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1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ | |
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
3 * All rights reserved. | |
4 * | |
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
8 * | |
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
15 * | |
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
17 * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
22 * | |
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 * are met: | |
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
40 * | |
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
52 * | |
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 */ | |
58 | |
59 #include <stdio.h> | |
60 #include <time.h> | |
61 #include <errno.h> | |
62 | |
63 #include "cryptlib.h" | |
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h> | |
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h> | |
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h> | |
67 #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
69 #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | |
71 #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
72 | |
73 /* CRL score values */ | |
74 | |
75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */ | |
76 | |
77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 | |
78 | |
79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */ | |
80 | |
81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 | |
82 | |
83 /* CRL times valid */ | |
84 | |
85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 | |
86 | |
87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */ | |
88 | |
89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 | |
90 | |
91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ | |
92 | |
93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) | |
94 | |
95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ | |
96 | |
97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 | |
98 | |
99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ | |
100 | |
101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 | |
102 | |
103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ | |
104 | |
105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 | |
106 | |
107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ | |
108 | |
109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 | |
110 | |
111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e); | |
112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); | |
113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); | |
114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
116 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
117 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
118 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
119 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
120 | |
121 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
122 unsigned int *preasons, | |
123 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); | |
124 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
125 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); | |
126 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score, | |
127 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); | |
128 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, | |
129 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score); | |
130 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, | |
131 unsigned int *preasons); | |
132 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); | |
133 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
134 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, | |
135 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); | |
136 | |
137 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
138 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; | |
139 | |
140 | |
141 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) | |
142 { | |
143 return ok; | |
144 } | |
145 | |
146 #if 0 | |
147 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) | |
148 { | |
149 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b); | |
150 } | |
151 #endif | |
152 | |
153 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
154 { | |
155 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; | |
156 int bad_chain = 0; | |
157 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; | |
158 int depth,i,ok=0; | |
159 int num; | |
160 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
161 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL; | |
162 if (ctx->cert == NULL) | |
163 { | |
164 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VER
IFY); | |
165 return -1; | |
166 } | |
167 | |
168 cb=ctx->verify_cb; | |
169 | |
170 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is | |
171 * present and that the first entry is in place */ | |
172 if (ctx->chain == NULL) | |
173 { | |
174 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || | |
175 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert))) | |
176 { | |
177 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
178 goto end; | |
179 } | |
180 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
181 ctx->last_untrusted=1; | |
182 } | |
183 | |
184 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ | |
185 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL | |
186 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) | |
187 { | |
188 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
189 goto end; | |
190 } | |
191 | |
192 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
193 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); | |
194 depth=param->depth; | |
195 | |
196 | |
197 for (;;) | |
198 { | |
199 /* If we have enough, we break */ | |
200 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should tak
e | |
201 * note of it and, if appropriate, use t
he | |
202 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error | |
203 * code later. | |
204 */ | |
205 | |
206 /* If we are self signed, we break */ | |
207 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break; | |
208 | |
209 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ | |
210 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) | |
211 { | |
212 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x); | |
213 if (xtmp != NULL) | |
214 { | |
215 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp)) | |
216 { | |
217 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MA
LLOC_FAILURE); | |
218 goto end; | |
219 } | |
220 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509)
; | |
221 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp); | |
222 ctx->last_untrusted++; | |
223 x=xtmp; | |
224 num++; | |
225 /* reparse the full chain for | |
226 * the next one */ | |
227 continue; | |
228 } | |
229 } | |
230 break; | |
231 } | |
232 | |
233 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted | |
234 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, | |
235 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ | |
236 | |
237 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it | |
238 * is self signed. | |
239 */ | |
240 | |
241 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
242 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1); | |
243 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) | |
244 { | |
245 /* we have a self signed certificate */ | |
246 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) | |
247 { | |
248 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if | |
249 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact | |
250 * match to avoid possible impersonation. | |
251 */ | |
252 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | |
253 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) | |
254 { | |
255 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CER
T; | |
256 ctx->current_cert=x; | |
257 ctx->error_depth=i-1; | |
258 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp); | |
259 bad_chain = 1; | |
260 ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
261 if (!ok) goto end; | |
262 } | |
263 else | |
264 { | |
265 /* We have a match: replace certificate with sto
re version | |
266 * so we get any trust settings. | |
267 */ | |
268 X509_free(x); | |
269 x = xtmp; | |
270 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); | |
271 ctx->last_untrusted=0; | |
272 } | |
273 } | |
274 else | |
275 { | |
276 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later us
e */ | |
277 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); | |
278 ctx->last_untrusted--; | |
279 num--; | |
280 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); | |
281 } | |
282 } | |
283 | |
284 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ | |
285 for (;;) | |
286 { | |
287 /* If we have enough, we break */ | |
288 if (depth < num) break; | |
289 | |
290 /* If we are self signed, we break */ | |
291 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break; | |
292 | |
293 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | |
294 | |
295 if (ok < 0) return ok; | |
296 if (ok == 0) break; | |
297 | |
298 x = xtmp; | |
299 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x)) | |
300 { | |
301 X509_free(xtmp); | |
302 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
303 return 0; | |
304 } | |
305 num++; | |
306 } | |
307 | |
308 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ | |
309 | |
310 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ | |
311 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) | |
312 { | |
313 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) | |
314 { | |
315 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) | |
316 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_
LOCALLY; | |
317 else | |
318 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; | |
319 ctx->current_cert=x; | |
320 } | |
321 else | |
322 { | |
323 | |
324 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss); | |
325 num++; | |
326 ctx->last_untrusted=num; | |
327 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; | |
328 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; | |
329 chain_ss=NULL; | |
330 } | |
331 | |
332 ctx->error_depth=num-1; | |
333 bad_chain = 1; | |
334 ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
335 if (!ok) goto end; | |
336 } | |
337 | |
338 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ | |
339 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); | |
340 | |
341 if (!ok) goto end; | |
342 | |
343 /* Check name constraints */ | |
344 | |
345 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); | |
346 | |
347 if (!ok) goto end; | |
348 | |
349 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ | |
350 | |
351 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx); | |
352 | |
353 if (!ok) goto end; | |
354 | |
355 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ | |
356 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); | |
357 | |
358 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters | |
359 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification. | |
360 */ | |
361 | |
362 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); | |
363 if(!ok) goto end; | |
364 | |
365 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ | |
366 if (ctx->verify != NULL) | |
367 ok=ctx->verify(ctx); | |
368 else | |
369 ok=internal_verify(ctx); | |
370 if(!ok) goto end; | |
371 | |
372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 | |
373 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ | |
374 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); | |
375 if (!ok) goto end; | |
376 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); | |
377 if (!ok) goto end; | |
378 #endif | |
379 | |
380 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ | |
381 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) | |
382 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); | |
383 if(!ok) goto end; | |
384 if (0) | |
385 { | |
386 end: | |
387 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); | |
388 } | |
389 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); | |
390 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); | |
391 return ok; | |
392 } | |
393 | |
394 | |
395 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) | |
396 */ | |
397 | |
398 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) | |
399 { | |
400 int i; | |
401 X509 *issuer; | |
402 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) | |
403 { | |
404 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
405 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) | |
406 return issuer; | |
407 } | |
408 return NULL; | |
409 } | |
410 | |
411 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ | |
412 | |
413 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) | |
414 { | |
415 int ret; | |
416 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); | |
417 if (ret == X509_V_OK) | |
418 return 1; | |
419 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ | |
420 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) | |
421 return 0; | |
422 | |
423 ctx->error = ret; | |
424 ctx->current_cert = x; | |
425 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
426 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
427 return 0; | |
428 } | |
429 | |
430 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ | |
431 | |
432 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
433 { | |
434 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); | |
435 if (*issuer) | |
436 { | |
437 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
438 return 1; | |
439 } | |
440 else | |
441 return 0; | |
442 } | |
443 | |
444 | |
445 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency | |
446 * with the supplied purpose | |
447 */ | |
448 | |
449 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
450 { | |
451 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY | |
452 return 1; | |
453 #else | |
454 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; | |
455 X509 *x; | |
456 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
457 int proxy_path_length = 0; | |
458 int purpose; | |
459 int allow_proxy_certs; | |
460 cb=ctx->verify_cb; | |
461 | |
462 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: | |
463 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct | |
464 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). | |
465 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not | |
466 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. | |
467 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for | |
468 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. | |
469 */ | |
470 must_be_ca = -1; | |
471 | |
472 /* CRL path validation */ | |
473 if (ctx->parent) | |
474 { | |
475 allow_proxy_certs = 0; | |
476 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; | |
477 } | |
478 else | |
479 { | |
480 allow_proxy_certs = | |
481 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); | |
482 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their | |
483 software happy */ | |
484 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) | |
485 allow_proxy_certs = 1; | |
486 purpose = ctx->param->purpose; | |
487 } | |
488 | |
489 /* Check all untrusted certificates */ | |
490 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) | |
491 { | |
492 int ret; | |
493 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
494 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
495 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) | |
496 { | |
497 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; | |
498 ctx->error_depth = i; | |
499 ctx->current_cert = x; | |
500 ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
501 if (!ok) goto end; | |
502 } | |
503 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) | |
504 { | |
505 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
506 ctx->error_depth = i; | |
507 ctx->current_cert = x; | |
508 ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
509 if (!ok) goto end; | |
510 } | |
511 ret = X509_check_ca(x); | |
512 switch(must_be_ca) | |
513 { | |
514 case -1: | |
515 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) | |
516 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) | |
517 { | |
518 ret = 0; | |
519 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
520 } | |
521 else | |
522 ret = 1; | |
523 break; | |
524 case 0: | |
525 if (ret != 0) | |
526 { | |
527 ret = 0; | |
528 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; | |
529 } | |
530 else | |
531 ret = 1; | |
532 break; | |
533 default: | |
534 if ((ret == 0) | |
535 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) | |
536 && (ret != 1))) | |
537 { | |
538 ret = 0; | |
539 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
540 } | |
541 else | |
542 ret = 1; | |
543 break; | |
544 } | |
545 if (ret == 0) | |
546 { | |
547 ctx->error_depth = i; | |
548 ctx->current_cert = x; | |
549 ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
550 if (!ok) goto end; | |
551 } | |
552 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) | |
553 { | |
554 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); | |
555 if ((ret == 0) | |
556 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) | |
557 && (ret != 1))) | |
558 { | |
559 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; | |
560 ctx->error_depth = i; | |
561 ctx->current_cert = x; | |
562 ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
563 if (!ok) goto end; | |
564 } | |
565 } | |
566 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ | |
567 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) | |
568 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) | |
569 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) | |
570 { | |
571 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | |
572 ctx->error_depth = i; | |
573 ctx->current_cert = x; | |
574 ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
575 if (!ok) goto end; | |
576 } | |
577 /* Increment path length if not self issued */ | |
578 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
579 plen++; | |
580 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next | |
581 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE | |
582 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a | |
583 CA certificate. */ | |
584 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) | |
585 { | |
586 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) | |
587 { | |
588 ctx->error = | |
589 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | |
590 ctx->error_depth = i; | |
591 ctx->current_cert = x; | |
592 ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
593 if (!ok) goto end; | |
594 } | |
595 proxy_path_length++; | |
596 must_be_ca = 0; | |
597 } | |
598 else | |
599 must_be_ca = 1; | |
600 } | |
601 ok = 1; | |
602 end: | |
603 return ok; | |
604 #endif | |
605 } | |
606 | |
607 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
608 { | |
609 X509 *x; | |
610 int i, j, rv; | |
611 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ | |
612 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) | |
613 { | |
614 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
615 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ | |
616 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
617 continue; | |
618 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in | |
619 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly | |
620 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be | |
621 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed. | |
622 */ | |
623 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) | |
624 { | |
625 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; | |
626 if (nc) | |
627 { | |
628 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); | |
629 if (rv != X509_V_OK) | |
630 { | |
631 ctx->error = rv; | |
632 ctx->error_depth = i; | |
633 ctx->current_cert = x; | |
634 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx)) | |
635 return 0; | |
636 } | |
637 } | |
638 } | |
639 } | |
640 return 1; | |
641 } | |
642 | |
643 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
644 { | |
645 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY | |
646 return 1; | |
647 #else | |
648 int i, ok; | |
649 X509 *x; | |
650 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
651 cb=ctx->verify_cb; | |
652 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ | |
653 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
654 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
655 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); | |
656 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) | |
657 return 1; | |
658 ctx->error_depth = i; | |
659 ctx->current_cert = x; | |
660 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) | |
661 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; | |
662 else | |
663 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; | |
664 ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
665 return ok; | |
666 #endif | |
667 } | |
668 | |
669 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
670 { | |
671 int i, last, ok; | |
672 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) | |
673 return 1; | |
674 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) | |
675 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
676 else | |
677 { | |
678 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ | |
679 if (ctx->parent) | |
680 return 1; | |
681 last = 0; | |
682 } | |
683 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++) | |
684 { | |
685 ctx->error_depth = i; | |
686 ok = check_cert(ctx); | |
687 if (!ok) return ok; | |
688 } | |
689 return 1; | |
690 } | |
691 | |
692 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
693 { | |
694 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
695 X509 *x; | |
696 int ok, cnum; | |
697 cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
698 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); | |
699 ctx->current_cert = x; | |
700 ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
701 ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
702 ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
703 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) | |
704 { | |
705 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ | |
706 if (ctx->get_crl) | |
707 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); | |
708 else | |
709 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); | |
710 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except | |
711 * notify callback | |
712 */ | |
713 if(!ok) | |
714 { | |
715 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | |
716 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
717 goto err; | |
718 } | |
719 ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
720 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); | |
721 if (!ok) | |
722 goto err; | |
723 | |
724 if (dcrl) | |
725 { | |
726 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); | |
727 if (!ok) | |
728 goto err; | |
729 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); | |
730 if (!ok) | |
731 goto err; | |
732 } | |
733 else | |
734 ok = 1; | |
735 | |
736 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ | |
737 if (ok != 2) | |
738 { | |
739 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); | |
740 if (!ok) | |
741 goto err; | |
742 } | |
743 | |
744 X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
745 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
746 crl = NULL; | |
747 dcrl = NULL; | |
748 } | |
749 err: | |
750 X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
751 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
752 | |
753 ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
754 return ok; | |
755 | |
756 } | |
757 | |
758 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ | |
759 | |
760 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) | |
761 { | |
762 time_t *ptime; | |
763 int i; | |
764 if (notify) | |
765 ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
766 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
767 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
768 else | |
769 ptime = NULL; | |
770 | |
771 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
772 if (i == 0) | |
773 { | |
774 if (!notify) | |
775 return 0; | |
776 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; | |
777 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
778 return 0; | |
779 } | |
780 | |
781 if (i > 0) | |
782 { | |
783 if (!notify) | |
784 return 0; | |
785 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
786 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
787 return 0; | |
788 } | |
789 | |
790 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) | |
791 { | |
792 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
793 | |
794 if (i == 0) | |
795 { | |
796 if (!notify) | |
797 return 0; | |
798 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; | |
799 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
800 return 0; | |
801 } | |
802 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ | |
803 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) | |
804 { | |
805 if (!notify) | |
806 return 0; | |
807 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
808 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
809 return 0; | |
810 } | |
811 } | |
812 | |
813 if (notify) | |
814 ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
815 | |
816 return 1; | |
817 } | |
818 | |
819 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, | |
820 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, | |
821 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) | |
822 { | |
823 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; | |
824 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; | |
825 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; | |
826 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; | |
827 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; | |
828 | |
829 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) | |
830 { | |
831 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
832 reasons = *preasons; | |
833 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); | |
834 | |
835 if (crl_score > best_score) | |
836 { | |
837 best_crl = crl; | |
838 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; | |
839 best_score = crl_score; | |
840 best_reasons = reasons; | |
841 } | |
842 } | |
843 | |
844 if (best_crl) | |
845 { | |
846 if (*pcrl) | |
847 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); | |
848 *pcrl = best_crl; | |
849 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; | |
850 *pscore = best_score; | |
851 *preasons = best_reasons; | |
852 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); | |
853 if (*pdcrl) | |
854 { | |
855 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); | |
856 *pdcrl = NULL; | |
857 } | |
858 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); | |
859 } | |
860 | |
861 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) | |
862 return 1; | |
863 | |
864 return 0; | |
865 } | |
866 | |
867 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be | |
868 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. | |
869 */ | |
870 | |
871 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) | |
872 { | |
873 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; | |
874 int i; | |
875 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); | |
876 if (i >= 0) | |
877 { | |
878 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ | |
879 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) | |
880 return 0; | |
881 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); | |
882 } | |
883 else | |
884 exta = NULL; | |
885 | |
886 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); | |
887 | |
888 if (i >= 0) | |
889 { | |
890 | |
891 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) | |
892 return 0; | |
893 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); | |
894 } | |
895 else | |
896 extb = NULL; | |
897 | |
898 if (!exta && !extb) | |
899 return 1; | |
900 | |
901 if (!exta || !extb) | |
902 return 0; | |
903 | |
904 | |
905 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) | |
906 return 0; | |
907 | |
908 return 1; | |
909 } | |
910 | |
911 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ | |
912 | |
913 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) | |
914 { | |
915 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ | |
916 if (!delta->base_crl_number) | |
917 return 0; | |
918 /* Base must have a CRL number */ | |
919 if (!base->crl_number) | |
920 return 0; | |
921 /* Issuer names must match */ | |
922 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), | |
923 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) | |
924 return 0; | |
925 /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
926 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) | |
927 return 0; | |
928 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) | |
929 return 0; | |
930 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ | |
931 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
932 return 0; | |
933 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
934 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
935 return 1; | |
936 return 0; | |
937 } | |
938 | |
939 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring | |
940 * or retrieve a chain of deltas... | |
941 */ | |
942 | |
943 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, | |
944 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) | |
945 { | |
946 X509_CRL *delta; | |
947 int i; | |
948 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) | |
949 return; | |
950 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) | |
951 return; | |
952 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) | |
953 { | |
954 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
955 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) | |
956 { | |
957 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) | |
958 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; | |
959 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); | |
960 *dcrl = delta; | |
961 return; | |
962 } | |
963 } | |
964 *dcrl = NULL; | |
965 } | |
966 | |
967 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'. | |
968 * The return value is a mask of several criteria. | |
969 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. | |
970 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if | |
971 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. | |
972 */ | |
973 | |
974 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
975 unsigned int *preasons, | |
976 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
977 { | |
978 | |
979 int crl_score = 0; | |
980 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; | |
981 | |
982 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ | |
983 | |
984 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ | |
985 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) | |
986 return 0; | |
987 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ | |
988 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) | |
989 { | |
990 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) | |
991 return 0; | |
992 } | |
993 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) | |
994 { | |
995 /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
996 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
997 return 0; | |
998 } | |
999 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ | |
1000 else if (crl->base_crl_number) | |
1001 return 0; | |
1002 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ | |
1003 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) | |
1004 { | |
1005 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) | |
1006 return 0; | |
1007 } | |
1008 else | |
1009 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; | |
1010 | |
1011 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) | |
1012 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; | |
1013 | |
1014 /* Check expiry */ | |
1015 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) | |
1016 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; | |
1017 | |
1018 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ | |
1019 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); | |
1020 | |
1021 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ | |
1022 | |
1023 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) | |
1024 return 0; | |
1025 | |
1026 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ | |
1027 | |
1028 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) | |
1029 { | |
1030 /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
1031 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
1032 return 0; | |
1033 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; | |
1034 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; | |
1035 } | |
1036 | |
1037 *preasons = tmp_reasons; | |
1038 | |
1039 return crl_score; | |
1040 | |
1041 } | |
1042 | |
1043 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, | |
1044 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) | |
1045 { | |
1046 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; | |
1047 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
1048 int cidx = ctx->error_depth; | |
1049 int i; | |
1050 | |
1051 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) | |
1052 cidx++; | |
1053 | |
1054 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1055 | |
1056 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) | |
1057 { | |
1058 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) | |
1059 { | |
1060 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; | |
1061 *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1062 return; | |
1063 } | |
1064 } | |
1065 | |
1066 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) | |
1067 { | |
1068 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
1069 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1070 continue; | |
1071 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) | |
1072 { | |
1073 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; | |
1074 *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1075 return; | |
1076 } | |
1077 } | |
1078 | |
1079 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ | |
1080 | |
1081 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) | |
1082 return; | |
1083 | |
1084 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the | |
1085 * set of untrusted certificates. | |
1086 */ | |
1087 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) | |
1088 { | |
1089 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); | |
1090 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
1091 continue; | |
1092 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) | |
1093 { | |
1094 *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
1095 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; | |
1096 return; | |
1097 } | |
1098 } | |
1099 } | |
1100 | |
1101 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new | |
1102 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the | |
1103 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking | |
1104 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in | |
1105 * practice. | |
1106 */ | |
1107 | |
1108 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
1109 { | |
1110 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; | |
1111 int ret; | |
1112 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ | |
1113 if (ctx->parent) | |
1114 return 0; | |
1115 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) | |
1116 return -1; | |
1117 | |
1118 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; | |
1119 /* Copy verify params across */ | |
1120 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); | |
1121 | |
1122 crl_ctx.parent = ctx; | |
1123 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
1124 | |
1125 /* Verify CRL issuer */ | |
1126 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); | |
1127 | |
1128 if (ret <= 0) | |
1129 goto err; | |
1130 | |
1131 /* Check chain is acceptable */ | |
1132 | |
1133 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); | |
1134 err: | |
1135 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); | |
1136 return ret; | |
1137 } | |
1138 | |
1139 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path | |
1140 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a | |
1141 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised | |
1142 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must | |
1143 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain... | |
1144 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version | |
1145 */ | |
1146 | |
1147 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
1148 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, | |
1149 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) | |
1150 { | |
1151 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; | |
1152 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); | |
1153 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); | |
1154 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) | |
1155 return 1; | |
1156 return 0; | |
1157 } | |
1158 | |
1159 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. | |
1160 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. | |
1161 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. | |
1162 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. | |
1163 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. | |
1164 */ | |
1165 | |
1166 | |
1167 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) | |
1168 { | |
1169 X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | |
1170 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; | |
1171 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; | |
1172 int i, j; | |
1173 if (!a || !b) | |
1174 return 1; | |
1175 if (a->type == 1) | |
1176 { | |
1177 if (!a->dpname) | |
1178 return 0; | |
1179 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ | |
1180 if (b->type == 1) | |
1181 { | |
1182 if (!b->dpname) | |
1183 return 0; | |
1184 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) | |
1185 return 1; | |
1186 else | |
1187 return 0; | |
1188 } | |
1189 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1190 nm = a->dpname; | |
1191 gens = b->name.fullname; | |
1192 } | |
1193 else if (b->type == 1) | |
1194 { | |
1195 if (!b->dpname) | |
1196 return 0; | |
1197 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
1198 gens = a->name.fullname; | |
1199 nm = b->dpname; | |
1200 } | |
1201 | |
1202 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ | |
1203 if (nm) | |
1204 { | |
1205 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) | |
1206 { | |
1207 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
1208 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1209 continue; | |
1210 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) | |
1211 return 1; | |
1212 } | |
1213 return 0; | |
1214 } | |
1215 | |
1216 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ | |
1217 | |
1218 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) | |
1219 { | |
1220 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); | |
1221 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) | |
1222 { | |
1223 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); | |
1224 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) | |
1225 return 1; | |
1226 } | |
1227 } | |
1228 | |
1229 return 0; | |
1230 | |
1231 } | |
1232 | |
1233 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) | |
1234 { | |
1235 int i; | |
1236 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
1237 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ | |
1238 if (!dp->CRLissuer) | |
1239 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); | |
1240 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) | |
1241 { | |
1242 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); | |
1243 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
1244 continue; | |
1245 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) | |
1246 return 1; | |
1247 } | |
1248 return 0; | |
1249 } | |
1250 | |
1251 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ | |
1252 | |
1253 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, | |
1254 unsigned int *preasons) | |
1255 { | |
1256 int i; | |
1257 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) | |
1258 return 0; | |
1259 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) | |
1260 { | |
1261 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) | |
1262 return 0; | |
1263 } | |
1264 else | |
1265 { | |
1266 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) | |
1267 return 0; | |
1268 } | |
1269 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; | |
1270 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) | |
1271 { | |
1272 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); | |
1273 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) | |
1274 { | |
1275 if (!crl->idp || | |
1276 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) | |
1277 { | |
1278 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; | |
1279 return 1; | |
1280 } | |
1281 } | |
1282 } | |
1283 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER
_NAME)) | |
1284 return 1; | |
1285 return 0; | |
1286 } | |
1287 | |
1288 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. | |
1289 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too | |
1290 */ | |
1291 | |
1292 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
1293 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) | |
1294 { | |
1295 int ok; | |
1296 X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1297 int crl_score = 0; | |
1298 unsigned int reasons; | |
1299 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
1300 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; | |
1301 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
1302 reasons = ctx->current_reasons; | |
1303 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, | |
1304 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); | |
1305 | |
1306 if (ok) | |
1307 goto done; | |
1308 | |
1309 /* Lookup CRLs from store */ | |
1310 | |
1311 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); | |
1312 | |
1313 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ | |
1314 if (!skcrl && crl) | |
1315 goto done; | |
1316 | |
1317 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); | |
1318 | |
1319 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); | |
1320 | |
1321 done: | |
1322 | |
1323 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ | |
1324 if (crl) | |
1325 { | |
1326 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
1327 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; | |
1328 ctx->current_reasons = reasons; | |
1329 *pcrl = crl; | |
1330 *pdcrl = dcrl; | |
1331 return 1; | |
1332 } | |
1333 | |
1334 return 0; | |
1335 } | |
1336 | |
1337 /* Check CRL validity */ | |
1338 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) | |
1339 { | |
1340 X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
1341 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; | |
1342 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; | |
1343 cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
1344 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
1345 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ | |
1346 if (ctx->current_issuer) | |
1347 issuer = ctx->current_issuer; | |
1348 | |
1349 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer | |
1350 * is next certificate in chain. | |
1351 */ | |
1352 else if (cnum < chnum) | |
1353 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); | |
1354 else | |
1355 { | |
1356 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); | |
1357 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ | |
1358 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) | |
1359 { | |
1360 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; | |
1361 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1362 if(!ok) goto err; | |
1363 } | |
1364 } | |
1365 | |
1366 if(issuer) | |
1367 { | |
1368 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already | |
1369 * been done | |
1370 */ | |
1371 if (!crl->base_crl_number) | |
1372 { | |
1373 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ | |
1374 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && | |
1375 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) | |
1376 { | |
1377 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; | |
1378 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1379 if(!ok) goto err; | |
1380 } | |
1381 | |
1382 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) | |
1383 { | |
1384 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; | |
1385 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1386 if(!ok) goto err; | |
1387 } | |
1388 | |
1389 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) | |
1390 { | |
1391 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <=
0) | |
1392 { | |
1393 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDAT
ION_ERROR; | |
1394 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1395 if(!ok) goto err; | |
1396 } | |
1397 } | |
1398 | |
1399 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) | |
1400 { | |
1401 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; | |
1402 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1403 if(!ok) goto err; | |
1404 } | |
1405 | |
1406 | |
1407 } | |
1408 | |
1409 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) | |
1410 { | |
1411 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); | |
1412 if (!ok) | |
1413 goto err; | |
1414 } | |
1415 | |
1416 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ | |
1417 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); | |
1418 | |
1419 if(!ikey) | |
1420 { | |
1421 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
; | |
1422 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1423 if (!ok) goto err; | |
1424 } | |
1425 else | |
1426 { | |
1427 /* Verify CRL signature */ | |
1428 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) | |
1429 { | |
1430 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
1431 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1432 if (!ok) goto err; | |
1433 } | |
1434 } | |
1435 } | |
1436 | |
1437 ok = 1; | |
1438 | |
1439 err: | |
1440 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); | |
1441 return ok; | |
1442 } | |
1443 | |
1444 /* Check certificate against CRL */ | |
1445 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
1446 { | |
1447 int ok; | |
1448 X509_REVOKED *rev; | |
1449 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained | |
1450 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate | |
1451 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since | |
1452 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries. | |
1453 */ | |
1454 if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) | |
1455 { | |
1456 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
1457 return 1; | |
1458 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; | |
1459 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1460 if(!ok) | |
1461 return 0; | |
1462 } | |
1463 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL | |
1464 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL. | |
1465 */ | |
1466 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) | |
1467 { | |
1468 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) | |
1469 return 2; | |
1470 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; | |
1471 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1472 if (!ok) | |
1473 return 0; | |
1474 } | |
1475 | |
1476 return 1; | |
1477 } | |
1478 | |
1479 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1480 { | |
1481 int ret; | |
1482 if (ctx->parent) | |
1483 return 1; | |
1484 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, | |
1485 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); | |
1486 if (ret == 0) | |
1487 { | |
1488 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1489 return 0; | |
1490 } | |
1491 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ | |
1492 if (ret == -1) | |
1493 { | |
1494 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify | |
1495 * callback. | |
1496 */ | |
1497 X509 *x; | |
1498 int i; | |
1499 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) | |
1500 { | |
1501 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
1502 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) | |
1503 continue; | |
1504 ctx->current_cert = x; | |
1505 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; | |
1506 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1507 return 0; | |
1508 } | |
1509 return 1; | |
1510 } | |
1511 if (ret == -2) | |
1512 { | |
1513 ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1514 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | |
1515 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
1516 } | |
1517 | |
1518 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) | |
1519 { | |
1520 ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
1521 ctx->error = X509_V_OK; | |
1522 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) | |
1523 return 0; | |
1524 } | |
1525 | |
1526 return 1; | |
1527 } | |
1528 | |
1529 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
1530 { | |
1531 time_t *ptime; | |
1532 int i; | |
1533 | |
1534 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
1535 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
1536 else | |
1537 ptime = NULL; | |
1538 | |
1539 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); | |
1540 if (i == 0) | |
1541 { | |
1542 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; | |
1543 ctx->current_cert=x; | |
1544 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1545 return 0; | |
1546 } | |
1547 | |
1548 if (i > 0) | |
1549 { | |
1550 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
1551 ctx->current_cert=x; | |
1552 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1553 return 0; | |
1554 } | |
1555 | |
1556 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); | |
1557 if (i == 0) | |
1558 { | |
1559 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; | |
1560 ctx->current_cert=x; | |
1561 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1562 return 0; | |
1563 } | |
1564 | |
1565 if (i < 0) | |
1566 { | |
1567 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
1568 ctx->current_cert=x; | |
1569 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
1570 return 0; | |
1571 } | |
1572 | |
1573 return 1; | |
1574 } | |
1575 | |
1576 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1577 { | |
1578 int ok=0,n; | |
1579 X509 *xs,*xi; | |
1580 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; | |
1581 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
1582 | |
1583 cb=ctx->verify_cb; | |
1584 | |
1585 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
1586 ctx->error_depth=n-1; | |
1587 n--; | |
1588 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); | |
1589 | |
1590 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) | |
1591 xs=xi; | |
1592 else | |
1593 { | |
1594 if (n <= 0) | |
1595 { | |
1596 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; | |
1597 ctx->current_cert=xi; | |
1598 ok=cb(0,ctx); | |
1599 goto end; | |
1600 } | |
1601 else | |
1602 { | |
1603 n--; | |
1604 ctx->error_depth=n; | |
1605 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); | |
1606 } | |
1607 } | |
1608 | |
1609 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ | |
1610 while (n >= 0) | |
1611 { | |
1612 ctx->error_depth=n; | |
1613 | |
1614 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless | |
1615 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and | |
1616 * just wastes time. | |
1617 */ | |
1618 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_
CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) | |
1619 { | |
1620 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) | |
1621 { | |
1622 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PU
BLIC_KEY; | |
1623 ctx->current_cert=xi; | |
1624 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | |
1625 if (!ok) goto end; | |
1626 } | |
1627 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) | |
1628 { | |
1629 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
1630 ctx->current_cert=xs; | |
1631 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | |
1632 if (!ok) | |
1633 { | |
1634 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
1635 goto end; | |
1636 } | |
1637 } | |
1638 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
1639 pkey=NULL; | |
1640 } | |
1641 | |
1642 xs->valid = 1; | |
1643 | |
1644 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); | |
1645 if (!ok) | |
1646 goto end; | |
1647 | |
1648 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ | |
1649 ctx->current_issuer=xi; | |
1650 ctx->current_cert=xs; | |
1651 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx); | |
1652 if (!ok) goto end; | |
1653 | |
1654 n--; | |
1655 if (n >= 0) | |
1656 { | |
1657 xi=xs; | |
1658 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); | |
1659 } | |
1660 } | |
1661 ok=1; | |
1662 end: | |
1663 return ok; | |
1664 } | |
1665 | |
1666 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) | |
1667 { | |
1668 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); | |
1669 } | |
1670 | |
1671 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) | |
1672 { | |
1673 char *str; | |
1674 ASN1_TIME atm; | |
1675 long offset; | |
1676 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p; | |
1677 int i,j; | |
1678 | |
1679 p=buff1; | |
1680 i=ctm->length; | |
1681 str=(char *)ctm->data; | |
1682 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) | |
1683 { | |
1684 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0; | |
1685 memcpy(p,str,10); | |
1686 p+=10; | |
1687 str+=10; | |
1688 } | |
1689 else | |
1690 { | |
1691 if (i < 13) return 0; | |
1692 memcpy(p,str,12); | |
1693 p+=12; | |
1694 str+=12; | |
1695 } | |
1696 | |
1697 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) | |
1698 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; } | |
1699 else | |
1700 { | |
1701 *(p++)= *(str++); | |
1702 *(p++)= *(str++); | |
1703 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ | |
1704 if (*str == '.') | |
1705 { | |
1706 str++; | |
1707 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++; | |
1708 } | |
1709 | |
1710 } | |
1711 *(p++)='Z'; | |
1712 *(p++)='\0'; | |
1713 | |
1714 if (*str == 'Z') | |
1715 offset=0; | |
1716 else | |
1717 { | |
1718 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) | |
1719 return 0; | |
1720 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60; | |
1721 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0'); | |
1722 if (*str == '-') | |
1723 offset= -offset; | |
1724 } | |
1725 atm.type=ctm->type; | |
1726 atm.flags = 0; | |
1727 atm.length=sizeof(buff2); | |
1728 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; | |
1729 | |
1730 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL) | |
1731 return 0; | |
1732 | |
1733 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) | |
1734 { | |
1735 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0'); | |
1736 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ | |
1737 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0'); | |
1738 if (j < 50) j+=100; | |
1739 | |
1740 if (i < j) return -1; | |
1741 if (i > j) return 1; | |
1742 } | |
1743 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2); | |
1744 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ | |
1745 return -1; | |
1746 else | |
1747 return i; | |
1748 } | |
1749 | |
1750 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) | |
1751 { | |
1752 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); | |
1753 } | |
1754 | |
1755 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) | |
1756 { | |
1757 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); | |
1758 } | |
1759 | |
1760 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, | |
1761 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) | |
1762 { | |
1763 time_t t; | |
1764 | |
1765 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; | |
1766 else time(&t); | |
1767 | |
1768 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) | |
1769 { | |
1770 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) | |
1771 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1772 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) | |
1773 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, | |
1774 offset_sec); | |
1775 } | |
1776 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
1777 } | |
1778 | |
1779 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) | |
1780 { | |
1781 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2; | |
1782 int i,j; | |
1783 | |
1784 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; | |
1785 | |
1786 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++) | |
1787 { | |
1788 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i)); | |
1789 if (ktmp == NULL) | |
1790 { | |
1791 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_
TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
1792 return 0; | |
1793 } | |
1794 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | |
1795 break; | |
1796 else | |
1797 { | |
1798 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); | |
1799 ktmp=NULL; | |
1800 } | |
1801 } | |
1802 if (ktmp == NULL) | |
1803 { | |
1804 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_
PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); | |
1805 return 0; | |
1806 } | |
1807 | |
1808 /* first, populate the other certs */ | |
1809 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--) | |
1810 { | |
1811 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j)); | |
1812 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp); | |
1813 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); | |
1814 } | |
1815 | |
1816 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp); | |
1817 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); | |
1818 return 1; | |
1819 } | |
1820 | |
1821 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_fu
nc, | |
1822 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) | |
1823 { | |
1824 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by | |
1825 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */ | |
1826 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, arg
p, | |
1827 new_func, dup_func, free_func); | |
1828 } | |
1829 | |
1830 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) | |
1831 { | |
1832 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data); | |
1833 } | |
1834 | |
1835 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) | |
1836 { | |
1837 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx); | |
1838 } | |
1839 | |
1840 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1841 { | |
1842 return ctx->error; | |
1843 } | |
1844 | |
1845 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) | |
1846 { | |
1847 ctx->error=err; | |
1848 } | |
1849 | |
1850 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1851 { | |
1852 return ctx->error_depth; | |
1853 } | |
1854 | |
1855 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1856 { | |
1857 return ctx->current_cert; | |
1858 } | |
1859 | |
1860 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1861 { | |
1862 return ctx->chain; | |
1863 } | |
1864 | |
1865 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1866 { | |
1867 int i; | |
1868 X509 *x; | |
1869 STACK_OF(X509) *chain; | |
1870 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL; | |
1871 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) | |
1872 { | |
1873 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
1874 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
1875 } | |
1876 return chain; | |
1877 } | |
1878 | |
1879 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1880 { | |
1881 return ctx->current_issuer; | |
1882 } | |
1883 | |
1884 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1885 { | |
1886 return ctx->current_crl; | |
1887 } | |
1888 | |
1889 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1890 { | |
1891 return ctx->parent; | |
1892 } | |
1893 | |
1894 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
1895 { | |
1896 ctx->cert=x; | |
1897 } | |
1898 | |
1899 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
1900 { | |
1901 ctx->untrusted=sk; | |
1902 } | |
1903 | |
1904 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) | |
1905 { | |
1906 ctx->crls=sk; | |
1907 } | |
1908 | |
1909 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) | |
1910 { | |
1911 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); | |
1912 } | |
1913 | |
1914 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) | |
1915 { | |
1916 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); | |
1917 } | |
1918 | |
1919 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust | |
1920 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its | |
1921 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by | |
1922 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default | |
1923 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value. | |
1924 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own | |
1925 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they | |
1926 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server. | |
1927 */ | |
1928 | |
1929 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, | |
1930 int purpose, int trust) | |
1931 { | |
1932 int idx; | |
1933 /* If purpose not set use default */ | |
1934 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; | |
1935 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ | |
1936 if (purpose) | |
1937 { | |
1938 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; | |
1939 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); | |
1940 if (idx == -1) | |
1941 { | |
1942 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
1943 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
1944 return 0; | |
1945 } | |
1946 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
1947 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) | |
1948 { | |
1949 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); | |
1950 if (idx == -1) | |
1951 { | |
1952 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
1953 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
1954 return 0; | |
1955 } | |
1956 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
1957 } | |
1958 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ | |
1959 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; | |
1960 } | |
1961 if (trust) | |
1962 { | |
1963 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); | |
1964 if (idx == -1) | |
1965 { | |
1966 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | |
1967 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); | |
1968 return 0; | |
1969 } | |
1970 } | |
1971 | |
1972 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose; | |
1973 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust; | |
1974 return 1; | |
1975 } | |
1976 | |
1977 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) | |
1978 { | |
1979 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | |
1980 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | |
1981 if (!ctx) | |
1982 { | |
1983 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1984 return NULL; | |
1985 } | |
1986 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | |
1987 return ctx; | |
1988 } | |
1989 | |
1990 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
1991 { | |
1992 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); | |
1993 OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
1994 } | |
1995 | |
1996 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, | |
1997 STACK_OF(X509) *chain) | |
1998 { | |
1999 int ret = 1; | |
2000 ctx->ctx=store; | |
2001 ctx->current_method=0; | |
2002 ctx->cert=x509; | |
2003 ctx->untrusted=chain; | |
2004 ctx->crls = NULL; | |
2005 ctx->last_untrusted=0; | |
2006 ctx->other_ctx=NULL; | |
2007 ctx->valid=0; | |
2008 ctx->chain=NULL; | |
2009 ctx->error=0; | |
2010 ctx->explicit_policy=0; | |
2011 ctx->error_depth=0; | |
2012 ctx->current_cert=NULL; | |
2013 ctx->current_issuer=NULL; | |
2014 ctx->current_crl=NULL; | |
2015 ctx->current_crl_score=0; | |
2016 ctx->current_reasons=0; | |
2017 ctx->tree = NULL; | |
2018 ctx->parent = NULL; | |
2019 | |
2020 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); | |
2021 | |
2022 if (!ctx->param) | |
2023 { | |
2024 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2025 return 0; | |
2026 } | |
2027 | |
2028 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set | |
2029 * use defaults. | |
2030 */ | |
2031 | |
2032 | |
2033 if (store) | |
2034 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); | |
2035 else | |
2036 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; | |
2037 | |
2038 if (store) | |
2039 { | |
2040 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | |
2041 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; | |
2042 } | |
2043 else | |
2044 ctx->cleanup = 0; | |
2045 | |
2046 if (ret) | |
2047 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, | |
2048 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); | |
2049 | |
2050 if (ret == 0) | |
2051 { | |
2052 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2053 return 0; | |
2054 } | |
2055 | |
2056 if (store && store->check_issued) | |
2057 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; | |
2058 else | |
2059 ctx->check_issued = check_issued; | |
2060 | |
2061 if (store && store->get_issuer) | |
2062 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; | |
2063 else | |
2064 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; | |
2065 | |
2066 if (store && store->verify_cb) | |
2067 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | |
2068 else | |
2069 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; | |
2070 | |
2071 if (store && store->verify) | |
2072 ctx->verify = store->verify; | |
2073 else | |
2074 ctx->verify = internal_verify; | |
2075 | |
2076 if (store && store->check_revocation) | |
2077 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; | |
2078 else | |
2079 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; | |
2080 | |
2081 if (store && store->get_crl) | |
2082 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; | |
2083 else | |
2084 ctx->get_crl = NULL; | |
2085 | |
2086 if (store && store->check_crl) | |
2087 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; | |
2088 else | |
2089 ctx->check_crl = check_crl; | |
2090 | |
2091 if (store && store->cert_crl) | |
2092 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; | |
2093 else | |
2094 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; | |
2095 | |
2096 if (store && store->lookup_certs) | |
2097 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; | |
2098 else | |
2099 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; | |
2100 | |
2101 if (store && store->lookup_crls) | |
2102 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; | |
2103 else | |
2104 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; | |
2105 | |
2106 ctx->check_policy = check_policy; | |
2107 | |
2108 | |
2109 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As | |
2110 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a | |
2111 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */ | |
2112 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ | |
2113 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, | |
2114 &(ctx->ex_data))) | |
2115 { | |
2116 OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
2117 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2118 return 0; | |
2119 } | |
2120 return 1; | |
2121 } | |
2122 | |
2123 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. | |
2124 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. | |
2125 */ | |
2126 | |
2127 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
2128 { | |
2129 ctx->other_ctx = sk; | |
2130 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; | |
2131 } | |
2132 | |
2133 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2134 { | |
2135 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx); | |
2136 if (ctx->param != NULL) | |
2137 { | |
2138 if (ctx->parent == NULL) | |
2139 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
2140 ctx->param=NULL; | |
2141 } | |
2142 if (ctx->tree != NULL) | |
2143 { | |
2144 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); | |
2145 ctx->tree=NULL; | |
2146 } | |
2147 if (ctx->chain != NULL) | |
2148 { | |
2149 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free); | |
2150 ctx->chain=NULL; | |
2151 } | |
2152 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)
); | |
2153 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); | |
2154 } | |
2155 | |
2156 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) | |
2157 { | |
2158 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); | |
2159 } | |
2160 | |
2161 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) | |
2162 { | |
2163 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); | |
2164 } | |
2165 | |
2166 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t) | |
2167 { | |
2168 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); | |
2169 } | |
2170 | |
2171 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
2172 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) | |
2173 { | |
2174 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb; | |
2175 } | |
2176 | |
2177 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2178 { | |
2179 return ctx->tree; | |
2180 } | |
2181 | |
2182 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2183 { | |
2184 return ctx->explicit_policy; | |
2185 } | |
2186 | |
2187 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) | |
2188 { | |
2189 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; | |
2190 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); | |
2191 if (!param) | |
2192 return 0; | |
2193 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); | |
2194 } | |
2195 | |
2196 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
2197 { | |
2198 return ctx->param; | |
2199 } | |
2200 | |
2201 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) | |
2202 { | |
2203 if (ctx->param) | |
2204 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
2205 ctx->param = param; | |
2206 } | |
2207 | |
2208 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) | |
2209 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) | |
2210 | |
2211 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) | |
2212 | |
2213 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) | |
2214 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) | |
OLD | NEW |