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1 /* pcy_tree.c */ | |
2 /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL | |
3 * project 2004. | |
4 */ | |
5 /* ==================================================================== | |
6 * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | |
7 * | |
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
10 * are met: | |
11 * | |
12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
14 * | |
15 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
16 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
17 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
18 * distribution. | |
19 * | |
20 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
21 * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
22 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
23 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | |
24 * | |
25 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
26 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
27 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
28 * licensing@OpenSSL.org. | |
29 * | |
30 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
31 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
32 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
33 * | |
34 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
35 * acknowledgment: | |
36 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
37 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | |
38 * | |
39 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
40 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
41 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
42 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
43 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
44 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
45 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
46 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
48 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
49 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
50 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
51 * ==================================================================== | |
52 * | |
53 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
54 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
55 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
56 * | |
57 */ | |
58 | |
59 #include "cryptlib.h" | |
60 #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
61 #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | |
62 | |
63 #include "pcy_int.h" | |
64 | |
65 /* Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during | |
66 * evaluation. | |
67 */ | |
68 | |
69 /*#define OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG*/ | |
70 | |
71 #ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG | |
72 | |
73 static void expected_print(BIO *err, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, | |
74 X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent) | |
75 { | |
76 if ( (lev->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) | |
77 || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK)) | |
78 BIO_puts(err, " Not Mapped\n"); | |
79 else | |
80 { | |
81 int i; | |
82 STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *pset = node->data->expected_policy_set; | |
83 ASN1_OBJECT *oid; | |
84 BIO_puts(err, " Expected: "); | |
85 for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(pset); i++) | |
86 { | |
87 oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(pset, i); | |
88 if (i) | |
89 BIO_puts(err, ", "); | |
90 i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(err, oid); | |
91 } | |
92 BIO_puts(err, "\n"); | |
93 } | |
94 } | |
95 | |
96 static void tree_print(char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, | |
97 X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) | |
98 { | |
99 X509_POLICY_LEVEL *plev; | |
100 X509_POLICY_NODE *node; | |
101 int i; | |
102 BIO *err; | |
103 err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE); | |
104 if (!curr) | |
105 curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel; | |
106 else | |
107 curr++; | |
108 BIO_printf(err, "Level print after %s\n", str); | |
109 BIO_printf(err, "Printing Up to Level %ld\n", curr - tree->levels); | |
110 for (plev = tree->levels; plev != curr; plev++) | |
111 { | |
112 BIO_printf(err, "Level %ld, flags = %x\n", | |
113 plev - tree->levels, plev->flags); | |
114 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(plev->nodes); i++) | |
115 { | |
116 node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i); | |
117 X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, node, 2); | |
118 expected_print(err, plev, node, 2); | |
119 BIO_printf(err, " Flags: %x\n", node->data->flags); | |
120 } | |
121 if (plev->anyPolicy) | |
122 X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, plev->anyPolicy, 2); | |
123 } | |
124 | |
125 BIO_free(err); | |
126 | |
127 } | |
128 #else | |
129 | |
130 #define tree_print(a,b,c) /* */ | |
131 | |
132 #endif | |
133 | |
134 /* Initialize policy tree. Return values: | |
135 * 0 Some internal error occured. | |
136 * -1 Inconsistent or invalid extensions in certificates. | |
137 * 1 Tree initialized OK. | |
138 * 2 Policy tree is empty. | |
139 * 5 Tree OK and requireExplicitPolicy true. | |
140 * 6 Tree empty and requireExplicitPolicy true. | |
141 */ | |
142 | |
143 static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, | |
144 unsigned int flags) | |
145 { | |
146 X509_POLICY_TREE *tree; | |
147 X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level; | |
148 const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache; | |
149 X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL; | |
150 X509 *x; | |
151 int ret = 1; | |
152 int i, n; | |
153 int explicit_policy; | |
154 int any_skip; | |
155 int map_skip; | |
156 *ptree = NULL; | |
157 n = sk_X509_num(certs); | |
158 | |
159 #if 0 | |
160 /* Disable policy mapping for now... */ | |
161 flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP; | |
162 #endif | |
163 | |
164 if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) | |
165 explicit_policy = 0; | |
166 else | |
167 explicit_policy = n + 1; | |
168 | |
169 if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) | |
170 any_skip = 0; | |
171 else | |
172 any_skip = n + 1; | |
173 | |
174 if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) | |
175 map_skip = 0; | |
176 else | |
177 map_skip = n + 1; | |
178 | |
179 /* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */ | |
180 if (n == 1) | |
181 return 1; | |
182 /* First setup policy cache in all certificates apart from the | |
183 * trust anchor. Note any bad cache results on the way. Also can | |
184 * calculate explicit_policy value at this point. | |
185 */ | |
186 for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) | |
187 { | |
188 x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); | |
189 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1); | |
190 cache = policy_cache_set(x); | |
191 /* If cache NULL something bad happened: return immediately */ | |
192 if (cache == NULL) | |
193 return 0; | |
194 /* If inconsistent extensions keep a note of it but continue */ | |
195 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) | |
196 ret = -1; | |
197 /* Otherwise if we have no data (hence no CertificatePolicies) | |
198 * and haven't already set an inconsistent code note it. | |
199 */ | |
200 else if ((ret == 1) && !cache->data) | |
201 ret = 2; | |
202 if (explicit_policy > 0) | |
203 { | |
204 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
205 explicit_policy--; | |
206 if ((cache->explicit_skip != -1) | |
207 && (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy)) | |
208 explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip; | |
209 } | |
210 } | |
211 | |
212 if (ret != 1) | |
213 { | |
214 if (ret == 2 && !explicit_policy) | |
215 return 6; | |
216 return ret; | |
217 } | |
218 | |
219 | |
220 /* If we get this far initialize the tree */ | |
221 | |
222 tree = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_TREE)); | |
223 | |
224 if (!tree) | |
225 return 0; | |
226 | |
227 tree->flags = 0; | |
228 tree->levels = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) * n); | |
229 tree->nlevel = 0; | |
230 tree->extra_data = NULL; | |
231 tree->auth_policies = NULL; | |
232 tree->user_policies = NULL; | |
233 | |
234 if (!tree->levels) | |
235 { | |
236 OPENSSL_free(tree); | |
237 return 0; | |
238 } | |
239 | |
240 memset(tree->levels, 0, n * sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL)); | |
241 | |
242 tree->nlevel = n; | |
243 | |
244 level = tree->levels; | |
245 | |
246 /* Root data: initialize to anyPolicy */ | |
247 | |
248 data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0); | |
249 | |
250 if (!data || !level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree)) | |
251 goto bad_tree; | |
252 | |
253 for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) | |
254 { | |
255 level++; | |
256 x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); | |
257 cache = policy_cache_set(x); | |
258 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
259 level->cert = x; | |
260 | |
261 if (!cache->anyPolicy) | |
262 level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY; | |
263 | |
264 /* Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags */ | |
265 if (any_skip == 0) | |
266 { | |
267 /* Any matching allowed if certificate is self | |
268 * issued and not the last in the chain. | |
269 */ | |
270 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0)) | |
271 level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY; | |
272 } | |
273 else | |
274 { | |
275 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
276 any_skip--; | |
277 if ((cache->any_skip >= 0) | |
278 && (cache->any_skip < any_skip)) | |
279 any_skip = cache->any_skip; | |
280 } | |
281 | |
282 if (map_skip == 0) | |
283 level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP; | |
284 else | |
285 { | |
286 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
287 map_skip--; | |
288 if ((cache->map_skip >= 0) | |
289 && (cache->map_skip < map_skip)) | |
290 map_skip = cache->map_skip; | |
291 } | |
292 | |
293 } | |
294 | |
295 *ptree = tree; | |
296 | |
297 if (explicit_policy) | |
298 return 1; | |
299 else | |
300 return 5; | |
301 | |
302 bad_tree: | |
303 | |
304 X509_policy_tree_free(tree); | |
305 | |
306 return 0; | |
307 | |
308 } | |
309 | |
310 static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, | |
311 const X509_POLICY_DATA *data) | |
312 { | |
313 X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; | |
314 X509_POLICY_NODE *node; | |
315 int i, matched = 0; | |
316 /* Iterate through all in nodes linking matches */ | |
317 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) | |
318 { | |
319 node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); | |
320 if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) | |
321 { | |
322 if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL)) | |
323 return 0; | |
324 matched = 1; | |
325 } | |
326 } | |
327 if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) | |
328 { | |
329 if (!level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL)) | |
330 return 0; | |
331 } | |
332 return 1; | |
333 } | |
334 | |
335 /* This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(1): | |
336 * link any data from CertificatePolicies onto matching parent | |
337 * or anyPolicy if no match. | |
338 */ | |
339 | |
340 static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, | |
341 const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache) | |
342 { | |
343 int i; | |
344 X509_POLICY_DATA *data; | |
345 | |
346 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++) | |
347 { | |
348 data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i); | |
349 /* If a node is mapped any it doesn't have a corresponding | |
350 * CertificatePolicies entry. | |
351 * However such an identical node would be created | |
352 * if anyPolicy matching is enabled because there would be | |
353 * no match with the parent valid_policy_set. So we create | |
354 * link because then it will have the mapping flags | |
355 * right and we can prune it later. | |
356 */ | |
357 #if 0 | |
358 if ((data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY) | |
359 && !(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)) | |
360 continue; | |
361 #endif | |
362 /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */ | |
363 if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data)) | |
364 return 0; | |
365 } | |
366 return 1; | |
367 } | |
368 | |
369 /* This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(2): | |
370 * Create new data for any unmatched policies in the parent and link | |
371 * to anyPolicy. | |
372 */ | |
373 | |
374 static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, | |
375 const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, | |
376 const ASN1_OBJECT *id, | |
377 X509_POLICY_NODE *node, | |
378 X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) | |
379 { | |
380 X509_POLICY_DATA *data; | |
381 if (id == NULL) | |
382 id = node->data->valid_policy; | |
383 /* Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and | |
384 * id from unmatched node. | |
385 */ | |
386 data = policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node)); | |
387 | |
388 if (data == NULL) | |
389 return 0; | |
390 /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ | |
391 data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; | |
392 data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; | |
393 if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) | |
394 { | |
395 policy_data_free(data); | |
396 return 0; | |
397 } | |
398 | |
399 return 1; | |
400 } | |
401 | |
402 static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, | |
403 const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, | |
404 X509_POLICY_NODE *node, | |
405 X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) | |
406 { | |
407 const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; | |
408 int i; | |
409 | |
410 if ( (last->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) | |
411 || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED)) | |
412 { | |
413 /* If no policy mapping: matched if one child present */ | |
414 if (node->nchild) | |
415 return 1; | |
416 if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, NULL, node, tree)) | |
417 return 0; | |
418 /* Add it */ | |
419 } | |
420 else | |
421 { | |
422 /* If mapping: matched if one child per expected policy set */ | |
423 STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expset = node->data->expected_policy_set; | |
424 if (node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset)) | |
425 return 1; | |
426 /* Locate unmatched nodes */ | |
427 for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset); i++) | |
428 { | |
429 ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(expset, i); | |
430 if (level_find_node(curr, node, oid)) | |
431 continue; | |
432 if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, oid, node, tree)) | |
433 return 0; | |
434 } | |
435 | |
436 } | |
437 | |
438 return 1; | |
439 | |
440 } | |
441 | |
442 static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, | |
443 const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, | |
444 X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) | |
445 { | |
446 int i; | |
447 /*X509_POLICY_DATA *data;*/ | |
448 X509_POLICY_NODE *node; | |
449 X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; | |
450 | |
451 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) | |
452 { | |
453 node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); | |
454 | |
455 if (!tree_link_unmatched(curr, cache, node, tree)) | |
456 return 0; | |
457 | |
458 #if 0 | |
459 | |
460 /* Skip any node with any children: we only want unmathced | |
461 * nodes. | |
462 * | |
463 * Note: need something better for policy mapping | |
464 * because each node may have multiple children | |
465 */ | |
466 if (node->nchild) | |
467 continue; | |
468 | |
469 /* Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and | |
470 * id from unmatched node. | |
471 */ | |
472 data = policy_data_new(NULL, node->data->valid_policy, | |
473 node_critical(node)); | |
474 | |
475 if (data == NULL) | |
476 return 0; | |
477 /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ | |
478 data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; | |
479 data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; | |
480 if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) | |
481 { | |
482 policy_data_free(data); | |
483 return 0; | |
484 } | |
485 | |
486 #endif | |
487 | |
488 } | |
489 /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */ | |
490 if (last->anyPolicy) | |
491 { | |
492 if (!level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, | |
493 last->anyPolicy, NULL)) | |
494 return 0; | |
495 } | |
496 return 1; | |
497 } | |
498 | |
499 /* Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level | |
500 * then proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever | |
501 * have no data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty. | |
502 */ | |
503 | |
504 static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) | |
505 { | |
506 STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes; | |
507 X509_POLICY_NODE *node; | |
508 int i; | |
509 nodes = curr->nodes; | |
510 if (curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) | |
511 { | |
512 for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) | |
513 { | |
514 node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); | |
515 /* Delete any mapped data: see RFC3280 XXXX */ | |
516 if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK) | |
517 { | |
518 node->parent->nchild--; | |
519 OPENSSL_free(node); | |
520 (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes,i); | |
521 } | |
522 } | |
523 } | |
524 | |
525 for(;;) { | |
526 --curr; | |
527 nodes = curr->nodes; | |
528 for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) | |
529 { | |
530 node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); | |
531 if (node->nchild == 0) | |
532 { | |
533 node->parent->nchild--; | |
534 OPENSSL_free(node); | |
535 (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i); | |
536 } | |
537 } | |
538 if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild) | |
539 { | |
540 if (curr->anyPolicy->parent) | |
541 curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--; | |
542 OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy); | |
543 curr->anyPolicy = NULL; | |
544 } | |
545 if (curr == tree->levels) | |
546 { | |
547 /* If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty */ | |
548 if (!curr->anyPolicy) | |
549 return 2; | |
550 return 1; | |
551 } | |
552 } | |
553 | |
554 return 1; | |
555 | |
556 } | |
557 | |
558 static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes, | |
559 X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy) | |
560 { | |
561 if (!*pnodes) | |
562 { | |
563 *pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new(); | |
564 if (!*pnodes) | |
565 return 0; | |
566 } | |
567 else if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, pcy) != -1) | |
568 return 1; | |
569 | |
570 if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy)) | |
571 return 0; | |
572 | |
573 return 1; | |
574 | |
575 } | |
576 | |
577 /* Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. | |
578 * The 'pnodes' parameter is used as a store for the set of policy nodes | |
579 * used to calculate the user set. If the authority set is not anyPolicy | |
580 * then pnodes will just point to the authority set. If however the authority | |
581 * set is anyPolicy then the set of valid policies (other than anyPolicy) | |
582 * is store in pnodes. The return value of '2' is used in this case to indicate | |
583 * that pnodes should be freed. | |
584 */ | |
585 | |
586 static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, | |
587 STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes) | |
588 { | |
589 X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr; | |
590 X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr; | |
591 STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes; | |
592 int i, j; | |
593 curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1; | |
594 | |
595 /* If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy */ | |
596 if (curr->anyPolicy) | |
597 { | |
598 if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy)) | |
599 return 0; | |
600 addnodes = pnodes; | |
601 } | |
602 else | |
603 /* Add policies to authority set */ | |
604 addnodes = &tree->auth_policies; | |
605 | |
606 curr = tree->levels; | |
607 for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++) | |
608 { | |
609 /* If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't | |
610 * appear on lower levels so end search. | |
611 */ | |
612 if (!(anyptr = curr->anyPolicy)) | |
613 break; | |
614 curr++; | |
615 for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++) | |
616 { | |
617 node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j); | |
618 if ((node->parent == anyptr) | |
619 && !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node)) | |
620 return 0; | |
621 } | |
622 } | |
623 | |
624 if (addnodes == pnodes) | |
625 return 2; | |
626 | |
627 *pnodes = tree->auth_policies; | |
628 | |
629 return 1; | |
630 } | |
631 | |
632 static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, | |
633 STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, | |
634 STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes) | |
635 { | |
636 int i; | |
637 X509_POLICY_NODE *node; | |
638 ASN1_OBJECT *oid; | |
639 | |
640 X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy; | |
641 X509_POLICY_DATA *extra; | |
642 | |
643 /* Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set: | |
644 * this will happen if it is a leaf node. | |
645 */ | |
646 | |
647 if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0) | |
648 return 1; | |
649 | |
650 anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy; | |
651 | |
652 for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) | |
653 { | |
654 oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i); | |
655 if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy) | |
656 { | |
657 tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY; | |
658 return 1; | |
659 } | |
660 } | |
661 | |
662 for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) | |
663 { | |
664 oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i); | |
665 node = tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid); | |
666 if (!node) | |
667 { | |
668 if (!anyPolicy) | |
669 continue; | |
670 /* Create a new node with policy ID from user set | |
671 * and qualifiers from anyPolicy. | |
672 */ | |
673 extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid, | |
674 node_critical(anyPolicy)); | |
675 if (!extra) | |
676 return 0; | |
677 extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set; | |
678 extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS | |
679 | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE; | |
680 node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, | |
681 tree); | |
682 } | |
683 if (!tree->user_policies) | |
684 { | |
685 tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null(); | |
686 if (!tree->user_policies) | |
687 return 1; | |
688 } | |
689 if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node)) | |
690 return 0; | |
691 } | |
692 return 1; | |
693 | |
694 } | |
695 | |
696 static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) | |
697 { | |
698 int ret, i; | |
699 X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1; | |
700 const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache; | |
701 | |
702 for(i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) | |
703 { | |
704 cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert); | |
705 if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache)) | |
706 return 0; | |
707 | |
708 if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) | |
709 && !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree)) | |
710 return 0; | |
711 tree_print("before tree_prune()", tree, curr); | |
712 ret = tree_prune(tree, curr); | |
713 if (ret != 1) | |
714 return ret; | |
715 } | |
716 | |
717 return 1; | |
718 | |
719 } | |
720 | |
721 static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node) | |
722 { | |
723 if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE)) | |
724 OPENSSL_free(node); | |
725 } | |
726 | |
727 | |
728 void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) | |
729 { | |
730 X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr; | |
731 int i; | |
732 | |
733 if (!tree) | |
734 return; | |
735 | |
736 sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies); | |
737 sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free); | |
738 | |
739 for(i = 0, curr = tree->levels; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) | |
740 { | |
741 if (curr->cert) | |
742 X509_free(curr->cert); | |
743 if (curr->nodes) | |
744 sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, | |
745 policy_node_free); | |
746 if (curr->anyPolicy) | |
747 policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy); | |
748 } | |
749 | |
750 if (tree->extra_data) | |
751 sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, | |
752 policy_data_free); | |
753 | |
754 OPENSSL_free(tree->levels); | |
755 OPENSSL_free(tree); | |
756 | |
757 } | |
758 | |
759 /* Application policy checking function. | |
760 * Return codes: | |
761 * 0 Internal Error. | |
762 * 1 Successful. | |
763 * -1 One or more certificates contain invalid or inconsistent extensions | |
764 * -2 User constrained policy set empty and requireExplicit true. | |
765 */ | |
766 | |
767 int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy, | |
768 STACK_OF(X509) *certs, | |
769 STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, | |
770 unsigned int flags) | |
771 { | |
772 int ret; | |
773 X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL; | |
774 STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL; | |
775 *ptree = NULL; | |
776 | |
777 *pexplicit_policy = 0; | |
778 ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags); | |
779 | |
780 switch (ret) | |
781 { | |
782 | |
783 /* Tree empty requireExplicit False: OK */ | |
784 case 2: | |
785 return 1; | |
786 | |
787 /* Some internal error */ | |
788 case -1: | |
789 return -1; | |
790 | |
791 /* Some internal error */ | |
792 case 0: | |
793 return 0; | |
794 | |
795 /* Tree empty requireExplicit True: Error */ | |
796 | |
797 case 6: | |
798 *pexplicit_policy = 1; | |
799 return -2; | |
800 | |
801 /* Tree OK requireExplicit True: OK and continue */ | |
802 case 5: | |
803 *pexplicit_policy = 1; | |
804 break; | |
805 | |
806 /* Tree OK: continue */ | |
807 | |
808 case 1: | |
809 if (!tree) | |
810 /* | |
811 * tree_init() returns success and a null tree | |
812 * if it's just looking at a trust anchor. | |
813 * I'm not sure that returning success here is | |
814 * correct, but I'm sure that reporting this | |
815 * as an internal error which our caller | |
816 * interprets as a malloc failure is wrong. | |
817 */ | |
818 return 1; | |
819 break; | |
820 } | |
821 | |
822 if (!tree) goto error; | |
823 ret = tree_evaluate(tree); | |
824 | |
825 tree_print("tree_evaluate()", tree, NULL); | |
826 | |
827 if (ret <= 0) | |
828 goto error; | |
829 | |
830 /* Return value 2 means tree empty */ | |
831 if (ret == 2) | |
832 { | |
833 X509_policy_tree_free(tree); | |
834 if (*pexplicit_policy) | |
835 return -2; | |
836 else | |
837 return 1; | |
838 } | |
839 | |
840 /* Tree is not empty: continue */ | |
841 | |
842 ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes); | |
843 | |
844 if (!ret) | |
845 goto error; | |
846 | |
847 if (!tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes)) | |
848 goto error; | |
849 | |
850 if (ret == 2) | |
851 sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes); | |
852 | |
853 if (tree) | |
854 *ptree = tree; | |
855 | |
856 if (*pexplicit_policy) | |
857 { | |
858 nodes = X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree); | |
859 if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0) | |
860 return -2; | |
861 } | |
862 | |
863 return 1; | |
864 | |
865 error: | |
866 | |
867 X509_policy_tree_free(tree); | |
868 | |
869 return 0; | |
870 | |
871 } | |
872 | |
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