Move base to DEPS

base/security_unittest.cc

Index: base/security_unittest.cc
diff --git a/base/security_unittest.cc b/base/security_unittest.cc
deleted file mode 100644
index 4a0bcf8c2ac39ab30556f3d2819092aa3927b7df..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/base/security_unittest.cc
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
-// found in the LICENSE file.
-
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <algorithm>
-#include <limits>
-
-#include "base/files/file_util.h"
-#include "base/logging.h"
-#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h"
-#include "build/build_config.h"
-#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
-
-#if defined(OS_POSIX)
-#include <sys/mman.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#endif
-
-using std::nothrow;
-using std::numeric_limits;
-
-namespace {
-
-// This function acts as a compiler optimization barrier. We use it to
-// prevent the compiler from making an expression a compile-time constant.
-// We also use it so that the compiler doesn't discard certain return values
-// as something we don't need (see the comment with calloc below).
-template <typename Type>
-NOINLINE Type HideValueFromCompiler(volatile Type value) {
-#if defined(__GNUC__)
-  // In a GCC compatible compiler (GCC or Clang), make this compiler barrier
-  // more robust than merely using "volatile".
-  __asm__ volatile ("" : "+r" (value));
-#endif  // __GNUC__
-  return value;
-}
-
-// Tcmalloc and Windows allocator shim support setting malloc limits.
-// - NO_TCMALLOC (should be defined if compiled with use_allocator!="tcmalloc")
-// - ADDRESS_SANITIZER and SYZYASAN because they have their own memory allocator
-// - IOS does not use tcmalloc
-// - OS_MACOSX does not use tcmalloc
-// - Windows allocator shim defines ALLOCATOR_SHIM
-#if (!defined(NO_TCMALLOC) || defined(ALLOCATOR_SHIM)) &&                     \
-    !defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER) && !defined(OS_IOS) && !defined(OS_MACOSX) && \
-    !defined(SYZYASAN)
-#define MALLOC_OVERFLOW_TEST(function) function
-#else
-#define MALLOC_OVERFLOW_TEST(function) DISABLED_##function
-#endif
-
-#if defined(OS_LINUX) && defined(__x86_64__)
-// Detect runtime TCMalloc bypasses.
-bool IsTcMallocBypassed() {
-  // This should detect a TCMalloc bypass from Valgrind.
-  char* g_slice = getenv("G_SLICE");
-  if (g_slice && !strcmp(g_slice, "always-malloc"))
-    return true;
-  return false;
-}
-#endif
-
-// There are platforms where these tests are known to fail. We would like to
-// be able to easily check the status on the bots, but marking tests as
-// FAILS_ is too clunky.
-void OverflowTestsSoftExpectTrue(bool overflow_detected) {
-  if (!overflow_detected) {
-#if defined(OS_LINUX) || defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_MACOSX)
-    // Sadly, on Linux, Android, and OSX we don't have a good story yet. Don't
-    // fail the test, but report.
-    printf("Platform has overflow: %s\n",
-           !overflow_detected ? "yes." : "no.");
-#else
-    // Otherwise, fail the test. (Note: EXPECT are ok in subfunctions, ASSERT
-    // aren't).
-    EXPECT_TRUE(overflow_detected);
-#endif
-  }
-}
-
-#if defined(OS_IOS) || defined(OS_WIN) || defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER) || defined(THREAD_SANITIZER) || defined(OS_MACOSX)
-#define MAYBE_NewOverflow DISABLED_NewOverflow
-#else
-#define MAYBE_NewOverflow NewOverflow
-#endif
-// Test array[TooBig][X] and array[X][TooBig] allocations for int overflows.
-// IOS doesn't honor nothrow, so disable the test there.
-// Crashes on Windows Dbg builds, disable there as well.
-// Fails on Mac 10.8 http://crbug.com/227092
-TEST(SecurityTest, MAYBE_NewOverflow) {
-  const size_t kArraySize = 4096;
-  // We want something "dynamic" here, so that the compiler doesn't
-  // immediately reject crazy arrays.
-  const size_t kDynamicArraySize = HideValueFromCompiler(kArraySize);
-  // numeric_limits are still not constexpr until we switch to C++11, so we
-  // use an ugly cast.
-  const size_t kMaxSizeT = ~static_cast<size_t>(0);
-  ASSERT_EQ(numeric_limits<size_t>::max(), kMaxSizeT);
-  const size_t kArraySize2 = kMaxSizeT / kArraySize + 10;
-  const size_t kDynamicArraySize2 = HideValueFromCompiler(kArraySize2);
-  {
-    scoped_ptr<char[][kArraySize]> array_pointer(new (nothrow)
-        char[kDynamicArraySize2][kArraySize]);
-    OverflowTestsSoftExpectTrue(!array_pointer);
-  }
-  // On windows, the compiler prevents static array sizes of more than
-  // 0x7fffffff (error C2148).
-#if defined(OS_WIN) && defined(ARCH_CPU_64_BITS)
-  ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(kDynamicArraySize);
-#else
-  {
-    scoped_ptr<char[][kArraySize2]> array_pointer(new (nothrow)
-        char[kDynamicArraySize][kArraySize2]);
-    OverflowTestsSoftExpectTrue(!array_pointer);
-  }
-#endif  // !defined(OS_WIN) || !defined(ARCH_CPU_64_BITS)
-}
-
-#if defined(OS_LINUX) && defined(__x86_64__)
-// Check if ptr1 and ptr2 are separated by less than size chars.
-bool ArePointersToSameArea(void* ptr1, void* ptr2, size_t size) {
-  ptrdiff_t ptr_diff = reinterpret_cast<char*>(std::max(ptr1, ptr2)) -
-                       reinterpret_cast<char*>(std::min(ptr1, ptr2));
-  return static_cast<size_t>(ptr_diff) <= size;
-}
-
-// Check if TCMalloc uses an underlying random memory allocator.
-TEST(SecurityTest, MALLOC_OVERFLOW_TEST(RandomMemoryAllocations)) {
-  if (IsTcMallocBypassed())
-    return;
-  size_t kPageSize = 4096;  // We support x86_64 only.
-  // Check that malloc() returns an address that is neither the kernel's
-  // un-hinted mmap area, nor the current brk() area. The first malloc() may
-  // not be at a random address because TCMalloc will first exhaust any memory
-  // that it has allocated early on, before starting the sophisticated
-  // allocators.
-  void* default_mmap_heap_address =
-      mmap(0, kPageSize, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
-           MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
-  ASSERT_NE(default_mmap_heap_address,
-            static_cast<void*>(MAP_FAILED));
-  ASSERT_EQ(munmap(default_mmap_heap_address, kPageSize), 0);
-  void* brk_heap_address = sbrk(0);
-  ASSERT_NE(brk_heap_address, reinterpret_cast<void*>(-1));
-  ASSERT_TRUE(brk_heap_address != NULL);
-  // 1 MB should get us past what TCMalloc pre-allocated before initializing
-  // the sophisticated allocators.
-  size_t kAllocSize = 1<<20;
-  scoped_ptr<char, base::FreeDeleter> ptr(
-      static_cast<char*>(malloc(kAllocSize)));
-  ASSERT_TRUE(ptr != NULL);
-  // If two pointers are separated by less than 512MB, they are considered
-  // to be in the same area.
-  // Our random pointer could be anywhere within 0x3fffffffffff (46bits),
-  // and we are checking that it's not withing 1GB (30 bits) from two
-  // addresses (brk and mmap heap). We have roughly one chance out of
-  // 2^15 to flake.
-  const size_t kAreaRadius = 1<<29;
-  bool in_default_mmap_heap = ArePointersToSameArea(
-      ptr.get(), default_mmap_heap_address, kAreaRadius);
-  EXPECT_FALSE(in_default_mmap_heap);
-
-  bool in_default_brk_heap = ArePointersToSameArea(
-      ptr.get(), brk_heap_address, kAreaRadius);
-  EXPECT_FALSE(in_default_brk_heap);
-
-  // In the implementation, we always mask our random addresses with
-  // kRandomMask, so we use it as an additional detection mechanism.
-  const uintptr_t kRandomMask = 0x3fffffffffffULL;
-  bool impossible_random_address =
-      reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(ptr.get()) & ~kRandomMask;
-  EXPECT_FALSE(impossible_random_address);
-}
-
-#endif  // defined(OS_LINUX) && defined(__x86_64__)
-
-}  // namespace