Convert Pass()→std::move() in //components/[n-z]*

components/nacl/loader/sandbox_linux/nacl_sandbox_linux.cc

 // Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 #include "components/nacl/loader/sandbox_linux/nacl_sandbox_linux.h"
 
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <sys/prctl.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
-
 #include <limits>
+#include <utility>
 
 #include "base/callback.h"
 #include "base/command_line.h"
 #include "base/compiler_specific.h"
 #include "base/files/scoped_file.h"
 #include "base/logging.h"
 #include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h"
 #include "base/posix/eintr_wrapper.h"
 #include "build/build_config.h"
 #include "components/nacl/common/nacl_switches.h"
@@ skipping 158 matching lines @@
 
   // Pass proc_fd_ ownership to the BPF sandbox, which guarantees it will
   // be closed. There is no point in keeping it around since the BPF policy
   // will prevent its usage.
 #if defined(OS_NACL_NONSFI)
   CHECK(uses_nonsfi_mode);
   layer_two_enabled_ = nacl::nonsfi::InitializeBPFSandbox(std::move(proc_fd_));
   layer_two_is_nonsfi_ = true;
 #else
   CHECK(!uses_nonsfi_mode);
-  layer_two_enabled_ = nacl::InitializeBPFSandbox(proc_fd_.Pass());
+  layer_two_enabled_ = nacl::InitializeBPFSandbox(std::move(proc_fd_));
 #endif
 }
 
 void NaClSandbox::SealLayerOneSandbox() {
   if (proc_fd_.is_valid() && !layer_two_enabled_) {
     // If nothing prevents us, check that there is no superfluous directory
     // open.
     CHECK(!HasOpenDirectory());
   }
   proc_fd_.reset();
@@ skipping 32 matching lines @@
     static const char kNoBpfMsg[] =
         "The seccomp-bpf sandbox is not engaged for NaCl:";
     if (can_be_no_sandbox)
       LOG(ERROR) << kNoBpfMsg << kItIsDangerousMsg;
     else
       LOG(FATAL) << kNoBpfMsg << kItIsNotAllowedMsg;
   }
 }
 
 }  // namespace nacl