| Index: net/cert/sha256_legacy_support_win.cc
|
| diff --git a/net/cert/sha256_legacy_support_win.cc b/net/cert/sha256_legacy_support_win.cc
|
| deleted file mode 100644
|
| index a936637e520d19e2b8630b9f626e4fe909dd29cf..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
|
| --- a/net/cert/sha256_legacy_support_win.cc
|
| +++ /dev/null
|
| @@ -1,217 +0,0 @@
|
| -// Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
|
| -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
|
| -// found in the LICENSE file.
|
| -
|
| -#include "net/cert/sha256_legacy_support_win.h"
|
| -
|
| -#include <openssl/asn1.h>
|
| -#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
|
| -#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
| -#include <openssl/obj.h>
|
| -#include <openssl/x509.h>
|
| -
|
| -#include "base/logging.h"
|
| -#include "crypto/scoped_openssl_types.h"
|
| -
|
| -namespace net {
|
| -
|
| -namespace sha256_interception {
|
| -
|
| -namespace {
|
| -
|
| -using ScopedX509_ALGOR = crypto::ScopedOpenSSL<X509_ALGOR, X509_ALGOR_free>;
|
| -
|
| -bool IsSupportedSubjectType(DWORD subject_type) {
|
| - switch (subject_type) {
|
| - case CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_BLOB:
|
| - case CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT:
|
| - case CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CRL:
|
| - return true;
|
| - }
|
| - return false;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -bool IsSupportedIssuerType(DWORD issuer_type) {
|
| - switch (issuer_type) {
|
| - case CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_PUBKEY:
|
| - case CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT:
|
| - case CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CHAIN:
|
| - return true;
|
| - }
|
| - return false;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -base::StringPiece GetSubjectSignature(DWORD subject_type,
|
| - void* subject_data) {
|
| - switch (subject_type) {
|
| - case CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_BLOB: {
|
| - CRYPT_DATA_BLOB* data_blob =
|
| - reinterpret_cast<CRYPT_DATA_BLOB*>(subject_data);
|
| - return base::StringPiece(reinterpret_cast<char*>(data_blob->pbData),
|
| - data_blob->cbData);
|
| - }
|
| - case CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT: {
|
| - PCCERT_CONTEXT subject_cert =
|
| - reinterpret_cast<PCCERT_CONTEXT>(subject_data);
|
| - return base::StringPiece(
|
| - reinterpret_cast<char*>(subject_cert->pbCertEncoded),
|
| - subject_cert->cbCertEncoded);
|
| - }
|
| - case CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CRL: {
|
| - PCCRL_CONTEXT subject_crl =
|
| - reinterpret_cast<PCCRL_CONTEXT>(subject_data);
|
| - return base::StringPiece(
|
| - reinterpret_cast<char*>(subject_crl->pbCrlEncoded),
|
| - subject_crl->cbCrlEncoded);
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - return base::StringPiece();
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -PCERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO GetIssuerPublicKey(DWORD issuer_type,
|
| - void* issuer_data) {
|
| - switch (issuer_type) {
|
| - case CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_PUBKEY:
|
| - return reinterpret_cast<PCERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO>(issuer_data);
|
| - case CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT: {
|
| - PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = reinterpret_cast<PCCERT_CONTEXT>(issuer_data);
|
| - return &cert->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo;
|
| - }
|
| - case CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CHAIN: {
|
| - PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain =
|
| - reinterpret_cast<PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT>(issuer_data);
|
| - PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = chain->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->pCertContext;
|
| - return &cert->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - return NULL;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -// Parses |subject_signature| and writes the components into |*out_tbs_data|,
|
| -// |*out_algor|, and |*out_signature|. The BIT STRING in the signature must be
|
| -// a multiple of 8 bits. |*out_signature| will have the padding byte removed.
|
| -// It returns true on success and false on failure.
|
| -bool ParseSubjectSignature(const base::StringPiece& subject_signature,
|
| - CBS* out_tbs_data,
|
| - ScopedX509_ALGOR* out_algor,
|
| - CBS* out_signature) {
|
| - CBS cbs, sequence, tbs_data, algorithm, signature;
|
| - CBS_init(&cbs, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(subject_signature.data()),
|
| - subject_signature.size());
|
| - if (!CBS_get_asn1(&cbs, &sequence, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0 ||
|
| - !CBS_get_any_asn1_element(&sequence, &tbs_data, nullptr, nullptr) ||
|
| - !CBS_get_asn1_element(&sequence, &algorithm, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
|
| - !CBS_get_asn1(&sequence, &signature, CBS_ASN1_BITSTRING) ||
|
| - CBS_len(&sequence) != 0) {
|
| - return false;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - // Decode the algorithm.
|
| - const uint8_t* ptr = CBS_data(&algorithm);
|
| - ScopedX509_ALGOR algor(d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &ptr, CBS_len(&algorithm)));
|
| - if (!algor || ptr != CBS_data(&algorithm) + CBS_len(&algorithm))
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| - // An ASN.1 BIT STRING is encoded with a leading byte denoting the number of
|
| - // padding bits. All supported signature algorithms output octets, so the
|
| - // leading byte must be zero.
|
| - uint8_t padding;
|
| - if (!CBS_get_u8(&signature, &padding) || padding != 0)
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| - *out_tbs_data = tbs_data;
|
| - *out_algor = algor.Pass();
|
| - *out_signature = signature;
|
| - return true;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -} // namespace
|
| -
|
| -BOOL CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureExHook(
|
| - CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureExFunc original_func,
|
| - HCRYPTPROV_LEGACY provider,
|
| - DWORD encoding_type,
|
| - DWORD subject_type,
|
| - void* subject_data,
|
| - DWORD issuer_type,
|
| - void* issuer_data,
|
| - DWORD flags,
|
| - void* extra) {
|
| - CHECK(original_func);
|
| -
|
| - // Only intercept if the arguments are supported.
|
| - if (provider != NULL || (encoding_type != X509_ASN_ENCODING) ||
|
| - !IsSupportedSubjectType(subject_type) || subject_data == NULL ||
|
| - !IsSupportedIssuerType(issuer_type) || issuer_data == NULL) {
|
| - return original_func(provider, encoding_type, subject_type, subject_data,
|
| - issuer_type, issuer_data, flags, extra);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - base::StringPiece subject_signature =
|
| - GetSubjectSignature(subject_type, subject_data);
|
| - bool should_intercept = false;
|
| -
|
| - // Parse out the data, AlgorithmIdentifier, and signature.
|
| - CBS tbs_data, signature;
|
| - ScopedX509_ALGOR algor;
|
| - if (ParseSubjectSignature(subject_signature, &tbs_data, &algor, &signature)) {
|
| - // If the signature algorithm is RSA with one of the SHA-2 algorithms
|
| - // supported by BoringSSL (excluding SHA-224, which is pointless), then
|
| - // defer to the BoringSSL implementation. Otherwise, fall back and let the
|
| - // OS handle it (e.g. in case there are any algorithm policies in effect).
|
| - int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(algor->algorithm);
|
| - if (nid == NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption ||
|
| - nid == NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption ||
|
| - nid == NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption) {
|
| - should_intercept = true;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (!should_intercept) {
|
| - return original_func(provider, encoding_type, subject_type, subject_data,
|
| - issuer_type, issuer_data, flags, extra);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - // Rather than attempting to synthesize an EVP_PKEY by hand, just force the
|
| - // OS to do an ASN.1 encoding and then decode it back into BoringSSL. This
|
| - // is silly for performance, but safest for consistency.
|
| - PCERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO issuer_public_key =
|
| - GetIssuerPublicKey(issuer_type, issuer_data);
|
| - if (!issuer_public_key) {
|
| - SetLastError(static_cast<DWORD>(NTE_BAD_ALGID));
|
| - return FALSE;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - uint8_t* issuer_spki_data = NULL;
|
| - DWORD issuer_spki_len = 0;
|
| - if (!CryptEncodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO,
|
| - issuer_public_key, CRYPT_ENCODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
|
| - &issuer_spki_data, &issuer_spki_len)) {
|
| - return FALSE;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - const uint8_t* ptr = issuer_spki_data;
|
| - crypto::ScopedEVP_PKEY pubkey(d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &ptr, issuer_spki_len));
|
| - if (!pubkey.get() || ptr != issuer_spki_data + issuer_spki_len) {
|
| - ::LocalFree(issuer_spki_data);
|
| - SetLastError(static_cast<DWORD>(NTE_BAD_ALGID));
|
| - return FALSE;
|
| - }
|
| - ::LocalFree(issuer_spki_data);
|
| -
|
| - crypto::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX md_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX_create());
|
| - if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInitFromAlgorithm(md_ctx.get(), algor.get(),
|
| - pubkey.get()) ||
|
| - !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx.get(), CBS_data(&tbs_data),
|
| - CBS_len(&tbs_data)) ||
|
| - !EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx.get(), CBS_data(&signature),
|
| - CBS_len(&signature))) {
|
| - SetLastError(static_cast<DWORD>(NTE_BAD_SIGNATURE));
|
| - return FALSE;
|
| - }
|
| - return TRUE;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -} // namespace sha256_interception
|
| -
|
| -} // namespace net
|
|
|