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| 1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. | |
| 2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be | |
| 3 // found in the LICENSE file. | |
| 4 | |
| 5 #ifndef SANDBOX_WIN_SRC_SANDBOX_POLICY_H_ | |
| 6 #define SANDBOX_WIN_SRC_SANDBOX_POLICY_H_ | |
| 7 | |
| 8 #include <stddef.h> | |
| 9 #include <stdint.h> | |
| 10 | |
| 11 #include "base/strings/string16.h" | |
| 12 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_types.h" | |
| 13 #include "sandbox/win/src/security_level.h" | |
| 14 | |
| 15 namespace sandbox { | |
| 16 | |
| 17 class TargetPolicy { | |
| 18 public: | |
| 19 // Windows subsystems that can have specific rules. | |
| 20 // Note: The process subsystem(SUBSY_PROCESS) does not evaluate the request | |
| 21 // exactly like the CreateProcess API does. See the comment at the top of | |
| 22 // process_thread_dispatcher.cc for more details. | |
| 23 enum SubSystem { | |
| 24 SUBSYS_FILES, // Creation and opening of files and pipes. | |
| 25 SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, // Creation of named pipes. | |
| 26 SUBSYS_PROCESS, // Creation of child processes. | |
| 27 SUBSYS_REGISTRY, // Creation and opening of registry keys. | |
| 28 SUBSYS_SYNC, // Creation of named sync objects. | |
| 29 SUBSYS_HANDLES, // Duplication of handles to other processes. | |
| 30 SUBSYS_WIN32K_LOCKDOWN // Win32K Lockdown related policy. | |
| 31 }; | |
| 32 | |
| 33 // Allowable semantics when a rule is matched. | |
| 34 enum Semantics { | |
| 35 FILES_ALLOW_ANY, // Allows open or create for any kind of access that | |
| 36 // the file system supports. | |
| 37 FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, // Allows open or create with read access only. | |
| 38 FILES_ALLOW_QUERY, // Allows access to query the attributes of a file. | |
| 39 FILES_ALLOW_DIR_ANY, // Allows open or create with directory semantics | |
| 40 // only. | |
| 41 HANDLES_DUP_ANY, // Allows duplicating handles opened with any | |
| 42 // access permissions. | |
| 43 HANDLES_DUP_BROKER, // Allows duplicating handles to the broker process. | |
| 44 NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, // Allows creation of a named pipe. | |
| 45 PROCESS_MIN_EXEC, // Allows to create a process with minimal rights | |
| 46 // over the resulting process and thread handles. | |
| 47 // No other parameters besides the command line are | |
| 48 // passed to the child process. | |
| 49 PROCESS_ALL_EXEC, // Allows the creation of a process and return full | |
| 50 // access on the returned handles. | |
| 51 // This flag can be used only when the main token of | |
| 52 // the sandboxed application is at least INTERACTIVE. | |
| 53 EVENTS_ALLOW_ANY, // Allows the creation of an event with full access. | |
| 54 EVENTS_ALLOW_READONLY, // Allows opening an even with synchronize access. | |
| 55 REG_ALLOW_READONLY, // Allows readonly access to a registry key. | |
| 56 REG_ALLOW_ANY, // Allows read and write access to a registry key. | |
| 57 FAKE_USER_GDI_INIT // Fakes user32 and gdi32 initialization. This can | |
| 58 // be used to allow the DLLs to load and initialize | |
| 59 // even if the process cannot access that subsystem. | |
| 60 }; | |
| 61 | |
| 62 // Increments the reference count of this object. The reference count must | |
| 63 // be incremented if this interface is given to another component. | |
| 64 virtual void AddRef() = 0; | |
| 65 | |
| 66 // Decrements the reference count of this object. When the reference count | |
| 67 // is zero the object is automatically destroyed. | |
| 68 // Indicates that the caller is done with this interface. After calling | |
| 69 // release no other method should be called. | |
| 70 virtual void Release() = 0; | |
| 71 | |
| 72 // Sets the security level for the target process' two tokens. | |
| 73 // This setting is permanent and cannot be changed once the target process is | |
| 74 // spawned. | |
| 75 // initial: the security level for the initial token. This is the token that | |
| 76 // is used by the process from the creation of the process until the moment | |
| 77 // the process calls TargetServices::LowerToken() or the process calls | |
| 78 // win32's RevertToSelf(). Once this happens the initial token is no longer | |
| 79 // available and the lockdown token is in effect. Using an initial token is | |
| 80 // not compatible with AppContainer, see SetAppContainer. | |
| 81 // lockdown: the security level for the token that comes into force after the | |
| 82 // process calls TargetServices::LowerToken() or the process calls | |
| 83 // RevertToSelf(). See the explanation of each level in the TokenLevel | |
| 84 // definition. | |
| 85 // Return value: SBOX_ALL_OK if the setting succeeds and false otherwise. | |
| 86 // Returns false if the lockdown value is more permissive than the initial | |
| 87 // value. | |
| 88 // | |
| 89 // Important: most of the sandbox-provided security relies on this single | |
| 90 // setting. The caller should strive to set the lockdown level as restricted | |
| 91 // as possible. | |
| 92 virtual ResultCode SetTokenLevel(TokenLevel initial, TokenLevel lockdown) = 0; | |
| 93 | |
| 94 // Returns the initial token level. | |
| 95 virtual TokenLevel GetInitialTokenLevel() const = 0; | |
| 96 | |
| 97 // Returns the lockdown token level. | |
| 98 virtual TokenLevel GetLockdownTokenLevel() const = 0; | |
| 99 | |
| 100 // Sets the security level of the Job Object to which the target process will | |
| 101 // belong. This setting is permanent and cannot be changed once the target | |
| 102 // process is spawned. The job controls the global security settings which | |
| 103 // can not be specified in the token security profile. | |
| 104 // job_level: the security level for the job. See the explanation of each | |
| 105 // level in the JobLevel definition. | |
| 106 // ui_exceptions: specify what specific rights that are disabled in the | |
| 107 // chosen job_level that need to be granted. Use this parameter to avoid | |
| 108 // selecting the next permissive job level unless you need all the rights | |
| 109 // that are granted in such level. | |
| 110 // The exceptions can be specified as a combination of the following | |
| 111 // constants: | |
| 112 // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_HANDLES : grant access to all user-mode handles. These | |
| 113 // include windows, icons, menus and various GDI objects. In addition the | |
| 114 // target process can set hooks, and broadcast messages to other processes | |
| 115 // that belong to the same desktop. | |
| 116 // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_READCLIPBOARD : grant read-only access to the clipboard. | |
| 117 // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_WRITECLIPBOARD : grant write access to the clipboard. | |
| 118 // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_SYSTEMPARAMETERS : allow changes to the system-wide | |
| 119 // parameters as defined by the Win32 call SystemParametersInfo(). | |
| 120 // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DISPLAYSETTINGS : allow programmatic changes to the | |
| 121 // display settings. | |
| 122 // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_GLOBALATOMS : allow access to the global atoms table. | |
| 123 // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DESKTOP : allow the creation of new desktops. | |
| 124 // JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_EXITWINDOWS : allow the call to ExitWindows(). | |
| 125 // | |
| 126 // Return value: SBOX_ALL_OK if the setting succeeds and false otherwise. | |
| 127 // | |
| 128 // Note: JOB_OBJECT_XXXX constants are defined in winnt.h and documented at | |
| 129 // length in: | |
| 130 // http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms684152.aspx | |
| 131 // | |
| 132 // Note: the recommended level is JOB_RESTRICTED or JOB_LOCKDOWN. | |
| 133 virtual ResultCode SetJobLevel(JobLevel job_level, | |
| 134 uint32_t ui_exceptions) = 0; | |
| 135 | |
| 136 // Returns the job level. | |
| 137 virtual JobLevel GetJobLevel() const = 0; | |
| 138 | |
| 139 // Sets a hard limit on the size of the commit set for the sandboxed process. | |
| 140 // If the limit is reached, the process will be terminated with | |
| 141 // SBOX_FATAL_MEMORY_EXCEEDED (7012). | |
| 142 virtual ResultCode SetJobMemoryLimit(size_t memory_limit) = 0; | |
| 143 | |
| 144 // Specifies the desktop on which the application is going to run. If the | |
| 145 // desktop does not exist, it will be created. If alternate_winstation is | |
| 146 // set to true, the desktop will be created on an alternate window station. | |
| 147 virtual ResultCode SetAlternateDesktop(bool alternate_winstation) = 0; | |
| 148 | |
| 149 // Returns the name of the alternate desktop used. If an alternate window | |
| 150 // station is specified, the name is prepended by the window station name, | |
| 151 // followed by a backslash. | |
| 152 virtual base::string16 GetAlternateDesktop() const = 0; | |
| 153 | |
| 154 // Precreates the desktop and window station, if any. | |
| 155 virtual ResultCode CreateAlternateDesktop(bool alternate_winstation) = 0; | |
| 156 | |
| 157 // Destroys the desktop and windows station. | |
| 158 virtual void DestroyAlternateDesktop() = 0; | |
| 159 | |
| 160 // Sets the integrity level of the process in the sandbox. Both the initial | |
| 161 // token and the main token will be affected by this. If the integrity level | |
| 162 // is set to a level higher than the current level, the sandbox will fail | |
| 163 // to start. | |
| 164 virtual ResultCode SetIntegrityLevel(IntegrityLevel level) = 0; | |
| 165 | |
| 166 // Returns the initial integrity level used. | |
| 167 virtual IntegrityLevel GetIntegrityLevel() const = 0; | |
| 168 | |
| 169 // Sets the integrity level of the process in the sandbox. The integrity level | |
| 170 // will not take effect before you call LowerToken. User Interface Privilege | |
| 171 // Isolation is not affected by this setting and will remain off for the | |
| 172 // process in the sandbox. If the integrity level is set to a level higher | |
| 173 // than the current level, the sandbox will fail to start. | |
| 174 virtual ResultCode SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(IntegrityLevel level) = 0; | |
| 175 | |
| 176 // Sets the AppContainer to be used for the sandboxed process. Any capability | |
| 177 // to be enabled for the process should be added before this method is invoked | |
| 178 // (by calling SetCapability() as many times as needed). | |
| 179 // The desired AppContainer must be already installed on the system, otherwise | |
| 180 // launching the sandboxed process will fail. See BrokerServices for details | |
| 181 // about installing an AppContainer. | |
| 182 // Note that currently Windows restricts the use of impersonation within | |
| 183 // AppContainers, so this function is incompatible with the use of an initial | |
| 184 // token. | |
| 185 virtual ResultCode SetAppContainer(const wchar_t* sid) = 0; | |
| 186 | |
| 187 // Sets a capability to be enabled for the sandboxed process' AppContainer. | |
| 188 virtual ResultCode SetCapability(const wchar_t* sid) = 0; | |
| 189 | |
| 190 // Sets the LowBox token for sandboxed process. This is mutually exclusive | |
| 191 // with SetAppContainer method. | |
| 192 virtual ResultCode SetLowBox(const wchar_t* sid) = 0; | |
| 193 | |
| 194 // Sets the mitigations enabled when the process is created. Most of these | |
| 195 // are implemented as attributes passed via STARTUPINFOEX. So they take | |
| 196 // effect before any thread in the target executes. The declaration of | |
| 197 // MitigationFlags is followed by a detailed description of each flag. | |
| 198 virtual ResultCode SetProcessMitigations(MitigationFlags flags) = 0; | |
| 199 | |
| 200 // Returns the currently set mitigation flags. | |
| 201 virtual MitigationFlags GetProcessMitigations() = 0; | |
| 202 | |
| 203 // Sets process mitigation flags that don't take effect before the call to | |
| 204 // LowerToken(). | |
| 205 virtual ResultCode SetDelayedProcessMitigations(MitigationFlags flags) = 0; | |
| 206 | |
| 207 // Returns the currently set delayed mitigation flags. | |
| 208 virtual MitigationFlags GetDelayedProcessMitigations() const = 0; | |
| 209 | |
| 210 // Disconnect the target from CSRSS when TargetServices::LowerToken() is | |
| 211 // called inside the target. | |
| 212 virtual void SetDisconnectCsrss() = 0; | |
| 213 | |
| 214 // Sets the interceptions to operate in strict mode. By default, interceptions | |
| 215 // are performed in "relaxed" mode, where if something inside NTDLL.DLL is | |
| 216 // already patched we attempt to intercept it anyway. Setting interceptions | |
| 217 // to strict mode means that when we detect that the function is patched we'll | |
| 218 // refuse to perform the interception. | |
| 219 virtual void SetStrictInterceptions() = 0; | |
| 220 | |
| 221 // Set the handles the target process should inherit for stdout and | |
| 222 // stderr. The handles the caller passes must remain valid for the | |
| 223 // lifetime of the policy object. This only has an effect on | |
| 224 // Windows Vista and later versions. These methods accept pipe and | |
| 225 // file handles, but not console handles. | |
| 226 virtual ResultCode SetStdoutHandle(HANDLE handle) = 0; | |
| 227 virtual ResultCode SetStderrHandle(HANDLE handle) = 0; | |
| 228 | |
| 229 // Adds a policy rule effective for processes spawned using this policy. | |
| 230 // subsystem: One of the above enumerated windows subsystems. | |
| 231 // semantics: One of the above enumerated FileSemantics. | |
| 232 // pattern: A specific full path or a full path with wildcard patterns. | |
| 233 // The valid wildcards are: | |
| 234 // '*' : Matches zero or more character. Only one in series allowed. | |
| 235 // '?' : Matches a single character. One or more in series are allowed. | |
| 236 // Examples: | |
| 237 // "c:\\documents and settings\\vince\\*.dmp" | |
| 238 // "c:\\documents and settings\\*\\crashdumps\\*.dmp" | |
| 239 // "c:\\temp\\app_log_?????_chrome.txt" | |
| 240 virtual ResultCode AddRule(SubSystem subsystem, Semantics semantics, | |
| 241 const wchar_t* pattern) = 0; | |
| 242 | |
| 243 // Adds a dll that will be unloaded in the target process before it gets | |
| 244 // a chance to initialize itself. Typically, dlls that cause the target | |
| 245 // to crash go here. | |
| 246 virtual ResultCode AddDllToUnload(const wchar_t* dll_name) = 0; | |
| 247 | |
| 248 // Adds a handle that will be closed in the target process after lockdown. | |
| 249 // A NULL value for handle_name indicates all handles of the specified type. | |
| 250 // An empty string for handle_name indicates the handle is unnamed. | |
| 251 virtual ResultCode AddKernelObjectToClose(const wchar_t* handle_type, | |
| 252 const wchar_t* handle_name) = 0; | |
| 253 | |
| 254 // Adds a handle that will be shared with the target process. Does not take | |
| 255 // ownership of the handle. | |
| 256 virtual void AddHandleToShare(HANDLE handle) = 0; | |
| 257 | |
| 258 // Locks down the default DACL of the created lockdown and initial tokens | |
| 259 // to restrict what other processes are allowed to access a process' kernel | |
| 260 // resources. | |
| 261 virtual void SetLockdownDefaultDacl() = 0; | |
| 262 }; | |
| 263 | |
| 264 } // namespace sandbox | |
| 265 | |
| 266 | |
| 267 #endif // SANDBOX_WIN_SRC_SANDBOX_POLICY_H_ | |
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