Remove sandbox on Windows.

sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_policy_test.cc

Index: sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_policy_test.cc
diff --git a/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_policy_test.cc b/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_policy_test.cc
deleted file mode 100644
index 04f048832e3d76d07b2d181261861fbe7df59efa..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/sandbox/win/src/named_pipe_policy_test.cc
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
-// found in the LICENSE file.
-
-#include "base/win/windows_version.h"
-#include "sandbox/win/src/handle_closer.h"
-#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
-#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy.h"
-#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_factory.h"
-#include "sandbox/win/tests/common/controller.h"
-#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
-
-namespace sandbox {
-
-
-SBOX_TESTS_COMMAND int NamedPipe_Create(int argc, wchar_t **argv) {
-  if (argc < 1 || argc > 2) {
-    return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND;
-  }
-  if ((NULL == argv) || (NULL == argv[0])) {
-    return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND;
-  }
-
-  HANDLE pipe = ::CreateNamedPipeW(argv[0],
-                                   PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX | FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED,
-                                   PIPE_TYPE_BYTE | PIPE_READMODE_BYTE, 1, 4096,
-                                   4096, 2000, NULL);
-  if (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == pipe)
-    return SBOX_TEST_DENIED;
-
-  // The second parameter allows us to enforce a whitelist for where the
-  // pipe should be in the object namespace after creation.
-  if (argc == 2) {
-    base::string16 handle_name;
-    if (GetHandleName(pipe, &handle_name)) {
-      if (handle_name.compare(0, wcslen(argv[1]), argv[1]) != 0)
-        return SBOX_TEST_FAILED;
-    } else {
-      return SBOX_TEST_FAILED;
-    }
-  }
-
-  OVERLAPPED overlapped = {0};
-  overlapped.hEvent = ::CreateEvent(NULL, TRUE, TRUE, NULL);
-  BOOL result = ::ConnectNamedPipe(pipe, &overlapped);
-
-  if (!result) {
-    DWORD error = ::GetLastError();
-    if (ERROR_PIPE_CONNECTED != error &&
-        ERROR_IO_PENDING != error) {
-          return SBOX_TEST_FAILED;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!::CloseHandle(pipe))
-    return SBOX_TEST_FAILED;
-
-  ::CloseHandle(overlapped.hEvent);
-  return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED;
-}
-
-// Tests if we can create a pipe in the sandbox.
-TEST(NamedPipePolicyTest, CreatePipe) {
-  TestRunner runner;
-  // TODO(nsylvain): This policy is wrong because "*" is a valid char in a
-  // namedpipe name. Here we apply it like a wildcard. http://b/893603
-  EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
-                             TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
-                             L"\\\\.\\pipe\\test*"));
-
-  EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED,
-            runner.RunTest(L"NamedPipe_Create \\\\.\\pipe\\testbleh"));
-
-  EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED,
-            runner.RunTest(L"NamedPipe_Create \\\\.\\pipe\\bleh"));
-}
-
-// Tests if we can create a pipe with a path traversal in the sandbox.
-TEST(NamedPipePolicyTest, CreatePipeTraversal) {
-  TestRunner runner;
-  // TODO(nsylvain): This policy is wrong because "*" is a valid char in a
-  // namedpipe name. Here we apply it like a wildcard. http://b/893603
-  EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
-                             TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
-                              L"\\\\.\\pipe\\test*"));
-
-  EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED,
-            runner.RunTest(L"NamedPipe_Create \\\\.\\pipe\\test\\..\\bleh"));
-  EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED,
-            runner.RunTest(L"NamedPipe_Create \\\\.\\pipe\\test/../bleh"));
-  EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED,
-            runner.RunTest(L"NamedPipe_Create \\\\.\\pipe\\test\\../bleh"));
-  EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED,
-            runner.RunTest(L"NamedPipe_Create \\\\.\\pipe\\test/..\\bleh"));
-}
-
-// This tests that path canonicalization is actually disabled if we use \\?\
-// syntax.
-TEST(NamedPipePolicyTest, CreatePipeCanonicalization) {
-  // "For file I/O, the "\\?\" prefix to a path string tells the Windows APIs to
-  // disable all string parsing and to send the string that follows it straight
-  // to the file system."
-  // http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa365247(VS.85).aspx
-  const wchar_t* argv[2] = { L"\\\\?\\pipe\\test\\..\\bleh",
-                             L"\\Device\\NamedPipe\\test" };
-  EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED,
-            NamedPipe_Create(2, const_cast<wchar_t**>(argv)));
-}
-
-// The same test as CreatePipe but this time using strict interceptions.
-TEST(NamedPipePolicyTest, CreatePipeStrictInterceptions) {
-  TestRunner runner;
-  runner.GetPolicy()->SetStrictInterceptions();
-
-  // TODO(nsylvain): This policy is wrong because "*" is a valid char in a
-  // namedpipe name. Here we apply it like a wildcard. http://b/893603
-  EXPECT_TRUE(runner.AddRule(TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
-                             TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
-                              L"\\\\.\\pipe\\test*"));
-
-  EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED,
-            runner.RunTest(L"NamedPipe_Create \\\\.\\pipe\\testbleh"));
-
-  EXPECT_EQ(SBOX_TEST_DENIED,
-            runner.RunTest(L"NamedPipe_Create \\\\.\\pipe\\bleh"));
-}
-
-}  // namespace sandbox