Uprev NSS to 3.23 on iOS

net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c

Index: net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c
diff --git a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c
index bdf470b0cf0f1a9672d400da13152e9ca6f89872..48d615ec0de5472440fa3d61fb2ec8831efd4c8b 100644
--- a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c
+++ b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslgathr.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Gather (Read) entire SSL2 records from socket into buffer.  
+ * Gather (Read) entire SSL2 records from socket into buffer.
  *
  * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ static SECStatus ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(sslSocket *ss);
 ** and is to be called multiple times until ss->sec.recordLen != 0.
 ** This function decrypts the gathered record in place, in gs_buf.
  *
- * Caller must hold RecvBufLock. 
+ * Caller must hold RecvBufLock.
  *
  * Returns +1 when it has gathered a complete SSLV2 record.
  * Returns  0 if it hits EOF.
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static SECStatus ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(sslSocket *ss);
 **             advance to one of two states, depending on whether the record
 **             is encrypted (GS_MAC), or unencrypted (GS_DATA).
 **
-** GS_MAC    - The machine is in this state while waiting for the remainder 
+** GS_MAC    - The machine is in this state while waiting for the remainder
 **             of the SSL2 record to be read in.  When the read is completed,
 **             the machine checks the record for valid length, decrypts it,
 **             and checks and discards the MAC, then advances to GS_INIT.
@@ -50,295 +50,291 @@ static SECStatus ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(sslSocket *ss);
 **             of the unencrypted SSL2 record to be read in.  Upon completion,
 **             the machine advances to the GS_INIT state and returns the data.
 */
-int 
+int
 ssl2_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags)
 {
-    unsigned char *  bp;
-    unsigned char *  pBuf;
-    int              nb, err, rv;
+    unsigned char *bp;
+    unsigned char *pBuf;
+    int nb, err, rv;
 
-    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
+    PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
 
     if (gs->state == GS_INIT) {
-	/* Initialize gathering engine */
-	gs->state         = GS_HEADER;
-	gs->remainder     = 3;
-	gs->count         = 3;
-	gs->offset        = 0;
-	gs->recordLen     = 0;
-	gs->recordPadding = 0;
-	gs->hdr[2]        = 0;
-
-	gs->writeOffset   = 0;
-	gs->readOffset    = 0;
+        /* Initialize gathering engine */
+        gs->state = GS_HEADER;
+        gs->remainder = 3;
+        gs->count = 3;
+        gs->offset = 0;
+        gs->recordLen = 0;
+        gs->recordPadding = 0;
+        gs->hdr[2] = 0;
+
+        gs->writeOffset = 0;
+        gs->readOffset = 0;
     }
     if (gs->encrypted) {
-	PORT_Assert(ss->sec.hash != 0);
+        PORT_Assert(ss->sec.hash != 0);
     }
 
     pBuf = gs->buf.buf;
     for (;;) {
-	SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL[%d]: gather state %d (need %d more)",
-		     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->state, gs->remainder));
-	bp = ((gs->state != GS_HEADER) ? pBuf : gs->hdr) + gs->offset;
-	nb = ssl_DefRecv(ss, bp, gs->remainder, flags);
-	if (nb > 0) {
-	    PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "raw gather data:", bp, nb));
-	}
-	if (nb == 0) {
-	    /* EOF */
-	    SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL[%d]: EOF", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-	    rv = 0;
-	    break;
-	}
-	if (nb < 0) {
-	    SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: recv error %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
-		     PR_GetError()));
-	    rv = SECFailure;
-	    break;
-	}
-
-	gs->offset    += nb;
-	gs->remainder -= nb;
-
-	if (gs->remainder > 0) {
-	    continue;
-	}
-
-	/* Probably finished this piece */
-	switch (gs->state) {
-	case GS_HEADER: 
-	    if (!SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange) && !ss->firstHsDone) {
-
-		PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
-
-		/* If this looks like an SSL3 handshake record, 
-		** and we're expecting an SSL2 Hello message from our peer, 
-		** handle it here.
-		*/
-		if (gs->hdr[0] == content_handshake) {
-		    if ((ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage) ||
-			(ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage)) {
-			rv = ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(ss);
-			if (rv == SECFailure) {
-			    return SECFailure;
-			}
-		    }
-		    /* XXX_1	The call stack to here is:
-		     * ssl_Do1stHandshake -> ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake -> 
-		     *			ssl2_GatherRecord -> here.
-		     * We want to return all the way out to ssl_Do1stHandshake,
-		     * and have it call ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake again. 
-		     * ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake will call 
-		     * ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake when it is called again.
-		     *
-		     * Returning SECWouldBlock here causes 
-		     * ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake to return without clearing 
-		     * ss->handshake, ensuring that ssl_Do1stHandshake will 
-		     * call it again immediately.
-		     * 
-		     * If we return 1 here, ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake will 
-		     * clear ss->handshake before returning, and thus will not 
-		     * be called again by ssl_Do1stHandshake.  
-		     */
-		    return SECWouldBlock;
-		} else if (gs->hdr[0] == content_alert) {
-		    if (ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage) {
-			/* XXX This is a hack.  We're assuming that any failure
-			 * XXX on the client hello is a failure to match
-			 * XXX ciphers.
-			 */
-			PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
-			return SECFailure;
-		    }
-		}
-	    }
-
-	    /* we've got the first 3 bytes.  The header may be two or three. */
-	    if (gs->hdr[0] & 0x80) {
-		/* This record has a 2-byte header, and no padding */
-		gs->count = ((gs->hdr[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | gs->hdr[1];
-		gs->recordPadding = 0;
-	    } else {
-		/* This record has a 3-byte header that is all read in now. */
-		gs->count = ((gs->hdr[0] & 0x3f) << 8) | gs->hdr[1];
-	    /*  is_escape =  (gs->hdr[0] & 0x40) != 0; */
-		gs->recordPadding = gs->hdr[2];
-	    }
-	    if (!gs->count) {
-		PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
-		goto cleanup;
-	    }
-
-	    if (gs->count > gs->buf.space) {
-		err = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, gs->count);
-		if (err) {
-		    return err;
-		}
-		pBuf = gs->buf.buf;
-	    }
-
-
-	    if (gs->hdr[0] & 0x80) {
-	    	/* we've already read in the first byte of the body.
-		** Put it into the buffer.
-		*/
-		pBuf[0]        = gs->hdr[2];
-		gs->offset    = 1;
-		gs->remainder = gs->count - 1;
-	    } else {
-		gs->offset    = 0;
-		gs->remainder = gs->count;
-	    }
-
-	    if (gs->encrypted) {
-		gs->state     = GS_MAC;
-		gs->recordLen = gs->count - gs->recordPadding
-		                          - ss->sec.hash->length;
-	    } else {
-		gs->state     = GS_DATA;
-		gs->recordLen = gs->count;
-	    }
-
-	    break;
-
-
-	case GS_MAC:
-	    /* Have read in entire rest of the ciphertext.  
-	    ** Check for valid length.
-	    ** Decrypt it.
-	    ** Check the MAC.
-	    */
-	    PORT_Assert(gs->encrypted);
-
-	  {
-	    unsigned int     macLen;
-	    int              nout;
-	    unsigned char    mac[SSL_MAX_MAC_BYTES];
-
-	    ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /**********************************/
-
-	    /* If this is a stream cipher, blockSize will be 1,
-	     * and this test will always be false.
-	     * If this is a block cipher, this will detect records
-	     * that are not a multiple of the blocksize in length.
-	     */
-	    if (gs->count & (ss->sec.blockSize - 1)) {
-		/* This is an error. Sender is misbehaving */
-		SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: sender, count=%d blockSize=%d",
-			 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->count,
-			 ss->sec.blockSize));
-		PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING);
-		rv = SECFailure;
-		goto spec_locked_done;
-	    }
-	    PORT_Assert(gs->count == gs->offset);
-
-	    if (gs->offset == 0) {
-		rv = 0;			/* means EOF. */
-		goto spec_locked_done;
-	    }
-
-	    /* Decrypt the portion of data that we just received.
-	    ** Decrypt it in place.
-	    */
-	    rv = (*ss->sec.dec)(ss->sec.readcx, pBuf, &nout, gs->offset,
-			     pBuf, gs->offset);
-	    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-		goto spec_locked_done;
-	    }
-
-
-	    /* Have read in all the MAC portion of record 
-	    **
-	    ** Prepare MAC by resetting it and feeding it the shared secret
-	    */
-	    macLen = ss->sec.hash->length;
-	    if (gs->offset >= macLen) {
-		PRUint32           sequenceNumber = ss->sec.rcvSequence++;
-		unsigned char    seq[4];
-
-		seq[0] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber >> 24);
-		seq[1] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber >> 16);
-		seq[2] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber >> 8);
-		seq[3] = (unsigned char) (sequenceNumber);
-
-		(*ss->sec.hash->begin)(ss->sec.hashcx);
-		(*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, ss->sec.rcvSecret.data,
-				        ss->sec.rcvSecret.len);
-		(*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, pBuf + macLen, 
-				        gs->offset - macLen);
-		(*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, seq, 4);
-		(*ss->sec.hash->end)(ss->sec.hashcx, mac, &macLen, macLen);
-
-		PORT_Assert(macLen == ss->sec.hash->length);
-
-		ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);  /******************************/
-
-		if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(mac, pBuf, macLen) != 0) {
-		    /* MAC's didn't match... */
-		    SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: mac check failed, seq=%d",
-			     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.rcvSequence));
-		    PRINT_BUF(1, (ss, "computed mac:", mac, macLen));
-		    PRINT_BUF(1, (ss, "received mac:", pBuf, macLen));
-		    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
-		    rv = SECFailure;
-		    goto cleanup;
-		}
-	    } else {
-		ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);  /******************************/
-	    }
-
-	    if (gs->recordPadding + macLen <= gs->offset) {
-		gs->recordOffset  = macLen;
-		gs->readOffset    = macLen;
-		gs->writeOffset   = gs->offset - gs->recordPadding;
-		rv = 1;
-	    } else {
-		PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING);
-cleanup:
-		/* nothing in the buffer any more. */
-		gs->recordOffset  = 0;
-		gs->readOffset    = 0;
-	    	gs->writeOffset   = 0;
-		rv = SECFailure;
-	    }
-
-	    gs->recordLen     = gs->writeOffset - gs->readOffset;
-	    gs->recordPadding = 0;	/* forget we did any padding. */
-	    gs->state = GS_INIT;
-
-
-	    if (rv > 0) {
-		PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "recv clear record:", 
-		               pBuf + gs->recordOffset, gs->recordLen));
-	    }
-	    return rv;
-
-spec_locked_done:
-	    ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
-	    return rv;
-	  }
-
-	case GS_DATA:
-	    /* Have read in all the DATA portion of record */
-
-	    gs->recordOffset  = 0;
-	    gs->readOffset    = 0;
-	    gs->writeOffset   = gs->offset;
-	    PORT_Assert(gs->recordLen == gs->writeOffset - gs->readOffset);
-	    gs->recordLen     = gs->offset;
-	    gs->recordPadding = 0;
-	    gs->state         = GS_INIT;
-
-	    ++ss->sec.rcvSequence;
-
-	    PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "recv clear record:", 
-	                   pBuf + gs->recordOffset, gs->recordLen));
-	    return 1;
-
-	}	/* end switch gs->state */
-    }		/* end gather loop. */
+        SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL[%d]: gather state %d (need %d more)",
+                     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->state, gs->remainder));
+        bp = ((gs->state != GS_HEADER) ? pBuf : gs->hdr) + gs->offset;
+        nb = ssl_DefRecv(ss, bp, gs->remainder, flags);
+        if (nb > 0) {
+            PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "raw gather data:", bp, nb));
+        }
+        if (nb == 0) {
+            /* EOF */
+            SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL[%d]: EOF", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+            rv = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+        if (nb < 0) {
+            SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: recv error %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
+                     PR_GetError()));
+            rv = SECFailure;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        gs->offset += nb;
+        gs->remainder -= nb;
+
+        if (gs->remainder > 0) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /* Probably finished this piece */
+        switch (gs->state) {
+            case GS_HEADER:
+                if (!SSL3_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange) && !ss->firstHsDone) {
+
+                    PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss));
+
+                    /* If this looks like an SSL3 handshake record,
+                    ** and we're expecting an SSL2 Hello message from our peer,
+                    ** handle it here.
+                    */
+                    if (gs->hdr[0] == content_handshake) {
+                        if ((ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage) ||
+                            (ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage)) {
+                            rv = ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(ss);
+                            if (rv == SECFailure) {
+                                return SECFailure;
+                            }
+                        }
+                        /* XXX_1    The call stack to here is:
+                         * ssl_Do1stHandshake -> ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake ->
+                         *          ssl2_GatherRecord -> here.
+                         * We want to return all the way out to ssl_Do1stHandshake,
+                         * and have it call ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake again.
+                         * ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake will call
+                         * ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake when it is called again.
+                         *
+                         * Returning SECWouldBlock here causes
+                         * ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake to return without clearing
+                         * ss->handshake, ensuring that ssl_Do1stHandshake will
+                         * call it again immediately.
+                         *
+                         * If we return 1 here, ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake will
+                         * clear ss->handshake before returning, and thus will not
+                         * be called again by ssl_Do1stHandshake.
+                         */
+                        return SECWouldBlock;
+                    } else if (gs->hdr[0] == content_alert) {
+                        if (ss->nextHandshake == ssl2_HandleServerHelloMessage) {
+                            /* XXX This is a hack.  We're assuming that any failure
+                             * XXX on the client hello is a failure to match
+                             * XXX ciphers.
+                             */
+                            PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP);
+                            return SECFailure;
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+
+                /* we've got the first 3 bytes.  The header may be two or three. */
+                if (gs->hdr[0] & 0x80) {
+                    /* This record has a 2-byte header, and no padding */
+                    gs->count = ((gs->hdr[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | gs->hdr[1];
+                    gs->recordPadding = 0;
+                } else {
+                    /* This record has a 3-byte header that is all read in now. */
+                    gs->count = ((gs->hdr[0] & 0x3f) << 8) | gs->hdr[1];
+                    /*  is_escape =  (gs->hdr[0] & 0x40) != 0; */
+                    gs->recordPadding = gs->hdr[2];
+                }
+                if (!gs->count) {
+                    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
+                    goto cleanup;
+                }
+
+                if (gs->count > gs->buf.space) {
+                    err = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, gs->count);
+                    if (err) {
+                        return err;
+                    }
+                    pBuf = gs->buf.buf;
+                }
+
+                if (gs->hdr[0] & 0x80) {
+                    /* we've already read in the first byte of the body.
+                    ** Put it into the buffer.
+                    */
+                    pBuf[0] = gs->hdr[2];
+                    gs->offset = 1;
+                    gs->remainder = gs->count - 1;
+                } else {
+                    gs->offset = 0;
+                    gs->remainder = gs->count;
+                }
+
+                if (gs->encrypted) {
+                    gs->state = GS_MAC;
+                    gs->recordLen = gs->count - gs->recordPadding -
+                                    ss->sec.hash->length;
+                } else {
+                    gs->state = GS_DATA;
+                    gs->recordLen = gs->count;
+                }
+
+                break;
+
+            case GS_MAC:
+                /* Have read in entire rest of the ciphertext.
+                ** Check for valid length.
+                ** Decrypt it.
+                ** Check the MAC.
+                */
+                PORT_Assert(gs->encrypted);
+
+                {
+                    unsigned int macLen;
+                    int nout;
+                    unsigned char mac[SSL_MAX_MAC_BYTES];
+
+                    ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /**********************************/
+
+                    /* If this is a stream cipher, blockSize will be 1,
+                     * and this test will always be false.
+                     * If this is a block cipher, this will detect records
+                     * that are not a multiple of the blocksize in length.
+                     */
+                    if (gs->count & (ss->sec.blockSize - 1)) {
+                        /* This is an error. Sender is misbehaving */
+                        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: sender, count=%d blockSize=%d",
+                                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->count,
+                                 ss->sec.blockSize));
+                        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING);
+                        rv = SECFailure;
+                        goto spec_locked_done;
+                    }
+                    PORT_Assert(gs->count == gs->offset);
+
+                    if (gs->offset == 0) {
+                        rv = 0; /* means EOF. */
+                        goto spec_locked_done;
+                    }
+
+                    /* Decrypt the portion of data that we just received.
+                    ** Decrypt it in place.
+                    */
+                    rv = (*ss->sec.dec)(ss->sec.readcx, pBuf, &nout, gs->offset,
+                                        pBuf, gs->offset);
+                    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                        goto spec_locked_done;
+                    }
+
+                    /* Have read in all the MAC portion of record
+                    **
+                    ** Prepare MAC by resetting it and feeding it the shared secret
+                    */
+                    macLen = ss->sec.hash->length;
+                    if (gs->offset >= macLen) {
+                        PRUint32 sequenceNumber = ss->sec.rcvSequence++;
+                        unsigned char seq[4];
+
+                        seq[0] = (unsigned char)(sequenceNumber >> 24);
+                        seq[1] = (unsigned char)(sequenceNumber >> 16);
+                        seq[2] = (unsigned char)(sequenceNumber >> 8);
+                        seq[3] = (unsigned char)(sequenceNumber);
+
+                        (*ss->sec.hash->begin)(ss->sec.hashcx);
+                        (*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, ss->sec.rcvSecret.data,
+                                                ss->sec.rcvSecret.len);
+                        (*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, pBuf + macLen,
+                                                gs->offset - macLen);
+                        (*ss->sec.hash->update)(ss->sec.hashcx, seq, 4);
+                        (*ss->sec.hash->end)(ss->sec.hashcx, mac, &macLen, macLen);
+
+                        PORT_Assert(macLen == ss->sec.hash->length);
+
+                        ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /******************************/
+
+                        if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(mac, pBuf, macLen) != 0) {
+                            /* MAC's didn't match... */
+                            SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: mac check failed, seq=%d",
+                                     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.rcvSequence));
+                            PRINT_BUF(1, (ss, "computed mac:", mac, macLen));
+                            PRINT_BUF(1, (ss, "received mac:", pBuf, macLen));
+                            PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
+                            rv = SECFailure;
+                            goto cleanup;
+                        }
+                    } else {
+                        ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /******************************/
+                    }
+
+                    if (gs->recordPadding + macLen <= gs->offset) {
+                        gs->recordOffset = macLen;
+                        gs->readOffset = macLen;
+                        gs->writeOffset = gs->offset - gs->recordPadding;
+                        rv = 1;
+                    } else {
+                        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING);
+                    cleanup:
+                        /* nothing in the buffer any more. */
+                        gs->recordOffset = 0;
+                        gs->readOffset = 0;
+                        gs->writeOffset = 0;
+                        rv = SECFailure;
+                    }
+
+                    gs->recordLen = gs->writeOffset - gs->readOffset;
+                    gs->recordPadding = 0; /* forget we did any padding. */
+                    gs->state = GS_INIT;
+
+                    if (rv > 0) {
+                        PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "recv clear record:",
+                                       pBuf + gs->recordOffset, gs->recordLen));
+                    }
+                    return rv;
+
+                spec_locked_done:
+                    ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+                    return rv;
+                }
+
+            case GS_DATA:
+                /* Have read in all the DATA portion of record */
+
+                gs->recordOffset = 0;
+                gs->readOffset = 0;
+                gs->writeOffset = gs->offset;
+                PORT_Assert(gs->recordLen == gs->writeOffset - gs->readOffset);
+                gs->recordLen = gs->offset;
+                gs->recordPadding = 0;
+                gs->state = GS_INIT;
+
+                ++ss->sec.rcvSequence;
+
+                PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "recv clear record:",
+                               pBuf + gs->recordOffset, gs->recordLen));
+                return 1;
+
+        } /* end switch gs->state */
+    }     /* end gather loop. */
     return rv;
 }
 
@@ -352,13 +348,13 @@ spec_locked_done:
  * Returns +1 when it has gathered a complete SSLV2 record.
  * Returns  0 if it hits EOF.
  * Returns -1 (SECFailure)    on any error
- * Returns -2 (SECWouldBlock) 
+ * Returns -2 (SECWouldBlock)
  *
- * Called by ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake in sslcon.c, 
+ * Called by ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake in sslcon.c,
  * and by DoRecv in sslsecur.c
  * Caller must hold RecvBufLock.
  */
-int 
+int
 ssl2_GatherRecord(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
 {
     return ssl2_GatherData(ss, &ss->gs, flags);
@@ -372,7 +368,7 @@ ssl_InitGather(sslGather *gs)
 
     gs->state = GS_INIT;
     gs->writeOffset = 0;
-    gs->readOffset  = 0;
+    gs->readOffset = 0;
     gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0;
     gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0;
     status = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, 4096);
@@ -380,13 +376,13 @@ ssl_InitGather(sslGather *gs)
 }
 
 /* Caller must hold RecvBufLock. */
-void 
+void
 ssl_DestroyGather(sslGather *gs)
 {
-    if (gs) {	/* the PORT_*Free functions check for NULL pointers. */
-	PORT_ZFree(gs->buf.buf, gs->buf.space);
-	PORT_Free(gs->inbuf.buf);
-	PORT_Free(gs->dtlsPacket.buf);
+    if (gs) { /* the PORT_*Free functions check for NULL pointers. */
+        PORT_ZFree(gs->buf.buf, gs->buf.space);
+        PORT_Free(gs->inbuf.buf);
+        PORT_Free(gs->dtlsPacket.buf);
     }
 }
 
@@ -394,32 +390,32 @@ ssl_DestroyGather(sslGather *gs)
 static SECStatus
 ssl2_HandleV3HandshakeRecord(sslSocket *ss)
 {
-    SECStatus           rv;
+    SECStatus rv;
 
-    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
-    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+    PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+    PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss));
 
     /* We've read in 3 bytes, there are 2 more to go in an ssl3 header. */
-    ss->gs.remainder         = 2;
-    ss->gs.count             = 0;
+    ss->gs.remainder = 2;
+    ss->gs.count = 0;
 
-    /* Clearing these handshake pointers ensures that 
+    /* Clearing these handshake pointers ensures that
      * ssl_Do1stHandshake won't call ssl2_HandleMessage when we return.
      */
-    ss->nextHandshake     = 0;
+    ss->nextHandshake = 0;
     ss->securityHandshake = 0;
 
-    /* Setting ss->version to an SSL 3.x value will cause 
-    ** ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake to invoke ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake() 
+    /* Setting ss->version to an SSL 3.x value will cause
+    ** ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake to invoke ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake()
     ** the next time it is called.
     **/
     rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED,
-			       PR_TRUE);
+                               PR_TRUE);
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	return rv;
+        return rv;
     }
 
-    ss->sec.send         = ssl3_SendApplicationData;
+    ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData;
 
     return SECSuccess;
 }