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Unified Diff: net/third_party/nss/ssl/tls13con.c

Issue 1844813002: Uprev NSS to 3.23 on iOS (Closed) Base URL: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git@master
Patch Set: One more GN fix Created 4 years, 8 months ago
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Index: net/third_party/nss/ssl/tls13con.c
diff --git a/net/third_party/nss/ssl/tls13con.c b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/tls13con.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4bb136a5eefbe4173acf93fb2cbf679baf4a8526
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/third_party/nss/ssl/tls13con.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2059 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
+/*
+ * TLS 1.3 Protocol
+ *
+ * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "stdarg.h"
+#include "cert.h"
+#include "ssl.h"
+#include "keyhi.h"
+#include "pk11func.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "sslimpl.h"
+#include "sslproto.h"
+#include "sslerr.h"
+#include "tls13hkdf.h"
+#include "tls13con.h"
+
+typedef enum {
+ TrafficKeyEarlyData,
+ TrafficKeyHandshake,
+ TrafficKeyApplicationData
+} TrafficKeyType;
+
+typedef enum {
+ InstallCipherSpecRead,
+ InstallCipherSpecWrite,
+ InstallCipherSpecBoth
+} InstallCipherSpecDirection;
+
+#define MAX_FINISHED_SIZE 64
+
+static SECStatus tls13_InitializeHandshakeEncryption(sslSocket *ss);
+static SECStatus tls13_InstallCipherSpec(
+ sslSocket *ss, InstallCipherSpecDirection direction);
+static SECStatus tls13_InitCipherSpec(
+ sslSocket *ss, TrafficKeyType type, InstallCipherSpecDirection install);
+static SECStatus tls13_AESGCM(
+ ssl3KeyMaterial *keys,
+ PRBool doDecrypt,
+ unsigned char *out, int *outlen, int maxout,
+ const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
+ const unsigned char *additionalData, int additionalDataLen);
+static SECStatus tls13_SendEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss);
+static SECStatus tls13_HandleEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b,
+ PRUint32 length);
+static SECStatus tls13_HandleCertificate(
+ sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length);
+static SECStatus tls13_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b,
+ PRUint32 length);
+static SECStatus tls13_HandleCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b,
+ PRUint32 length);
+static SECStatus tls13_HandleCertificateVerify(
+ sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length,
+ SSL3Hashes *hashes);
+static SECStatus tls13_HkdfExtractSharedKey(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *key,
+ SharedSecretType keyType);
+static SECStatus tls13_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss);
+static SECStatus tls13_HandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length,
+ const SSL3Hashes *hashes);
+static SECStatus tls13_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b,
+ PRUint32 length);
+static SECStatus tls13_ComputeSecrets1(sslSocket *ss);
+static SECStatus tls13_ComputeFinished(
+ sslSocket *ss, const SSL3Hashes *hashes,
+ PRBool sending,
+ PRUint8 *output, unsigned int *outputLen,
+ unsigned int maxOutputLen);
+static SECStatus tls13_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss);
+static SECStatus tls13_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss);
+
+const char kHkdfLabelExpandedSs[] = "expanded static secret";
+const char kHkdfLabelExpandedEs[] = "expanded ephemeral secret";
+const char kHkdfLabelMasterSecret[] = "master secret";
+const char kHkdfLabelTrafficSecret[] = "traffic secret";
+const char kHkdfLabelClientFinishedSecret[] = "client finished";
+const char kHkdfLabelServerFinishedSecret[] = "server finished";
+const char kHkdfLabelResumptionMasterSecret[] = "resumption master secret";
+const char kHkdfLabelExporterMasterSecret[] = "exporter master secret";
+const char kHkdfPhaseEarlyHandshakeDataKeys[] = "early handshake key expansion";
+const char kHkdfPhaseEarlyApplicationDataKeys[] = "early application data key expansion";
+const char kHkdfPhaseHandshakeKeys[] = "handshake key expansion";
+const char kHkdfPhaseApplicationDataKeys[] = "application data key expansion";
+const char kHkdfPurposeClientWriteKey[] = "client write key";
+const char kHkdfPurposeServerWriteKey[] = "server write key";
+const char kHkdfPurposeClientWriteIv[] = "client write iv";
+const char kHkdfPurposeServerWriteIv[] = "server write iv";
+const char kClientFinishedLabel[] = "client finished";
+const char kServerFinishedLabel[] = "server finished";
+
+const SSL3ProtocolVersion kRecordVersion = 0x0301U;
+
+#define FATAL_ERROR(ss, prError, desc) \
+ do { \
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)", \
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, prError, __func__, __FILE__, __LINE__)); \
+ tls13_FatalError(ss, prError, desc); \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define UNIMPLEMENTED() \
+ do { \
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: unimplemented feature in %s (%s:%d)", \
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, __func__, __FILE__, __LINE__)); \
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); \
+ PORT_Assert(0); \
+ return SECFailure; \
+ } while (0)
+
+void
+tls13_FatalError(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode prError, SSL3AlertDescription desc)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(desc != internal_error); /* These should never happen */
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
+ PORT_SetError(prError);
+}
+
+#ifdef TRACE
+#define STATE_CASE(a) \
+ case a: \
+ return #a
+static char *
+tls13_HandshakeState(SSL3WaitState st)
+{
+ switch (st) {
+ STATE_CASE(wait_client_hello);
+ STATE_CASE(wait_client_cert);
+ STATE_CASE(wait_cert_verify);
+ STATE_CASE(wait_finished);
+ STATE_CASE(wait_server_hello);
+ STATE_CASE(wait_certificate_status);
+ STATE_CASE(wait_server_cert);
+ STATE_CASE(wait_cert_request);
+ STATE_CASE(wait_encrypted_extensions);
+ STATE_CASE(idle_handshake);
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ return "unknown";
+}
+#endif
+
+#define TLS13_WAIT_STATE_MASK 0x80
+
+#define TLS13_BASE_WAIT_STATE(ws) (ws & ~TLS13_WAIT_STATE_MASK)
+/* We don't mask idle_handshake because other parts of the code use it*/
+#define TLS13_WAIT_STATE(ws) (ws == idle_handshake ? ws : ws | TLS13_WAIT_STATE_MASK)
+#define TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, err, ...) \
+ tls13_CheckHsState(ss, err, #err, __func__, __FILE__, __LINE__, \
+ __VA_ARGS__, \
+ wait_invalid)
+void
+tls13_SetHsState(sslSocket *ss, SSL3WaitState ws,
+ const char *func, const char *file, int line)
+{
+#ifdef TRACE
+ const char *new_state_name =
+ tls13_HandshakeState(ws);
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: state change from %s->%s in %s (%s:%d)",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
+ tls13_HandshakeState(TLS13_BASE_WAIT_STATE(ss->ssl3.hs.ws)),
+ new_state_name,
+ func, file, line));
+#endif
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = TLS13_WAIT_STATE(ws);
+}
+
+static PRBool
+tls13_InHsStateV(sslSocket *ss, va_list ap)
+{
+ SSL3WaitState ws;
+
+ while ((ws = va_arg(ap, SSL3WaitState)) != wait_invalid) {
+ if (ws == TLS13_BASE_WAIT_STATE(ss->ssl3.hs.ws)) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+PRBool
+tls13_InHsState(sslSocket *ss, ...)
+{
+ PRBool found;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, ss);
+ found = tls13_InHsStateV(ss, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ return found;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+tls13_CheckHsState(sslSocket *ss, int err, const char *error_name,
+ const char *func, const char *file, int line,
+ ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ va_start(ap, line);
+ if (tls13_InHsStateV(ss, ap)) {
+ va_end(ap);
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: error %s state is (%s) at %s (%s:%d)",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
+ error_name,
+ tls13_HandshakeState(TLS13_BASE_WAIT_STATE(ss->ssl3.hs.ws)),
+ func, file, line));
+ tls13_FatalError(ss, err, unexpected_message);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SSLHashType
+tls13_GetHash(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): This needs to actually be looked up. */
+ return ssl_hash_sha256;
+}
+
+CK_MECHANISM_TYPE
+tls13_GetHkdfMechanism(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): This needs to actually be looked up. */
+ return CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256;
+}
+
+static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE
+tls13_GetHmacMechanism(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): This needs to actually be looked up. */
+ return CKM_SHA256_HMAC;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called from ssl3_SendClientHello
+ */
+SECStatus
+tls13_SetupClientHello(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Handle multiple curves here. */
+ ECName curves_to_try[] = { ec_secp256r1 };
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+
+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair);
+
+ rv = ssl3_CreateECDHEphemeralKeyPair(curves_to_try[0],
+ &ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+tls13_HandleECDHEKeyShare(sslSocket *ss,
+ TLS13KeyShareEntry *entry,
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey,
+ SharedSecretType type)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey;
+ PK11SymKey *shared;
+
+ peerKey = tls13_ImportECDHKeyShare(ss, entry->key_exchange.data,
+ entry->key_exchange.len,
+ entry->group);
+ if (!peerKey)
+ return SECFailure; /* Error code set already. */
+
+ /* Compute shared key. */
+ shared = tls13_ComputeECDHSharedKey(ss, privKey, peerKey);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(peerKey);
+ if (!shared) {
+ return SECFailure; /* Error code set already. */
+ }
+
+ /* Extract key. */
+ rv = tls13_HkdfExtractSharedKey(ss, shared, type);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(shared);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b,
+ PRUint32 length, SSL3Hashes *hashesPtr)
+{
+ /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Would it be better to check all the states here? */
+ switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) {
+ case certificate:
+ return tls13_HandleCertificate(ss, b, length);
+
+ case certificate_status:
+ return tls13_HandleCertificateStatus(ss, b, length);
+
+ case certificate_request:
+ return tls13_HandleCertificateRequest(ss, b, length);
+
+ case certificate_verify:
+ return tls13_HandleCertificateVerify(ss, b, length, hashesPtr);
+
+ case encrypted_extensions:
+ return tls13_HandleEncryptedExtensions(ss, b, length);
+
+ case new_session_ticket:
+ return tls13_HandleNewSessionTicket(ss, b, length);
+
+ case finished:
+ return tls13_HandleFinished(ss, b, length, hashesPtr);
+
+ default:
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE, unexpected_message);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(0); /* Unreached */
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Called from ssl3_HandleClientHello.
+ *
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+SECStatus
+tls13_HandleClientKeyShare(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ ECName expectedGroup;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ TLS13KeyShareEntry *found = NULL;
+ PRCList *cur_p;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle client_key_share handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return SECFailure; /* Error code set below */
+
+ /* Figure out what group we expect */
+ switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) {
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+ case ssl_kea_ecdh:
+ expectedGroup = ssl3_GetCurveNameForServerSocket(ss);
+ if (!expectedGroup) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP,
+ handshake_failure);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ /* Got an unknown or unsupported Key Exchange Algorithm.
+ * Can't happen. */
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG,
+ internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Now walk through the keys until we find one for our group */
+ cur_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteKeyShares);
+ while (cur_p != &ss->ssl3.hs.remoteKeyShares) {
+ TLS13KeyShareEntry *offer = (TLS13KeyShareEntry *)cur_p;
+
+ if (offer->group == expectedGroup) {
+ found = offer;
+ break;
+ }
+ cur_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(cur_p);
+ }
+
+ if (!found) {
+ /* No acceptable group. In future, we will need to correct the client.
+ * Currently just generate an error.
+ * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Write code to correct client.
+ */
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP, handshake_failure);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate our key */
+ rv = ssl3_CreateECDHEphemeralKeyPair(expectedGroup, &ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+
+ ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType;
+ ss->sec.keaKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(
+ ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair->pubKey);
+
+ /* Register the sender */
+ rv = ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss, ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn,
+ tls13_ServerSendKeyShareXtn);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return SECFailure; /* Error code set below */
+
+ rv = tls13_HandleECDHEKeyShare(ss, found,
+ ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair->privKey,
+ EphemeralSharedSecret);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return SECFailure; /* Error code set below */
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * [draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11] Section 6.3.3.2
+ *
+ * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1>;
+ * opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } CertificateExtension;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
+ * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
+ * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
+ * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
+ * CertificateExtension certificate_extensions<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } CertificateRequest;
+ */
+static SECStatus
+tls13_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ int calen;
+ SECItem *names;
+ int nnames;
+ SECItem *name;
+ int i;
+ PRUint8 sigAlgs[MAX_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS * 2];
+ unsigned int sigAlgsLength = 0;
+ int length;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: begin send certificate_request",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ /* Fixed context value. */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.certReqContext[0] = 0;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.certReqContextLen = 1;
+
+ rv = ssl3_EncodeCertificateRequestSigAlgs(ss, sigAlgs, sizeof(sigAlgs),
+ &sigAlgsLength);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_GetCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &calen, &names, &nnames);
+ length = 1 + ss->ssl3.hs.certReqContextLen +
+ 2 + sigAlgsLength + 2 + calen + 2;
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_request, length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.certReqContext,
+ ss->ssl3.hs.certReqContextLen, 1);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, sigAlgs, sigAlgsLength, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, calen, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ for (i = 0, name = names; i < nnames; i++, name++) {
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, name->data, name->len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+tls13_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem context = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECItem algorithms = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ CERTDistNames ca_list;
+ PRInt32 extensionsLength;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle certificate_request sequence",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ /* Client */
+ rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST, wait_cert_request);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate == NULL);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey == NULL);
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &context, 1, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return SECFailure;
+ PORT_Assert(sizeof(ss->ssl3.hs.certReqContext) == 255);
+ PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.hs.certReqContext, context.data, context.len);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.certReqContextLen = context.len;
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &algorithms, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ if (algorithms.len == 0 || (algorithms.len & 1) != 0) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST,
+ illegal_parameter);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ arena = ca_list.arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+ if (!arena) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &b, &length, arena, &ca_list);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto loser; /* alert sent below */
+
+ /* Verify that the extensions length is correct. */
+ extensionsLength = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (extensionsLength < 0) {
+ goto loser; /* alert sent below */
+ }
+ if (extensionsLength != length) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST,
+ illegal_parameter);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_server_cert);
+
+ rv = ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificateRequest(ss, &algorithms, &ca_list);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+tls13_InitializeHandshakeEncryption(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* For all present cipher suites, SS = ES.
+ * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Revisit for 0-RTT. */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.xSS = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.xES);
+ if (!ss->ssl3.hs.xSS) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = tls13_InitCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyHandshake,
+ InstallCipherSpecBoth);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_INIT_CIPHER_SUITE_FAILURE, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello */
+SECStatus
+tls13_SendServerHelloSequence(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SSL3KEAType certIndex;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: begin send server_hello sequence",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err code is set. */
+ }
+
+ rv = tls13_InitializeHandshakeEncryption(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+
+ rv = tls13_SendEncryptedExtensions(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+
+ if (ss->opt.requestCertificate) {
+ rv = tls13_SendCertificateRequest(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+
+ /* This was copied from: ssl3_SendCertificate.
+ * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Verify that this selection logic is correct.
+ * Bug 1237514.
+ */
+ if ((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) ||
+ (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_rsa)) {
+ certIndex = kt_rsa;
+ } else {
+ certIndex = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(ss, ss->serverCerts[certIndex].SERVERKEY);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* err code is set. */
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the rest of the secrets except for the resumption
+ * and exporter secret. */
+ rv = tls13_ComputeSecrets1(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = tls13_SendFinished(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+
+ TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, ss->opt.requestCertificate ? wait_client_cert
+ : wait_finished);
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called from ssl3_HandleServerHello.
+ *
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+SECStatus
+tls13_HandleServerKeyShare(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ ECName expectedGroup;
+ PRCList *cur_p;
+ TLS13KeyShareEntry *entry;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle server_key_share handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) {
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
+ case ssl_kea_ecdh:
+ expectedGroup = ssl3_PubKey2ECName(ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair->pubKey);
+ break;
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
+ default:
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG, handshake_failure);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* This list should have one entry. */
+ cur_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteKeyShares);
+ if (!cur_p) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_KEY_SHARE, missing_extension);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(PR_NEXT_LINK(cur_p) == &ss->ssl3.hs.remoteKeyShares);
+
+ entry = (TLS13KeyShareEntry *)cur_p;
+ if (entry->group != expectedGroup) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE, illegal_parameter);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = tls13_HandleECDHEKeyShare(ss, entry,
+ ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair->privKey,
+ EphemeralSharedSecret);
+
+ ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType;
+ ss->sec.keaKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(
+ ss->ephemeralECDHKeyPair->pubKey);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return SECFailure; /* Error code set below */
+
+ return tls13_InitializeHandshakeEncryption(ss);
+}
+
+/* Called from tls13_CompleteHandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
+ * tls13 Certificate message.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+tls13_HandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SECItem context = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle certificate handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE,
+ wait_client_cert);
+ } else {
+ rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE,
+ wait_cert_request, wait_server_cert);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ /* Process the context string */
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &context, 1, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return SECFailure;
+ if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
+ if (context.len) {
+ /* The server's context string MUST be empty */
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE,
+ illegal_parameter);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!context.len || context.len != ss->ssl3.hs.certReqContextLen ||
+ (NSS_SecureMemcmp(ss->ssl3.hs.certReqContext,
+ context.data, context.len) != 0)) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE,
+ illegal_parameter);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ context.len = 0; /* Belt and suspenders. Zero out the context. */
+ }
+
+ return ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificate(ss, b, length);
+}
+
+/* Called from tls13_CompleteHandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
+ * ssl3 CertificateStatus message.
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+tls13_HandleCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_STATUS,
+ wait_certificate_status);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return rv;
+
+ return ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificateStatus(ss, b, length);
+}
+
+/*
+ * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): This install logic needs renaming since it's
+ * what happens at various stages of cipher spec setup. Legacy from ssl3con.c.
+ */
+int
+tls13_InstallCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, InstallCipherSpecDirection direction)
+{
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Installing new cipher specs direction = %s",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
+ direction == InstallCipherSpecRead ? "read" : "write"));
+
+ PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss)); /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Update for DTLS */
+ /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Holddown timer for DTLS. */
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/
+
+ /* Flush out any old stuff in the handshake buffers */
+ switch (direction) {
+ case InstallCipherSpecWrite: {
+ ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec;
+ pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
+
+ ss->ssl3.pwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
+ ss->ssl3.cwSpec = pwSpec;
+ break;
+ } break;
+ case InstallCipherSpecRead: {
+ ssl3CipherSpec *prSpec;
+
+ prSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec;
+ ss->ssl3.prSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec;
+ ss->ssl3.crSpec = prSpec;
+ } break;
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* If we are really through with the old cipher prSpec
+ * (Both the read and write sides have changed) destroy it.
+ */
+ if (ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec) {
+ ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3.prSpec, PR_FALSE /*freeSrvName*/);
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Add context to the hash functions as described in
+ [draft-ietf-tls-tls13; Section 4.9.1] */
+SECStatus
+tls13_AddContextToHashes(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Hashes *hashes /* IN/OUT */,
+ SSLHashType algorithm, PRBool sending)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ PK11Context *ctx;
+ const unsigned char context_padding[] = {
+ 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+ 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+ 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+ 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+ 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+ 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+ 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+ 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+ };
+ const char *client_cert_verify_string = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
+ const char *server_cert_verify_string = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
+ const char *context_string = (sending ^ ss->sec.isServer) ? client_cert_verify_string
+ : server_cert_verify_string;
+ unsigned int hashlength;
+
+ /* Double check that we are doing SHA-256 for the handshake hash.*/
+ PORT_Assert(hashes->hashAlg == ssl_hash_sha256);
+ if (hashes->hashAlg != ssl_hash_sha256) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(hashes->len == 32);
+
+ ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID(algorithm));
+ if (!ctx) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(SECFailure);
+ PORT_Assert(!SECSuccess);
+
+ rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(ctx);
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, context_padding, sizeof(context_padding));
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, (unsigned char *)context_string,
+ strlen(context_string) + 1); /* +1 includes the terminating 0 */
+ rv |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, hashes->u.raw, hashes->len);
+ /* Update the hash in-place */
+ rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, hashes->u.raw, &hashlength, sizeof(hashes->u.raw));
+ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE);
+ PRINT_BUF(90, (NULL, "TLS 1.3 hash with context", hashes->u.raw, hashlength));
+
+ hashes->len = hashlength;
+ hashes->hashAlg = algorithm;
+
+ if (rv) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+tls13_HkdfExtractSharedKey(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *key,
+ SharedSecretType keyType)
+{
+ PK11SymKey **destp;
+
+ switch (keyType) {
+ case EphemeralSharedSecret:
+ destp = &ss->ssl3.hs.xES;
+ break;
+ case StaticSharedSecret:
+ destp = &ss->ssl3.hs.xSS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(!*destp);
+ return tls13_HkdfExtract(NULL, key, tls13_GetHash(ss), destp);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+tls13_DeriveTrafficKeys(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec,
+ TrafficKeyType type)
+{
+ size_t keySize = pwSpec->cipher_def->key_size;
+ size_t ivSize = pwSpec->cipher_def->iv_size +
+ pwSpec->cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size; /* This isn't always going to
+ * work, but it does for
+ * AES-GCM */
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE bulkAlgorithm = ssl3_Alg2Mech(pwSpec->cipher_def->calg);
+ SSL3Hashes hashes;
+ PK11SymKey *prk = NULL;
+ const char *phase;
+ char label[256]; /* Arbitrary buffer large enough to hold the label */
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+#define FORMAT_LABEL(phase_, purpose_) \
+ do { \
+ PRUint32 n = PR_snprintf(label, sizeof(label), "%s, %s", phase_, purpose_); \
+ /* Check for getting close. */ \
+ if ((n + 1) >= sizeof(label)) { \
+ PORT_Assert(0); \
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); \
+ goto loser; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+#define EXPAND_TRAFFIC_KEY(purpose_, target_) \
+ do { \
+ FORMAT_LABEL(phase, purpose_); \
+ rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(prk, tls13_GetHash(ss), \
+ hashes.u.raw, hashes.len, \
+ label, strlen(label), \
+ bulkAlgorithm, keySize, &pwSpec->target_); \
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) { \
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); \
+ PORT_Assert(0); \
+ goto loser; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define EXPAND_TRAFFIC_IV(purpose_, target_) \
+ do { \
+ FORMAT_LABEL(phase, purpose_); \
+ rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabelRaw(prk, tls13_GetHash(ss), \
+ hashes.u.raw, hashes.len, \
+ label, strlen(label), \
+ pwSpec->target_, ivSize); \
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) { \
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); \
+ PORT_Assert(0); \
+ goto loser; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
+
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, pwSpec, &hashes, 0);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_Assert(0); /* Should never fail */
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "Deriving traffic keys. Session hash=", hashes.u.raw,
+ hashes.len));
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case TrafficKeyHandshake:
+ phase = kHkdfPhaseHandshakeKeys;
+ prk = ss->ssl3.hs.xES;
+ break;
+ case TrafficKeyApplicationData:
+ phase = kHkdfPhaseApplicationDataKeys;
+ prk = ss->ssl3.hs.trafficSecret;
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(prk != NULL);
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deriving traffic keys phase='%s'",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, phase));
+
+ EXPAND_TRAFFIC_KEY(kHkdfPurposeClientWriteKey, client.write_key);
+ EXPAND_TRAFFIC_KEY(kHkdfPurposeServerWriteKey, server.write_key);
+ EXPAND_TRAFFIC_IV(kHkdfPurposeClientWriteIv, client.write_iv);
+ EXPAND_TRAFFIC_IV(kHkdfPurposeServerWriteIv, server.write_iv);
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Set up a cipher spec with keys. If install is nonzero, then also install
+ * it as the current cipher spec for each value in the mask. */
+SECStatus
+tls13_InitCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, TrafficKeyType type, InstallCipherSpecDirection install)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec;
+ ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ if (install == InstallCipherSpecWrite ||
+ install == InstallCipherSpecBoth) {
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
+
+ rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER);
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec == ss->ssl3.pwSpec);
+
+ pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec;
+ cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
+
+ switch (pwSpec->cipher_def->calg) {
+ case calg_aes_gcm:
+ pwSpec->aead = tls13_AESGCM;
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ goto loser;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Generic behaviors -- common to all crypto methods */
+ if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ pwSpec->read_seq_num.high = pwSpec->write_seq_num.high = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (cwSpec->epoch == PR_UINT16_MAX) {
+ /* The problem here is that we have rehandshaked too many
+ * times (you are not allowed to wrap the epoch). The
+ * spec says you should be discarding the connection
+ * and start over, so not much we can do here. */
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ /* The sequence number has the high 16 bits as the epoch. */
+ pwSpec->epoch = cwSpec->epoch + 1;
+ pwSpec->read_seq_num.high = pwSpec->write_seq_num.high =
+ pwSpec->epoch << 16;
+
+ dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&pwSpec->recvdRecords);
+ }
+ pwSpec->read_seq_num.low = pwSpec->write_seq_num.low = 0;
+
+ rv = tls13_DeriveTrafficKeys(ss, pwSpec, type);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ if (install == InstallCipherSpecWrite ||
+ install == InstallCipherSpecBoth) {
+ rv = tls13_InstallCipherSpec(ss, InstallCipherSpecWrite);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+ if (install == InstallCipherSpecRead ||
+ install == InstallCipherSpecBoth) {
+ rv = tls13_InstallCipherSpec(ss, InstallCipherSpecRead);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INIT_CIPHER_SUITE_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+tls13_ComputeSecrets1(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PK11SymKey *mSS = NULL;
+ PK11SymKey *mES = NULL;
+ PK11SymKey *masterSecret = NULL;
+ SSL3Hashes hashes;
+
+ rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv; /* error code set below. */
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, &hashes, 0);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_Assert(0); /* Should never fail */
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.xSS);
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.xES);
+
+ rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(ss->ssl3.hs.xSS,
+ tls13_GetHash(ss),
+ hashes.u.raw, hashes.len,
+ kHkdfLabelExpandedSs,
+ strlen(kHkdfLabelExpandedSs),
+ tls13_GetHkdfMechanism(ss),
+ hashes.len, &mSS);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(ss->ssl3.hs.xES,
+ tls13_GetHash(ss),
+ hashes.u.raw, hashes.len,
+ kHkdfLabelExpandedEs,
+ strlen(kHkdfLabelExpandedEs),
+ tls13_GetHkdfMechanism(ss),
+ hashes.len, &mES);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = tls13_HkdfExtract(mSS, mES,
+ tls13_GetHash(ss),
+ &masterSecret);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(masterSecret,
+ tls13_GetHash(ss),
+ hashes.u.raw, hashes.len,
+ kHkdfLabelTrafficSecret,
+ strlen(kHkdfLabelTrafficSecret),
+ tls13_GetHkdfMechanism(ss),
+ hashes.len, &ss->ssl3.hs.trafficSecret);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(masterSecret,
+ tls13_GetHash(ss),
+ NULL, 0,
+ kHkdfLabelClientFinishedSecret,
+ strlen(kHkdfLabelClientFinishedSecret),
+ tls13_GetHmacMechanism(ss),
+ hashes.len, &ss->ssl3.hs.clientFinishedSecret);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(masterSecret,
+ tls13_GetHash(ss),
+ NULL, 0,
+ kHkdfLabelServerFinishedSecret,
+ strlen(kHkdfLabelServerFinishedSecret),
+ tls13_GetHmacMechanism(ss),
+ hashes.len, &ss->ssl3.hs.serverFinishedSecret);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+loser:
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.xSS);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.xSS = NULL;
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.xES);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.xES = NULL;
+
+ if (mSS) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(mSS);
+ }
+ if (mES) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(mES);
+ }
+ if (masterSecret) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(masterSecret);
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+void
+tls13_DestroyKeyShareEntry(TLS13KeyShareEntry *offer)
+{
+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&offer->key_exchange, PR_FALSE);
+ PORT_ZFree(offer, sizeof(*offer));
+}
+
+void
+tls13_DestroyKeyShares(PRCList *list)
+{
+ PRCList *cur_p;
+
+ while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(list)) {
+ cur_p = PR_LIST_TAIL(list);
+ PR_REMOVE_LINK(cur_p);
+ tls13_DestroyKeyShareEntry((TLS13KeyShareEntry *)cur_p);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Implement the SSLAEADCipher interface defined in sslimpl.h.
+ *
+ * That interface mixes the AD and the sequence number, but in
+ * TLS 1.3 there is no additional data so this value is just the
+ * encoded sequence number and we call it |seqNumBuf|.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+tls13_AESGCM(ssl3KeyMaterial *keys,
+ PRBool doDecrypt,
+ unsigned char *out,
+ int *outlen,
+ int maxout,
+ const unsigned char *in,
+ int inlen,
+ const unsigned char *seqNumBuf,
+ int seqNumLen)
+{
+ SECItem param;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ unsigned char nonce[12];
+ size_t i;
+ unsigned int uOutLen;
+ CK_GCM_PARAMS gcmParams;
+ static const int tagSize = 16;
+
+ PORT_Assert(seqNumLen == 8);
+
+ /* draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Section 5.2.2 specifies the following
+ * nonce algorithm:
+ *
+ * The length of the per-record nonce (iv_length) is set to max(8 bytes,
+ * N_MIN) for the AEAD algorithm (see [RFC5116] Section 4). An AEAD
+ * algorithm where N_MAX is less than 8 bytes MUST NOT be used with TLS.
+ * The per-record nonce for the AEAD construction is formed as follows:
+ *
+ * 1. The 64-bit record sequence number is padded to the left with
+ * zeroes to iv_length.
+ *
+ * 2. The padded sequence number is XORed with the static
+ * client_write_iv or server_write_iv, depending on the role.
+ *
+ * The resulting quantity (of length iv_length) is used as the per-
+ * record nonce.
+ *
+ * Per RFC 5288: N_MIN = N_MAX = 12 bytes.
+ *
+ */
+ memcpy(nonce, keys->write_iv, sizeof(nonce));
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+ nonce[4 + i] ^= seqNumBuf[i];
+ }
+
+ param.type = siBuffer;
+ param.data = (unsigned char *)&gcmParams;
+ param.len = sizeof(gcmParams);
+ gcmParams.pIv = nonce;
+ gcmParams.ulIvLen = sizeof(nonce);
+ gcmParams.pAAD = NULL;
+ gcmParams.ulAADLen = 0;
+ gcmParams.ulTagBits = tagSize * 8;
+
+ if (doDecrypt) {
+ rv = PK11_Decrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_AES_GCM, &param, out, &uOutLen,
+ maxout, in, inlen);
+ } else {
+ rv = PK11_Encrypt(keys->write_key, CKM_AES_GCM, &param, out, &uOutLen,
+ maxout, in, inlen);
+ }
+ *outlen = (int)uOutLen;
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+tls13_HandleEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRInt32 innerLength;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle encrypted extensions",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+ wait_encrypted_extensions);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ innerLength = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (innerLength < 0) {
+ return SECFailure; /* Alert already sent. */
+ }
+ if (innerLength != length) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+ illegal_parameter);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions(ss, &b, &length, encrypted_extensions);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure; /* Error code set below */
+ }
+
+ TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_request);
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+tls13_SendEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRInt32 extensions_len = 0;
+ PRInt32 sent_len = 0;
+ PRUint32 maxBytes = 65535;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send encrypted extensions handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+
+ extensions_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(
+ ss, PR_FALSE, maxBytes, &ss->xtnData.encryptedExtensionsSenders[0]);
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, encrypted_extensions,
+ extensions_len + 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extensions_len, 2);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ sent_len = ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(
+ ss, PR_TRUE, extensions_len,
+ &ss->xtnData.encryptedExtensionsSenders[0]);
+ PORT_Assert(sent_len == extensions_len);
+ if (sent_len != extensions_len) {
+ PORT_Assert(sent_len == 0);
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Called from tls13_CompleteHandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete
+ * tls13 CertificateVerify message
+ * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks.
+ */
+SECStatus
+tls13_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length,
+ SSL3Hashes *hashes)
+{
+ SECItem signed_hash = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ SECStatus rv;
+ SSLSignatureAndHashAlg sigAndHash;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle certificate_verify handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY,
+ wait_cert_verify);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (!hashes) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* We only support CertificateVerify messages that use the handshake
+ * hash.
+ * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): This should be easy to relax in TLS 1.3 by
+ * reading the client's hash algorithm first, but there may
+ * be subtleties so retain the restriction for now.
+ */
+ rv = tls13_AddContextToHashes(ss, hashes, hashes->hashAlg, PR_FALSE);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(ss, &b, &length,
+ &sigAndHash);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_CheckSignatureAndHashAlgorithmConsistency(
+ ss, &sigAndHash, ss->sec.peerCert);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY, decrypt_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* We only support CertificateVerify messages that use the handshake
+ * hash. */
+ if (sigAndHash.hashAlg != hashes->hashAlg) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM, decrypt_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signed_hash, 2, &b, &length);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (length != 0) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY, decode_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(hashes, ss->sec.peerCert, &signed_hash,
+ PR_TRUE, ss->pkcs11PinArg);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), decrypt_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
+ /* Compute the rest of the secrets except for the resumption
+ * and exporter secret. */
+ rv = tls13_ComputeSecrets1(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished);
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+tls13_ComputeFinished(sslSocket *ss, const SSL3Hashes *hashes, PRBool sending,
+ PRUint8 *output, unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PK11Context *hmacCtx = NULL;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macAlg = tls13_GetHmacMechanism(ss);
+ SECItem param = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
+ unsigned int outputLenUint;
+ PK11SymKey *secret = (ss->sec.isServer ^ sending) ? ss->ssl3.hs.clientFinishedSecret
+ : ss->ssl3.hs.serverFinishedSecret;
+
+ PORT_Assert(secret);
+ PRINT_BUF(90, (NULL, "Handshake hash", hashes->u.raw, hashes->len));
+
+ hmacCtx = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(macAlg, CKA_SIGN,
+ secret, &param);
+ if (!hmacCtx) {
+ goto abort;
+ }
+
+ rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hmacCtx);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto abort;
+
+ rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmacCtx, hashes->u.raw, hashes->len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto abort;
+
+ PORT_Assert(maxOutputLen >= hashes->len);
+ rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hmacCtx, output, &outputLenUint, maxOutputLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ goto abort;
+ *outputLen = outputLenUint;
+
+ PK11_DestroyContext(hmacCtx, PR_TRUE);
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+abort:
+ if (hmacCtx) {
+ PK11_DestroyContext(hmacCtx, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+tls13_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRUint8 finishedBuf[MAX_FINISHED_SIZE];
+ unsigned int finishedLen;
+ SSL3Hashes hashes;
+ int errCode;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send finished handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec, &hashes, 0);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
+ rv = tls13_ComputeFinished(ss, &hashes, PR_TRUE,
+ finishedBuf, &finishedLen, sizeof(finishedBuf));
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, finishedLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PR_GetError();
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, finishedBuf, finishedLen);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PR_GetError();
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ errCode = PR_GetError();
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ rv = tls13_InitCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyApplicationData,
+ InstallCipherSpecWrite);
+ } else {
+ rv = tls13_InstallCipherSpec(ss, InstallCipherSpecWrite);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Record key log */
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error);
+ PORT_SetError(errCode); /* Restore error code */
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+tls13_HandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length,
+ const SSL3Hashes *hashes)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRUint8 finishedBuf[MAX_FINISHED_SIZE];
+ unsigned int finishedLen;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle finished handshake",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+ rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED, wait_finished);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (!hashes) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
+ rv = tls13_ComputeFinished(ss, hashes, PR_FALSE,
+ finishedBuf, &finishedLen, sizeof(finishedBuf));
+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (length != finishedLen) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED, decode_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(b, finishedBuf, finishedLen) != 0) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE,
+ decrypt_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Server is now finished.
+ * Client sends second flight
+ */
+ /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Send NewSession Ticket if server. */
+ if (ss->sec.isServer) {
+ rv = tls13_InstallCipherSpec(ss, InstallCipherSpecRead);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = tls13_FinishHandshake(ss);
+ } else {
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) {
+ /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Handle pending auth */
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = tls13_InitCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyApplicationData,
+ InstallCipherSpecRead);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = tls13_SendClientSecondRound(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ return SECFailure; /* Error code and alerts handled below */
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+tls13_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget == NULL);
+
+ /* The first handshake is now completed. */
+ ss->handshake = NULL;
+
+ TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, idle_handshake);
+
+ ssl_FinishHandshake(ss);
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+tls13_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRBool sendClientCert;
+
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
+ PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
+
+ sendClientCert = !ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert &&
+ ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL &&
+ ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL;
+
+ /* Defer client authentication sending if we are still
+ * waiting for server authentication. See the long block
+ * comment in ssl3_SendClientSecondRound for more detail.
+ */
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) {
+ PR_NOT_REACHED("unexpected ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget");
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending && (sendClientCert ||
+ ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert)) {
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%p]: deferring ssl3_SendClientSecondRound because"
+ " certificate authentication is still pending.",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = tls13_SendClientSecondRound;
+ return SECWouldBlock;
+ }
+
+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/
+ if (ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert) {
+ ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_FALSE;
+ rv = ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(ss);
+ /* Don't send verify */
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+ } else if (sendClientCert) {
+ rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* error code is set. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sendClientCert) {
+ rv = ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(ss, ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey);
+ ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL;
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err is set. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = tls13_SendFinished(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err code was set. */
+ }
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/
+
+ /* The handshake is now finished */
+ return tls13_FinishHandshake(ss);
+
+loser:
+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+tls13_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ idle_handshake);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ UNIMPLEMENTED();
+
+ /* Ignore */
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+typedef enum {
+ ExtensionNotUsed,
+ ExtensionClientOnly,
+ ExtensionSendClear,
+ ExtensionSendEncrypted,
+} Tls13ExtensionStatus;
+
+static const struct {
+ SSLExtensionType ex_value;
+ Tls13ExtensionStatus status;
+} KnownExtensions[] = {
+ { ssl_server_name_xtn,
+ ExtensionSendEncrypted },
+ {
+ ssl_cert_status_xtn,
+ ExtensionNotUsed /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Disabled because broken
+ in TLS 1.3. */
+ /* ExtensionSendEncrypted */
+ },
+ { ssl_elliptic_curves_xtn,
+ ExtensionSendClear },
+ { ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn,
+ ExtensionNotUsed },
+ { ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn,
+ ExtensionClientOnly },
+ { ssl_use_srtp_xtn,
+ ExtensionSendEncrypted },
+ { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn,
+ ExtensionSendEncrypted },
+ { ssl_padding_xtn,
+ ExtensionNotUsed },
+ { ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn,
+ ExtensionNotUsed },
+ { ssl_session_ticket_xtn,
+ ExtensionClientOnly },
+ { ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn,
+ ExtensionSendClear },
+ { ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn,
+ ExtensionNotUsed },
+ { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn,
+ ExtensionNotUsed },
+ { ssl_tls13_draft_version_xtn,
+ ExtensionClientOnly }
+};
+
+PRBool
+tls13_ExtensionAllowed(PRUint16 extension, SSL3HandshakeType message)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PORT_Assert((message == client_hello) ||
+ (message == server_hello) ||
+ (message == encrypted_extensions));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(KnownExtensions); i++) {
+ if (KnownExtensions[i].ex_value == extension)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i == PR_ARRAY_SIZE(KnownExtensions)) {
+ /* We have never heard of this extension which is OK on
+ * the server but not the client. */
+ return message == client_hello;
+ }
+
+ switch (KnownExtensions[i].status) {
+ case ExtensionNotUsed:
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ case ExtensionClientOnly:
+ return message == client_hello;
+ case ExtensionSendClear:
+ return message == client_hello ||
+ message == server_hello;
+ case ExtensionSendEncrypted:
+ return message == client_hello ||
+ message == encrypted_extensions;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(0);
+
+ /* Not reached */
+ return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+/* Helper function to encode a uint32 into a buffer */
+unsigned char *
+tls13_EncodeUintX(PRUint32 value, unsigned int bytes, unsigned char *to)
+{
+ PRUint32 encoded;
+
+ PORT_Assert(bytes > 0 && bytes <= 4);
+
+ encoded = PR_htonl(value);
+ memcpy(to, ((unsigned char *)(&encoded)) + (4 - bytes), bytes);
+ return to + bytes;
+}
+
+/* TLS 1.3 doesn't actually have additional data but the aead function
+ * signature overloads additional data to carry the record sequence
+ * number and that's what we put here. The TLS 1.3 AEAD functions
+ * just use this input as the sequence number and not as additional
+ * data. */
+static void
+tls13_FormatAdditionalData(unsigned char *aad, unsigned int length,
+ SSL3SequenceNumber seqNum)
+{
+ unsigned char *ptr = aad;
+
+ PORT_Assert(length == 8);
+ ptr = tls13_EncodeUintX(seqNum.high, 4, ptr);
+ ptr = tls13_EncodeUintX(seqNum.low, 4, ptr);
+ PORT_Assert((ptr - aad) == length);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ProtectRecord(sslSocket *ss,
+ SSL3ContentType type,
+ const SSL3Opaque *pIn,
+ PRUint32 contentLen,
+ sslBuffer *wrBuf)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec;
+ const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = cwSpec->cipher_def;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRUint16 headerLen;
+ int cipherBytes = 0;
+ const int tagLen = cipher_def->tag_size;
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: protect record of length %u, seq=0x%0x%0x",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, contentLen,
+ cwSpec->write_seq_num.high,
+ cwSpec->write_seq_num.low));
+
+ headerLen = IS_DTLS(ss) ? DTLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH : SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ if (headerLen + contentLen + 1 + tagLen > wrBuf->space) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy the data into the wrBuf. We're going to encrypt in-place
+ * in the AEAD branch anyway */
+ PORT_Memcpy(wrBuf->buf + headerLen, pIn, contentLen);
+
+ if (cipher_def->calg == ssl_calg_null) {
+ /* Shortcut for plaintext */
+ cipherBytes = contentLen;
+ } else {
+ unsigned char aad[8];
+ PORT_Assert(cipher_def->type == type_aead);
+
+ /* Add the content type at the end. */
+ wrBuf->buf[headerLen + contentLen] = type;
+
+ /* Stomp the content type to be application_data */
+ type = content_application_data;
+
+ tls13_FormatAdditionalData(aad, sizeof(aad),
+ cwSpec->write_seq_num);
+ cipherBytes = contentLen + 1; /* Room for the content type on the end. */
+ rv = cwSpec->aead(
+ ss->sec.isServer ? &cwSpec->server : &cwSpec->client,
+ PR_FALSE, /* do encrypt */
+ wrBuf->buf + headerLen, /* output */
+ &cipherBytes, /* out len */
+ wrBuf->space - headerLen, /* max out */
+ wrBuf->buf + headerLen, contentLen + 1, /* input */
+ aad, sizeof(aad));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ PORT_Assert(cipherBytes <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 256);
+
+ wrBuf->len = cipherBytes + headerLen;
+ wrBuf->buf[0] = type;
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+ (void)tls13_EncodeUintX(2, dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(kRecordVersion),
+ &wrBuf->buf[1]);
+ (void)tls13_EncodeUintX(cwSpec->write_seq_num.high, 4, &wrBuf->buf[3]);
+ (void)tls13_EncodeUintX(cwSpec->write_seq_num.low, 4, &wrBuf->buf[7]);
+ (void)tls13_EncodeUintX(cipherBytes, 2, &wrBuf->buf[11]);
+ } else {
+ (void)tls13_EncodeUintX(kRecordVersion, 2, &wrBuf->buf[1]);
+ (void)tls13_EncodeUintX(cipherBytes, 2, &wrBuf->buf[3]);
+ }
+ ssl3_BumpSequenceNumber(&cwSpec->write_seq_num);
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Unprotect a TLS 1.3 record and leave the result in plaintext.
+ *
+ * Called by ssl3_HandleRecord. Caller must hold the spec read lock.
+ * Therefore, we MUST not call SSL3_SendAlert().
+ *
+ * If SECFailure is returned, we:
+ * 1. Set |*alert| to the alert to be sent.
+ * 2. Call PORT_SetError() witn an appropriate code.
+ */
+SECStatus
+tls13_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext,
+ SSL3AlertDescription *alert)
+{
+ ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec;
+ const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = crSpec->cipher_def;
+ unsigned char aad[8];
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ *alert = bad_record_mac; /* Default alert for most issues. */
+
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: unprotect record of length %u",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->buf->len));
+
+ /* We can perform this test in variable time because the record's total
+ * length and the ciphersuite are both public knowledge. */
+ if (cText->buf->len < cipher_def->tag_size) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify that the content type is right, even though we overwrite it. */
+ if (cText->type != content_application_data) {
+ /* Do we need a better error here? */
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Check the version number in the record */
+ if (cText->version != kRecordVersion) {
+ /* Do we need a better error here? */
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Decrypt */
+ PORT_Assert(cipher_def->type == type_aead);
+ tls13_FormatAdditionalData(aad, sizeof(aad),
+ IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num
+ : crSpec->read_seq_num);
+ rv = crSpec->aead(
+ ss->sec.isServer ? &crSpec->client : &crSpec->server,
+ PR_TRUE, /* do decrypt */
+ plaintext->buf, /* out */
+ (int *)&plaintext->len, /* outlen */
+ plaintext->space, /* maxout */
+ cText->buf->buf, /* in */
+ cText->buf->len, /* inlen */
+ aad, sizeof(aad));
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* The record is right-padded with 0s, followed by the true
+ * content type, so read from the right until we receive a
+ * nonzero byte. */
+ while (plaintext->len > 0 && !(plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1])) {
+ --plaintext->len;
+ }
+
+ /* Bogus padding. */
+ if (plaintext->len < 1) {
+ /* It's safe to report this specifically because it happened
+ * after the MAC has been verified. */
+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* Record the type. */
+ cText->type = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1];
+ --plaintext->len;
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
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