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| 1 /* v3_purp.c */ | |
| 2 /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL | |
| 3 * project 2001. | |
| 4 */ | |
| 5 /* ==================================================================== | |
| 6 * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | |
| 7 * | |
| 8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| 9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| 10 * are met: | |
| 11 * | |
| 12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
| 13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| 14 * | |
| 15 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| 16 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
| 17 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
| 18 * distribution. | |
| 19 * | |
| 20 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
| 21 * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
| 22 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| 23 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | |
| 24 * | |
| 25 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
| 26 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
| 27 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
| 28 * licensing@OpenSSL.org. | |
| 29 * | |
| 30 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
| 31 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
| 32 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
| 33 * | |
| 34 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
| 35 * acknowledgment: | |
| 36 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| 37 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | |
| 38 * | |
| 39 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
| 40 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| 41 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
| 42 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
| 43 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
| 44 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
| 45 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
| 46 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| 47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
| 48 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
| 49 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
| 50 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| 51 * ==================================================================== | |
| 52 * | |
| 53 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
| 54 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
| 55 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| 56 * | |
| 57 */ | |
| 58 | |
| 59 #include <stdio.h> | |
| 60 #include "cryptlib.h" | |
| 61 #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | |
| 62 #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h> | |
| 63 | |
| 64 static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x); | |
| 65 | |
| 66 static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x); | |
| 67 static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int c
a); | |
| 68 static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int c
a); | |
| 69 static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, in
t ca); | |
| 70 static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca); | |
| 71 static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int c
a); | |
| 72 static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, in
t ca); | |
| 73 static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
; | |
| 74 static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, i
nt ca); | |
| 75 static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); | |
| 76 static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); | |
| 77 | |
| 78 static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a, | |
| 79 const X509_PURPOSE * const *b); | |
| 80 static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p); | |
| 81 | |
| 82 static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = { | |
| 83 {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, check_purpose_ssl_cl
ient, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL}, | |
| 84 {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ssl_se
rver, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL}, | |
| 85 {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ns_
ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL}, | |
| 86 {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign,
"S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL}, | |
| 87 {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_en
crypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL}, | |
| 88 {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, "C
RL signing", "crlsign", NULL}, | |
| 89 {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any"
, NULL}, | |
| 90 {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, "OCSP help
er", "ocsphelper", NULL}, | |
| 91 {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, check_purpose_timestamp
_sign, "Time Stamp signing", "timestampsign", NULL}, | |
| 92 }; | |
| 93 | |
| 94 #define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)) | |
| 95 | |
| 96 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) | |
| 97 | |
| 98 static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL; | |
| 99 | |
| 100 static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a, | |
| 101 const X509_PURPOSE * const *b) | |
| 102 { | |
| 103 return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose; | |
| 104 } | |
| 105 | |
| 106 /* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* | |
| 107 * I really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const | |
| 108 * things. */ | |
| 109 int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca) | |
| 110 { | |
| 111 int idx; | |
| 112 const X509_PURPOSE *pt; | |
| 113 if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) { | |
| 114 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
| 115 x509v3_cache_extensions(x); | |
| 116 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
| 117 } | |
| 118 if(id == -1) return 1; | |
| 119 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); | |
| 120 if(idx == -1) return -1; | |
| 121 pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
| 122 return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca); | |
| 123 } | |
| 124 | |
| 125 int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose) | |
| 126 { | |
| 127 if(X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) { | |
| 128 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE); | |
| 129 return 0; | |
| 130 } | |
| 131 *p = purpose; | |
| 132 return 1; | |
| 133 } | |
| 134 | |
| 135 int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void) | |
| 136 { | |
| 137 if(!xptable) return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; | |
| 138 return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; | |
| 139 } | |
| 140 | |
| 141 X509_PURPOSE * X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx) | |
| 142 { | |
| 143 if(idx < 0) return NULL; | |
| 144 if(idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx; | |
| 145 return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT); | |
| 146 } | |
| 147 | |
| 148 int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname) | |
| 149 { | |
| 150 int i; | |
| 151 X509_PURPOSE *xptmp; | |
| 152 for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) { | |
| 153 xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i); | |
| 154 if(!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) return i; | |
| 155 } | |
| 156 return -1; | |
| 157 } | |
| 158 | |
| 159 int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose) | |
| 160 { | |
| 161 X509_PURPOSE tmp; | |
| 162 int idx; | |
| 163 if((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX)) | |
| 164 return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN; | |
| 165 tmp.purpose = purpose; | |
| 166 if(!xptable) return -1; | |
| 167 idx = sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &tmp); | |
| 168 if(idx == -1) return -1; | |
| 169 return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; | |
| 170 } | |
| 171 | |
| 172 int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags, | |
| 173 int (*ck)(const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int), | |
| 174 char *name, char *sname, void *arg) | |
| 175 { | |
| 176 int idx; | |
| 177 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; | |
| 178 /* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */ | |
| 179 flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; | |
| 180 /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */ | |
| 181 flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME; | |
| 182 /* Get existing entry if any */ | |
| 183 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); | |
| 184 /* Need a new entry */ | |
| 185 if(idx == -1) { | |
| 186 if(!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) { | |
| 187 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
); | |
| 188 return 0; | |
| 189 } | |
| 190 ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; | |
| 191 } else ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
| 192 | |
| 193 /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */ | |
| 194 if(ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { | |
| 195 OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name); | |
| 196 OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname); | |
| 197 } | |
| 198 /* dup supplied name */ | |
| 199 ptmp->name = BUF_strdup(name); | |
| 200 ptmp->sname = BUF_strdup(sname); | |
| 201 if(!ptmp->name || !ptmp->sname) { | |
| 202 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| 203 return 0; | |
| 204 } | |
| 205 /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */ | |
| 206 ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; | |
| 207 /* Set all other flags */ | |
| 208 ptmp->flags |= flags; | |
| 209 | |
| 210 ptmp->purpose = id; | |
| 211 ptmp->trust = trust; | |
| 212 ptmp->check_purpose = ck; | |
| 213 ptmp->usr_data = arg; | |
| 214 | |
| 215 /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */ | |
| 216 if(idx == -1) { | |
| 217 if(!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) { | |
| 218 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
); | |
| 219 return 0; | |
| 220 } | |
| 221 if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) { | |
| 222 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
); | |
| 223 return 0; | |
| 224 } | |
| 225 } | |
| 226 return 1; | |
| 227 } | |
| 228 | |
| 229 static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p) | |
| 230 { | |
| 231 if(!p) return; | |
| 232 if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) | |
| 233 { | |
| 234 if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { | |
| 235 OPENSSL_free(p->name); | |
| 236 OPENSSL_free(p->sname); | |
| 237 } | |
| 238 OPENSSL_free(p); | |
| 239 } | |
| 240 } | |
| 241 | |
| 242 void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void) | |
| 243 { | |
| 244 unsigned int i; | |
| 245 sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free); | |
| 246 for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) xptable_free(xstandard + i); | |
| 247 xptable = NULL; | |
| 248 } | |
| 249 | |
| 250 int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp) | |
| 251 { | |
| 252 return xp->purpose; | |
| 253 } | |
| 254 | |
| 255 char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp) | |
| 256 { | |
| 257 return xp->name; | |
| 258 } | |
| 259 | |
| 260 char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp) | |
| 261 { | |
| 262 return xp->sname; | |
| 263 } | |
| 264 | |
| 265 int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp) | |
| 266 { | |
| 267 return xp->trust; | |
| 268 } | |
| 269 | |
| 270 static int nid_cmp(const int *a, const int *b) | |
| 271 { | |
| 272 return *a - *b; | |
| 273 } | |
| 274 | |
| 275 DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid); | |
| 276 IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid); | |
| 277 | |
| 278 int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex) | |
| 279 { | |
| 280 /* This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: | |
| 281 * that is those which are used by the verify process. If | |
| 282 * an extension is critical and doesn't appear in this list | |
| 283 * then the verify process will normally reject the certificate. | |
| 284 * The list must be kept in numerical order because it will be | |
| 285 * searched using bsearch. | |
| 286 */ | |
| 287 | |
| 288 static const int supported_nids[] = { | |
| 289 NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */ | |
| 290 NID_key_usage, /* 83 */ | |
| 291 NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */ | |
| 292 NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */ | |
| 293 NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */ | |
| 294 NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */ | |
| 295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 | |
| 296 NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, /* 290 */ | |
| 297 NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, /* 291 */ | |
| 298 #endif | |
| 299 NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */ | |
| 300 NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */ | |
| 301 NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */ | |
| 302 NID_policy_mappings, /* 747 */ | |
| 303 NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */ | |
| 304 }; | |
| 305 | |
| 306 int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)); | |
| 307 | |
| 308 if (ex_nid == NID_undef) | |
| 309 return 0; | |
| 310 | |
| 311 if (OBJ_bsearch_nid(&ex_nid, supported_nids, | |
| 312 sizeof(supported_nids)/sizeof(int))) | |
| 313 return 1; | |
| 314 return 0; | |
| 315 } | |
| 316 | |
| 317 static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp) | |
| 318 { | |
| 319 X509_NAME *iname = NULL; | |
| 320 int i; | |
| 321 if (dp->reasons) | |
| 322 { | |
| 323 if (dp->reasons->length > 0) | |
| 324 dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0]; | |
| 325 if (dp->reasons->length > 1) | |
| 326 dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8); | |
| 327 dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; | |
| 328 } | |
| 329 else | |
| 330 dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; | |
| 331 if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1)) | |
| 332 return; | |
| 333 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) | |
| 334 { | |
| 335 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); | |
| 336 if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) | |
| 337 { | |
| 338 iname = gen->d.directoryName; | |
| 339 break; | |
| 340 } | |
| 341 } | |
| 342 if (!iname) | |
| 343 iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
| 344 | |
| 345 DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname); | |
| 346 | |
| 347 } | |
| 348 | |
| 349 static void setup_crldp(X509 *x) | |
| 350 { | |
| 351 int i; | |
| 352 x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL); | |
| 353 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) | |
| 354 setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i)); | |
| 355 } | |
| 356 | |
| 357 static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) | |
| 358 { | |
| 359 BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs; | |
| 360 PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci; | |
| 361 ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage; | |
| 362 ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns; | |
| 363 EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage; | |
| 364 X509_EXTENSION *ex; | |
| 365 | |
| 366 int i; | |
| 367 if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) return; | |
| 368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA | |
| 369 X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL); | |
| 370 #endif | |
| 371 /* Does subject name match issuer ? */ | |
| 372 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) | |
| 373 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; | |
| 374 /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */ | |
| 375 if(!X509_get_version(x)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1; | |
| 376 /* Handle basic constraints */ | |
| 377 if((bs=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) { | |
| 378 if(bs->ca) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA; | |
| 379 if(bs->pathlen) { | |
| 380 if((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) | |
| 381 || !bs->ca) { | |
| 382 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; | |
| 383 x->ex_pathlen = 0; | |
| 384 } else x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen); | |
| 385 } else x->ex_pathlen = -1; | |
| 386 BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs); | |
| 387 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS; | |
| 388 } | |
| 389 /* Handle proxy certificates */ | |
| 390 if((pci=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) { | |
| 391 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA | |
| 392 || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, 0) >= 0 | |
| 393 || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, 0) >= 0) { | |
| 394 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; | |
| 395 } | |
| 396 if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) { | |
| 397 x->ex_pcpathlen = | |
| 398 ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint); | |
| 399 } else x->ex_pcpathlen = -1; | |
| 400 PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci); | |
| 401 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY; | |
| 402 } | |
| 403 /* Handle key usage */ | |
| 404 if((usage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { | |
| 405 if(usage->length > 0) { | |
| 406 x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0]; | |
| 407 if(usage->length > 1) | |
| 408 x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8; | |
| 409 } else x->ex_kusage = 0; | |
| 410 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE; | |
| 411 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage); | |
| 412 } | |
| 413 x->ex_xkusage = 0; | |
| 414 if((extusage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { | |
| 415 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE; | |
| 416 for(i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) { | |
| 417 switch(OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage,i))) { | |
| 418 case NID_server_auth: | |
| 419 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER; | |
| 420 break; | |
| 421 | |
| 422 case NID_client_auth: | |
| 423 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT; | |
| 424 break; | |
| 425 | |
| 426 case NID_email_protect: | |
| 427 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME; | |
| 428 break; | |
| 429 | |
| 430 case NID_code_sign: | |
| 431 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN; | |
| 432 break; | |
| 433 | |
| 434 case NID_ms_sgc: | |
| 435 case NID_ns_sgc: | |
| 436 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC; | |
| 437 break; | |
| 438 | |
| 439 case NID_OCSP_sign: | |
| 440 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN; | |
| 441 break; | |
| 442 | |
| 443 case NID_time_stamp: | |
| 444 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP; | |
| 445 break; | |
| 446 | |
| 447 case NID_dvcs: | |
| 448 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS; | |
| 449 break; | |
| 450 } | |
| 451 } | |
| 452 sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free); | |
| 453 } | |
| 454 | |
| 455 if((ns=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) { | |
| 456 if(ns->length > 0) x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0]; | |
| 457 else x->ex_nscert = 0; | |
| 458 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT; | |
| 459 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns); | |
| 460 } | |
| 461 x->skid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); | |
| 462 x->akid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); | |
| 463 x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); | |
| 464 x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &i, NULL); | |
| 465 if (!x->nc && (i != -1)) | |
| 466 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; | |
| 467 setup_crldp(x); | |
| 468 | |
| 469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 | |
| 470 x->rfc3779_addr =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, NULL, NULL); | |
| 471 x->rfc3779_asid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, | |
| 472 NULL, NULL); | |
| 473 #endif | |
| 474 for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++) | |
| 475 { | |
| 476 ex = X509_get_ext(x, i); | |
| 477 if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)) | |
| 478 == NID_freshest_crl) | |
| 479 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST; | |
| 480 if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex)) | |
| 481 continue; | |
| 482 if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) | |
| 483 { | |
| 484 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; | |
| 485 break; | |
| 486 } | |
| 487 } | |
| 488 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; | |
| 489 } | |
| 490 | |
| 491 /* CA checks common to all purposes | |
| 492 * return codes: | |
| 493 * 0 not a CA | |
| 494 * 1 is a CA | |
| 495 * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA | |
| 496 * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1. | |
| 497 * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted. | |
| 498 */ | |
| 499 | |
| 500 #define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS) | |
| 501 #define ku_reject(x, usage) \ | |
| 502 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) | |
| 503 #define xku_reject(x, usage) \ | |
| 504 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage))) | |
| 505 #define ns_reject(x, usage) \ | |
| 506 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage))) | |
| 507 | |
| 508 static int check_ca(const X509 *x) | |
| 509 { | |
| 510 /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */ | |
| 511 if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return 0; | |
| 512 if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) { | |
| 513 if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) return 1; | |
| 514 /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */ | |
| 515 else return 0; | |
| 516 } else { | |
| 517 /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */ | |
| 518 if((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) return 3; | |
| 519 /* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */ | |
| 520 else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) return 4; | |
| 521 /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */ | |
| 522 else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT | |
| 523 && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) return 5; | |
| 524 /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */ | |
| 525 return 0; | |
| 526 } | |
| 527 } | |
| 528 | |
| 529 int X509_check_ca(X509 *x) | |
| 530 { | |
| 531 if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) { | |
| 532 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
| 533 x509v3_cache_extensions(x); | |
| 534 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
| 535 } | |
| 536 | |
| 537 return check_ca(x); | |
| 538 } | |
| 539 | |
| 540 /* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */ | |
| 541 static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x) | |
| 542 { | |
| 543 int ca_ret; | |
| 544 ca_ret = check_ca(x); | |
| 545 if(!ca_ret) return 0; | |
| 546 /* check nsCertType if present */ | |
| 547 if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) return ca_ret; | |
| 548 else return 0; | |
| 549 } | |
| 550 | |
| 551 | |
| 552 static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int c
a) | |
| 553 { | |
| 554 if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0; | |
| 555 if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x); | |
| 556 /* We need to do digital signatures with it */ | |
| 557 if(ku_reject(x,KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) return 0; | |
| 558 /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */ | |
| 559 if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0; | |
| 560 return 1; | |
| 561 } | |
| 562 | |
| 563 static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int c
a) | |
| 564 { | |
| 565 if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_SERVER|XKU_SGC)) return 0; | |
| 566 if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x); | |
| 567 | |
| 568 if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) return 0; | |
| 569 /* Now as for keyUsage: we'll at least need to sign OR encipher */ | |
| 570 if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0; | |
| 571 | |
| 572 return 1; | |
| 573 | |
| 574 } | |
| 575 | |
| 576 static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, in
t ca) | |
| 577 { | |
| 578 int ret; | |
| 579 ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca); | |
| 580 if(!ret || ca) return ret; | |
| 581 /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */ | |
| 582 if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0; | |
| 583 return ret; | |
| 584 } | |
| 585 | |
| 586 /* common S/MIME checks */ | |
| 587 static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca) | |
| 588 { | |
| 589 if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SMIME)) return 0; | |
| 590 if(ca) { | |
| 591 int ca_ret; | |
| 592 ca_ret = check_ca(x); | |
| 593 if(!ca_ret) return 0; | |
| 594 /* check nsCertType if present */ | |
| 595 if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) return ca_ret; | |
| 596 else return 0; | |
| 597 } | |
| 598 if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) { | |
| 599 if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) return 1; | |
| 600 /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */ | |
| 601 if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) return 2; | |
| 602 return 0; | |
| 603 } | |
| 604 return 1; | |
| 605 } | |
| 606 | |
| 607 static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int c
a) | |
| 608 { | |
| 609 int ret; | |
| 610 ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); | |
| 611 if(!ret || ca) return ret; | |
| 612 if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) return 0; | |
| 613 return ret; | |
| 614 } | |
| 615 | |
| 616 static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, in
t ca) | |
| 617 { | |
| 618 int ret; | |
| 619 ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); | |
| 620 if(!ret || ca) return ret; | |
| 621 if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0; | |
| 622 return ret; | |
| 623 } | |
| 624 | |
| 625 static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | |
| 626 { | |
| 627 if(ca) { | |
| 628 int ca_ret; | |
| 629 if((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) return ca_ret; | |
| 630 else return 0; | |
| 631 } | |
| 632 if(ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) return 0; | |
| 633 return 1; | |
| 634 } | |
| 635 | |
| 636 /* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that | |
| 637 * each CA is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain. | |
| 638 */ | |
| 639 | |
| 640 static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | |
| 641 { | |
| 642 /* Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know" | |
| 643 value (2)? */ | |
| 644 if(ca) return check_ca(x); | |
| 645 /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */ | |
| 646 return 1; | |
| 647 } | |
| 648 | |
| 649 static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | |
| 650 int ca) | |
| 651 { | |
| 652 int i_ext; | |
| 653 | |
| 654 /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */ | |
| 655 if (ca) return check_ca(x); | |
| 656 | |
| 657 /* | |
| 658 * Check the optional key usage field: | |
| 659 * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature | |
| 660 * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall | |
| 661 * be rejected). | |
| 662 */ | |
| 663 if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) | |
| 664 && ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) || | |
| 665 !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)))) | |
| 666 return 0; | |
| 667 | |
| 668 /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */ | |
| 669 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP) | |
| 670 return 0; | |
| 671 | |
| 672 /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */ | |
| 673 i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *) x, NID_ext_key_usage, 0); | |
| 674 if (i_ext >= 0) | |
| 675 { | |
| 676 X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *) x, i_ext); | |
| 677 if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) | |
| 678 return 0; | |
| 679 } | |
| 680 | |
| 681 return 1; | |
| 682 } | |
| 683 | |
| 684 static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | |
| 685 { | |
| 686 return 1; | |
| 687 } | |
| 688 | |
| 689 /* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. | |
| 690 * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates | |
| 691 * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by | |
| 692 * subject name. | |
| 693 * These are: | |
| 694 * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) | |
| 695 * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer | |
| 696 * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing | |
| 697 * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match | |
| 698 * codes for X509_verify_cert() | |
| 699 */ | |
| 700 | |
| 701 int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) | |
| 702 { | |
| 703 if(X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer), | |
| 704 X509_get_issuer_name(subject))) | |
| 705 return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH; | |
| 706 x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer); | |
| 707 x509v3_cache_extensions(subject); | |
| 708 | |
| 709 if(subject->akid) | |
| 710 { | |
| 711 int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid); | |
| 712 if (ret != X509_V_OK) | |
| 713 return ret; | |
| 714 } | |
| 715 | |
| 716 if(subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) | |
| 717 { | |
| 718 if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) | |
| 719 return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; | |
| 720 } | |
| 721 else if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) | |
| 722 return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN; | |
| 723 return X509_V_OK; | |
| 724 } | |
| 725 | |
| 726 int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) | |
| 727 { | |
| 728 | |
| 729 if(!akid) | |
| 730 return X509_V_OK; | |
| 731 | |
| 732 /* Check key ids (if present) */ | |
| 733 if(akid->keyid && issuer->skid && | |
| 734 ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid) ) | |
| 735 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH; | |
| 736 /* Check serial number */ | |
| 737 if(akid->serial && | |
| 738 ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial)) | |
| 739 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; | |
| 740 /* Check issuer name */ | |
| 741 if(akid->issuer) | |
| 742 { | |
| 743 /* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes | |
| 744 * SEQUENCE OF GeneralName. So look for a DirName. | |
| 745 * There may be more than one but we only take any | |
| 746 * notice of the first. | |
| 747 */ | |
| 748 GENERAL_NAMES *gens; | |
| 749 GENERAL_NAME *gen; | |
| 750 X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | |
| 751 int i; | |
| 752 gens = akid->issuer; | |
| 753 for(i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) | |
| 754 { | |
| 755 gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
| 756 if(gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) | |
| 757 { | |
| 758 nm = gen->d.dirn; | |
| 759 break; | |
| 760 } | |
| 761 } | |
| 762 if(nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer))) | |
| 763 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; | |
| 764 } | |
| 765 return X509_V_OK; | |
| 766 } | |
| 767 | |
| OLD | NEW |
|---|
Chromium Code Reviews
Issue 2072073002:
Delete bundled copy of OpenSSL and replace with README. (Closed)
Base URL: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/deps/openssl@master