Index: fusl/src/passwd/getspnam_r.c |
diff --git a/fusl/src/passwd/getspnam_r.c b/fusl/src/passwd/getspnam_r.c |
new file mode 100644 |
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..92339528ad170f2ed76d3bc3ba03a14b8e98c30e |
--- /dev/null |
+++ b/fusl/src/passwd/getspnam_r.c |
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ |
+#include <fcntl.h> |
+#include <unistd.h> |
+#include <sys/stat.h> |
+#include <ctype.h> |
+#include <pthread.h> |
+#include "pwf.h" |
+ |
+/* This implementation support Openwall-style TCB passwords in place of |
+ * traditional shadow, if the appropriate directories and files exist. |
+ * Thus, it is careful to avoid following symlinks or blocking on fifos |
+ * which a malicious user might create in place of his or her TCB shadow |
+ * file. It also avoids any allocation to prevent memory-exhaustion |
+ * attacks via huge TCB shadow files. */ |
+ |
+static long xatol(char **s) |
+{ |
+ long x; |
+ if (**s == ':' || **s == '\n') return -1; |
+ for (x=0; **s-'0'<10U; ++*s) x=10*x+(**s-'0'); |
+ return x; |
+} |
+ |
+int __parsespent(char *s, struct spwd *sp) |
+{ |
+ sp->sp_namp = s; |
+ if (!(s = strchr(s, ':'))) return -1; |
+ *s = 0; |
+ |
+ sp->sp_pwdp = ++s; |
+ if (!(s = strchr(s, ':'))) return -1; |
+ *s = 0; |
+ |
+ s++; sp->sp_lstchg = xatol(&s); |
+ if (*s != ':') return -1; |
+ |
+ s++; sp->sp_min = xatol(&s); |
+ if (*s != ':') return -1; |
+ |
+ s++; sp->sp_max = xatol(&s); |
+ if (*s != ':') return -1; |
+ |
+ s++; sp->sp_warn = xatol(&s); |
+ if (*s != ':') return -1; |
+ |
+ s++; sp->sp_inact = xatol(&s); |
+ if (*s != ':') return -1; |
+ |
+ s++; sp->sp_expire = xatol(&s); |
+ if (*s != ':') return -1; |
+ |
+ s++; sp->sp_flag = xatol(&s); |
+ if (*s != '\n') return -1; |
+ return 0; |
+} |
+ |
+static void cleanup(void *p) |
+{ |
+ fclose(p); |
+} |
+ |
+int getspnam_r(const char *name, struct spwd *sp, char *buf, size_t size, struct spwd **res) |
+{ |
+ char path[20+NAME_MAX]; |
+ FILE *f = 0; |
+ int rv = 0; |
+ int fd; |
+ size_t k, l = strlen(name); |
+ int skip = 0; |
+ int cs; |
+ |
+ *res = 0; |
+ |
+ /* Disallow potentially-malicious user names */ |
+ if (*name=='.' || strchr(name, '/') || !l) |
+ return EINVAL; |
+ |
+ /* Buffer size must at least be able to hold name, plus some.. */ |
+ if (size < l+100) return ERANGE; |
+ |
+ /* Protect against truncation */ |
+ if (snprintf(path, sizeof path, "/etc/tcb/%s/shadow", name) >= sizeof path) |
+ return EINVAL; |
+ |
+ fd = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NONBLOCK|O_CLOEXEC); |
+ if (fd >= 0) { |
+ struct stat st = { 0 }; |
+ errno = EINVAL; |
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) || !S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || !(f = fdopen(fd, "rb"))) { |
+ pthread_setcancelstate(PTHREAD_CANCEL_DISABLE, &cs); |
+ close(fd); |
+ pthread_setcancelstate(cs, 0); |
+ return errno; |
+ } |
+ } else { |
+ f = fopen("/etc/shadow", "rbe"); |
+ if (!f) return errno; |
+ } |
+ |
+ pthread_cleanup_push(cleanup, f); |
+ while (fgets(buf, size, f) && (k=strlen(buf))>0) { |
+ if (skip || strncmp(name, buf, l) || buf[l]!=':') { |
+ skip = buf[k-1] != '\n'; |
+ continue; |
+ } |
+ if (buf[k-1] != '\n') { |
+ rv = ERANGE; |
+ break; |
+ } |
+ |
+ if (__parsespent(buf, sp) < 0) continue; |
+ *res = sp; |
+ break; |
+ } |
+ pthread_cleanup_pop(1); |
+ return rv; |
+} |