| Index: net/quic/crypto/aead_base_encrypter_nss.cc
|
| ===================================================================
|
| --- net/quic/crypto/aead_base_encrypter_nss.cc (revision 255481)
|
| +++ net/quic/crypto/aead_base_encrypter_nss.cc (working copy)
|
| @@ -2,9 +2,8 @@
|
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
|
| // found in the LICENSE file.
|
|
|
| -#include "net/quic/crypto/aes_128_gcm_12_encrypter.h"
|
| +#include "net/quic/crypto/aead_base_encrypter.h"
|
|
|
| -#include <nss.h>
|
| #include <pk11pub.h>
|
| #include <secerr.h>
|
|
|
| @@ -23,26 +22,6 @@
|
|
|
| namespace {
|
|
|
| -// The pkcs11t.h header in NSS versions older than 3.14 does not have the CTR
|
| -// and GCM types, so define them here.
|
| -#if !defined(CKM_AES_CTR)
|
| -#define CKM_AES_CTR 0x00001086
|
| -#define CKM_AES_GCM 0x00001087
|
| -
|
| -struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS {
|
| - CK_ULONG ulCounterBits;
|
| - CK_BYTE cb[16];
|
| -};
|
| -
|
| -struct CK_GCM_PARAMS {
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pIv;
|
| - CK_ULONG ulIvLen;
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pAAD;
|
| - CK_ULONG ulAADLen;
|
| - CK_ULONG ulTagBits;
|
| -};
|
| -#endif // CKM_AES_CTR
|
| -
|
| typedef SECStatus
|
| (*PK11_EncryptFunction)(
|
| PK11SymKey* symKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism, SECItem* param,
|
| @@ -53,22 +32,18 @@
|
| // order to continue working on systems without up-to-date versions of NSS,
|
| // lookup PK11_Encrypt with dlsym.
|
|
|
| -// GcmSupportChecker is a singleton which caches the results of runtime symbol
|
| +// AeadSupportChecker is a singleton which caches the results of runtime symbol
|
| // resolution of PK11_Encrypt.
|
| -class GcmSupportChecker {
|
| +class AeadSupportChecker {
|
| public:
|
| static PK11_EncryptFunction pk11_encrypt_func() {
|
| return pk11_encrypt_func_;
|
| }
|
|
|
| - static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE aes_key_mechanism() {
|
| - return aes_key_mechanism_;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| private:
|
| - friend struct base::DefaultLazyInstanceTraits<GcmSupportChecker>;
|
| + friend struct base::DefaultLazyInstanceTraits<AeadSupportChecker>;
|
|
|
| - GcmSupportChecker() {
|
| + AeadSupportChecker() {
|
| #if !defined(USE_NSS)
|
| // Using a bundled version of NSS that is guaranteed to have this symbol.
|
| pk11_encrypt_func_ = PK11_Encrypt;
|
| @@ -80,34 +55,19 @@
|
| // AES-GCM directly. This was introduced in NSS 3.15.
|
| pk11_encrypt_func_ = (PK11_EncryptFunction)dlsym(RTLD_DEFAULT,
|
| "PK11_Encrypt");
|
| - if (pk11_encrypt_func_ == NULL) {
|
| - aes_key_mechanism_ = CKM_AES_ECB;
|
| - }
|
| #endif
|
| }
|
|
|
| // |pk11_encrypt_func_| stores the runtime symbol resolution of PK11_Encrypt.
|
| static PK11_EncryptFunction pk11_encrypt_func_;
|
| -
|
| - // The correct value for |aes_key_mechanism_| is CKM_AES_GCM, but because of
|
| - // NSS bug https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=853285 (to be fixed in
|
| - // NSS 3.15), use CKM_AES_ECB for NSS versions older than 3.15.
|
| - static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE aes_key_mechanism_;
|
| };
|
|
|
| // static
|
| -PK11_EncryptFunction GcmSupportChecker::pk11_encrypt_func_ = NULL;
|
| +PK11_EncryptFunction AeadSupportChecker::pk11_encrypt_func_ = NULL;
|
|
|
| -// static
|
| -CK_MECHANISM_TYPE GcmSupportChecker::aes_key_mechanism_ = CKM_AES_GCM;
|
| -
|
| -base::LazyInstance<GcmSupportChecker>::Leaky g_gcm_support_checker =
|
| +base::LazyInstance<AeadSupportChecker>::Leaky g_aead_support_checker =
|
| LAZY_INSTANCE_INITIALIZER;
|
|
|
| -const size_t kKeySize = 16;
|
| -const size_t kNoncePrefixSize = 4;
|
| -const size_t kAESNonceSize = 12;
|
| -
|
| // Calls PK11_Encrypt if it's available. Otherwise, emulates CKM_AES_GCM using
|
| // CKM_AES_CTR and the GaloisHash class.
|
| SECStatus My_Encrypt(PK11SymKey* key,
|
| @@ -119,9 +79,9 @@
|
| const unsigned char* data,
|
| unsigned int data_len) {
|
| // If PK11_Encrypt() was successfully resolved or if bundled version of NSS is
|
| - // being used, then NSS will support AES-GCM directly.
|
| + // being used, use PK11_Encrypt().
|
| PK11_EncryptFunction pk11_encrypt_func =
|
| - GcmSupportChecker::pk11_encrypt_func();
|
| + AeadSupportChecker::pk11_encrypt_func();
|
| if (pk11_encrypt_func != NULL) {
|
| return pk11_encrypt_func(key, mechanism, param, out, out_len, max_len, data,
|
| data_len);
|
| @@ -137,17 +97,16 @@
|
| DCHECK_EQ(mechanism, static_cast<CK_MECHANISM_TYPE>(CKM_AES_GCM));
|
| DCHECK_EQ(param->len, sizeof(CK_GCM_PARAMS));
|
|
|
| - if (max_len < static_cast<unsigned int>(Aes128Gcm12Encrypter::kAuthTagSize)) {
|
| - DVLOG(1) << "max_len is less than kAuthTagSize";
|
| + const CK_GCM_PARAMS* gcm_params =
|
| + reinterpret_cast<CK_GCM_PARAMS*>(param->data);
|
| +
|
| + const unsigned int auth_tag_size = gcm_params->ulTagBits / 8;
|
| + if (max_len < auth_tag_size) {
|
| + DVLOG(1) << "max_len is less than auth_tag_size";
|
| PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
|
| return SECFailure;
|
| }
|
|
|
| - const CK_GCM_PARAMS* gcm_params =
|
| - reinterpret_cast<CK_GCM_PARAMS*>(param->data);
|
| -
|
| - DCHECK_EQ(gcm_params->ulTagBits,
|
| - static_cast<CK_ULONG>(Aes128Gcm12Encrypter::kAuthTagSize * 8));
|
| if (gcm_params->ulIvLen != 12u) {
|
| DVLOG(1) << "ulIvLen is not equal to 12";
|
| PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
|
| @@ -229,9 +188,8 @@
|
| return SECFailure;
|
| }
|
|
|
| - if ((max_len - Aes128Gcm12Encrypter::kAuthTagSize) <
|
| - static_cast<unsigned int>(output_len)) {
|
| - DVLOG(1) << "(max_len - kAuthTagSize) is less than output_len";
|
| + if ((max_len - auth_tag_size) < static_cast<unsigned int>(output_len)) {
|
| + DVLOG(1) << "(max_len - auth_tag_size) is less than output_len";
|
| PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
|
| return SECFailure;
|
| }
|
| @@ -239,47 +197,55 @@
|
| crypto::GaloisHash ghash(ghash_key);
|
| ghash.UpdateAdditional(gcm_params->pAAD, gcm_params->ulAADLen);
|
| ghash.UpdateCiphertext(out, output_len);
|
| - ghash.Finish(out + output_len, Aes128Gcm12Encrypter::kAuthTagSize);
|
| - for (unsigned int i = 0; i < Aes128Gcm12Encrypter::kAuthTagSize; i++) {
|
| + ghash.Finish(out + output_len, auth_tag_size);
|
| + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < auth_tag_size; i++) {
|
| out[output_len + i] ^= tag_mask[i];
|
| }
|
|
|
| - *out_len = output_len + Aes128Gcm12Encrypter::kAuthTagSize;
|
| + *out_len = output_len + auth_tag_size;
|
| return SECSuccess;
|
| }
|
|
|
| } // namespace
|
|
|
| -Aes128Gcm12Encrypter::Aes128Gcm12Encrypter() {
|
| - ignore_result(g_gcm_support_checker.Get());
|
| +AeadBaseEncrypter::AeadBaseEncrypter(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE aead_mechanism,
|
| + size_t key_size,
|
| + size_t auth_tag_size,
|
| + size_t nonce_prefix_size)
|
| + : aead_mechanism_(aead_mechanism),
|
| + key_size_(key_size),
|
| + auth_tag_size_(auth_tag_size),
|
| + nonce_prefix_size_(nonce_prefix_size) {
|
| + DCHECK_LE(key_size_, sizeof(key_));
|
| + DCHECK_LE(nonce_prefix_size_, sizeof(nonce_prefix_));
|
| + ignore_result(g_aead_support_checker.Get());
|
| }
|
|
|
| -Aes128Gcm12Encrypter::~Aes128Gcm12Encrypter() {}
|
| +AeadBaseEncrypter::~AeadBaseEncrypter() {}
|
|
|
| -bool Aes128Gcm12Encrypter::SetKey(StringPiece key) {
|
| - DCHECK_EQ(key.size(), sizeof(key_));
|
| - if (key.size() != sizeof(key_)) {
|
| +bool AeadBaseEncrypter::SetKey(StringPiece key) {
|
| + DCHECK_EQ(key.size(), key_size_);
|
| + if (key.size() != key_size_) {
|
| return false;
|
| }
|
| memcpy(key_, key.data(), key.size());
|
| return true;
|
| }
|
|
|
| -bool Aes128Gcm12Encrypter::SetNoncePrefix(StringPiece nonce_prefix) {
|
| - DCHECK_EQ(nonce_prefix.size(), kNoncePrefixSize);
|
| - if (nonce_prefix.size() != kNoncePrefixSize) {
|
| +bool AeadBaseEncrypter::SetNoncePrefix(StringPiece nonce_prefix) {
|
| + DCHECK_EQ(nonce_prefix.size(), nonce_prefix_size_);
|
| + if (nonce_prefix.size() != nonce_prefix_size_) {
|
| return false;
|
| }
|
| - COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(nonce_prefix_) == kNoncePrefixSize, bad_nonce_length);
|
| memcpy(nonce_prefix_, nonce_prefix.data(), nonce_prefix.size());
|
| return true;
|
| }
|
|
|
| -bool Aes128Gcm12Encrypter::Encrypt(StringPiece nonce,
|
| - StringPiece associated_data,
|
| - StringPiece plaintext,
|
| - unsigned char* output) {
|
| - if (nonce.size() != kNoncePrefixSize + sizeof(QuicPacketSequenceNumber)) {
|
| +bool AeadBaseEncrypter::Encrypt(StringPiece nonce,
|
| + StringPiece associated_data,
|
| + StringPiece plaintext,
|
| + unsigned char* output) {
|
| + if (nonce.size() != nonce_prefix_size_ + sizeof(QuicPacketSequenceNumber)) {
|
| return false;
|
| }
|
|
|
| @@ -289,37 +255,40 @@
|
| SECItem key_item;
|
| key_item.type = siBuffer;
|
| key_item.data = key_;
|
| - key_item.len = sizeof(key_);
|
| + key_item.len = key_size_;
|
| PK11SlotInfo* slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
|
| +
|
| + // TODO(wtc): For an AES-GCM key, the correct value for |key_mechanism| is
|
| + // CKM_AES_GCM, but because of NSS bug
|
| + // https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=853285, use CKM_AES_ECB as a
|
| + // workaround. Remove this when we require NSS 3.15.
|
| + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_mechanism = aead_mechanism_;
|
| + if (key_mechanism == CKM_AES_GCM) {
|
| + key_mechanism = CKM_AES_ECB;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| // The exact value of the |origin| argument doesn't matter to NSS as long as
|
| // it's not PK11_OriginFortezzaHack, so we pass PK11_OriginUnwrap as a
|
| // placeholder.
|
| - crypto::ScopedPK11SymKey aes_key(PK11_ImportSymKey(
|
| - slot, GcmSupportChecker::aes_key_mechanism(), PK11_OriginUnwrap,
|
| - CKA_ENCRYPT, &key_item, NULL));
|
| + crypto::ScopedPK11SymKey aead_key(PK11_ImportSymKey(
|
| + slot, key_mechanism, PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT, &key_item, NULL));
|
| PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
|
| slot = NULL;
|
| - if (!aes_key) {
|
| + if (!aead_key) {
|
| DVLOG(1) << "PK11_ImportSymKey failed";
|
| return false;
|
| }
|
|
|
| - CK_GCM_PARAMS gcm_params = {0};
|
| - gcm_params.pIv =
|
| - reinterpret_cast<CK_BYTE*>(const_cast<char*>(nonce.data()));
|
| - gcm_params.ulIvLen = nonce.size();
|
| - gcm_params.pAAD =
|
| - reinterpret_cast<CK_BYTE*>(const_cast<char*>(associated_data.data()));
|
| - gcm_params.ulAADLen = associated_data.size();
|
| - gcm_params.ulTagBits = kAuthTagSize * 8;
|
| + AeadParams aead_params = {0};
|
| + FillAeadParams(nonce, associated_data, auth_tag_size_, &aead_params);
|
|
|
| SECItem param;
|
| param.type = siBuffer;
|
| - param.data = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(&gcm_params);
|
| - param.len = sizeof(gcm_params);
|
| + param.data = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(&aead_params.data);
|
| + param.len = aead_params.len;
|
|
|
| unsigned int output_len;
|
| - if (My_Encrypt(aes_key.get(), CKM_AES_GCM, ¶m,
|
| + if (My_Encrypt(aead_key.get(), aead_mechanism_, ¶m,
|
| output, &output_len, ciphertext_size,
|
| reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(plaintext.data()),
|
| plaintext.size()) != SECSuccess) {
|
| @@ -335,7 +304,7 @@
|
| return true;
|
| }
|
|
|
| -QuicData* Aes128Gcm12Encrypter::EncryptPacket(
|
| +QuicData* AeadBaseEncrypter::EncryptPacket(
|
| QuicPacketSequenceNumber sequence_number,
|
| StringPiece associated_data,
|
| StringPiece plaintext) {
|
| @@ -344,11 +313,12 @@
|
|
|
| // TODO(ianswett): Introduce a check to ensure that we don't encrypt with the
|
| // same sequence number twice.
|
| - uint8 nonce[kNoncePrefixSize + sizeof(sequence_number)];
|
| - COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(nonce) == kAESNonceSize, bad_sequence_number_size);
|
| - memcpy(nonce, nonce_prefix_, kNoncePrefixSize);
|
| - memcpy(nonce + kNoncePrefixSize, &sequence_number, sizeof(sequence_number));
|
| - if (!Encrypt(StringPiece(reinterpret_cast<char*>(nonce), sizeof(nonce)),
|
| + uint8 nonce[sizeof(nonce_prefix_) + sizeof(sequence_number)];
|
| + const size_t nonce_size = nonce_prefix_size_ + sizeof(sequence_number);
|
| + DCHECK_LE(nonce_size, sizeof(nonce));
|
| + memcpy(nonce, nonce_prefix_, nonce_prefix_size_);
|
| + memcpy(nonce + nonce_prefix_size_, &sequence_number, sizeof(sequence_number));
|
| + if (!Encrypt(StringPiece(reinterpret_cast<char*>(nonce), nonce_size),
|
| associated_data, plaintext,
|
| reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(ciphertext.get()))) {
|
| return NULL;
|
| @@ -357,29 +327,30 @@
|
| return new QuicData(ciphertext.release(), ciphertext_size, true);
|
| }
|
|
|
| -size_t Aes128Gcm12Encrypter::GetKeySize() const { return kKeySize; }
|
| +size_t AeadBaseEncrypter::GetKeySize() const { return key_size_; }
|
|
|
| -size_t Aes128Gcm12Encrypter::GetNoncePrefixSize() const {
|
| - return kNoncePrefixSize;
|
| +size_t AeadBaseEncrypter::GetNoncePrefixSize() const {
|
| + return nonce_prefix_size_;
|
| }
|
|
|
| -size_t Aes128Gcm12Encrypter::GetMaxPlaintextSize(size_t ciphertext_size) const {
|
| - return ciphertext_size - kAuthTagSize;
|
| +size_t AeadBaseEncrypter::GetMaxPlaintextSize(size_t ciphertext_size) const {
|
| + return ciphertext_size - auth_tag_size_;
|
| }
|
|
|
| -// An AEAD_AES_128_GCM_12 ciphertext is exactly 12 bytes longer than its
|
| -// corresponding plaintext.
|
| -size_t Aes128Gcm12Encrypter::GetCiphertextSize(size_t plaintext_size) const {
|
| - return plaintext_size + kAuthTagSize;
|
| +size_t AeadBaseEncrypter::GetCiphertextSize(size_t plaintext_size) const {
|
| + return plaintext_size + auth_tag_size_;
|
| }
|
|
|
| -StringPiece Aes128Gcm12Encrypter::GetKey() const {
|
| - return StringPiece(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(key_), sizeof(key_));
|
| +StringPiece AeadBaseEncrypter::GetKey() const {
|
| + return StringPiece(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(key_), key_size_);
|
| }
|
|
|
| -StringPiece Aes128Gcm12Encrypter::GetNoncePrefix() const {
|
| +StringPiece AeadBaseEncrypter::GetNoncePrefix() const {
|
| + if (nonce_prefix_size_ == 0) {
|
| + return StringPiece();
|
| + }
|
| return StringPiece(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(nonce_prefix_),
|
| - kNoncePrefixSize);
|
| + nonce_prefix_size_);
|
| }
|
|
|
| } // namespace net
|
|
|