| Index: crypto/p224_spake_unittest.cc
|
| diff --git a/crypto/p224_spake_unittest.cc b/crypto/p224_spake_unittest.cc
|
| new file mode 100644
|
| index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..15b5be268413d81ee697679fbea4b8ca9ad9afdf
|
| --- /dev/null
|
| +++ b/crypto/p224_spake_unittest.cc
|
| @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
|
| +// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
|
| +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
|
| +// found in the LICENSE file.
|
| +
|
| +#include "crypto/p224_spake.h"
|
| +
|
| +#include <string>
|
| +
|
| +#include "base/logging.h"
|
| +#include "base/strings/string_number_conversions.h"
|
| +#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
|
| +
|
| +namespace crypto {
|
| +
|
| +namespace {
|
| +
|
| +std::string HexEncodeString(const std::string& binary_data) {
|
| + return base::HexEncode(binary_data.c_str(), binary_data.size());
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +bool RunExchange(P224EncryptedKeyExchange* client,
|
| + P224EncryptedKeyExchange* server,
|
| + bool is_password_same) {
|
| + for (;;) {
|
| + std::string client_message, server_message;
|
| + client_message = client->GetNextMessage();
|
| + server_message = server->GetNextMessage();
|
| +
|
| + P224EncryptedKeyExchange::Result client_result, server_result;
|
| + client_result = client->ProcessMessage(server_message);
|
| + server_result = server->ProcessMessage(client_message);
|
| +
|
| + // Check that we never hit the case where only one succeeds.
|
| + EXPECT_EQ(client_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultSuccess,
|
| + server_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultSuccess);
|
| +
|
| + if (client_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultFailed ||
|
| + server_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultFailed) {
|
| + return false;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + EXPECT_EQ(is_password_same,
|
| + client->GetUnverifiedKey() == server->GetUnverifiedKey());
|
| +
|
| + if (client_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultSuccess &&
|
| + server_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultSuccess) {
|
| + return true;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + EXPECT_EQ(P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultPending, client_result);
|
| + EXPECT_EQ(P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultPending, server_result);
|
| + }
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +const char kPassword[] = "foo";
|
| +
|
| +} // namespace
|
| +
|
| +TEST(MutualAuth, CorrectAuth) {
|
| + P224EncryptedKeyExchange client(
|
| + P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeClient, kPassword);
|
| + P224EncryptedKeyExchange server(
|
| + P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeServer, kPassword);
|
| +
|
| + EXPECT_TRUE(RunExchange(&client, &server, true));
|
| + EXPECT_EQ(client.GetKey(), server.GetKey());
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +TEST(MutualAuth, IncorrectPassword) {
|
| + P224EncryptedKeyExchange client(
|
| + P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeClient,
|
| + kPassword);
|
| + P224EncryptedKeyExchange server(
|
| + P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeServer,
|
| + "wrongpassword");
|
| +
|
| + EXPECT_FALSE(RunExchange(&client, &server, false));
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +TEST(MutualAuth, ExpectedValues) {
|
| + P224EncryptedKeyExchange client(P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeClient,
|
| + kPassword);
|
| + client.SetXForTesting("Client x");
|
| + P224EncryptedKeyExchange server(P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeServer,
|
| + kPassword);
|
| + server.SetXForTesting("Server x");
|
| +
|
| + std::string client_message = client.GetNextMessage();
|
| + EXPECT_EQ(
|
| + "3508EF7DECC8AB9F9C439FBB0154288BBECC0A82E8448F4CF29554EB"
|
| + "BE9D486686226255EAD1D077C635B1A41F46AC91D7F7F32CED9EC3E0",
|
| + HexEncodeString(client_message));
|
| +
|
| + std::string server_message = server.GetNextMessage();
|
| + EXPECT_EQ(
|
| + "A3088C18B75D2C2B107105661AEC85424777475EB29F1DDFB8C14AFB"
|
| + "F1603D0DF38413A00F420ACF2059E7997C935F5A957A193D09A2B584",
|
| + HexEncodeString(server_message));
|
| +
|
| + EXPECT_EQ(P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultPending,
|
| + client.ProcessMessage(server_message));
|
| + EXPECT_EQ(P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultPending,
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| + server.ProcessMessage(client_message));
|
| +
|
| + EXPECT_EQ(client.GetUnverifiedKey(), server.GetUnverifiedKey());
|
| + // Must stay the same. External implementations should be able to pair with.
|
| + EXPECT_EQ(
|
| + "CE7CCFC435CDA4F01EC8826788B1F8B82EF7D550A34696B371096E64"
|
| + "C487D4FE193F7D1A6FF6820BC7F807796BA3889E8F999BBDEFC32FFA",
|
| + HexEncodeString(server.GetUnverifiedKey()));
|
| +
|
| + EXPECT_TRUE(RunExchange(&client, &server, true));
|
| + EXPECT_EQ(client.GetKey(), server.GetKey());
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +TEST(MutualAuth, Fuzz) {
|
| + static const unsigned kIterations = 40;
|
| +
|
| + for (unsigned i = 0; i < kIterations; i++) {
|
| + P224EncryptedKeyExchange client(
|
| + P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeClient, kPassword);
|
| + P224EncryptedKeyExchange server(
|
| + P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kPeerTypeServer, kPassword);
|
| +
|
| + // We'll only be testing small values of i, but we don't want that to bias
|
| + // the test coverage. So we disperse the value of i by multiplying by the
|
| + // FNV, 32-bit prime, producing a poor-man's PRNG.
|
| + const uint32 rand = i * 16777619;
|
| +
|
| + for (unsigned round = 0;; round++) {
|
| + std::string client_message, server_message;
|
| + client_message = client.GetNextMessage();
|
| + server_message = server.GetNextMessage();
|
| +
|
| + if ((rand & 1) == round) {
|
| + const bool server_or_client = rand & 2;
|
| + std::string* m = server_or_client ? &server_message : &client_message;
|
| + if (rand & 4) {
|
| + // Truncate
|
| + *m = m->substr(0, (i >> 3) % m->size());
|
| + } else {
|
| + // Corrupt
|
| + const size_t bits = m->size() * 8;
|
| + const size_t bit_to_corrupt = (rand >> 3) % bits;
|
| + const_cast<char*>(m->data())[bit_to_corrupt / 8] ^=
|
| + 1 << (bit_to_corrupt % 8);
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + P224EncryptedKeyExchange::Result client_result, server_result;
|
| + client_result = client.ProcessMessage(server_message);
|
| + server_result = server.ProcessMessage(client_message);
|
| +
|
| + // If we have corrupted anything, we expect the authentication to fail,
|
| + // although one side can succeed if we happen to corrupt the second round
|
| + // message to the other.
|
| + ASSERT_FALSE(
|
| + client_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultSuccess &&
|
| + server_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultSuccess);
|
| +
|
| + if (client_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultFailed ||
|
| + server_result == P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultFailed) {
|
| + break;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + ASSERT_EQ(P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultPending,
|
| + client_result);
|
| + ASSERT_EQ(P224EncryptedKeyExchange::kResultPending,
|
| + server_result);
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +} // namespace crypto
|
|
|