Make Document::isSecureContext() work for OOPIFs

third_party/WebKit/Source/core/dom/Document.cpp

 /*
  * Copyright (C) 1999 Lars Knoll (knoll@kde.org)
  *           (C) 1999 Antti Koivisto (koivisto@kde.org)
  *           (C) 2001 Dirk Mueller (mueller@kde.org)
  *           (C) 2006 Alexey Proskuryakov (ap@webkit.org)
  * Copyright (C) 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 Torch Mobile Inc. All rights reserved. (http://www.torchmobile.com/)
  * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012 Google Inc. All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies)
  * Copyright (C) Research In Motion Limited 2010-2011. All rights reserved.
@@ skipping 3371 matching lines @@
     //   <iframe src="scheme-has-exception://host">
     //     <iframe src="http://host"></iframe>
     //     <iframe sandbox src="http://host"></iframe>
     //   </iframe>
     // both inner iframes would fail the check, even though the outermost iframe
     // passes.
     //
     // In all cases, a frame must be potentially trustworthy in addition to
     // having an exception listed in order for the exception to be granted.
     if (SecurityContext::isSandboxed(SandboxOrigin)) {
-        RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> origin = SecurityOrigin::create(url());
-        if (!isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy(origin.get(), errorMessage))
+        if (!SecurityContext::isPotentiallyTrustworthySandboxedOrigin()) {
+            if (errorMessage)
+                *errorMessage = securityOrigin()->isPotentiallyTrustworthyErrorMessage();
             return false;
-        if (SchemeRegistry::schemeShouldBypassSecureContextCheck(origin->protocol()))
+        }
+        if (SecurityContext::bypassSecureContextCheckForSandboxedOrigin())
             return true;
     } else {
         if (!isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy(securityOrigin(), errorMessage))
             return false;
         if (SchemeRegistry::schemeShouldBypassSecureContextCheck(securityOrigin()->protocol()))
             return true;
     }
 
     if (privilegeContextCheck == StandardSecureContextCheck) {
-        Document* context = parentDocument();
-        while (context) {
-            // Skip to the next ancestor if it's a srcdoc.
-            if (!context->isSrcdocDocument()) {
-                if (context->securityContext().isSandboxed(SandboxOrigin)) {
-                    // For a sandboxed origin, use the document's URL.
-                    RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> origin = SecurityOrigin::create(context->url());
-                    if (!isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy(origin.get(), errorMessage))
-                        return false;
-                } else {
-                    if (!isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy(context->securityOrigin(), errorMessage))
-                        return false;
+        if (!m_frame)
+            return true;
+        Frame* parent = m_frame->tree().parent();
+        while (parent) {
+            if (parent->securityContext()->isSandboxed(SandboxOrigin)) {
+                if (!parent->securityContext()->isPotentiallyTrustworthySandboxedOrigin()) {
+                    if (errorMessage)
+                        *errorMessage = parent->securityContext()->securityOrigin()->isPotentiallyTrustworthyErrorMessage();
+                    return false;
                 }
+            } else {
+                if (!isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy(parent->securityContext()->securityOrigin(), errorMessage))
+                    return false;
             }
-            context = context->parentDocument();
+            parent = parent->tree().parent();
         }
     }
     return true;
 }
 
 StyleSheetList* Document::styleSheets()
 {
     if (!m_styleSheetList)
         m_styleSheetList = StyleSheetList::create(this);
     return m_styleSheetList.get();
@@ skipping 1461 matching lines @@
         // This can occur via document.implementation.createDocument().
         m_cookieURL = KURL(ParsedURLString, emptyString());
         setSecurityOrigin(SecurityOrigin::createUnique());
         initContentSecurityPolicy();
         return;
     }
 
     // In the common case, create the security context from the currently
     // loading URL with a fresh content security policy.
     m_cookieURL = m_url;
+    // Set the origin initially based on the URL. enforceSandboxFlags()
+    // will adjust it to be a unique origin if necessary.
+    setSecurityOrigin(SecurityOrigin::create(m_url));
     enforceSandboxFlags(initializer.sandboxFlags());
     if (initializer.shouldEnforceStrictMixedContentChecking())
         enforceStrictMixedContentChecking();
     setInsecureRequestsPolicy(initializer.insecureRequestsPolicy());
     if (initializer.insecureNavigationsToUpgrade()) {
         for (auto toUpgrade : *initializer.insecureNavigationsToUpgrade())
             addInsecureNavigationUpgrade(toUpgrade);
     }
-    setSecurityOrigin(isSandboxed(SandboxOrigin) ? SecurityOrigin::createUnique() : SecurityOrigin::create(m_url));
 
     if (importsController()) {
         // If this document is an HTML import, grab a reference to it's master document's Content
         // Security Policy. We don't call 'initContentSecurityPolicy' in this case, as we can't
         // rebind the master document's policy object: its ExecutionContext needs to remain tied
         // to the master document.
         setContentSecurityPolicy(importsController()->master()->contentSecurityPolicy());
     } else {
         initContentSecurityPolicy();
     }
@@ skipping 25 matching lines @@
     // If we do not obtain a meaningful origin from the URL, then we try to
     // find one via the frame hierarchy.
 
     if (!initializer.owner()) {
         didFailToInitializeSecurityOrigin();
         return;
     }
 
     if (isSandboxed(SandboxOrigin)) {
         // If we're supposed to inherit our security origin from our owner,
-        // but we're also sandboxed, the only thing we inherit is the ability
-        // to load local resources. This lets about:blank iframes in file://
+        // but we're also sandboxed, the only things we inherit are the
+        // potential trustworthiness of the origin and the ability to
+        // load local resources. This lets about:blank iframes in file://
         // URL documents load images and other resources from the file system.
+        if (initializer.owner()->isPotentiallyTrustworthySandboxedOrigin() || initializer.owner()->securityOrigin()->isPotentiallyTrustworthy())
+            setIsPotentiallyTrustworthySandboxedOrigin();
         if (initializer.owner()->securityOrigin()->canLoadLocalResources())
             securityOrigin()->grantLoadLocalResources();
         return;
     }
 
     m_cookieURL = initializer.owner()->cookieURL();
     // We alias the SecurityOrigins to match Firefox, see Bug 15313
     // https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15313
     setSecurityOrigin(initializer.owner()->securityOrigin());
 }
@@ skipping 977 matching lines @@
 #ifndef NDEBUG
 using namespace blink;
 void showLiveDocumentInstances()
 {
     Document::WeakDocumentSet& set = Document::liveDocumentSet();
     fprintf(stderr, "There are %u documents currently alive:\n", set.size());
     for (Document* document : set)
         fprintf(stderr, "- Document %p URL: %s\n", document, document->url().string().utf8().data());
 }
 #endif