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1 // Copyright 2016 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. | |
2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be | |
3 // found in the LICENSE file. | |
4 | |
5 #include <stdint.h> | |
6 | |
7 #include <limits> | |
8 #include <vector> | |
9 | |
10 #include "base/base64.h" | |
11 #include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" | |
12 #include "base/strings/string_piece.h" | |
13 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h" | |
14 #include "components/update_client/client_update_protocol_ecdsa.h" | |
15 #include "crypto/random.h" | |
16 #include "crypto/secure_util.h" | |
17 #include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" | |
18 | |
19 namespace update_client { | |
20 | |
21 namespace { | |
22 | |
23 std::string GetPublicKeyForTesting() { | |
24 // How to generate this key: | |
25 // openssl ecparam -genkey -name prime256v1 -out ecpriv.pem | |
26 // openssl ec -in ecpriv.pem -pubout -out ecpub.pem | |
27 | |
28 static const char kCupEcdsaTestKey_Base64[] = | |
29 "MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEJNOjKyN6UHyUGkGow+xCmQthQXUo" | |
30 "9sd7RIXSpVIM768UlbGb/5JrnISjSYejCc/pxQooI6mJTzWL3pZb5TA1DA=="; | |
31 | |
32 std::string result; | |
33 if (!base::Base64Decode(std::string(kCupEcdsaTestKey_Base64), &result)) | |
34 return std::string(); | |
35 | |
36 return result; | |
37 } | |
38 | |
39 } // end namespace | |
40 | |
41 class CupEcdsaTest : public testing::Test { | |
42 protected: | |
43 void SetUp() override { | |
44 cup_ = ClientUpdateProtocolEcdsa::Create(8, GetPublicKeyForTesting()); | |
45 ASSERT_TRUE(cup_.get()); | |
46 } | |
47 | |
48 void OverrideNonce(uint32_t nonce) { | |
49 cup_->request_query_cup2key_ = | |
50 base::StringPrintf("%d:%u", cup_->pub_key_version_, nonce); | |
51 } | |
52 | |
53 ClientUpdateProtocolEcdsa& CUP() { return *cup_.get(); } | |
54 | |
55 private: | |
56 scoped_ptr<ClientUpdateProtocolEcdsa> cup_; | |
57 }; | |
58 | |
59 TEST_F(CupEcdsaTest, SignRequest) { | |
60 static const char kRequest[] = "TestSequenceForCupEcdsaUnitTest"; | |
61 static const char kRequestHash[] = | |
62 "&cup2hreq=" | |
63 "cde1f7dc1311ed96813057ca321c2f5a17ea2c9c776ee0eb31965f7985a3074a"; | |
64 static const char kKeyId[] = "cup2key=8:"; | |
65 | |
66 std::string query; | |
67 CUP().SignRequest(kRequest, &query); | |
68 std::string query2; | |
69 CUP().SignRequest(kRequest, &query2); | |
70 | |
71 EXPECT_FALSE(query.empty()); | |
72 EXPECT_FALSE(query2.empty()); | |
73 EXPECT_EQ(0UL, query.find(kKeyId)); | |
74 EXPECT_EQ(0UL, query2.find(kKeyId)); | |
75 EXPECT_NE(std::string::npos, query.find(kRequestHash)); | |
76 EXPECT_NE(std::string::npos, query2.find(kRequestHash)); | |
77 | |
78 // In theory, this is a flaky test, as there's nothing preventing the RNG | |
79 // from returning the same nonce twice in a row. In practice, this should | |
80 // be fine. | |
81 EXPECT_NE(query, query2); | |
82 } | |
83 | |
84 TEST_F(CupEcdsaTest, ValidateResponse_TestETagParsing) { | |
85 // Invalid ETags must be gracefully rejected without a crash. | |
86 std::string query_discard; | |
87 CUP().SignRequest("Request_A", &query_discard); | |
88 OverrideNonce(12345); | |
89 | |
90 // Expect a pass for a well-formed etag. | |
91 EXPECT_TRUE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
92 "Response_A", | |
93 "3044" | |
94 "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
95 "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e" | |
96 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
97 | |
98 // Reject empty etags. | |
99 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse("Response_A", "")); | |
100 | |
101 // Reject etags with zero-length hashes or signatures, even if the other | |
102 // component is wellformed. | |
103 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse("Response_A", ":")); | |
104 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
105 "Response_A", | |
106 "3044" | |
107 "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
108 "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e" | |
109 ":")); | |
110 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
111 "Response_A", | |
112 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
113 | |
114 // Reject etags with non-hex content in either component. | |
115 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
116 "Response_A", | |
117 "3044" | |
118 "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458__ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
119 "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e" | |
120 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
121 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
122 "Response_A", | |
123 "3044" | |
124 "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
125 "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e" | |
126 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901d__7d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
127 | |
128 // Reject etags where either/both component has a length that's not a | |
129 // multiple of 2 (i.e. not a valid hex encoding). | |
130 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
131 "Response_A", | |
132 "3044" | |
133 "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
134 "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10" | |
135 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
136 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
137 "Response_A", | |
138 "3044" | |
139 "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
140 "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e" | |
141 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f")); | |
142 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
143 "Response_A", | |
144 "3044" | |
145 "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
146 "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10" | |
147 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f")); | |
148 | |
149 // Reject etags where the hash is even, but not 256 bits. | |
150 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
151 "Response_A", | |
152 "3044" | |
153 "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
154 "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e" | |
155 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243")); | |
156 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
157 "Response_A", | |
158 "3044" | |
159 "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
160 "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e" | |
161 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5ff")); | |
162 | |
163 // Reject etags where the signature field is too small to be valid. (Note that | |
164 // the case isn't even a signature -- it's a validly encoded ASN.1 NULL.) | |
165 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
166 "Response_A", | |
167 "0500" | |
168 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243")); | |
169 | |
170 // Reject etags where the signature field is too big to be a valid signature. | |
171 // (This is a validly formed structure, but both ints are over 256 bits.) | |
172 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
173 "Response_A", | |
174 "3048" | |
175 "202207fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" | |
176 "202207fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" | |
177 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5ff")); | |
178 | |
179 // Reject etags where the signature is valid DER-encoded ASN.1, but is not | |
180 // an ECDSA signature. (This is actually stressing crypto's SignatureValidator | |
181 // library, and not CUP's use of it, but it's worth testing here.) Cases: | |
182 // * Something that's not a sequence | |
183 // * Sequences that contain things other than ints (i.e. octet strings) | |
184 // * Sequences that contain a negative int. | |
185 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
186 "Response_A", | |
187 "0406020100020100" | |
188 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243")); | |
189 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
190 "Response_A", | |
191 "3044" | |
192 "06200123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef" | |
193 "06200123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef" | |
194 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243")); | |
195 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
196 "Response_A", | |
197 "3046" | |
198 "02047fffffff" | |
199 "0220ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" | |
200 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243")); | |
201 | |
202 // Reject etags where the signature is not a valid DER encoding. (Again, this | |
203 // is stressing SignatureValidator.) Test cases are: | |
204 // * No length field | |
205 // * Zero length field | |
206 // * One of the ints has truncated content | |
207 // * One of the ints has content longer than its length field | |
208 // * A positive int is improperly zero-padded | |
209 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
210 "Response_A", | |
211 "30" | |
212 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243")); | |
213 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
214 "Response_A", | |
215 "3000" | |
216 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243")); | |
217 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
218 "Response_A", | |
219 "3044" | |
220 "02207fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" | |
221 "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
222 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243")); | |
223 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
224 "Response_A", | |
225 "3044" | |
226 "02207fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff00" | |
227 "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
228 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243")); | |
229 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
230 "Response_A", | |
231 "3044" | |
232 "022000007f24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
233 "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e" | |
234 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
235 } | |
236 | |
237 TEST_F(CupEcdsaTest, ValidateResponse_TestSigning) { | |
238 std::string query_discard; | |
239 CUP().SignRequest("Request_A", &query_discard); | |
240 OverrideNonce(12345); | |
241 | |
242 // How to generate an ECDSA signature: | |
243 // echo -n Request_A | sha256sum | cut -d " " -f 1 > h | |
244 // echo -n Response_A | sha256sum | cut -d " " -f 1 >> h | |
245 // cat h | xxd -r -p > hbin | |
246 // echo -n 8:12345 >> hbin | |
247 // sha256sum hbin | cut -d " " -f 1 | xxd -r -p > hbin2 | |
248 // openssl dgst -hex -sha256 -sign ecpriv.pem hbin2 | cut -d " " -f 2 > sig | |
249 // echo -n :Request_A | sha256sum | cut -d " " -f 1 >> sig | |
250 // cat sig | |
251 // It's useful to throw this in a bash script and parameterize it if you're | |
252 // updating this unit test. | |
253 | |
254 // Valid case: | |
255 // * Send "Request_A" with key 8 / nonce 12345 to server. | |
256 // * Receive "Response_A", signature, and observed request hash from server. | |
257 // * Signature signs HASH(Request_A) | HASH(Response_A) | 8:12345. | |
258 // * Observed hash matches HASH(Request_A). | |
259 EXPECT_TRUE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
260 "Response_A", | |
261 "3045022077a2d004f1643a92af5d356877c3434c46519ce32882d6e30ef6d154ee9775e3" | |
262 "022100aca63c77d34152bdc0918ae0629e82b59314e5459f607cdc5ac95f1a4b7c31a2" | |
263 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
264 | |
265 // Failure case: "Request_A" made it to the server intact, but the response | |
266 // body is modified to "Response_B" on return. The signature is now invalid. | |
267 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
268 "Response_B", | |
269 "3045022077a2d004f1643a92af5d356877c3434c46519ce32882d6e30ef6d154ee9775e3" | |
270 "022100aca63c77d34152bdc0918ae0629e82b59314e5459f607cdc5ac95f1a4b7c31a2" | |
271 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
272 | |
273 // Failure case: Request body was modified to "Request_B" before it reached | |
274 // the server. Test a fast reject based on the observed_hash parameter. | |
275 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
276 "Response_B", | |
277 "304402206289a7765f0371c7c48796779747f1166707d5937a99af518845f44af95876" | |
278 "8c0220139fe935fde3e6b416ee742f91c6a480113762d78d889a2661de37576866d21c" | |
279 ":80e3ef1b373efe5f2a8383a0cf9c89fb2e0cbb8e85db4813655ff5dc05009e7e")); | |
280 | |
281 // Failure case: Request body was modified to "Request_B" before it reached | |
282 // the server. Test a slow reject based on a signature mismatch. | |
283 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
284 "Response_B", | |
285 "304402206289a7765f0371c7c48796779747f1166707d5937a99af518845f44af95876" | |
286 "8c0220139fe935fde3e6b416ee742f91c6a480113762d78d889a2661de37576866d21c" | |
287 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
288 | |
289 // Failure case: Request/response are intact, but the signature is invalid | |
290 // because it was signed against a different nonce (67890). | |
291 EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
292 "Response_A", | |
293 "3046022100d3bbb1fb4451c8e04a07fe95404cc39121ed0e0bc084f87de19d52eee50a97" | |
294 "bf022100dd7d41d467be2af98d9116b0c7ba09740d54578c02a02f74da5f089834be3403" | |
295 ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
296 } | |
297 | |
298 } // namespace update_client | |
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