Chromium Code Reviews
chromiumcodereview-hr@appspot.gserviceaccount.com (chromiumcodereview-hr) | Please choose your nickname with Settings | Help | Chromium Project | Gerrit Changes | Sign out
(3269)

Unified Diff: content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc

Issue 184393006: Linux Sandbox: setuid sandbox initialization cleanup. (Closed) Base URL: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src
Patch Set: Created 6 years, 10 months ago
Use n/p to move between diff chunks; N/P to move between comments. Draft comments are only viewable by you.
Jump to:
View side-by-side diff with in-line comments
Download patch
« no previous file with comments | « no previous file | no next file » | no next file with comments »
Expand Comments ('e') | Collapse Comments ('c') | Show Comments Hide Comments ('s')
Index: content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc
diff --git a/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc b/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc
index e70afc63928b4ab31b5045d4eeeffec746542835..6c35502c111b693b54289e3d2eaebda151bfb60c 100644
--- a/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc
+++ b/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#include "content/public/common/zygote_fork_delegate_linux.h"
#include "content/zygote/zygote_linux.h"
#include "crypto/nss_util.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/services/init_process_reaper.h"
#include "sandbox/linux/services/libc_urandom_override.h"
#include "sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.h"
#include "third_party/icu/source/i18n/unicode/timezone.h"
@@ -291,7 +292,7 @@ void PreloadPepperPlugins() {
// This function triggers the static and lazy construction of objects that need
// to be created before imposing the sandbox.
-static void PreSandboxInit() {
+static void ZygotePreSandboxInit() {
base::RandUint64();
base::SysInfo::AmountOfPhysicalMemory();
@@ -332,88 +333,102 @@ static void CloseFdAndHandleEintr(int fd) {
close(fd);
}
-// This will set the *using_suid_sandbox variable to true if the SUID sandbox
-// is enabled. This does not necessarily exclude other types of sandboxing.
-static bool EnterSuidSandbox(LinuxSandbox* linux_sandbox,
- bool* using_suid_sandbox,
- bool* has_started_new_init) {
- *using_suid_sandbox = false;
- *has_started_new_init = false;
+static bool CreateInitProcessReaper() {
+ // This "magic" socket must only appear in one process, so make sure
+ // it gets closed in the parent after fork().
+ base::Closure zygoteid_fd_closer =
+ base::Bind(CloseFdAndHandleEintr, kZygoteIdFd);
+ // The current process becomes init(1), this function returns from a
+ // newly created process.
+ const bool init_created =
+ sandbox::CreateInitProcessReaper(&zygoteid_fd_closer);
+ if (!init_created) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Error creating an init process to reap zombies";
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
- sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient* setuid_sandbox =
- linux_sandbox->setuid_sandbox_client();
+// Enter the setuid sandbox. This requires the current process to have been
+// created through the setuid sandbox.
+static bool EnterSuidSandbox(sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient* setuid_sandbox) {
+ DCHECK(setuid_sandbox);
+ DCHECK(setuid_sandbox->IsSuidSandboxChild());
+
+ // Use the SUID sandbox. This still allows the seccomp sandbox to
+ // be enabled by the process later.
+
+ if (!setuid_sandbox->IsSuidSandboxUpToDate()) {
+ LOG(WARNING) <<
+ "You are using a wrong version of the setuid binary!\n"
+ "Please read "
+ "https://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxSUIDSandboxDevelopment."
+ "\n\n";
+ }
- if (!setuid_sandbox)
+ if (!setuid_sandbox->ChrootMe())
return false;
- PreSandboxInit();
+ if (setuid_sandbox->IsInNewPIDNamespace()) {
+ CHECK_EQ(1, getpid())
+ << "The SUID sandbox created a new PID namespace but Zygote "
+ "is not the init process. Please, make sure the SUID "
+ "binary is up to date.";
+ }
- // Check that the pre-sandbox initialization didn't spawn threads.
-#if !defined(THREAD_SANITIZER)
- DCHECK(linux_sandbox->IsSingleThreaded());
-#endif
+ if (getpid() == 1) {
+ // The setuid sandbox has created a new PID namespace and we need
+ // to assume the role of init.
+ CHECK(CreateInitProcessReaper());
+ }
- if (setuid_sandbox->IsSuidSandboxChild()) {
- // Use the SUID sandbox. This still allows the seccomp sandbox to
- // be enabled by the process later.
- *using_suid_sandbox = true;
-
- if (!setuid_sandbox->IsSuidSandboxUpToDate()) {
- LOG(WARNING) << "You are using a wrong version of the setuid binary!\n"
- "Please read "
- "https://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxSUIDSandboxDevelopment."
- "\n\n";
+#if !defined(OS_OPENBSD)
+ // Previously, we required that the binary be non-readable. This causes the
+ // kernel to mark the process as non-dumpable at startup. The thinking was
+ // that, although we were putting the renderers into a PID namespace (with
+ // the SUID sandbox), they would nonetheless be in the /same/ PID
+ // namespace. So they could ptrace each other unless they were non-dumpable.
+ //
+ // If the binary was readable, then there would be a window between process
+ // startup and the point where we set the non-dumpable flag in which a
+ // compromised renderer could ptrace attach.
+ //
+ // However, now that we have a zygote model, only the (trusted) zygote
+ // exists at this point and we can set the non-dumpable flag which is
+ // inherited by all our renderer children.
+ //
+ // Note: a non-dumpable process can't be debugged. To debug sandbox-related
+ // issues, one can specify --allow-sandbox-debugging to let the process be
+ // dumpable.
+ const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
+ if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowSandboxDebugging)) {
+ prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ if (prctl(PR_GET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set non-dumpable flag";
+ return false;
}
+ }
+#endif
- if (!setuid_sandbox->ChrootMe())
- return false;
+ return true;
+}
- if (getpid() == 1) {
- // The setuid sandbox has created a new PID namespace and we need
- // to assume the role of init.
- // This "magic" socket must only appear in one process, so make sure
- // it gets closed in the parent after fork().
- base::Closure zygoteid_fd_closer =
- base::Bind(CloseFdAndHandleEintr, kZygoteIdFd);
- const bool init_created =
- setuid_sandbox->CreateInitProcessReaper(&zygoteid_fd_closer);
- if (!init_created) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error creating an init process to reap zombies";
- return false;
- }
- *has_started_new_init = true;
- }
+static void EnterLayerOneSandbox(LinuxSandbox* linux_sandbox) {
+ DCHECK(linux_sandbox);
-#if !defined(OS_OPENBSD)
- // Previously, we required that the binary be non-readable. This causes the
- // kernel to mark the process as non-dumpable at startup. The thinking was
- // that, although we were putting the renderers into a PID namespace (with
- // the SUID sandbox), they would nonetheless be in the /same/ PID
- // namespace. So they could ptrace each other unless they were non-dumpable.
- //
- // If the binary was readable, then there would be a window between process
- // startup and the point where we set the non-dumpable flag in which a
- // compromised renderer could ptrace attach.
- //
- // However, now that we have a zygote model, only the (trusted) zygote
- // exists at this point and we can set the non-dumpable flag which is
- // inherited by all our renderer children.
- //
- // Note: a non-dumpable process can't be debugged. To debug sandbox-related
- // issues, one can specify --allow-sandbox-debugging to let the process be
- // dumpable.
- const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
- if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowSandboxDebugging)) {
- prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
- if (prctl(PR_GET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set non-dumpable flag";
- return false;
- }
- }
+ ZygotePreSandboxInit();
+
+ // Check that the pre-sandbox initialization didn't spawn threads.
+#if !defined(THREAD_SANITIZER)
+ DCHECK(linux_sandbox->IsSingleThreaded());
#endif
- }
- return true;
+ sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient* setuid_sandbox =
+ linux_sandbox->setuid_sandbox_client();
+
+ if (setuid_sandbox->IsSuidSandboxChild()) {
+ CHECK(EnterSuidSandbox(setuid_sandbox)) << "Failed to enter setuid sandbox";
+ }
}
bool ZygoteMain(const MainFunctionParams& params,
@@ -432,26 +447,8 @@ bool ZygoteMain(const MainFunctionParams& params,
VLOG(1) << "ZygoteMain: fork delegate is NULL";
}
- // Turn on the sandbox.
- bool using_suid_sandbox = false;
- bool has_started_new_init = false;
-
- if (!EnterSuidSandbox(linux_sandbox,
- &using_suid_sandbox,
- &has_started_new_init)) {
- LOG(FATAL) << "Failed to enter sandbox. Fail safe abort. (errno: "
- << errno << ")";
- return false;
- }
-
- sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient* setuid_sandbox =
- linux_sandbox->setuid_sandbox_client();
-
- if (setuid_sandbox->IsInNewPIDNamespace() && !has_started_new_init) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "The SUID sandbox created a new PID namespace but Zygote "
- "is not the init process. Please, make sure the SUID "
- "binary is up to date.";
- }
+ // Turn on the first layer of the sandbox if the configuration warrants it.
+ EnterLayerOneSandbox(linux_sandbox);
int sandbox_flags = linux_sandbox->GetStatus();
« no previous file with comments | « no previous file | no next file » | no next file with comments »

Powered by Google App Engine
This is Rietveld 408576698