Index: mozilla/security/nss/lib/freebl/cts.c |
=================================================================== |
--- mozilla/security/nss/lib/freebl/cts.c (revision 191424) |
+++ mozilla/security/nss/lib/freebl/cts.c (working copy) |
@@ -1,302 +0,0 @@ |
-/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public |
- * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this |
- * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ |
- |
-#ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND |
-#include "stubs.h" |
-#endif |
-#include "blapit.h" |
-#include "blapii.h" |
-#include "cts.h" |
-#include "secerr.h" |
- |
-struct CTSContextStr { |
- freeblCipherFunc cipher; |
- void *context; |
- /* iv stores the last ciphertext block of the previous message. |
- * Only used by decrypt. */ |
- unsigned char iv[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
-}; |
- |
-CTSContext * |
-CTS_CreateContext(void *context, freeblCipherFunc cipher, |
- const unsigned char *iv, unsigned int blocksize) |
-{ |
- CTSContext *cts; |
- |
- if (blocksize > MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) { |
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); |
- return NULL; |
- } |
- cts = PORT_ZNew(CTSContext); |
- if (cts == NULL) { |
- return NULL; |
- } |
- PORT_Memcpy(cts->iv, iv, blocksize); |
- cts->cipher = cipher; |
- cts->context = context; |
- return cts; |
-} |
- |
-void |
-CTS_DestroyContext(CTSContext *cts, PRBool freeit) |
-{ |
- if (freeit) { |
- PORT_Free(cts); |
- } |
-} |
- |
-/* |
- * See addemdum to NIST SP 800-38A |
- * Generically handle cipher text stealing. Basically this is doing CBC |
- * operations except someone can pass us a partial block. |
- * |
- * Output Order: |
- * CS-1: C1||C2||C3..Cn-1(could be partial)||Cn (NIST) |
- * CS-2: pad == 0 C1||C2||C3...Cn-1(is full)||Cn (Schneier) |
- * CS-2: pad != 0 C1||C2||C3...Cn||Cn-1(is partial)(Schneier) |
- * CS-3: C1||C2||C3...Cn||Cn-1(could be partial) (Kerberos) |
- * |
- * The characteristics of these three options: |
- * - NIST & Schneier (CS-1 & CS-2) are identical to CBC if there are no |
- * partial blocks on input. |
- * - Scheier and Kerberos (CS-2 and CS-3) have no embedded partial blocks, |
- * which make decoding easier. |
- * - NIST & Kerberos (CS-1 and CS-3) have consistent block order independent |
- * of padding. |
- * |
- * PKCS #11 did not specify which version to implement, but points to the NIST |
- * spec, so this code implements CTS-CS-1 from NIST. |
- * |
- * To convert the returned buffer to: |
- * CS-2 (Schneier): do |
- * unsigned char tmp[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
- * pad = *outlen % blocksize; |
- * if (pad) { |
- * memcpy(tmp, outbuf+*outlen-blocksize, blocksize); |
- * memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-pad,outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, pad); |
- * memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, tmp, blocksize); |
- * } |
- * CS-3 (Kerberos): do |
- * unsigned char tmp[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
- * pad = *outlen % blocksize; |
- * if (pad == 0) { |
- * pad = blocksize; |
- * } |
- * memcpy(tmp, outbuf+*outlen-blocksize, blocksize); |
- * memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-pad,outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, pad); |
- * memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, tmp, blocksize); |
- */ |
-SECStatus |
-CTS_EncryptUpdate(CTSContext *cts, unsigned char *outbuf, |
- unsigned int *outlen, unsigned int maxout, |
- const unsigned char *inbuf, unsigned int inlen, |
- unsigned int blocksize) |
-{ |
- unsigned char lastBlock[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
- unsigned int tmp; |
- int fullblocks; |
- int written; |
- SECStatus rv; |
- |
- if (inlen < blocksize) { |
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN); |
- return SECFailure; |
- } |
- |
- if (maxout < inlen) { |
- *outlen = inlen; |
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN); |
- return SECFailure; |
- } |
- fullblocks = (inlen/blocksize)*blocksize; |
- rv = (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, outbuf, outlen, maxout, inbuf, |
- fullblocks, blocksize); |
- if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
- return SECFailure; |
- } |
- *outlen = fullblocks; /* AES low level doesn't set outlen */ |
- inbuf += fullblocks; |
- inlen -= fullblocks; |
- if (inlen == 0) { |
- return SECSuccess; |
- } |
- written = *outlen - (blocksize - inlen); |
- outbuf += written; |
- maxout -= written; |
- |
- /* |
- * here's the CTS magic, we pad our final block with zeros, |
- * then do a CBC encrypt. CBC will xor our plain text with |
- * the previous block (Cn-1), capturing part of that block (Cn-1**) as it |
- * xors with the zero pad. We then write this full block, overwritting |
- * (Cn-1**) in our buffer. This allows us to have input data == output |
- * data since Cn contains enough information to reconver Cn-1** when |
- * we decrypt (at the cost of some complexity as you can see in decrypt |
- * below */ |
- PORT_Memcpy(lastBlock, inbuf, inlen); |
- PORT_Memset(lastBlock + inlen, 0, blocksize - inlen); |
- rv = (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, outbuf, &tmp, maxout, lastBlock, |
- blocksize, blocksize); |
- PORT_Memset(lastBlock, 0, blocksize); |
- if (rv == SECSuccess) { |
- *outlen = written + blocksize; |
- } |
- return rv; |
-} |
- |
- |
-#define XOR_BLOCK(x,y,count) for(i=0; i < count; i++) x[i] = x[i] ^ y[i] |
- |
-/* |
- * See addemdum to NIST SP 800-38A |
- * Decrypt, Expect CS-1: input. See the comment on the encrypt side |
- * to understand what CS-2 and CS-3 mean. |
- * |
- * To convert the input buffer to CS-1 from ... |
- * CS-2 (Schneier): do |
- * unsigned char tmp[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
- * pad = inlen % blocksize; |
- * if (pad) { |
- * memcpy(tmp, inbuf+inlen-blocksize-pad, blocksize); |
- * memcpy(inbuf+inlen-blocksize-pad,inbuf+inlen-pad, pad); |
- * memcpy(inbuf+inlen-blocksize, tmp, blocksize); |
- * } |
- * CS-3 (Kerberos): do |
- * unsigned char tmp[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
- * pad = inlen % blocksize; |
- * if (pad == 0) { |
- * pad = blocksize; |
- * } |
- * memcpy(tmp, inbuf+inlen-blocksize-pad, blocksize); |
- * memcpy(inbuf+inlen-blocksize-pad,inbuf+inlen-pad, pad); |
- * memcpy(inbuf+inlen-blocksize, tmp, blocksize); |
- */ |
-SECStatus |
-CTS_DecryptUpdate(CTSContext *cts, unsigned char *outbuf, |
- unsigned int *outlen, unsigned int maxout, |
- const unsigned char *inbuf, unsigned int inlen, |
- unsigned int blocksize) |
-{ |
- unsigned char *Pn; |
- unsigned char Cn_2[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* block Cn-2 */ |
- unsigned char Cn_1[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* block Cn-1 */ |
- unsigned char Cn[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* block Cn */ |
- unsigned char lastBlock[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
- const unsigned char *tmp; |
- unsigned int tmpLen; |
- int fullblocks, pad; |
- unsigned int i; |
- SECStatus rv; |
- |
- if (inlen < blocksize) { |
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN); |
- return SECFailure; |
- } |
- |
- if (maxout < inlen) { |
- *outlen = inlen; |
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN); |
- return SECFailure; |
- } |
- |
- fullblocks = (inlen/blocksize)*blocksize; |
- |
- /* even though we expect the input to be CS-1, CS-2 is easier to parse, |
- * so convert to CS-2 immediately. NOTE: this is the same code as in |
- * the comment for encrypt. NOTE2: since we can't modify inbuf unless |
- * inbuf and outbuf overlap, just copy inbuf to outbuf and modify it there |
- */ |
- pad = inlen - fullblocks; |
- if (pad != 0) { |
- if (inbuf != outbuf) { |
- memcpy(outbuf, inbuf, inlen); |
- /* keep the names so we logically know how we are using the |
- * buffers */ |
- inbuf = outbuf; |
- } |
- memcpy(lastBlock, inbuf+inlen-blocksize, blocksize); |
- /* we know inbuf == outbuf now, inbuf is declared const and can't |
- * be the target, so use outbuf for the target here */ |
- memcpy(outbuf+inlen-pad, inbuf+inlen-blocksize-pad, pad); |
- memcpy(outbuf+inlen-blocksize-pad, lastBlock, blocksize); |
- } |
- /* save the previous to last block so we can undo the misordered |
- * chaining */ |
- tmp = (fullblocks < blocksize*2) ? cts->iv : |
- inbuf+fullblocks-blocksize*2; |
- PORT_Memcpy(Cn_2, tmp, blocksize); |
- PORT_Memcpy(Cn, inbuf+fullblocks-blocksize, blocksize); |
- rv = (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, outbuf, outlen, maxout, inbuf, |
- fullblocks, blocksize); |
- if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
- return SECFailure; |
- } |
- *outlen = fullblocks; /* AES low level doesn't set outlen */ |
- inbuf += fullblocks; |
- inlen -= fullblocks; |
- if (inlen == 0) { |
- return SECSuccess; |
- } |
- outbuf += fullblocks; |
- maxout -= fullblocks; |
- |
- /* recover the stolen text */ |
- PORT_Memset(lastBlock, 0, blocksize); |
- PORT_Memcpy(lastBlock, inbuf, inlen); |
- PORT_Memcpy(Cn_1, inbuf, inlen); |
- Pn = outbuf-blocksize; |
- /* inbuf points to Cn-1* in the input buffer */ |
- /* NOTE: below there are 2 sections marked "make up for the out of order |
- * cbc decryption". You may ask, what is going on here. |
- * Short answer: CBC automatically xors the plain text with the previous |
- * encrypted block. We are decrypting the last 2 blocks out of order, so |
- * we have to 'back out' the decrypt xor and 'add back' the encrypt xor. |
- * Long answer: When we encrypted, we encrypted as follows: |
- * Pn-2, Pn-1, (Pn || 0), but on decryption we can't |
- * decrypt Cn-1 until we decrypt Cn because part of Cn-1 is stored in |
- * Cn (see below). So above we decrypted all the full blocks: |
- * Cn-2, Cn, |
- * to get: |
- * Pn-2, Pn, Except that Pn is not yet corect. On encrypt, we |
- * xor'd Pn || 0 with Cn-1, but on decrypt we xor'd it with Cn-2 |
- * To recover Pn, we xor the block with Cn-1* || 0 (in last block) and |
- * Cn-2 to get Pn || Cn-1**. Pn can then be written to the output buffer |
- * and we can now reunite Cn-1. With the full Cn-1 we can decrypt it, |
- * but now decrypt is going to xor the decrypted data with Cn instead of |
- * Cn-2. xoring Cn and Cn-2 restores the original Pn-1 and we can now |
- * write that oout to the buffer */ |
- |
- /* make up for the out of order CBC decryption */ |
- XOR_BLOCK(lastBlock, Cn_2, blocksize); |
- XOR_BLOCK(lastBlock, Pn, blocksize); |
- /* last buf now has Pn || Cn-1**, copy out Pn */ |
- PORT_Memcpy(outbuf, lastBlock, inlen); |
- *outlen += inlen; |
- /* copy Cn-1* into last buf to recover Cn-1 */ |
- PORT_Memcpy(lastBlock, Cn_1, inlen); |
- /* note: because Cn and Cn-1 were out of order, our pointer to Pn also |
- * points to where Pn-1 needs to reside. From here on out read Pn in |
- * the code as really Pn-1. */ |
- rv = (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, Pn, &tmpLen, blocksize, lastBlock, |
- blocksize, blocksize); |
- if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
- return SECFailure; |
- } |
- /* make up for the out of order CBC decryption */ |
- XOR_BLOCK(Pn, Cn_2, blocksize); |
- XOR_BLOCK(Pn, Cn, blocksize); |
- /* reset iv to Cn */ |
- PORT_Memcpy(cts->iv, Cn, blocksize); |
- /* This makes Cn the last block for the next decrypt operation, which |
- * matches the encrypt. We don't care about the contexts of last block, |
- * only the side effect of setting the internal IV */ |
- (void) (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, lastBlock, &tmpLen, blocksize, Cn, |
- blocksize, blocksize); |
- /* clear last block. At this point last block contains Pn xor Cn_1 xor |
- * Cn_2, both of with an attacker would know, so we need to clear this |
- * buffer out */ |
- PORT_Memset(lastBlock, 0, blocksize); |
- /* Cn, Cn_1, and Cn_2 have encrypted data, so no need to clear them */ |
- return SECSuccess; |
-} |