Add information to SSLInfo about CT EV policy compliance

net/cert/ct_policy_enforcer_unittest.cc

 // Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 #include "net/cert/ct_policy_enforcer.h"
 
 #include <string>
 
 #include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h"
 #include "base/time/time.h"
@@ skipping 105 matching lines @@
       const base::Time& start,
       const base::Time& end,
       size_t required_scts) {
     scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
         new X509Certificate("subject", "issuer", start, end));
     ct::CTVerifyResult result;
 
     for (size_t i = 0; i < required_scts - 1; ++i) {
       FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED,
                                  1, std::vector<std::string>(), false, &result);
-      EXPECT_FALSE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
-          cert.get(), nullptr, result, BoundNetLog()))
+      EXPECT_EQ(CTPolicyEnforcer::EV_POLICY_NOT_ENOUGH_SCTS,
+                policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+                    cert.get(), nullptr, result.verified_scts, BoundNetLog()))
           << " for: " << (end - start).InDays() << " and " << required_scts
           << " scts=" << result.verified_scts.size() << " i=" << i;
     }
     FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 1,
                                std::vector<std::string>(), false, &result);
-    EXPECT_TRUE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
-        cert.get(), nullptr, result, BoundNetLog()))
+    EXPECT_EQ(CTPolicyEnforcer::EV_POLICY_COMPLIES_VIA_SCTS,
+              policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+                  cert.get(), nullptr, result.verified_scts, BoundNetLog()))
         << " for: " << (end - start).InDays() << " and " << required_scts
         << " scts=" << result.verified_scts.size();
   }
 
  protected:
   scoped_ptr<CTPolicyEnforcer> policy_enforcer_;
   scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain_;
   std::string google_log_id_;
   std::string non_google_log_id_;
 };
 
 TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest,
        DoesNotConformToCTEVPolicyNotEnoughDiverseSCTsAllGoogle) {
   ct::CTVerifyResult result;
   FillResultWithRepeatedLogID(google_log_id_, 2, true, &result);

[Eran Messeri, 2016/02/10 17:41:09]

Nit: Seems like we can completely get rid of references to CTVerifyResult in
this test. Feel free to put a TODO with my name on it.

[estark, 2016/02/11 01:54:21]

Done.

 
-  EXPECT_FALSE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
-      chain_.get(), nullptr, result, BoundNetLog()));
+  EXPECT_EQ(CTPolicyEnforcer::EV_POLICY_NOT_DIVERSE_SCTS,
+            policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+                chain_.get(), nullptr, result.verified_scts, BoundNetLog()));
 }
 
 TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest,
        DoesNotConformToCTEVPolicyNotEnoughDiverseSCTsAllNonGoogle) {
   ct::CTVerifyResult result;
   FillResultWithRepeatedLogID(non_google_log_id_, 2, true, &result);
 
-  EXPECT_FALSE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
-      chain_.get(), nullptr, result, BoundNetLog()));
+  EXPECT_EQ(CTPolicyEnforcer::EV_POLICY_NOT_DIVERSE_SCTS,
+            policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+                chain_.get(), nullptr, result.verified_scts, BoundNetLog()));
 }
 
 TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest, ConformsToCTEVPolicyIfSCTBeforeEnforcementDate) {
   ct::CTVerifyResult result;
   FillResultWithRepeatedLogID(non_google_log_id_, 2, false, &result);
 
-  EXPECT_TRUE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(chain_.get(), nullptr,
-                                                        result, BoundNetLog()));
+  EXPECT_EQ(CTPolicyEnforcer::EV_POLICY_COMPLIES_VIA_SCTS,
+            policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+                chain_.get(), nullptr, result.verified_scts, BoundNetLog()));
 }
 
 TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest, ConformsToCTEVPolicyWithNonEmbeddedSCTs) {
   ct::CTVerifyResult result;
   FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(
       ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_FROM_TLS_EXTENSION, 2, &result);
 
-  EXPECT_TRUE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(chain_.get(), nullptr,
-                                                        result, BoundNetLog()));
+  EXPECT_EQ(CTPolicyEnforcer::EV_POLICY_COMPLIES_VIA_SCTS,
+            policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+                chain_.get(), nullptr, result.verified_scts, BoundNetLog()));
 }
 
 TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest, ConformsToCTEVPolicyWithEmbeddedSCTs) {
   // This chain_ is valid for 10 years - over 121 months - so requires 5 SCTs.
   ct::CTVerifyResult result;
   FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 5,
                              &result);
 
-  EXPECT_TRUE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(chain_.get(), nullptr,
-                                                        result, BoundNetLog()));
+  EXPECT_EQ(CTPolicyEnforcer::EV_POLICY_COMPLIES_VIA_SCTS,
+            policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+                chain_.get(), nullptr, result.verified_scts, BoundNetLog()));
 }
 
 TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest, DoesNotConformToCTEVPolicyNotEnoughSCTs) {
   scoped_refptr<ct::EVCertsWhitelist> non_including_whitelist(
       new DummyEVCertsWhitelist(true, false));
   // This chain_ is valid for 10 years - over 121 months - so requires 5 SCTs.
   // However, as there are only two logs, two SCTs will be required - supply one
   // to guarantee the test fails.
   ct::CTVerifyResult result;
   FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 1,
                              &result);
 
-  EXPECT_FALSE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
-      chain_.get(), non_including_whitelist.get(), result, BoundNetLog()));
+  EXPECT_EQ(CTPolicyEnforcer::EV_POLICY_NOT_ENOUGH_SCTS,
+            policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+                chain_.get(), non_including_whitelist.get(),
+                result.verified_scts, BoundNetLog()));
 
   // ... but should be OK if whitelisted.
   scoped_refptr<ct::EVCertsWhitelist> whitelist(
       new DummyEVCertsWhitelist(true, true));
-  EXPECT_TRUE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
-      chain_.get(), whitelist.get(), result, BoundNetLog()));
+  EXPECT_EQ(
+      CTPolicyEnforcer::EV_POLICY_COMPLIES_VIA_WHITELIST,
+      policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+          chain_.get(), whitelist.get(), result.verified_scts, BoundNetLog()));
 }
 
 TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest, DoesNotConformToPolicyInvalidDates) {
   scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> no_valid_dates_cert(new X509Certificate(
       "subject", "issuer", base::Time(), base::Time::Now()));
   ct::CTVerifyResult result;
   FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 5,
                              &result);
-  EXPECT_FALSE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
-      no_valid_dates_cert.get(), nullptr, result, BoundNetLog()));
+  EXPECT_EQ(CTPolicyEnforcer::EV_POLICY_NOT_ENOUGH_SCTS,
+            policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+                no_valid_dates_cert.get(), nullptr, result.verified_scts,
+                BoundNetLog()));
   // ... but should be OK if whitelisted.
   scoped_refptr<ct::EVCertsWhitelist> whitelist(
       new DummyEVCertsWhitelist(true, true));
-  EXPECT_TRUE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
-      chain_.get(), whitelist.get(), result, BoundNetLog()));
+  EXPECT_EQ(
+      CTPolicyEnforcer::EV_POLICY_COMPLIES_VIA_WHITELIST,
+      policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+          chain_.get(), whitelist.get(), result.verified_scts, BoundNetLog()));
 }
 
 TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest,
        ConformsToPolicyExactNumberOfSCTsForValidityPeriod) {
   // Test multiple validity periods
   const struct TestData {
     base::Time validity_start;
     base::Time validity_end;
     size_t scts_required;
   } kTestData[] = {{// Cert valid for 14 months, needs 2 SCTs.
@@ skipping 33 matching lines @@
   }
 }
 
 TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest, ConformsToPolicyByEVWhitelistPresence) {
   scoped_refptr<ct::EVCertsWhitelist> whitelist(
       new DummyEVCertsWhitelist(true, true));
 
   ct::CTVerifyResult result;
   FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 1,
                              &result);
-  EXPECT_TRUE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
-      chain_.get(), whitelist.get(), result, BoundNetLog()));
+  EXPECT_EQ(
+      CTPolicyEnforcer::EV_POLICY_COMPLIES_VIA_WHITELIST,
+      policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+          chain_.get(), whitelist.get(), result.verified_scts, BoundNetLog()));
 }
 
 TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest, IgnoresInvalidEVWhitelist) {
   scoped_refptr<ct::EVCertsWhitelist> whitelist(
       new DummyEVCertsWhitelist(false, true));
 
   ct::CTVerifyResult result;
   FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 1,
                              &result);
-  EXPECT_FALSE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
-      chain_.get(), whitelist.get(), result, BoundNetLog()));
+  EXPECT_EQ(
+      CTPolicyEnforcer::EV_POLICY_NOT_ENOUGH_SCTS,
+      policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+          chain_.get(), whitelist.get(), result.verified_scts, BoundNetLog()));
 }
 
 TEST_F(CTPolicyEnforcerTest, IgnoresNullEVWhitelist) {
   ct::CTVerifyResult result;
   FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 1,
                              &result);
-  EXPECT_FALSE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
-      chain_.get(), nullptr, result, BoundNetLog()));
+  EXPECT_EQ(CTPolicyEnforcer::EV_POLICY_NOT_ENOUGH_SCTS,
+            policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+                chain_.get(), nullptr, result.verified_scts, BoundNetLog()));
 }
 
 }  // namespace
 
 }  // namespace net