net: extract net/cert out of net/base

net/base/cert_verify_proc_nss.cc

Index: net/base/cert_verify_proc_nss.cc
diff --git a/net/base/cert_verify_proc_nss.cc b/net/base/cert_verify_proc_nss.cc
deleted file mode 100644
index c8c4f391cd8cf6fb5297667e3c2050376b249a3c..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/net/base/cert_verify_proc_nss.cc
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,881 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
-// found in the LICENSE file.
-
-#include "net/base/cert_verify_proc_nss.h"
-
-#include <string>
-#include <vector>
-
-#include <cert.h>
-#include <nss.h>
-#include <prerror.h>
-#include <secerr.h>
-#include <sechash.h>
-#include <sslerr.h>
-
-#include "base/logging.h"
-#include "crypto/nss_util.h"
-#include "crypto/scoped_nss_types.h"
-#include "crypto/sha2.h"
-#include "net/base/asn1_util.h"
-#include "net/base/cert_status_flags.h"
-#include "net/base/cert_verifier.h"
-#include "net/base/cert_verify_result.h"
-#include "net/base/crl_set.h"
-#include "net/base/ev_root_ca_metadata.h"
-#include "net/base/net_errors.h"
-#include "net/base/x509_certificate.h"
-#include "net/base/x509_util_nss.h"
-
-#if defined(OS_IOS)
-#include <CommonCrypto/CommonDigest.h>
-#include "net/base/x509_util_ios.h"
-#endif  // defined(OS_IOS)
-
-#define NSS_VERSION_NUM (NSS_VMAJOR * 10000 + NSS_VMINOR * 100 + NSS_VPATCH)
-#if NSS_VERSION_NUM < 31305
-// Added in NSS 3.13.5.
-#define SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED -8016
-#endif
-
-#if NSS_VERSION_NUM < 31402
-// Added in NSS 3.14.2.
-#define cert_pi_useOnlyTrustAnchors static_cast<CERTValParamInType>(14)
-#endif
-
-namespace net {
-
-namespace {
-
-typedef scoped_ptr_malloc<
-    CERTCertificatePolicies,
-    crypto::NSSDestroyer<CERTCertificatePolicies,
-                         CERT_DestroyCertificatePoliciesExtension> >
-    ScopedCERTCertificatePolicies;
-
-typedef scoped_ptr_malloc<
-    CERTCertList,
-    crypto::NSSDestroyer<CERTCertList, CERT_DestroyCertList> >
-    ScopedCERTCertList;
-
-// ScopedCERTValOutParam manages destruction of values in the CERTValOutParam
-// array that cvout points to.  cvout must be initialized as passed to
-// CERT_PKIXVerifyCert, so that the array must be terminated with
-// cert_po_end type.
-// When it goes out of scope, it destroys values of cert_po_trustAnchor
-// and cert_po_certList types, but doesn't release the array itself.
-class ScopedCERTValOutParam {
- public:
-  explicit ScopedCERTValOutParam(CERTValOutParam* cvout)
-      : cvout_(cvout) {}
-
-  ~ScopedCERTValOutParam() {
-    if (cvout_ == NULL)
-      return;
-    for (CERTValOutParam *p = cvout_; p->type != cert_po_end; p++) {
-      switch (p->type) {
-        case cert_po_trustAnchor:
-          if (p->value.pointer.cert) {
-            CERT_DestroyCertificate(p->value.pointer.cert);
-            p->value.pointer.cert = NULL;
-          }
-          break;
-        case cert_po_certList:
-          if (p->value.pointer.chain) {
-            CERT_DestroyCertList(p->value.pointer.chain);
-            p->value.pointer.chain = NULL;
-          }
-          break;
-        default:
-          break;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
- private:
-  CERTValOutParam* cvout_;
-
-  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ScopedCERTValOutParam);
-};
-
-// Map PORT_GetError() return values to our network error codes.
-int MapSecurityError(int err) {
-  switch (err) {
-    case PR_DIRECTORY_LOOKUP_ERROR:  // DNS lookup error.
-      return ERR_NAME_NOT_RESOLVED;
-    case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS:
-      return ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-    case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN:
-      return ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID;
-    case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME:
-    case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE:
-    case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE:
-      return ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID;
-    case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
-    case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER:
-    case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID:
-      return ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID;
-    // TODO(port): map ERR_CERT_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM.
-    case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_BAD_HTTP_RESPONSE:
-    case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_SERVER_ERROR:
-      return ERR_CERT_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION;
-    case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE:
-    case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT:  // Treat as revoked.
-      return ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
-    case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER:
-    case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
-    case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID:
-    // TODO(port): add an ERR_CERT_WRONG_USAGE error code.
-    case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID:
-    case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE:  // Key usage.
-    case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE:  // Extended key usage and whether
-                                          // the certificate is a CA.
-    case SEC_ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED:
-    case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_IN_NAME_SPACE:
-    case SEC_ERROR_PATH_LEN_CONSTRAINT_INVALID:
-    case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
-    case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID:
-      return ERR_CERT_INVALID;
-    case SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED:
-      return ERR_CERT_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
-    default:
-      LOG(WARNING) << "Unknown error " << err << " mapped to net::ERR_FAILED";
-      return ERR_FAILED;
-  }
-}
-
-// Map PORT_GetError() return values to our cert status flags.
-CertStatus MapCertErrorToCertStatus(int err) {
-  int net_error = MapSecurityError(err);
-  return MapNetErrorToCertStatus(net_error);
-}
-
-// Saves some information about the certificate chain cert_list in
-// *verify_result.  The caller MUST initialize *verify_result before calling
-// this function.
-// Note that cert_list[0] is the end entity certificate.
-void GetCertChainInfo(CERTCertList* cert_list,
-                      CERTCertificate* root_cert,
-                      CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
-  // NOTE: Using a NSS library before 3.12.3.1 will crash below.  To see the
-  // NSS version currently in use:
-  // 1. use ldd on the chrome executable for NSS's location (ie. libnss3.so*)
-  // 2. use ident libnss3.so* for the library's version
-  DCHECK(cert_list);
-
-  CERTCertificate* verified_cert = NULL;
-  std::vector<CERTCertificate*> verified_chain;
-  int i = 0;
-  for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(cert_list);
-       !CERT_LIST_END(node, cert_list);
-       node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node), ++i) {
-    if (i == 0) {
-      verified_cert = node->cert;
-    } else {
-      // Because of an NSS bug, CERT_PKIXVerifyCert may chain a self-signed
-      // certificate of a root CA to another certificate of the same root CA
-      // key.  Detect that error and ignore the root CA certificate.
-      // See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=721288.
-      if (node->cert->isRoot) {
-        // NOTE: isRoot doesn't mean the certificate is a trust anchor.  It
-        // means the certificate is self-signed.  Here we assume isRoot only
-        // implies the certificate is self-issued.
-        CERTCertListNode* next_node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node);
-        CERTCertificate* next_cert;
-        if (!CERT_LIST_END(next_node, cert_list)) {
-          next_cert = next_node->cert;
-        } else {
-          next_cert = root_cert;
-        }
-        // Test that |node->cert| is actually a self-signed certificate
-        // whose key is equal to |next_cert|, and not a self-issued
-        // certificate signed by another key of the same CA.
-        if (next_cert && SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(&node->cert->derPublicKey,
-                                               &next_cert->derPublicKey)) {
-          continue;
-        }
-      }
-      verified_chain.push_back(node->cert);
-    }
-
-    SECAlgorithmID& signature = node->cert->signature;
-    SECOidTag oid_tag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&signature.algorithm);
-    switch (oid_tag) {
-      case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
-        verify_result->has_md5 = true;
-        if (i != 0)
-          verify_result->has_md5_ca = true;
-        break;
-      case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD2_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
-        verify_result->has_md2 = true;
-        if (i != 0)
-          verify_result->has_md2_ca = true;
-        break;
-      case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD4_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
-        verify_result->has_md4 = true;
-        break;
-      default:
-        break;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (root_cert)
-    verified_chain.push_back(root_cert);
-#if defined(OS_IOS)
-  verify_result->verified_cert =
-      x509_util_ios::CreateCertFromNSSHandles(verified_cert, verified_chain);
-#else
-  verify_result->verified_cert =
-      X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(verified_cert, verified_chain);
-#endif  // defined(OS_IOS)
-}
-
-// IsKnownRoot returns true if the given certificate is one that we believe
-// is a standard (as opposed to user-installed) root.
-bool IsKnownRoot(CERTCertificate* root) {
-  if (!root || !root->slot)
-    return false;
-
-  // This magic name is taken from
-  // http://bonsai.mozilla.org/cvsblame.cgi?file=mozilla/security/nss/lib/ckfw/builtins/constants.c&rev=1.13&mark=86,89#79
-  return 0 == strcmp(PK11_GetSlotName(root->slot),
-                     "NSS Builtin Objects");
-}
-
-// Returns true if the given certificate is one of the additional trust anchors.
-bool IsAdditionalTrustAnchor(CERTCertList* additional_trust_anchors,
-                             CERTCertificate* root) {
-  if (!additional_trust_anchors || !root)
-    return false;
-  for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(additional_trust_anchors);
-       !CERT_LIST_END(node, additional_trust_anchors);
-       node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) {
-    if (CERT_CompareCerts(node->cert, root))
-      return true;
-  }
-  return false;
-}
-
-enum CRLSetResult {
-  kCRLSetRevoked,
-  kCRLSetOk,
-  kCRLSetError,
-};
-
-// CheckRevocationWithCRLSet attempts to check each element of |cert_list|
-// against |crl_set|. It returns:
-//   kCRLSetRevoked: if any element of the chain is known to have been revoked.
-//   kCRLSetError: if an error occurs in processing.
-//   kCRLSetOk: if no element in the chain is known to have been revoked.
-CRLSetResult CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(CERTCertList* cert_list,
-                                       CERTCertificate* root,
-                                       CRLSet* crl_set) {
-  std::vector<CERTCertificate*> certs;
-
-  if (cert_list) {
-    for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(cert_list);
-         !CERT_LIST_END(node, cert_list);
-         node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) {
-      certs.push_back(node->cert);
-    }
-  }
-  if (root)
-    certs.push_back(root);
-
-  // We iterate from the root certificate down to the leaf, keeping track of
-  // the issuer's SPKI at each step.
-  std::string issuer_spki_hash;
-  for (std::vector<CERTCertificate*>::reverse_iterator i = certs.rbegin();
-       i != certs.rend(); ++i) {
-    CERTCertificate* cert = *i;
-
-    base::StringPiece der(reinterpret_cast<char*>(cert->derCert.data),
-                          cert->derCert.len);
-
-    base::StringPiece spki;
-    if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der, &spki)) {
-      NOTREACHED();
-      return kCRLSetError;
-    }
-    const std::string spki_hash = crypto::SHA256HashString(spki);
-
-    base::StringPiece serial_number = base::StringPiece(
-        reinterpret_cast<char*>(cert->serialNumber.data),
-        cert->serialNumber.len);
-
-    CRLSet::Result result = crl_set->CheckSPKI(spki_hash);
-
-    if (result != CRLSet::REVOKED && !issuer_spki_hash.empty())
-      result = crl_set->CheckSerial(serial_number, issuer_spki_hash);
-
-    issuer_spki_hash = spki_hash;
-
-    switch (result) {
-      case CRLSet::REVOKED:
-        return kCRLSetRevoked;
-      case CRLSet::UNKNOWN:
-      case CRLSet::GOOD:
-        continue;
-      default:
-        NOTREACHED();
-        return kCRLSetError;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return kCRLSetOk;
-}
-
-// Forward declarations.
-SECStatus RetryPKIXVerifyCertWithWorkarounds(
-    CERTCertificate* cert_handle, int num_policy_oids,
-    bool cert_io_enabled, std::vector<CERTValInParam>* cvin,
-    CERTValOutParam* cvout);
-SECOidTag GetFirstCertPolicy(CERTCertificate* cert_handle);
-
-// Call CERT_PKIXVerifyCert for the cert_handle.
-// Verification results are stored in an array of CERTValOutParam.
-// If policy_oids is not NULL and num_policy_oids is positive, policies
-// are also checked.
-// additional_trust_anchors is an optional list of certificates that can be
-// trusted as anchors when building a certificate chain.
-// Caller must initialize cvout before calling this function.
-SECStatus PKIXVerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert_handle,
-                         bool check_revocation,
-                         bool cert_io_enabled,
-                         const SECOidTag* policy_oids,
-                         int num_policy_oids,
-                         CERTCertList* additional_trust_anchors,
-                         CERTValOutParam* cvout) {
-  bool use_crl = check_revocation;
-  bool use_ocsp = check_revocation;
-
-  // These CAs have multiple keys, which trigger two bugs in NSS's CRL code.
-  // 1. NSS may use one key to verify a CRL signed with another key,
-  //    incorrectly concluding that the CRL's signature is invalid.
-  //    Hopefully this bug will be fixed in NSS 3.12.9.
-  // 2. NSS considers all certificates issued by the CA as revoked when it
-  //    receives a CRL with an invalid signature.  This overly strict policy
-  //    has been relaxed in NSS 3.12.7.  See
-  //    https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=562542.
-  // So we have to turn off CRL checking for these CAs.  See
-  // http://crbug.com/55695.
-  static const char* const kMultipleKeyCA[] = {
-    "CN=Microsoft Secure Server Authority,"
-    "DC=redmond,DC=corp,DC=microsoft,DC=com",
-    "CN=Microsoft Secure Server Authority",
-  };
-
-  if (!NSS_VersionCheck("3.12.7")) {
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kMultipleKeyCA); ++i) {
-      if (strcmp(cert_handle->issuerName, kMultipleKeyCA[i]) == 0) {
-        use_crl = false;
-        break;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  PRUint64 revocation_method_flags =
-      CERT_REV_M_DO_NOT_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD |
-      CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_NETWORK_FETCHING |
-      CERT_REV_M_IGNORE_IMPLICIT_DEFAULT_SOURCE |
-      CERT_REV_M_IGNORE_MISSING_FRESH_INFO |
-      CERT_REV_M_STOP_TESTING_ON_FRESH_INFO;
-  PRUint64 revocation_method_independent_flags =
-      CERT_REV_MI_TEST_ALL_LOCAL_INFORMATION_FIRST;
-  if (check_revocation && policy_oids && num_policy_oids > 0) {
-    // EV verification requires revocation checking.  Consider the certificate
-    // revoked if we don't have revocation info.
-    // TODO(wtc): Add a bool parameter to expressly specify we're doing EV
-    // verification or we want strict revocation flags.
-    revocation_method_flags |= CERT_REV_M_REQUIRE_INFO_ON_MISSING_SOURCE;
-    revocation_method_independent_flags |=
-        CERT_REV_MI_REQUIRE_SOME_FRESH_INFO_AVAILABLE;
-  } else {
-    revocation_method_flags |= CERT_REV_M_SKIP_TEST_ON_MISSING_SOURCE;
-    revocation_method_independent_flags |=
-        CERT_REV_MI_NO_OVERALL_INFO_REQUIREMENT;
-  }
-  PRUint64 method_flags[2];
-  method_flags[cert_revocation_method_crl] = revocation_method_flags;
-  method_flags[cert_revocation_method_ocsp] = revocation_method_flags;
-
-  if (use_crl) {
-    method_flags[cert_revocation_method_crl] |=
-        CERT_REV_M_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD;
-  }
-  if (use_ocsp) {
-    method_flags[cert_revocation_method_ocsp] |=
-        CERT_REV_M_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD;
-  }
-
-  CERTRevocationMethodIndex preferred_revocation_methods[1];
-  if (use_ocsp) {
-    preferred_revocation_methods[0] = cert_revocation_method_ocsp;
-  } else {
-    preferred_revocation_methods[0] = cert_revocation_method_crl;
-  }
-
-  CERTRevocationFlags revocation_flags;
-  revocation_flags.leafTests.number_of_defined_methods =
-      arraysize(method_flags);
-  revocation_flags.leafTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method = method_flags;
-  revocation_flags.leafTests.number_of_preferred_methods =
-      arraysize(preferred_revocation_methods);
-  revocation_flags.leafTests.preferred_methods = preferred_revocation_methods;
-  revocation_flags.leafTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags =
-      revocation_method_independent_flags;
-
-  revocation_flags.chainTests.number_of_defined_methods =
-      arraysize(method_flags);
-  revocation_flags.chainTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method = method_flags;
-  revocation_flags.chainTests.number_of_preferred_methods =
-      arraysize(preferred_revocation_methods);
-  revocation_flags.chainTests.preferred_methods = preferred_revocation_methods;
-  revocation_flags.chainTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags =
-      revocation_method_independent_flags;
-
-
-  std::vector<CERTValInParam> cvin;
-  cvin.reserve(7);
-  CERTValInParam in_param;
-  in_param.type = cert_pi_revocationFlags;
-  in_param.value.pointer.revocation = &revocation_flags;
-  cvin.push_back(in_param);
-  if (policy_oids && num_policy_oids > 0) {
-    in_param.type = cert_pi_policyOID;
-    in_param.value.arraySize = num_policy_oids;
-    in_param.value.array.oids = policy_oids;
-    cvin.push_back(in_param);
-  }
-  if (additional_trust_anchors) {
-    in_param.type = cert_pi_trustAnchors;
-    in_param.value.pointer.chain = additional_trust_anchors;
-    cvin.push_back(in_param);
-    in_param.type = cert_pi_useOnlyTrustAnchors;
-    in_param.value.scalar.b = PR_FALSE;
-    cvin.push_back(in_param);
-  }
-  in_param.type = cert_pi_end;
-  cvin.push_back(in_param);
-
-  SECStatus rv = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, certificateUsageSSLServer,
-                                     &cvin[0], cvout, NULL);
-  if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-    rv = RetryPKIXVerifyCertWithWorkarounds(cert_handle, num_policy_oids,
-                                            cert_io_enabled, &cvin, cvout);
-  }
-  return rv;
-}
-
-// PKIXVerifyCert calls this function to work around some bugs in
-// CERT_PKIXVerifyCert.  All the arguments of this function are either the
-// arguments or local variables of PKIXVerifyCert.
-SECStatus RetryPKIXVerifyCertWithWorkarounds(
-    CERTCertificate* cert_handle, int num_policy_oids,
-    bool cert_io_enabled, std::vector<CERTValInParam>* cvin,
-    CERTValOutParam* cvout) {
-  // We call this function when the first CERT_PKIXVerifyCert call in
-  // PKIXVerifyCert failed,  so we initialize |rv| to SECFailure.
-  SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
-  int nss_error = PORT_GetError();
-  CERTValInParam in_param;
-
-  // If we get SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER, we may be missing an intermediate
-  // CA certificate, so we retry with cert_pi_useAIACertFetch.
-  // cert_pi_useAIACertFetch has several bugs in its error handling and
-  // error reporting (NSS bug 528743), so we don't use it by default.
-  // Note: When building a certificate chain, CERT_PKIXVerifyCert may
-  // incorrectly pick a CA certificate with the same subject name as the
-  // missing intermediate CA certificate, and  fail with the
-  // SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE error (NSS bug 524013), so we also retry with
-  // cert_pi_useAIACertFetch on SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE.
-  if (cert_io_enabled &&
-      (nss_error == SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER ||
-       nss_error == SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE)) {
-    DCHECK_EQ(cvin->back().type,  cert_pi_end);
-    cvin->pop_back();
-    in_param.type = cert_pi_useAIACertFetch;
-    in_param.value.scalar.b = PR_TRUE;
-    cvin->push_back(in_param);
-    in_param.type = cert_pi_end;
-    cvin->push_back(in_param);
-    rv = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, certificateUsageSSLServer,
-                             &(*cvin)[0], cvout, NULL);
-    if (rv == SECSuccess)
-      return rv;
-    int new_nss_error = PORT_GetError();
-    if (new_nss_error == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS ||
-        new_nss_error == SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_AIA_LOCATION_TYPE ||
-        new_nss_error == SEC_ERROR_BAD_INFO_ACCESS_LOCATION ||
-        new_nss_error == SEC_ERROR_BAD_HTTP_RESPONSE ||
-        new_nss_error == SEC_ERROR_BAD_LDAP_RESPONSE ||
-        !IS_SEC_ERROR(new_nss_error)) {
-      // Use the original error code because of cert_pi_useAIACertFetch's
-      // bad error reporting.
-      PORT_SetError(nss_error);
-      return rv;
-    }
-    nss_error = new_nss_error;
-  }
-
-  // If an intermediate CA certificate has requireExplicitPolicy in its
-  // policyConstraints extension, CERT_PKIXVerifyCert fails with
-  // SEC_ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED because we didn't specify any
-  // certificate policy (NSS bug 552775).  So we retry with the certificate
-  // policy found in the server certificate.
-  if (nss_error == SEC_ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED &&
-      num_policy_oids == 0) {
-    SECOidTag policy = GetFirstCertPolicy(cert_handle);
-    if (policy != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
-      DCHECK_EQ(cvin->back().type,  cert_pi_end);
-      cvin->pop_back();
-      in_param.type = cert_pi_policyOID;
-      in_param.value.arraySize = 1;
-      in_param.value.array.oids = &policy;
-      cvin->push_back(in_param);
-      in_param.type = cert_pi_end;
-      cvin->push_back(in_param);
-      rv = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, certificateUsageSSLServer,
-                               &(*cvin)[0], cvout, NULL);
-      if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-        // Use the original error code.
-        PORT_SetError(nss_error);
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  return rv;
-}
-
-// Decodes the certificatePolicies extension of the certificate.  Returns
-// NULL if the certificate doesn't have the extension or the extension can't
-// be decoded.  The returned value must be freed with a
-// CERT_DestroyCertificatePoliciesExtension call.
-CERTCertificatePolicies* DecodeCertPolicies(
-    CERTCertificate* cert_handle) {
-  SECItem policy_ext;
-  SECStatus rv = CERT_FindCertExtension(cert_handle,
-                                        SEC_OID_X509_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES,
-                                        &policy_ext);
-  if (rv != SECSuccess)
-    return NULL;
-  CERTCertificatePolicies* policies =
-      CERT_DecodeCertificatePoliciesExtension(&policy_ext);
-  SECITEM_FreeItem(&policy_ext, PR_FALSE);
-  return policies;
-}
-
-// Returns the OID tag for the first certificate policy in the certificate's
-// certificatePolicies extension.  Returns SEC_OID_UNKNOWN if the certificate
-// has no certificate policy.
-SECOidTag GetFirstCertPolicy(CERTCertificate* cert_handle) {
-  ScopedCERTCertificatePolicies policies(DecodeCertPolicies(cert_handle));
-  if (!policies.get())
-    return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
-
-  CERTPolicyInfo* policy_info = policies->policyInfos[0];
-  if (!policy_info)
-    return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
-  if (policy_info->oid != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
-    return policy_info->oid;
-
-  // The certificate policy is unknown to NSS.  We need to create a dynamic
-  // OID tag for the policy.
-  SECOidData od;
-  od.oid.len = policy_info->policyID.len;
-  od.oid.data = policy_info->policyID.data;
-  od.offset = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
-  // NSS doesn't allow us to pass an empty description, so I use a hardcoded,
-  // default description here.  The description doesn't need to be unique for
-  // each OID.
-  od.desc = "a certificate policy";
-  od.mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM;
-  od.supportedExtension = INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION;
-  return SECOID_AddEntry(&od);
-}
-
-HashValue CertPublicKeyHashSHA1(CERTCertificate* cert) {
-  HashValue hash(HASH_VALUE_SHA1);
-#if defined(OS_IOS)
-  CC_SHA1(cert->derPublicKey.data, cert->derPublicKey.len, hash.data());
-#else
-  SECStatus rv = HASH_HashBuf(HASH_AlgSHA1, hash.data(),
-                              cert->derPublicKey.data, cert->derPublicKey.len);
-  DCHECK_EQ(SECSuccess, rv);
-#endif
-  return hash;
-}
-
-HashValue CertPublicKeyHashSHA256(CERTCertificate* cert) {
-  HashValue hash(HASH_VALUE_SHA256);
-#if defined(OS_IOS)
-  CC_SHA256(cert->derPublicKey.data, cert->derPublicKey.len, hash.data());
-#else
-  SECStatus rv = HASH_HashBuf(HASH_AlgSHA256, hash.data(),
-                              cert->derPublicKey.data, cert->derPublicKey.len);
-  DCHECK_EQ(rv, SECSuccess);
-#endif
-  return hash;
-}
-
-void AppendPublicKeyHashes(CERTCertList* cert_list,
-                           CERTCertificate* root_cert,
-                           HashValueVector* hashes) {
-  for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(cert_list);
-       !CERT_LIST_END(node, cert_list);
-       node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) {
-    hashes->push_back(CertPublicKeyHashSHA1(node->cert));
-    hashes->push_back(CertPublicKeyHashSHA256(node->cert));
-  }
-  if (root_cert) {
-    hashes->push_back(CertPublicKeyHashSHA1(root_cert));
-    hashes->push_back(CertPublicKeyHashSHA256(root_cert));
-  }
-}
-
-// Returns true if |cert_handle| contains a policy OID that is an EV policy
-// OID according to |metadata|, storing the resulting policy OID in
-// |*ev_policy_oid|. A true return is not sufficient to establish that a
-// certificate is EV, but a false return is sufficient to establish the
-// certificate cannot be EV.
-bool IsEVCandidate(EVRootCAMetadata* metadata,
-                   CERTCertificate* cert_handle,
-                   SECOidTag* ev_policy_oid) {
-  DCHECK(cert_handle);
-  ScopedCERTCertificatePolicies policies(DecodeCertPolicies(cert_handle));
-  if (!policies.get())
-    return false;
-
-  CERTPolicyInfo** policy_infos = policies->policyInfos;
-  while (*policy_infos != NULL) {
-    CERTPolicyInfo* policy_info = *policy_infos++;
-    // If the Policy OID is unknown, that implicitly means it has not been
-    // registered as an EV policy.
-    if (policy_info->oid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
-      continue;
-    if (metadata->IsEVPolicyOID(policy_info->oid)) {
-      *ev_policy_oid = policy_info->oid;
-      return true;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return false;
-}
-
-// Studied Mozilla's code (esp. security/manager/ssl/src/nsIdentityChecking.cpp
-// and nsNSSCertHelper.cpp) to learn how to verify EV certificate.
-// TODO(wtc): A possible optimization is that we get the trust anchor from
-// the first PKIXVerifyCert call.  We look up the EV policy for the trust
-// anchor.  If the trust anchor has no EV policy, we know the cert isn't EV.
-// Otherwise, we pass just that EV policy (as opposed to all the EV policies)
-// to the second PKIXVerifyCert call.
-bool VerifyEV(CERTCertificate* cert_handle,
-              int flags,
-              CRLSet* crl_set,
-              EVRootCAMetadata* metadata,
-              SECOidTag ev_policy_oid,
-              CERTCertList* additional_trust_anchors) {
-  CERTValOutParam cvout[3];
-  int cvout_index = 0;
-  cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_certList;
-  cvout[cvout_index].value.pointer.chain = NULL;
-  int cvout_cert_list_index = cvout_index;
-  cvout_index++;
-  cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_trustAnchor;
-  cvout[cvout_index].value.pointer.cert = NULL;
-  int cvout_trust_anchor_index = cvout_index;
-  cvout_index++;
-  cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_end;
-  ScopedCERTValOutParam scoped_cvout(cvout);
-
-  bool rev_checking_enabled =
-      (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED) ||
-      (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY);
-
-  SECStatus status = PKIXVerifyCert(
-      cert_handle,
-      rev_checking_enabled,
-      flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_CERT_IO_ENABLED,
-      &ev_policy_oid,
-      1,
-      additional_trust_anchors,
-      cvout);
-  if (status != SECSuccess)
-    return false;
-
-  CERTCertificate* root_ca =
-      cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert;
-  if (root_ca == NULL)
-    return false;
-
-  // This second PKIXVerifyCert call could have found a different certification
-  // path and one or more of the certificates on this new path, that weren't on
-  // the old path, might have been revoked.
-  if (crl_set) {
-    CRLSetResult crl_set_result = CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(
-        cvout[cvout_cert_list_index].value.pointer.chain,
-        cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert,
-        crl_set);
-    if (crl_set_result == kCRLSetRevoked)
-      return false;
-  }
-
-#if defined(OS_IOS)
-  SHA1HashValue fingerprint = x509_util_ios::CalculateFingerprintNSS(root_ca);
-#else
-  SHA1HashValue fingerprint =
-      X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint(root_ca);
-#endif
-  return metadata->HasEVPolicyOID(fingerprint, ev_policy_oid);
-}
-
-CERTCertList* CertificateListToCERTCertList(const CertificateList& list) {
-  CERTCertList* result = CERT_NewCertList();
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < list.size(); ++i) {
-#if defined(OS_IOS)
-    // X509Certificate::os_cert_handle() on iOS is a SecCertificateRef; convert
-    // it to an NSS CERTCertificate.
-    CERTCertificate* cert = x509_util_ios::CreateNSSCertHandleFromOSHandle(
-        list[i]->os_cert_handle());
-#else
-    CERTCertificate* cert = list[i]->os_cert_handle();
-#endif
-    CERT_AddCertToListTail(result, CERT_DupCertificate(cert));
-  }
-  return result;
-}
-
-}  // namespace
-
-CertVerifyProcNSS::CertVerifyProcNSS() {}
-
-CertVerifyProcNSS::~CertVerifyProcNSS() {}
-
-bool CertVerifyProcNSS::SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() const {
-  // This requires APIs introduced in 3.14.2.
-  return NSS_VersionCheck("3.14.2");
-}
-
-int CertVerifyProcNSS::VerifyInternal(
-    X509Certificate* cert,
-    const std::string& hostname,
-    int flags,
-    CRLSet* crl_set,
-    const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
-    CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
-#if defined(OS_IOS)
-  // For iOS, the entire chain must be loaded into NSS's in-memory certificate
-  // store.
-  x509_util_ios::NSSCertChain scoped_chain(cert);
-  CERTCertificate* cert_handle = scoped_chain.cert_handle();
-#else
-  CERTCertificate* cert_handle = cert->os_cert_handle();
-#endif  // defined(OS_IOS)
-
-  // Make sure that the hostname matches with the common name of the cert.
-  SECStatus status = CERT_VerifyCertName(cert_handle, hostname.c_str());
-  if (status != SECSuccess)
-    verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID;
-
-  // Make sure that the cert is valid now.
-  SECCertTimeValidity validity = CERT_CheckCertValidTimes(
-      cert_handle, PR_Now(), PR_TRUE);
-  if (validity != secCertTimeValid)
-    verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID;
-
-  CERTValOutParam cvout[3];
-  int cvout_index = 0;
-  cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_certList;
-  cvout[cvout_index].value.pointer.chain = NULL;
-  int cvout_cert_list_index = cvout_index;
-  cvout_index++;
-  cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_trustAnchor;
-  cvout[cvout_index].value.pointer.cert = NULL;
-  int cvout_trust_anchor_index = cvout_index;
-  cvout_index++;
-  cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_end;
-  ScopedCERTValOutParam scoped_cvout(cvout);
-
-  EVRootCAMetadata* metadata = EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance();
-  SECOidTag ev_policy_oid = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
-  bool is_ev_candidate =
-      (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT) &&
-      IsEVCandidate(metadata, cert_handle, &ev_policy_oid);
-  bool cert_io_enabled = flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_CERT_IO_ENABLED;
-  bool check_revocation =
-      cert_io_enabled &&
-      ((flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED) ||
-       ((flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY) &&
-        is_ev_candidate));
-  if (check_revocation)
-    verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
-
-  ScopedCERTCertList trust_anchors;
-  if (SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() && !additional_trust_anchors.empty()) {
-    trust_anchors.reset(
-        CertificateListToCERTCertList(additional_trust_anchors));
-  }
-
-  status = PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, check_revocation, cert_io_enabled,
-                          NULL, 0, trust_anchors.get(), cvout);
-
-  if (status == SECSuccess) {
-    AppendPublicKeyHashes(cvout[cvout_cert_list_index].value.pointer.chain,
-                          cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert,
-                          &verify_result->public_key_hashes);
-
-    verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root =
-        IsKnownRoot(cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert);
-    verify_result->is_issued_by_additional_trust_anchor =
-        IsAdditionalTrustAnchor(
-            trust_anchors.get(),
-            cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert);
-
-    GetCertChainInfo(cvout[cvout_cert_list_index].value.pointer.chain,
-                     cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert,
-                     verify_result);
-  }
-
-  if (crl_set) {
-    CRLSetResult crl_set_result = CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(
-        cvout[cvout_cert_list_index].value.pointer.chain,
-        cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert,
-        crl_set);
-    if (crl_set_result == kCRLSetRevoked) {
-      PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE);
-      status = SECFailure;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (status != SECSuccess) {
-    int err = PORT_GetError();
-    LOG(ERROR) << "CERT_PKIXVerifyCert for " << hostname
-               << " failed err=" << err;
-    // CERT_PKIXVerifyCert rerports the wrong error code for
-    // expired certificates (NSS bug 491174)
-    if (err == SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID &&
-        (verify_result->cert_status & CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID))
-      err = SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE;
-    CertStatus cert_status = MapCertErrorToCertStatus(err);
-    if (cert_status) {
-      verify_result->cert_status |= cert_status;
-      return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
-    }
-    // |err| is not a certificate error.
-    return MapSecurityError(err);
-  }
-
-  if (IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status))
-    return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
-
-  if ((flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT) && is_ev_candidate &&
-      VerifyEV(cert_handle, flags, crl_set, metadata, ev_policy_oid,
-               trust_anchors.get())) {
-    verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_IS_EV;
-  }
-
-  return OK;
-}
-
-}  // namespace net