Replicate Content-Security-Policy into remote frame proxies.

third_party/WebKit/Source/core/loader/FrameLoader.cpp

Index: third_party/WebKit/Source/core/loader/FrameLoader.cpp
diff --git a/third_party/WebKit/Source/core/loader/FrameLoader.cpp b/third_party/WebKit/Source/core/loader/FrameLoader.cpp
index 9477c3ba4bbfa71438314cf301c5e5baa40c27d5..465bcac54165b85e7a008b417c29e5fb137c3e68 100644
--- a/third_party/WebKit/Source/core/loader/FrameLoader.cpp
+++ b/third_party/WebKit/Source/core/loader/FrameLoader.cpp
@@ -1346,14 +1346,22 @@ bool FrameLoader::shouldContinueForNavigationPolicy(const ResourceRequest& reque
 
     // If we're loading content into a subframe, check against the parent's Content Security Policy
     // and kill the load if that check fails, unless we should bypass the main world's CSP.
-    // FIXME: CSP checks are broken for OOPI. For now, this policy always allows frames with a remote parent...
-    if ((shouldCheckMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy == CheckContentSecurityPolicy) && (m_frame->deprecatedLocalOwner() && !m_frame->deprecatedLocalOwner()->document().contentSecurityPolicy()->allowChildFrameFromSource(request.url(), request.followedRedirect() ? ContentSecurityPolicy::DidRedirect : ContentSecurityPolicy::DidNotRedirect))) {
-        // Fire a load event, as timing attacks would otherwise reveal that the
-        // frame was blocked. This way, it looks like every other cross-origin
-        // page load.
-        m_frame->document()->enforceSandboxFlags(SandboxOrigin);
-        m_frame->owner()->dispatchLoad();
-        return false;
+    if (shouldCheckMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy == CheckContentSecurityPolicy) {
+        Frame* parentFrame = m_frame->tree().parent();
+        if (parentFrame) {
+            ContentSecurityPolicy* parentPolicy = parentFrame->securityContext()->contentSecurityPolicy();
+            ContentSecurityPolicy::RedirectStatus redirectStatus = request.followedRedirect()
+                ? ContentSecurityPolicy::DidRedirect
+                : ContentSecurityPolicy::DidNotRedirect;
+            if (!parentPolicy->allowChildFrameFromSource(request.url(), redirectStatus)) {
+                // Fire a load event, as timing attacks would otherwise reveal that the
+                // frame was blocked. This way, it looks like every other cross-origin
+                // page load.
+                m_frame->document()->enforceSandboxFlags(SandboxOrigin);
+                m_frame->owner()->dispatchLoad();
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
     }
 
     bool isFormSubmission = type == NavigationTypeFormSubmitted || type == NavigationTypeFormResubmitted;