * handshake hash and store it. */

3646 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;

3647 unsigned int len;

3648

3649 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);

3650 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL);

3651 if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s))

3652 return -1;

3653 len = sizeof(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id);

3654 EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, &len);

3655 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);

3656 }

3657

3658 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,

3659 SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A,

3660 SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B,

3661 SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,

3662 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE,

3663 &ok);

3664

3665 if (!ok)

3666 return((int)n);

3667

3668 ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char*)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);

3669

3670 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received

3671 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset

3672 * by ssl3_get_finished). */

3673 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)

3674 {

3675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_C CS);

3676 return -1;

3677 }

3678

3679 if (n != 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE)

3680 {

3681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE);

3682 return -1;

3683 }

3684

3685 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;

3686

3687 /* The payload looks like:

3688 * uint16 extension_type

3689 * uint16 extension_len;

3690 * uint8 x[32];

3691 * uint8 y[32];

3692 * uint8 r[32];

3693 * uint8 s[32];

3694 */

3695 n2s(p, extension_type);

3696 n2s(p, extension_len);

3697

3698 if (extension_type != TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id \|\|

3699 extension_len != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE)

3700 {

3701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE);

3702 return -1;

3703 }

3704

3705 p256 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);

3706 if (!p256)

3707 {

3708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT);

3709 return -1;

3710 }

3711

3712 BN_init(&x);

3713 BN_init(&y);

3714 sig.r = BN_new();

3715 sig.s = BN_new();

3716

3717 if (BN_bin2bn(p + 0, 32, &x) == NULL \|\|

3718 BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, &y) == NULL \|\|

3719 BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig.r) == NULL \|\|

3720 BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig.s) == NULL)

3721 goto err;

3722

3723 point = EC_POINT_new(p256);

3724 if (!point \|\|

3725 !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256, point, &x, &y, NULL))

3726 goto err;

3727

3728 key = EC_KEY_new();

3729 if (!key \|\|

3730 !EC_KEY_set_group(key, p256) \|\|

3731 !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))

3732 goto err;

3733

3734 /* We stored the handshake hash in \|tlsext_channel_id\| the first time

3735 * that we were called. */

3736 switch (ECDSA_do_verify(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &sig, key)) {

3737 case 1:

3738 break;

3739 case 0:

3740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVA LID);

3741 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;

3742 goto err;

3743 default:

3744 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;

3745 goto err;

3746 }

3747

3748 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, p, 64);

3749 ret = 1;

3750

3751 err:

3752 BN_free(&x);

3753 BN_free(&y);

3754 BN_free(sig.r);

3755 BN_free(sig.s);

3756 if (key)

3757 EC_KEY_free(key);

3758 if (point)

3759 EC_POINT_free(point);

3760 if (p256)

3761 EC_GROUP_free(p256);

3762 return ret;

3763 }

3764 #endif

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