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Unified Diff: content/common/sandbox_win.cc

Issue 1851213002: Remove sandbox on Windows. (Closed) Base URL: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git@master
Patch Set: fix nacl compile issues Created 4 years, 9 months ago
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Index: content/common/sandbox_win.cc
diff --git a/content/common/sandbox_win.cc b/content/common/sandbox_win.cc
index fe266227ad899e66d818b19bc4c2aa97975a0838..0d3f89b08bcc7ad823a9ce78154bf5a7f21246f1 100644
--- a/content/common/sandbox_win.cc
+++ b/content/common/sandbox_win.cc
@@ -34,394 +34,17 @@
#include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
#include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
#include "content/public/common/sandboxed_process_launcher_delegate.h"
-#include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h"
-#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
-#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h"
-#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy_base.h"
-#include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h"
#if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
#include "ui/gfx/win/direct_write.h" // nogncheck: unused #ifdef NACL_WIN64
#endif // !defined(NACL_WIN64)
-static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL;
-static sandbox::TargetServices* g_target_services = NULL;
+static void* g_broker_services = NULL;
+static void* g_target_services = NULL;
namespace content {
namespace {
-// The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes
-// when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short
-// versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension.
-// For more information about how this list is generated, and how to get off
-// of it, see:
-// https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/third-party-developers
-const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = {
- L"adialhk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security.
- L"acpiz.dll", // Unknown.
- L"activedetect32.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056).
- L"activedetect64.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056).
- L"airfoilinject3.dll", // Airfoil.
- L"akinsofthook32.dll", // Akinsoft Software Engineering.
- L"assistant_x64.dll", // Unknown.
- L"avcuf64.dll", // Bit Defender Internet Security x64.
- L"avgrsstx.dll", // AVG 8.
- L"babylonchromepi.dll", // Babylon translator.
- L"btkeyind.dll", // Widcomm Bluetooth.
- L"cmcsyshk.dll", // CMC Internet Security.
- L"cmsetac.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware).
- L"cooliris.dll", // CoolIris.
- L"cplushook.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware).
- L"dockshellhook.dll", // Stardock Objectdock.
- L"easyhook32.dll", // GDIPP and others.
- L"esspd.dll", // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
- L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll", // Google Desktop Search v5.
- L"fwhook.dll", // PC Tools Firewall Plus.
- L"hookprocesscreation.dll", // Blumentals Program protector.
- L"hookterminateapis.dll", // Blumentals and Cyberprinter.
- L"hookprintapis.dll", // Cyberprinter.
- L"imon.dll", // NOD32 Antivirus.
- L"icatcdll.dll", // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
- L"icdcnl.dll", // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
- L"ioloHL.dll", // Iolo (System Mechanic).
- L"kloehk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security.
- L"lawenforcer.dll", // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro).
- L"libdivx.dll", // DivX.
- L"lvprcinj01.dll", // Logitech QuickCam.
- L"madchook.dll", // Madshi (generic hooking library).
- L"mdnsnsp.dll", // Bonjour.
- L"moonsysh.dll", // Moon Secure Antivirus.
- L"mpk.dll", // KGB Spy.
- L"npdivx32.dll", // DivX.
- L"npggNT.des", // GameGuard 2008.
- L"npggNT.dll", // GameGuard (older).
- L"oawatch.dll", // Online Armor.
- L"pastali32.dll", // PastaLeads.
- L"pavhook.dll", // Panda Internet Security.
- L"pavlsphook.dll", // Panda Antivirus.
- L"pavshook.dll", // Panda Antivirus.
- L"pavshookwow.dll", // Panda Antivirus.
- L"pctavhook.dll", // PC Tools Antivirus.
- L"pctgmhk.dll", // PC Tools Spyware Doctor.
- L"picrmi32.dll", // PicRec.
- L"picrmi64.dll", // PicRec.
- L"prntrack.dll", // Pharos Systems.
- L"protector.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware).
- L"radhslib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
- L"radprlib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
- L"rapportnikko.dll", // Trustware Rapport.
- L"rlhook.dll", // Trustware Bufferzone.
- L"rooksdol.dll", // Trustware Rapport.
- L"rndlpepperbrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
- L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
- L"r3hook.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security.
- L"sahook.dll", // McAfee Site Advisor.
- L"sbrige.dll", // Unknown.
- L"sc2hook.dll", // Supercopier 2.
- L"sdhook32.dll", // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection.
- L"sguard.dll", // Iolo (System Guard).
- L"smum32.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 6.
- L"smumhook.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 5.
- L"ssldivx.dll", // DivX.
- L"syncor11.dll", // SynthCore Midi interface.
- L"systools.dll", // Panda Antivirus.
- L"tfwah.dll", // Threatfire (PC tools).
- L"wblind.dll", // Stardock Object desktop.
- L"wbhelp.dll", // Stardock Object desktop.
- L"windowsapihookdll32.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056).
- L"windowsapihookdll64.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056).
- L"winstylerthemehelper.dll" // Tuneup utilities 2006.
-};
-
-#if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
-// Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|.
-// If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also
-// apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders.
-bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
- base::FilePath directory;
- if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory))
- return false;
-
- if (sub_dir)
- directory = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(directory.Append(sub_dir));
-
- sandbox::ResultCode result;
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
- directory.value().c_str());
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
- std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\";
- if (children)
- directory_str += L"*";
- // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator.
-
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
- directory_str.c_str());
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
- return true;
-}
-#endif // !defined(NACL_WIN64)
-
-// Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|.
-bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) {
- wchar_t path[MAX_PATH];
- DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path));
- if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) {
- // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway.
- return false;
- }
- if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path)))
- return false;
- base::FilePath fname(path);
- return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name);
-}
-
-// Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist.
-// If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll
-// is also loaded in this process.
-void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name,
- bool check_in_browser,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
- HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL;
- if (!module) {
- // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check
- // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes
- // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'.
- std::wstring name(module_name);
- size_t period = name.rfind(L'.');
- DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period);
- DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period));
- if (period <= 8)
- return;
- for (wchar_t ix = '1'; ix <= '3'; ++ix) {
- const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ix, 0};
- std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix;
- alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size());
- if (check_in_browser) {
- module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str());
- if (!module)
- return;
- // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we
- // want to make sure it is the right one.
- if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name))
- return;
- }
- // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy.
- policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str());
- }
- }
- policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name);
- DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name;
- return;
-}
-
-// Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash.
-// Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module
-// does not get a chance to execute any code.
-void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
- for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix)
- BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy);
-}
-
-// Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session.
-base::string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const base::char16* object) {
- // Cache this because it can't change after process creation.
- static DWORD s_session_id = 0;
- if (s_session_id == 0) {
- HANDLE token;
- DWORD session_id_length;
- DWORD session_id = 0;
-
- CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token));
- CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id,
- sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length));
- CloseHandle(token);
- if (session_id)
- s_session_id = session_id;
- }
-
- return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%lu%ls", s_session_id, object);
-}
-
-// Checks if the sandbox should be let to run without a job object assigned.
-bool ShouldSetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line) {
- if (!cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob))
- return true;
-
- // Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other
- // job.
- if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
- return true;
-
- BOOL in_job = true;
- // Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job,
- if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job))
- NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError();
- if (!in_job)
- return true;
-
- // ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set.
- JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {};
- if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL,
- JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &job_info,
- sizeof(job_info), NULL)) {
- NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError();
- return true;
- }
- if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK)
- return true;
-
- return false;
-}
-
-// Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy.
-bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
- sandbox::ResultCode result;
-
- // Renderers need to copy sections for plugin DIBs and GPU.
- // GPU needs to copy sections to renderers.
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
- L"Section");
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
- // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
- // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
- // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
- L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
- // Add the policy for the server side of nacl pipe. It is just a file
- // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
- // "chrome.nacl" so the sandboxed process cannot connect to
- // system services.
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
- L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*");
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
- // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have
- // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix.
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
- L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*");
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
- // Add the policy for debug message only in debug
-#ifndef NDEBUG
- base::FilePath app_dir;
- if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir))
- return false;
-
- wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH];
- DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(),
- long_path_buf,
- MAX_PATH);
- if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH)
- return false;
-
- base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf);
- debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe");
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC,
- debug_message.value().c_str());
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-#endif // NDEBUG
-
- // Add the policy for read-only PDB file access for stack traces.
-#if !defined(OFFICIAL_BUILD)
- base::FilePath exe;
- if (!PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &exe))
- return false;
- base::FilePath pdb_path = exe.DirName().Append(L"*.pdb");
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
- pdb_path.value().c_str());
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(SANITIZER_COVERAGE)
- DWORD coverage_dir_size =
- ::GetEnvironmentVariable(L"SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR", NULL, 0);
- if (coverage_dir_size == 0) {
- LOG(WARNING) << "SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR was not set, coverage won't work.";
- } else {
- std::wstring coverage_dir;
- wchar_t* coverage_dir_str =
- base::WriteInto(&coverage_dir, coverage_dir_size);
- coverage_dir_size = ::GetEnvironmentVariable(
- L"SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR", coverage_dir_str, coverage_dir_size);
- CHECK(coverage_dir.size() == coverage_dir_size);
- base::FilePath sancov_path =
- base::FilePath(coverage_dir).Append(L"*.sancov");
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
- sancov_path.value().c_str());
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
- }
-#endif
-
- AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
- return true;
-}
-
-bool AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
- sandbox::ResultCode result;
- // Renderers need to share events with plugins.
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
- L"Event");
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
- // Win8+ adds a device DeviceApi that we don't need.
- if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_WIN7)
- result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"File", L"\\Device\\DeviceApi");
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
- // Close the proxy settings on XP.
- if (base::win::GetVersion() <= base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003)
- result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Key",
- L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\" \
- L"CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings");
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
- sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
- if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
- // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main
- // token is restricted.
- initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
- }
-
- policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
- // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes.
- policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
- policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
- policy->SetLockdownDefaultDacl();
-
- if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != policy->SetAlternateDesktop(true)) {
- DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
- }
-
- return true;
-}
-
// Updates the command line arguments with debug-related flags. If debug flags
// have been used with this process, they will be filtered and added to
// command_line as needed.
@@ -440,227 +63,8 @@ void ProcessDebugFlags(base::CommandLine* command_line) {
}
}
-// This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of
-// DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes.
-#ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
-base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle;
-
-typedef BOOL (WINAPI *DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr)(HANDLE source_process_handle,
- HANDLE source_handle,
- HANDLE target_process_handle,
- LPHANDLE target_handle,
- DWORD desired_access,
- BOOL inherit_handle,
- DWORD options);
-
-DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle;
-
-NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL;
-
-static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning =
- "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed"
- " process.\n Please use the sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle API or"
- " contact security@chromium.org for assistance.";
-
-void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) {
- // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14).
- BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)];
- OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info =
- reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer);
- ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t);
- NTSTATUS error;
- error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size);
- CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
- type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0';
-
- // Get the object basic information.
- OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info;
- size = sizeof(basic_info);
- error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size,
- &size);
- CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
-
- CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & WRITE_DAC)) <<
- kDuplicateHandleWarning;
-
- if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) {
- const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask =
- ~static_cast<DWORD>(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | SYNCHRONIZE);
- CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) <<
- kDuplicateHandleWarning;
- }
-}
-
-BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle,
- HANDLE source_handle,
- HANDLE target_process_handle,
- LPHANDLE target_handle,
- DWORD desired_access,
- BOOL inherit_handle,
- DWORD options) {
- // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask.
- if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle,
- target_process_handle, target_handle,
- desired_access, inherit_handle, options))
- return FALSE;
-
- // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries.
- if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle ||
- target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess())
- return TRUE;
-
- // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them.
- BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
- if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) {
- // We need a handle with permission to check the job object.
- if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
- HANDLE temp_handle;
- CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(),
- target_process_handle,
- ::GetCurrentProcess(),
- &temp_handle,
- PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
- FALSE, 0));
- base::win::ScopedHandle process(temp_handle);
- CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process.Get(), NULL, &is_in_job));
- }
- }
-
- if (is_in_job) {
- // We never allow inheritable child handles.
- CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning;
-
- // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions.
- HANDLE temp_handle;
- CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle,
- ::GetCurrentProcess(), &temp_handle,
- 0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS));
- base::win::ScopedHandle handle(temp_handle);
-
- // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack.
- CheckDuplicateHandle(handle.Get());
- }
-
- return TRUE;
-}
-#endif
-
-bool IsAppContainerEnabled() {
- if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
- return false;
- const base::CommandLine& command_line =
- *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
- const std::string appcontainer_group_name =
- base::FieldTrialList::FindFullName("EnableAppContainer");
- if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAppContainer))
- return false;
- if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAppContainer))
- return true;
- return base::StartsWith(appcontainer_group_name, "Enabled",
- base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII);
-}
-
} // namespace
-void SetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line,
- sandbox::JobLevel job_level,
- uint32_t ui_exceptions,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
- if (ShouldSetJobLevel(cmd_line)) {
-#ifdef _WIN64
- policy->SetJobMemoryLimit(4ULL * 1024 * 1024 * 1024);
-#endif
- policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions);
- } else {
- policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_NONE, 0);
- }
-}
-
-// TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper.
-// Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first.
-void AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
- // TODO(cpu): Add back the BaseNamedObjects policy.
- base::string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath(
- L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters");
- policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data());
-}
-
-void AddAppContainerPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy, const wchar_t* sid) {
- if (IsAppContainerEnabled())
- policy->SetLowBox(sid);
-}
-
-bool AddWin32kLockdownPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
-#if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
- if (!IsWin32kRendererLockdownEnabled())
- return true;
-
- // Enable win32k lockdown if not already.
- sandbox::MitigationFlags flags = policy->GetProcessMitigations();
- if ((flags & sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE) ==
- sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE)
- return true;
-
- sandbox::ResultCode result =
- policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_WIN32K_LOCKDOWN,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::FAKE_USER_GDI_INIT, nullptr);
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
- flags |= sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE;
- result = policy->SetProcessMitigations(flags);
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-#endif
- return true;
-}
-
-bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) {
- // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
- // See <http://b/1287166>.
- DCHECK(broker_services);
- DCHECK(!g_broker_services);
- sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init();
- g_broker_services = broker_services;
-
- // In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle.
-#ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
- BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
- CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job));
- // In a Syzygy-profiled binary, instrumented for import profiling, this
- // patch will end in infinite recursion on the attempted delegation to the
- // original function.
- if (!base::debug::IsBinaryInstrumented() &&
- !is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) {
- HMODULE module = NULL;
- wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH];
- CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS,
- reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices),
- &module));
- DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH);
- if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) {
- ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject);
- result = g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch(
- module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle",
- DuplicateHandlePatch);
- CHECK(result == 0);
- g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle =
- reinterpret_cast<DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr>(
- g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.original_function());
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
-}
-
-bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services) {
- DCHECK(target_services);
- DCHECK(!g_target_services);
- sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init();
- g_target_services = target_services;
- return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
-}
base::Process StartSandboxedProcess(
SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate* delegate,
@@ -681,152 +85,17 @@ base::Process StartSandboxedProcess(
ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line);
- if ((!delegate->ShouldSandbox()) ||
- browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) ||
- cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
- base::LaunchOptions options;
+ base::LaunchOptions options;
- base::HandlesToInheritVector handles = handles_to_inherit;
- if (!handles_to_inherit.empty()) {
- options.inherit_handles = true;
- options.handles_to_inherit = &handles;
- }
- base::Process process = base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, options);
-
- // TODO(rvargas) crbug.com/417532: Don't share a raw handle.
- g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(process.Handle());
- return process;
+ base::HandlesToInheritVector handles = handles_to_inherit;
+ if (!handles_to_inherit.empty()) {
+ options.inherit_handles = true;
+ options.handles_to_inherit = &handles;
}
- sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
+ base::Process process = base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, options);
- // Add any handles to be inherited to the policy.
- for (HANDLE handle : handles_to_inherit)
- policy->AddHandleToShare(handle);
-
- // Pre-startup mitigations.
- sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations =
- sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
- sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
- sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP |
- sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
- sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP |
- sandbox::MITIGATION_NONSYSTEM_FONT_DISABLE |
- sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_REMOTE |
- sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_LOW_LABEL;
-#if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
- // Don't block font loading with GDI.
- if (!gfx::win::ShouldUseDirectWrite())
- mitigations ^= sandbox::MITIGATION_NONSYSTEM_FONT_DISABLE;
-#endif
-
- if (policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return base::Process();
-
-#if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
- if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess &&
- IsWin32kRendererLockdownEnabled()) {
- if (!AddWin32kLockdownPolicy(policy))
- return base::Process();
- }
-#endif
-
- // Post-startup mitigations.
- mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
- sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
-
- if (policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return base::Process();
-
- SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy);
-
- if (!delegate->DisableDefaultPolicy()) {
- if (!AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(policy))
- return base::Process();
- }
-
-#if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
- // NOTE: This is placed at function scope so that it stays alive through
- // process launch.
- base::SharedMemory direct_write_font_cache_section;
- if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess ||
- type_str == switches::kPpapiPluginProcess) {
- if (gfx::win::ShouldUseDirectWrite()) {
- AddDirectory(base::DIR_WINDOWS_FONTS,
- NULL,
- true,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
- policy);
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- if (type_str != switches::kRendererProcess) {
- // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into
- // this subprocess. See
- // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580
- cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer ");
- }
-
- if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) {
- NOTREACHED();
- return base::Process();
- }
-
- // Allow the renderer and gpu processes to access the log file.
- if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess ||
- type_str == switches::kGpuProcess) {
- if (logging::IsLoggingToFileEnabled()) {
- DCHECK(base::FilePath(logging::GetLogFileFullPath()).IsAbsolute());
- policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
- logging::GetLogFileFullPath().c_str());
- }
- }
-
-#if !defined(OFFICIAL_BUILD)
- // If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will
- // have no effect.
- policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE));
- policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE));
-#endif
-
- if (!delegate->PreSpawnTarget(policy))
- return base::Process();
-
- TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN0("startup", "StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS");
-
- PROCESS_INFORMATION temp_process_info = {};
- sandbox::ResultCode result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget(
- cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(),
- cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(), policy, &temp_process_info);
- DWORD last_error = ::GetLastError();
- base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target(temp_process_info);
-
- TRACE_EVENT_END0("startup", "StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS");
-
- if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
- if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC)
- DPLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process";
- else if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_CREATE_PROCESS) {
- // TODO(shrikant): Remove this special case handling after determining
- // cause for lowbox/createprocess errors.
- sandbox::PolicyBase* policy_base =
- static_cast<sandbox::PolicyBase*>(policy);
- UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY(policy_base->GetLowBoxSid() ?
- "Process.Sandbox.Lowbox.Launch.Error" :
- "Process.Sandbox.Launch.Error",
- last_error);
- } else
- DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result;
-
- return base::Process();
- }
-
- delegate->PostSpawnTarget(target.process_handle());
-
- CHECK(ResumeThread(target.thread_handle()) != static_cast<DWORD>(-1));
- return base::Process(target.TakeProcessHandle());
+ return process;
}
bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle,
@@ -841,14 +110,6 @@ bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle,
desired_access, FALSE, options);
}
- // Try the broker next
- if (g_target_services &&
- g_target_services->DuplicateHandle(source_handle, target_process_id,
- target_handle, desired_access,
- options) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
- return true;
- }
-
// Finally, see if we already have access to the process.
base::win::ScopedHandle target_process;
target_process.Set(::OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE,
@@ -862,8 +123,4 @@ bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle,
return false;
}
-bool BrokerAddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process) {
- return g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(peer_process) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
-}
-
} // namespace content
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