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Unified Diff: third_party/WebKit/Source/wtf/AddressSpaceRandomization.cpp

Issue 1611343002: wtf reformat test Base URL: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git@master
Patch Set: pydent Created 4 years, 11 months ago
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Index: third_party/WebKit/Source/wtf/AddressSpaceRandomization.cpp
diff --git a/third_party/WebKit/Source/wtf/AddressSpaceRandomization.cpp b/third_party/WebKit/Source/wtf/AddressSpaceRandomization.cpp
index f98e5cdfafbb3a5cf06143a8e529903d1cc02a88..a60e64ec0f005fbe2fee09991381799b0e9aadec 100644
--- a/third_party/WebKit/Source/wtf/AddressSpaceRandomization.cpp
+++ b/third_party/WebKit/Source/wtf/AddressSpaceRandomization.cpp
@@ -21,113 +21,108 @@ namespace {
// This is the same PRNG as used by tcmalloc for mapping address randomness;
// see http://burtleburtle.net/bob/rand/smallprng.html
struct ranctx {
- SpinLock lock;
- bool initialized;
- uint32_t a;
- uint32_t b;
- uint32_t c;
- uint32_t d;
+ SpinLock lock;
+ bool initialized;
+ uint32_t a;
+ uint32_t b;
+ uint32_t c;
+ uint32_t d;
};
#define rot(x, k) (((x) << (k)) | ((x) >> (32 - (k))))
-uint32_t ranvalInternal(ranctx* x)
-{
- uint32_t e = x->a - rot(x->b, 27);
- x->a = x->b ^ rot(x->c, 17);
- x->b = x->c + x->d;
- x->c = x->d + e;
- x->d = e + x->a;
- return x->d;
+uint32_t ranvalInternal(ranctx* x) {
+ uint32_t e = x->a - rot(x->b, 27);
+ x->a = x->b ^ rot(x->c, 17);
+ x->b = x->c + x->d;
+ x->c = x->d + e;
+ x->d = e + x->a;
+ return x->d;
}
#undef rot
-uint32_t ranval(ranctx* x)
-{
- SpinLock::Guard guard(x->lock);
- if (UNLIKELY(!x->initialized)) {
- x->initialized = true;
- char c;
- uint32_t seed = static_cast<uint32_t>(reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(&c));
- uint32_t pid;
- uint32_t usec;
+uint32_t ranval(ranctx* x) {
+ SpinLock::Guard guard(x->lock);
+ if (UNLIKELY(!x->initialized)) {
+ x->initialized = true;
+ char c;
+ uint32_t seed = static_cast<uint32_t>(reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(&c));
+ uint32_t pid;
+ uint32_t usec;
#if OS(WIN)
- pid = GetCurrentProcessId();
- SYSTEMTIME st;
- GetSystemTime(&st);
- usec = static_cast<uint32_t>(st.wMilliseconds * 1000);
+ pid = GetCurrentProcessId();
+ SYSTEMTIME st;
+ GetSystemTime(&st);
+ usec = static_cast<uint32_t>(st.wMilliseconds * 1000);
#else
- pid = static_cast<uint32_t>(getpid());
- struct timeval tv;
- gettimeofday(&tv, 0);
- usec = static_cast<uint32_t>(tv.tv_usec);
+ pid = static_cast<uint32_t>(getpid());
+ struct timeval tv;
+ gettimeofday(&tv, 0);
+ usec = static_cast<uint32_t>(tv.tv_usec);
#endif
- seed ^= pid;
- seed ^= usec;
- x->a = 0xf1ea5eed;
- x->b = x->c = x->d = seed;
- for (int i = 0; i < 20; ++i) {
- (void) ranvalInternal(x);
- }
+ seed ^= pid;
+ seed ^= usec;
+ x->a = 0xf1ea5eed;
+ x->b = x->c = x->d = seed;
+ for (int i = 0; i < 20; ++i) {
+ (void)ranvalInternal(x);
}
- uint32_t ret = ranvalInternal(x);
- return ret;
+ }
+ uint32_t ret = ranvalInternal(x);
+ return ret;
}
static struct ranctx s_ranctx;
-
}
// Calculates a random preferred mapping address. In calculating an
// address, we balance good ASLR against not fragmenting the address
// space too badly.
-void* getRandomPageBase()
-{
- uintptr_t random;
- random = static_cast<uintptr_t>(ranval(&s_ranctx));
+void* getRandomPageBase() {
+ uintptr_t random;
+ random = static_cast<uintptr_t>(ranval(&s_ranctx));
#if CPU(X86_64)
- random <<= 32UL;
- random |= static_cast<uintptr_t>(ranval(&s_ranctx));
- // This address mask gives a low liklihood of address space collisions.
- // We handle the situation gracefully if there is a collision.
+ random <<= 32UL;
+ random |= static_cast<uintptr_t>(ranval(&s_ranctx));
+// This address mask gives a low liklihood of address space collisions.
+// We handle the situation gracefully if there is a collision.
#if OS(WIN)
- // 64-bit Windows has a bizarrely small 8TB user address space.
- // Allocates in the 1-5TB region.
- // TODO(cevans): I think Win 8.1 has 47-bits like Linux.
- random &= 0x3ffffffffffUL;
- random += 0x10000000000UL;
+ // 64-bit Windows has a bizarrely small 8TB user address space.
+ // Allocates in the 1-5TB region.
+ // TODO(cevans): I think Win 8.1 has 47-bits like Linux.
+ random &= 0x3ffffffffffUL;
+ random += 0x10000000000UL;
#elif defined(MEMORY_TOOL_REPLACES_ALLOCATOR)
- // This range is copied from the TSan source, but works for all tools.
- random &= 0x007fffffffffUL;
- random += 0x7e8000000000UL;
+ // This range is copied from the TSan source, but works for all tools.
+ random &= 0x007fffffffffUL;
+ random += 0x7e8000000000UL;
#else
- // Linux and OS X support the full 47-bit user space of x64 processors.
- random &= 0x3fffffffffffUL;
+ // Linux and OS X support the full 47-bit user space of x64 processors.
+ random &= 0x3fffffffffffUL;
#endif
#elif CPU(ARM64)
- // ARM64 on Linux has 39-bit user space.
- random &= 0x3fffffffffUL;
- random += 0x1000000000UL;
-#else // !CPU(X86_64) && !CPU(ARM64)
+ // ARM64 on Linux has 39-bit user space.
+ random &= 0x3fffffffffUL;
+ random += 0x1000000000UL;
+#else // !CPU(X86_64) && !CPU(ARM64)
#if OS(WIN)
- // On win32 host systems the randomization plus huge alignment causes
- // excessive fragmentation. Plus most of these systems lack ASLR, so the
- // randomization isn't buying anything. In that case we just skip it.
- // TODO(jschuh): Just dump the randomization when HE-ASLR is present.
- static BOOL isWow64 = -1;
- if (isWow64 == -1 && !IsWow64Process(GetCurrentProcess(), &isWow64))
- isWow64 = FALSE;
- if (!isWow64)
- return nullptr;
-#endif // OS(WIN)
- // This is a good range on Windows, Linux and Mac.
- // Allocates in the 0.5-1.5GB region.
- random &= 0x3fffffff;
- random += 0x20000000;
-#endif // CPU(X86_64)
- random &= kPageAllocationGranularityBaseMask;
- return reinterpret_cast<void*>(random);
+ // On win32 host systems the randomization plus huge alignment causes
+ // excessive fragmentation. Plus most of these systems lack ASLR, so the
+ // randomization isn't buying anything. In that case we just skip it.
+ // TODO(jschuh): Just dump the randomization when HE-ASLR is present.
+ static BOOL isWow64 = -1;
+ if (isWow64 == -1 && !IsWow64Process(GetCurrentProcess(), &isWow64))
+ isWow64 = FALSE;
+ if (!isWow64)
+ return nullptr;
+#endif // OS(WIN)
+ // This is a good range on Windows, Linux and Mac.
+ // Allocates in the 0.5-1.5GB region.
+ random &= 0x3fffffff;
+ random += 0x20000000;
+#endif // CPU(X86_64)
+ random &= kPageAllocationGranularityBaseMask;
+ return reinterpret_cast<void*>(random);
}
-
}
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