| Index: fusl/src/passwd/getspnam_r.c
|
| diff --git a/fusl/src/passwd/getspnam_r.c b/fusl/src/passwd/getspnam_r.c
|
| new file mode 100644
|
| index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..92339528ad170f2ed76d3bc3ba03a14b8e98c30e
|
| --- /dev/null
|
| +++ b/fusl/src/passwd/getspnam_r.c
|
| @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
|
| +#include <fcntl.h>
|
| +#include <unistd.h>
|
| +#include <sys/stat.h>
|
| +#include <ctype.h>
|
| +#include <pthread.h>
|
| +#include "pwf.h"
|
| +
|
| +/* This implementation support Openwall-style TCB passwords in place of
|
| + * traditional shadow, if the appropriate directories and files exist.
|
| + * Thus, it is careful to avoid following symlinks or blocking on fifos
|
| + * which a malicious user might create in place of his or her TCB shadow
|
| + * file. It also avoids any allocation to prevent memory-exhaustion
|
| + * attacks via huge TCB shadow files. */
|
| +
|
| +static long xatol(char **s)
|
| +{
|
| + long x;
|
| + if (**s == ':' || **s == '\n') return -1;
|
| + for (x=0; **s-'0'<10U; ++*s) x=10*x+(**s-'0');
|
| + return x;
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +int __parsespent(char *s, struct spwd *sp)
|
| +{
|
| + sp->sp_namp = s;
|
| + if (!(s = strchr(s, ':'))) return -1;
|
| + *s = 0;
|
| +
|
| + sp->sp_pwdp = ++s;
|
| + if (!(s = strchr(s, ':'))) return -1;
|
| + *s = 0;
|
| +
|
| + s++; sp->sp_lstchg = xatol(&s);
|
| + if (*s != ':') return -1;
|
| +
|
| + s++; sp->sp_min = xatol(&s);
|
| + if (*s != ':') return -1;
|
| +
|
| + s++; sp->sp_max = xatol(&s);
|
| + if (*s != ':') return -1;
|
| +
|
| + s++; sp->sp_warn = xatol(&s);
|
| + if (*s != ':') return -1;
|
| +
|
| + s++; sp->sp_inact = xatol(&s);
|
| + if (*s != ':') return -1;
|
| +
|
| + s++; sp->sp_expire = xatol(&s);
|
| + if (*s != ':') return -1;
|
| +
|
| + s++; sp->sp_flag = xatol(&s);
|
| + if (*s != '\n') return -1;
|
| + return 0;
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +static void cleanup(void *p)
|
| +{
|
| + fclose(p);
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +int getspnam_r(const char *name, struct spwd *sp, char *buf, size_t size, struct spwd **res)
|
| +{
|
| + char path[20+NAME_MAX];
|
| + FILE *f = 0;
|
| + int rv = 0;
|
| + int fd;
|
| + size_t k, l = strlen(name);
|
| + int skip = 0;
|
| + int cs;
|
| +
|
| + *res = 0;
|
| +
|
| + /* Disallow potentially-malicious user names */
|
| + if (*name=='.' || strchr(name, '/') || !l)
|
| + return EINVAL;
|
| +
|
| + /* Buffer size must at least be able to hold name, plus some.. */
|
| + if (size < l+100) return ERANGE;
|
| +
|
| + /* Protect against truncation */
|
| + if (snprintf(path, sizeof path, "/etc/tcb/%s/shadow", name) >= sizeof path)
|
| + return EINVAL;
|
| +
|
| + fd = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NONBLOCK|O_CLOEXEC);
|
| + if (fd >= 0) {
|
| + struct stat st = { 0 };
|
| + errno = EINVAL;
|
| + if (fstat(fd, &st) || !S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || !(f = fdopen(fd, "rb"))) {
|
| + pthread_setcancelstate(PTHREAD_CANCEL_DISABLE, &cs);
|
| + close(fd);
|
| + pthread_setcancelstate(cs, 0);
|
| + return errno;
|
| + }
|
| + } else {
|
| + f = fopen("/etc/shadow", "rbe");
|
| + if (!f) return errno;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + pthread_cleanup_push(cleanup, f);
|
| + while (fgets(buf, size, f) && (k=strlen(buf))>0) {
|
| + if (skip || strncmp(name, buf, l) || buf[l]!=':') {
|
| + skip = buf[k-1] != '\n';
|
| + continue;
|
| + }
|
| + if (buf[k-1] != '\n') {
|
| + rv = ERANGE;
|
| + break;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (__parsespent(buf, sp) < 0) continue;
|
| + *res = sp;
|
| + break;
|
| + }
|
| + pthread_cleanup_pop(1);
|
| + return rv;
|
| +}
|
|
|