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| 1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. | |
| 2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be | |
| 3 // found in the LICENSE file. | |
| 4 | |
| 5 #include "net/base/cert_verify_proc_nss.h" | |
| 6 | |
| 7 #include <string> | |
| 8 #include <vector> | |
| 9 | |
| 10 #include <cert.h> | |
| 11 #include <nss.h> | |
| 12 #include <prerror.h> | |
| 13 #include <secerr.h> | |
| 14 #include <sechash.h> | |
| 15 #include <sslerr.h> | |
| 16 | |
| 17 #include "base/logging.h" | |
| 18 #include "crypto/nss_util.h" | |
| 19 #include "crypto/scoped_nss_types.h" | |
| 20 #include "crypto/sha2.h" | |
| 21 #include "net/base/asn1_util.h" | |
| 22 #include "net/base/cert_status_flags.h" | |
| 23 #include "net/base/cert_verifier.h" | |
| 24 #include "net/base/cert_verify_result.h" | |
| 25 #include "net/base/crl_set.h" | |
| 26 #include "net/base/ev_root_ca_metadata.h" | |
| 27 #include "net/base/net_errors.h" | |
| 28 #include "net/base/x509_certificate.h" | |
| 29 #include "net/base/x509_util_nss.h" | |
| 30 | |
| 31 #if defined(OS_IOS) | |
| 32 #include <CommonCrypto/CommonDigest.h> | |
| 33 #include "net/base/x509_util_ios.h" | |
| 34 #endif // defined(OS_IOS) | |
| 35 | |
| 36 #define NSS_VERSION_NUM (NSS_VMAJOR * 10000 + NSS_VMINOR * 100 + NSS_VPATCH) | |
| 37 #if NSS_VERSION_NUM < 31305 | |
| 38 // Added in NSS 3.13.5. | |
| 39 #define SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED -8016 | |
| 40 #endif | |
| 41 | |
| 42 #if NSS_VERSION_NUM < 31402 | |
| 43 // Added in NSS 3.14.2. | |
| 44 #define cert_pi_useOnlyTrustAnchors static_cast<CERTValParamInType>(14) | |
| 45 #endif | |
| 46 | |
| 47 namespace net { | |
| 48 | |
| 49 namespace { | |
| 50 | |
| 51 typedef scoped_ptr_malloc< | |
| 52 CERTCertificatePolicies, | |
| 53 crypto::NSSDestroyer<CERTCertificatePolicies, | |
| 54 CERT_DestroyCertificatePoliciesExtension> > | |
| 55 ScopedCERTCertificatePolicies; | |
| 56 | |
| 57 typedef scoped_ptr_malloc< | |
| 58 CERTCertList, | |
| 59 crypto::NSSDestroyer<CERTCertList, CERT_DestroyCertList> > | |
| 60 ScopedCERTCertList; | |
| 61 | |
| 62 // ScopedCERTValOutParam manages destruction of values in the CERTValOutParam | |
| 63 // array that cvout points to. cvout must be initialized as passed to | |
| 64 // CERT_PKIXVerifyCert, so that the array must be terminated with | |
| 65 // cert_po_end type. | |
| 66 // When it goes out of scope, it destroys values of cert_po_trustAnchor | |
| 67 // and cert_po_certList types, but doesn't release the array itself. | |
| 68 class ScopedCERTValOutParam { | |
| 69 public: | |
| 70 explicit ScopedCERTValOutParam(CERTValOutParam* cvout) | |
| 71 : cvout_(cvout) {} | |
| 72 | |
| 73 ~ScopedCERTValOutParam() { | |
| 74 if (cvout_ == NULL) | |
| 75 return; | |
| 76 for (CERTValOutParam *p = cvout_; p->type != cert_po_end; p++) { | |
| 77 switch (p->type) { | |
| 78 case cert_po_trustAnchor: | |
| 79 if (p->value.pointer.cert) { | |
| 80 CERT_DestroyCertificate(p->value.pointer.cert); | |
| 81 p->value.pointer.cert = NULL; | |
| 82 } | |
| 83 break; | |
| 84 case cert_po_certList: | |
| 85 if (p->value.pointer.chain) { | |
| 86 CERT_DestroyCertList(p->value.pointer.chain); | |
| 87 p->value.pointer.chain = NULL; | |
| 88 } | |
| 89 break; | |
| 90 default: | |
| 91 break; | |
| 92 } | |
| 93 } | |
| 94 } | |
| 95 | |
| 96 private: | |
| 97 CERTValOutParam* cvout_; | |
| 98 | |
| 99 DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ScopedCERTValOutParam); | |
| 100 }; | |
| 101 | |
| 102 // Map PORT_GetError() return values to our network error codes. | |
| 103 int MapSecurityError(int err) { | |
| 104 switch (err) { | |
| 105 case PR_DIRECTORY_LOOKUP_ERROR: // DNS lookup error. | |
| 106 return ERR_NAME_NOT_RESOLVED; | |
| 107 case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS: | |
| 108 return ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; | |
| 109 case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN: | |
| 110 return ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID; | |
| 111 case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME: | |
| 112 case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: | |
| 113 case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE: | |
| 114 return ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID; | |
| 115 case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER: | |
| 116 case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER: | |
| 117 case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID: | |
| 118 return ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID; | |
| 119 // TODO(port): map ERR_CERT_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM. | |
| 120 case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_BAD_HTTP_RESPONSE: | |
| 121 case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_SERVER_ERROR: | |
| 122 return ERR_CERT_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION; | |
| 123 case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE: | |
| 124 case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT: // Treat as revoked. | |
| 125 return ERR_CERT_REVOKED; | |
| 126 case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER: | |
| 127 case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE: | |
| 128 case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID: | |
| 129 // TODO(port): add an ERR_CERT_WRONG_USAGE error code. | |
| 130 case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID: | |
| 131 case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE: // Key usage. | |
| 132 case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE: // Extended key usage and whether | |
| 133 // the certificate is a CA. | |
| 134 case SEC_ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED: | |
| 135 case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_IN_NAME_SPACE: | |
| 136 case SEC_ERROR_PATH_LEN_CONSTRAINT_INVALID: | |
| 137 case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION: | |
| 138 case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID: | |
| 139 return ERR_CERT_INVALID; | |
| 140 case SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED: | |
| 141 return ERR_CERT_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; | |
| 142 default: | |
| 143 LOG(WARNING) << "Unknown error " << err << " mapped to net::ERR_FAILED"; | |
| 144 return ERR_FAILED; | |
| 145 } | |
| 146 } | |
| 147 | |
| 148 // Map PORT_GetError() return values to our cert status flags. | |
| 149 CertStatus MapCertErrorToCertStatus(int err) { | |
| 150 int net_error = MapSecurityError(err); | |
| 151 return MapNetErrorToCertStatus(net_error); | |
| 152 } | |
| 153 | |
| 154 // Saves some information about the certificate chain cert_list in | |
| 155 // *verify_result. The caller MUST initialize *verify_result before calling | |
| 156 // this function. | |
| 157 // Note that cert_list[0] is the end entity certificate. | |
| 158 void GetCertChainInfo(CERTCertList* cert_list, | |
| 159 CERTCertificate* root_cert, | |
| 160 CertVerifyResult* verify_result) { | |
| 161 // NOTE: Using a NSS library before 3.12.3.1 will crash below. To see the | |
| 162 // NSS version currently in use: | |
| 163 // 1. use ldd on the chrome executable for NSS's location (ie. libnss3.so*) | |
| 164 // 2. use ident libnss3.so* for the library's version | |
| 165 DCHECK(cert_list); | |
| 166 | |
| 167 CERTCertificate* verified_cert = NULL; | |
| 168 std::vector<CERTCertificate*> verified_chain; | |
| 169 int i = 0; | |
| 170 for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(cert_list); | |
| 171 !CERT_LIST_END(node, cert_list); | |
| 172 node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node), ++i) { | |
| 173 if (i == 0) { | |
| 174 verified_cert = node->cert; | |
| 175 } else { | |
| 176 // Because of an NSS bug, CERT_PKIXVerifyCert may chain a self-signed | |
| 177 // certificate of a root CA to another certificate of the same root CA | |
| 178 // key. Detect that error and ignore the root CA certificate. | |
| 179 // See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=721288. | |
| 180 if (node->cert->isRoot) { | |
| 181 // NOTE: isRoot doesn't mean the certificate is a trust anchor. It | |
| 182 // means the certificate is self-signed. Here we assume isRoot only | |
| 183 // implies the certificate is self-issued. | |
| 184 CERTCertListNode* next_node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node); | |
| 185 CERTCertificate* next_cert; | |
| 186 if (!CERT_LIST_END(next_node, cert_list)) { | |
| 187 next_cert = next_node->cert; | |
| 188 } else { | |
| 189 next_cert = root_cert; | |
| 190 } | |
| 191 // Test that |node->cert| is actually a self-signed certificate | |
| 192 // whose key is equal to |next_cert|, and not a self-issued | |
| 193 // certificate signed by another key of the same CA. | |
| 194 if (next_cert && SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(&node->cert->derPublicKey, | |
| 195 &next_cert->derPublicKey)) { | |
| 196 continue; | |
| 197 } | |
| 198 } | |
| 199 verified_chain.push_back(node->cert); | |
| 200 } | |
| 201 | |
| 202 SECAlgorithmID& signature = node->cert->signature; | |
| 203 SECOidTag oid_tag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&signature.algorithm); | |
| 204 switch (oid_tag) { | |
| 205 case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: | |
| 206 verify_result->has_md5 = true; | |
| 207 if (i != 0) | |
| 208 verify_result->has_md5_ca = true; | |
| 209 break; | |
| 210 case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD2_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: | |
| 211 verify_result->has_md2 = true; | |
| 212 if (i != 0) | |
| 213 verify_result->has_md2_ca = true; | |
| 214 break; | |
| 215 case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD4_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: | |
| 216 verify_result->has_md4 = true; | |
| 217 break; | |
| 218 default: | |
| 219 break; | |
| 220 } | |
| 221 } | |
| 222 | |
| 223 if (root_cert) | |
| 224 verified_chain.push_back(root_cert); | |
| 225 #if defined(OS_IOS) | |
| 226 verify_result->verified_cert = | |
| 227 x509_util_ios::CreateCertFromNSSHandles(verified_cert, verified_chain); | |
| 228 #else | |
| 229 verify_result->verified_cert = | |
| 230 X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(verified_cert, verified_chain); | |
| 231 #endif // defined(OS_IOS) | |
| 232 } | |
| 233 | |
| 234 // IsKnownRoot returns true if the given certificate is one that we believe | |
| 235 // is a standard (as opposed to user-installed) root. | |
| 236 bool IsKnownRoot(CERTCertificate* root) { | |
| 237 if (!root || !root->slot) | |
| 238 return false; | |
| 239 | |
| 240 // This magic name is taken from | |
| 241 // http://bonsai.mozilla.org/cvsblame.cgi?file=mozilla/security/nss/lib/ckfw/b
uiltins/constants.c&rev=1.13&mark=86,89#79 | |
| 242 return 0 == strcmp(PK11_GetSlotName(root->slot), | |
| 243 "NSS Builtin Objects"); | |
| 244 } | |
| 245 | |
| 246 // Returns true if the given certificate is one of the additional trust anchors. | |
| 247 bool IsAdditionalTrustAnchor(CERTCertList* additional_trust_anchors, | |
| 248 CERTCertificate* root) { | |
| 249 if (!additional_trust_anchors || !root) | |
| 250 return false; | |
| 251 for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(additional_trust_anchors); | |
| 252 !CERT_LIST_END(node, additional_trust_anchors); | |
| 253 node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) { | |
| 254 if (CERT_CompareCerts(node->cert, root)) | |
| 255 return true; | |
| 256 } | |
| 257 return false; | |
| 258 } | |
| 259 | |
| 260 enum CRLSetResult { | |
| 261 kCRLSetRevoked, | |
| 262 kCRLSetOk, | |
| 263 kCRLSetError, | |
| 264 }; | |
| 265 | |
| 266 // CheckRevocationWithCRLSet attempts to check each element of |cert_list| | |
| 267 // against |crl_set|. It returns: | |
| 268 // kCRLSetRevoked: if any element of the chain is known to have been revoked. | |
| 269 // kCRLSetError: if an error occurs in processing. | |
| 270 // kCRLSetOk: if no element in the chain is known to have been revoked. | |
| 271 CRLSetResult CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(CERTCertList* cert_list, | |
| 272 CERTCertificate* root, | |
| 273 CRLSet* crl_set) { | |
| 274 std::vector<CERTCertificate*> certs; | |
| 275 | |
| 276 if (cert_list) { | |
| 277 for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(cert_list); | |
| 278 !CERT_LIST_END(node, cert_list); | |
| 279 node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) { | |
| 280 certs.push_back(node->cert); | |
| 281 } | |
| 282 } | |
| 283 if (root) | |
| 284 certs.push_back(root); | |
| 285 | |
| 286 // We iterate from the root certificate down to the leaf, keeping track of | |
| 287 // the issuer's SPKI at each step. | |
| 288 std::string issuer_spki_hash; | |
| 289 for (std::vector<CERTCertificate*>::reverse_iterator i = certs.rbegin(); | |
| 290 i != certs.rend(); ++i) { | |
| 291 CERTCertificate* cert = *i; | |
| 292 | |
| 293 base::StringPiece der(reinterpret_cast<char*>(cert->derCert.data), | |
| 294 cert->derCert.len); | |
| 295 | |
| 296 base::StringPiece spki; | |
| 297 if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der, &spki)) { | |
| 298 NOTREACHED(); | |
| 299 return kCRLSetError; | |
| 300 } | |
| 301 const std::string spki_hash = crypto::SHA256HashString(spki); | |
| 302 | |
| 303 base::StringPiece serial_number = base::StringPiece( | |
| 304 reinterpret_cast<char*>(cert->serialNumber.data), | |
| 305 cert->serialNumber.len); | |
| 306 | |
| 307 CRLSet::Result result = crl_set->CheckSPKI(spki_hash); | |
| 308 | |
| 309 if (result != CRLSet::REVOKED && !issuer_spki_hash.empty()) | |
| 310 result = crl_set->CheckSerial(serial_number, issuer_spki_hash); | |
| 311 | |
| 312 issuer_spki_hash = spki_hash; | |
| 313 | |
| 314 switch (result) { | |
| 315 case CRLSet::REVOKED: | |
| 316 return kCRLSetRevoked; | |
| 317 case CRLSet::UNKNOWN: | |
| 318 case CRLSet::GOOD: | |
| 319 continue; | |
| 320 default: | |
| 321 NOTREACHED(); | |
| 322 return kCRLSetError; | |
| 323 } | |
| 324 } | |
| 325 | |
| 326 return kCRLSetOk; | |
| 327 } | |
| 328 | |
| 329 // Forward declarations. | |
| 330 SECStatus RetryPKIXVerifyCertWithWorkarounds( | |
| 331 CERTCertificate* cert_handle, int num_policy_oids, | |
| 332 bool cert_io_enabled, std::vector<CERTValInParam>* cvin, | |
| 333 CERTValOutParam* cvout); | |
| 334 SECOidTag GetFirstCertPolicy(CERTCertificate* cert_handle); | |
| 335 | |
| 336 // Call CERT_PKIXVerifyCert for the cert_handle. | |
| 337 // Verification results are stored in an array of CERTValOutParam. | |
| 338 // If policy_oids is not NULL and num_policy_oids is positive, policies | |
| 339 // are also checked. | |
| 340 // additional_trust_anchors is an optional list of certificates that can be | |
| 341 // trusted as anchors when building a certificate chain. | |
| 342 // Caller must initialize cvout before calling this function. | |
| 343 SECStatus PKIXVerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert_handle, | |
| 344 bool check_revocation, | |
| 345 bool cert_io_enabled, | |
| 346 const SECOidTag* policy_oids, | |
| 347 int num_policy_oids, | |
| 348 CERTCertList* additional_trust_anchors, | |
| 349 CERTValOutParam* cvout) { | |
| 350 bool use_crl = check_revocation; | |
| 351 bool use_ocsp = check_revocation; | |
| 352 | |
| 353 // These CAs have multiple keys, which trigger two bugs in NSS's CRL code. | |
| 354 // 1. NSS may use one key to verify a CRL signed with another key, | |
| 355 // incorrectly concluding that the CRL's signature is invalid. | |
| 356 // Hopefully this bug will be fixed in NSS 3.12.9. | |
| 357 // 2. NSS considers all certificates issued by the CA as revoked when it | |
| 358 // receives a CRL with an invalid signature. This overly strict policy | |
| 359 // has been relaxed in NSS 3.12.7. See | |
| 360 // https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=562542. | |
| 361 // So we have to turn off CRL checking for these CAs. See | |
| 362 // http://crbug.com/55695. | |
| 363 static const char* const kMultipleKeyCA[] = { | |
| 364 "CN=Microsoft Secure Server Authority," | |
| 365 "DC=redmond,DC=corp,DC=microsoft,DC=com", | |
| 366 "CN=Microsoft Secure Server Authority", | |
| 367 }; | |
| 368 | |
| 369 if (!NSS_VersionCheck("3.12.7")) { | |
| 370 for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kMultipleKeyCA); ++i) { | |
| 371 if (strcmp(cert_handle->issuerName, kMultipleKeyCA[i]) == 0) { | |
| 372 use_crl = false; | |
| 373 break; | |
| 374 } | |
| 375 } | |
| 376 } | |
| 377 | |
| 378 PRUint64 revocation_method_flags = | |
| 379 CERT_REV_M_DO_NOT_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD | | |
| 380 CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_NETWORK_FETCHING | | |
| 381 CERT_REV_M_IGNORE_IMPLICIT_DEFAULT_SOURCE | | |
| 382 CERT_REV_M_IGNORE_MISSING_FRESH_INFO | | |
| 383 CERT_REV_M_STOP_TESTING_ON_FRESH_INFO; | |
| 384 PRUint64 revocation_method_independent_flags = | |
| 385 CERT_REV_MI_TEST_ALL_LOCAL_INFORMATION_FIRST; | |
| 386 if (check_revocation && policy_oids && num_policy_oids > 0) { | |
| 387 // EV verification requires revocation checking. Consider the certificate | |
| 388 // revoked if we don't have revocation info. | |
| 389 // TODO(wtc): Add a bool parameter to expressly specify we're doing EV | |
| 390 // verification or we want strict revocation flags. | |
| 391 revocation_method_flags |= CERT_REV_M_REQUIRE_INFO_ON_MISSING_SOURCE; | |
| 392 revocation_method_independent_flags |= | |
| 393 CERT_REV_MI_REQUIRE_SOME_FRESH_INFO_AVAILABLE; | |
| 394 } else { | |
| 395 revocation_method_flags |= CERT_REV_M_SKIP_TEST_ON_MISSING_SOURCE; | |
| 396 revocation_method_independent_flags |= | |
| 397 CERT_REV_MI_NO_OVERALL_INFO_REQUIREMENT; | |
| 398 } | |
| 399 PRUint64 method_flags[2]; | |
| 400 method_flags[cert_revocation_method_crl] = revocation_method_flags; | |
| 401 method_flags[cert_revocation_method_ocsp] = revocation_method_flags; | |
| 402 | |
| 403 if (use_crl) { | |
| 404 method_flags[cert_revocation_method_crl] |= | |
| 405 CERT_REV_M_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD; | |
| 406 } | |
| 407 if (use_ocsp) { | |
| 408 method_flags[cert_revocation_method_ocsp] |= | |
| 409 CERT_REV_M_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD; | |
| 410 } | |
| 411 | |
| 412 CERTRevocationMethodIndex preferred_revocation_methods[1]; | |
| 413 if (use_ocsp) { | |
| 414 preferred_revocation_methods[0] = cert_revocation_method_ocsp; | |
| 415 } else { | |
| 416 preferred_revocation_methods[0] = cert_revocation_method_crl; | |
| 417 } | |
| 418 | |
| 419 CERTRevocationFlags revocation_flags; | |
| 420 revocation_flags.leafTests.number_of_defined_methods = | |
| 421 arraysize(method_flags); | |
| 422 revocation_flags.leafTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method = method_flags; | |
| 423 revocation_flags.leafTests.number_of_preferred_methods = | |
| 424 arraysize(preferred_revocation_methods); | |
| 425 revocation_flags.leafTests.preferred_methods = preferred_revocation_methods; | |
| 426 revocation_flags.leafTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags = | |
| 427 revocation_method_independent_flags; | |
| 428 | |
| 429 revocation_flags.chainTests.number_of_defined_methods = | |
| 430 arraysize(method_flags); | |
| 431 revocation_flags.chainTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method = method_flags; | |
| 432 revocation_flags.chainTests.number_of_preferred_methods = | |
| 433 arraysize(preferred_revocation_methods); | |
| 434 revocation_flags.chainTests.preferred_methods = preferred_revocation_methods; | |
| 435 revocation_flags.chainTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags = | |
| 436 revocation_method_independent_flags; | |
| 437 | |
| 438 | |
| 439 std::vector<CERTValInParam> cvin; | |
| 440 cvin.reserve(7); | |
| 441 CERTValInParam in_param; | |
| 442 in_param.type = cert_pi_revocationFlags; | |
| 443 in_param.value.pointer.revocation = &revocation_flags; | |
| 444 cvin.push_back(in_param); | |
| 445 if (policy_oids && num_policy_oids > 0) { | |
| 446 in_param.type = cert_pi_policyOID; | |
| 447 in_param.value.arraySize = num_policy_oids; | |
| 448 in_param.value.array.oids = policy_oids; | |
| 449 cvin.push_back(in_param); | |
| 450 } | |
| 451 if (additional_trust_anchors) { | |
| 452 in_param.type = cert_pi_trustAnchors; | |
| 453 in_param.value.pointer.chain = additional_trust_anchors; | |
| 454 cvin.push_back(in_param); | |
| 455 in_param.type = cert_pi_useOnlyTrustAnchors; | |
| 456 in_param.value.scalar.b = PR_FALSE; | |
| 457 cvin.push_back(in_param); | |
| 458 } | |
| 459 in_param.type = cert_pi_end; | |
| 460 cvin.push_back(in_param); | |
| 461 | |
| 462 SECStatus rv = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, certificateUsageSSLServer, | |
| 463 &cvin[0], cvout, NULL); | |
| 464 if (rv != SECSuccess) { | |
| 465 rv = RetryPKIXVerifyCertWithWorkarounds(cert_handle, num_policy_oids, | |
| 466 cert_io_enabled, &cvin, cvout); | |
| 467 } | |
| 468 return rv; | |
| 469 } | |
| 470 | |
| 471 // PKIXVerifyCert calls this function to work around some bugs in | |
| 472 // CERT_PKIXVerifyCert. All the arguments of this function are either the | |
| 473 // arguments or local variables of PKIXVerifyCert. | |
| 474 SECStatus RetryPKIXVerifyCertWithWorkarounds( | |
| 475 CERTCertificate* cert_handle, int num_policy_oids, | |
| 476 bool cert_io_enabled, std::vector<CERTValInParam>* cvin, | |
| 477 CERTValOutParam* cvout) { | |
| 478 // We call this function when the first CERT_PKIXVerifyCert call in | |
| 479 // PKIXVerifyCert failed, so we initialize |rv| to SECFailure. | |
| 480 SECStatus rv = SECFailure; | |
| 481 int nss_error = PORT_GetError(); | |
| 482 CERTValInParam in_param; | |
| 483 | |
| 484 // If we get SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER, we may be missing an intermediate | |
| 485 // CA certificate, so we retry with cert_pi_useAIACertFetch. | |
| 486 // cert_pi_useAIACertFetch has several bugs in its error handling and | |
| 487 // error reporting (NSS bug 528743), so we don't use it by default. | |
| 488 // Note: When building a certificate chain, CERT_PKIXVerifyCert may | |
| 489 // incorrectly pick a CA certificate with the same subject name as the | |
| 490 // missing intermediate CA certificate, and fail with the | |
| 491 // SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE error (NSS bug 524013), so we also retry with | |
| 492 // cert_pi_useAIACertFetch on SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE. | |
| 493 if (cert_io_enabled && | |
| 494 (nss_error == SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER || | |
| 495 nss_error == SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE)) { | |
| 496 DCHECK_EQ(cvin->back().type, cert_pi_end); | |
| 497 cvin->pop_back(); | |
| 498 in_param.type = cert_pi_useAIACertFetch; | |
| 499 in_param.value.scalar.b = PR_TRUE; | |
| 500 cvin->push_back(in_param); | |
| 501 in_param.type = cert_pi_end; | |
| 502 cvin->push_back(in_param); | |
| 503 rv = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, certificateUsageSSLServer, | |
| 504 &(*cvin)[0], cvout, NULL); | |
| 505 if (rv == SECSuccess) | |
| 506 return rv; | |
| 507 int new_nss_error = PORT_GetError(); | |
| 508 if (new_nss_error == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS || | |
| 509 new_nss_error == SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_AIA_LOCATION_TYPE || | |
| 510 new_nss_error == SEC_ERROR_BAD_INFO_ACCESS_LOCATION || | |
| 511 new_nss_error == SEC_ERROR_BAD_HTTP_RESPONSE || | |
| 512 new_nss_error == SEC_ERROR_BAD_LDAP_RESPONSE || | |
| 513 !IS_SEC_ERROR(new_nss_error)) { | |
| 514 // Use the original error code because of cert_pi_useAIACertFetch's | |
| 515 // bad error reporting. | |
| 516 PORT_SetError(nss_error); | |
| 517 return rv; | |
| 518 } | |
| 519 nss_error = new_nss_error; | |
| 520 } | |
| 521 | |
| 522 // If an intermediate CA certificate has requireExplicitPolicy in its | |
| 523 // policyConstraints extension, CERT_PKIXVerifyCert fails with | |
| 524 // SEC_ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED because we didn't specify any | |
| 525 // certificate policy (NSS bug 552775). So we retry with the certificate | |
| 526 // policy found in the server certificate. | |
| 527 if (nss_error == SEC_ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED && | |
| 528 num_policy_oids == 0) { | |
| 529 SECOidTag policy = GetFirstCertPolicy(cert_handle); | |
| 530 if (policy != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) { | |
| 531 DCHECK_EQ(cvin->back().type, cert_pi_end); | |
| 532 cvin->pop_back(); | |
| 533 in_param.type = cert_pi_policyOID; | |
| 534 in_param.value.arraySize = 1; | |
| 535 in_param.value.array.oids = &policy; | |
| 536 cvin->push_back(in_param); | |
| 537 in_param.type = cert_pi_end; | |
| 538 cvin->push_back(in_param); | |
| 539 rv = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, certificateUsageSSLServer, | |
| 540 &(*cvin)[0], cvout, NULL); | |
| 541 if (rv != SECSuccess) { | |
| 542 // Use the original error code. | |
| 543 PORT_SetError(nss_error); | |
| 544 } | |
| 545 } | |
| 546 } | |
| 547 | |
| 548 return rv; | |
| 549 } | |
| 550 | |
| 551 // Decodes the certificatePolicies extension of the certificate. Returns | |
| 552 // NULL if the certificate doesn't have the extension or the extension can't | |
| 553 // be decoded. The returned value must be freed with a | |
| 554 // CERT_DestroyCertificatePoliciesExtension call. | |
| 555 CERTCertificatePolicies* DecodeCertPolicies( | |
| 556 CERTCertificate* cert_handle) { | |
| 557 SECItem policy_ext; | |
| 558 SECStatus rv = CERT_FindCertExtension(cert_handle, | |
| 559 SEC_OID_X509_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES, | |
| 560 &policy_ext); | |
| 561 if (rv != SECSuccess) | |
| 562 return NULL; | |
| 563 CERTCertificatePolicies* policies = | |
| 564 CERT_DecodeCertificatePoliciesExtension(&policy_ext); | |
| 565 SECITEM_FreeItem(&policy_ext, PR_FALSE); | |
| 566 return policies; | |
| 567 } | |
| 568 | |
| 569 // Returns the OID tag for the first certificate policy in the certificate's | |
| 570 // certificatePolicies extension. Returns SEC_OID_UNKNOWN if the certificate | |
| 571 // has no certificate policy. | |
| 572 SECOidTag GetFirstCertPolicy(CERTCertificate* cert_handle) { | |
| 573 ScopedCERTCertificatePolicies policies(DecodeCertPolicies(cert_handle)); | |
| 574 if (!policies.get()) | |
| 575 return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; | |
| 576 | |
| 577 CERTPolicyInfo* policy_info = policies->policyInfos[0]; | |
| 578 if (!policy_info) | |
| 579 return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; | |
| 580 if (policy_info->oid != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) | |
| 581 return policy_info->oid; | |
| 582 | |
| 583 // The certificate policy is unknown to NSS. We need to create a dynamic | |
| 584 // OID tag for the policy. | |
| 585 SECOidData od; | |
| 586 od.oid.len = policy_info->policyID.len; | |
| 587 od.oid.data = policy_info->policyID.data; | |
| 588 od.offset = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; | |
| 589 // NSS doesn't allow us to pass an empty description, so I use a hardcoded, | |
| 590 // default description here. The description doesn't need to be unique for | |
| 591 // each OID. | |
| 592 od.desc = "a certificate policy"; | |
| 593 od.mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; | |
| 594 od.supportedExtension = INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION; | |
| 595 return SECOID_AddEntry(&od); | |
| 596 } | |
| 597 | |
| 598 HashValue CertPublicKeyHashSHA1(CERTCertificate* cert) { | |
| 599 HashValue hash(HASH_VALUE_SHA1); | |
| 600 #if defined(OS_IOS) | |
| 601 CC_SHA1(cert->derPublicKey.data, cert->derPublicKey.len, hash.data()); | |
| 602 #else | |
| 603 SECStatus rv = HASH_HashBuf(HASH_AlgSHA1, hash.data(), | |
| 604 cert->derPublicKey.data, cert->derPublicKey.len); | |
| 605 DCHECK_EQ(SECSuccess, rv); | |
| 606 #endif | |
| 607 return hash; | |
| 608 } | |
| 609 | |
| 610 HashValue CertPublicKeyHashSHA256(CERTCertificate* cert) { | |
| 611 HashValue hash(HASH_VALUE_SHA256); | |
| 612 #if defined(OS_IOS) | |
| 613 CC_SHA256(cert->derPublicKey.data, cert->derPublicKey.len, hash.data()); | |
| 614 #else | |
| 615 SECStatus rv = HASH_HashBuf(HASH_AlgSHA256, hash.data(), | |
| 616 cert->derPublicKey.data, cert->derPublicKey.len); | |
| 617 DCHECK_EQ(rv, SECSuccess); | |
| 618 #endif | |
| 619 return hash; | |
| 620 } | |
| 621 | |
| 622 void AppendPublicKeyHashes(CERTCertList* cert_list, | |
| 623 CERTCertificate* root_cert, | |
| 624 HashValueVector* hashes) { | |
| 625 for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(cert_list); | |
| 626 !CERT_LIST_END(node, cert_list); | |
| 627 node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) { | |
| 628 hashes->push_back(CertPublicKeyHashSHA1(node->cert)); | |
| 629 hashes->push_back(CertPublicKeyHashSHA256(node->cert)); | |
| 630 } | |
| 631 if (root_cert) { | |
| 632 hashes->push_back(CertPublicKeyHashSHA1(root_cert)); | |
| 633 hashes->push_back(CertPublicKeyHashSHA256(root_cert)); | |
| 634 } | |
| 635 } | |
| 636 | |
| 637 // Returns true if |cert_handle| contains a policy OID that is an EV policy | |
| 638 // OID according to |metadata|, storing the resulting policy OID in | |
| 639 // |*ev_policy_oid|. A true return is not sufficient to establish that a | |
| 640 // certificate is EV, but a false return is sufficient to establish the | |
| 641 // certificate cannot be EV. | |
| 642 bool IsEVCandidate(EVRootCAMetadata* metadata, | |
| 643 CERTCertificate* cert_handle, | |
| 644 SECOidTag* ev_policy_oid) { | |
| 645 DCHECK(cert_handle); | |
| 646 ScopedCERTCertificatePolicies policies(DecodeCertPolicies(cert_handle)); | |
| 647 if (!policies.get()) | |
| 648 return false; | |
| 649 | |
| 650 CERTPolicyInfo** policy_infos = policies->policyInfos; | |
| 651 while (*policy_infos != NULL) { | |
| 652 CERTPolicyInfo* policy_info = *policy_infos++; | |
| 653 // If the Policy OID is unknown, that implicitly means it has not been | |
| 654 // registered as an EV policy. | |
| 655 if (policy_info->oid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) | |
| 656 continue; | |
| 657 if (metadata->IsEVPolicyOID(policy_info->oid)) { | |
| 658 *ev_policy_oid = policy_info->oid; | |
| 659 return true; | |
| 660 } | |
| 661 } | |
| 662 | |
| 663 return false; | |
| 664 } | |
| 665 | |
| 666 // Studied Mozilla's code (esp. security/manager/ssl/src/nsIdentityChecking.cpp | |
| 667 // and nsNSSCertHelper.cpp) to learn how to verify EV certificate. | |
| 668 // TODO(wtc): A possible optimization is that we get the trust anchor from | |
| 669 // the first PKIXVerifyCert call. We look up the EV policy for the trust | |
| 670 // anchor. If the trust anchor has no EV policy, we know the cert isn't EV. | |
| 671 // Otherwise, we pass just that EV policy (as opposed to all the EV policies) | |
| 672 // to the second PKIXVerifyCert call. | |
| 673 bool VerifyEV(CERTCertificate* cert_handle, | |
| 674 int flags, | |
| 675 CRLSet* crl_set, | |
| 676 EVRootCAMetadata* metadata, | |
| 677 SECOidTag ev_policy_oid, | |
| 678 CERTCertList* additional_trust_anchors) { | |
| 679 CERTValOutParam cvout[3]; | |
| 680 int cvout_index = 0; | |
| 681 cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_certList; | |
| 682 cvout[cvout_index].value.pointer.chain = NULL; | |
| 683 int cvout_cert_list_index = cvout_index; | |
| 684 cvout_index++; | |
| 685 cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_trustAnchor; | |
| 686 cvout[cvout_index].value.pointer.cert = NULL; | |
| 687 int cvout_trust_anchor_index = cvout_index; | |
| 688 cvout_index++; | |
| 689 cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_end; | |
| 690 ScopedCERTValOutParam scoped_cvout(cvout); | |
| 691 | |
| 692 bool rev_checking_enabled = | |
| 693 (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED) || | |
| 694 (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY); | |
| 695 | |
| 696 SECStatus status = PKIXVerifyCert( | |
| 697 cert_handle, | |
| 698 rev_checking_enabled, | |
| 699 flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_CERT_IO_ENABLED, | |
| 700 &ev_policy_oid, | |
| 701 1, | |
| 702 additional_trust_anchors, | |
| 703 cvout); | |
| 704 if (status != SECSuccess) | |
| 705 return false; | |
| 706 | |
| 707 CERTCertificate* root_ca = | |
| 708 cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert; | |
| 709 if (root_ca == NULL) | |
| 710 return false; | |
| 711 | |
| 712 // This second PKIXVerifyCert call could have found a different certification | |
| 713 // path and one or more of the certificates on this new path, that weren't on | |
| 714 // the old path, might have been revoked. | |
| 715 if (crl_set) { | |
| 716 CRLSetResult crl_set_result = CheckRevocationWithCRLSet( | |
| 717 cvout[cvout_cert_list_index].value.pointer.chain, | |
| 718 cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert, | |
| 719 crl_set); | |
| 720 if (crl_set_result == kCRLSetRevoked) | |
| 721 return false; | |
| 722 } | |
| 723 | |
| 724 #if defined(OS_IOS) | |
| 725 SHA1HashValue fingerprint = x509_util_ios::CalculateFingerprintNSS(root_ca); | |
| 726 #else | |
| 727 SHA1HashValue fingerprint = | |
| 728 X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint(root_ca); | |
| 729 #endif | |
| 730 return metadata->HasEVPolicyOID(fingerprint, ev_policy_oid); | |
| 731 } | |
| 732 | |
| 733 CERTCertList* CertificateListToCERTCertList(const CertificateList& list) { | |
| 734 CERTCertList* result = CERT_NewCertList(); | |
| 735 for (size_t i = 0; i < list.size(); ++i) { | |
| 736 #if defined(OS_IOS) | |
| 737 // X509Certificate::os_cert_handle() on iOS is a SecCertificateRef; convert | |
| 738 // it to an NSS CERTCertificate. | |
| 739 CERTCertificate* cert = x509_util_ios::CreateNSSCertHandleFromOSHandle( | |
| 740 list[i]->os_cert_handle()); | |
| 741 #else | |
| 742 CERTCertificate* cert = list[i]->os_cert_handle(); | |
| 743 #endif | |
| 744 CERT_AddCertToListTail(result, CERT_DupCertificate(cert)); | |
| 745 } | |
| 746 return result; | |
| 747 } | |
| 748 | |
| 749 } // namespace | |
| 750 | |
| 751 CertVerifyProcNSS::CertVerifyProcNSS() {} | |
| 752 | |
| 753 CertVerifyProcNSS::~CertVerifyProcNSS() {} | |
| 754 | |
| 755 bool CertVerifyProcNSS::SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() const { | |
| 756 // This requires APIs introduced in 3.14.2. | |
| 757 return NSS_VersionCheck("3.14.2"); | |
| 758 } | |
| 759 | |
| 760 int CertVerifyProcNSS::VerifyInternal( | |
| 761 X509Certificate* cert, | |
| 762 const std::string& hostname, | |
| 763 int flags, | |
| 764 CRLSet* crl_set, | |
| 765 const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors, | |
| 766 CertVerifyResult* verify_result) { | |
| 767 #if defined(OS_IOS) | |
| 768 // For iOS, the entire chain must be loaded into NSS's in-memory certificate | |
| 769 // store. | |
| 770 x509_util_ios::NSSCertChain scoped_chain(cert); | |
| 771 CERTCertificate* cert_handle = scoped_chain.cert_handle(); | |
| 772 #else | |
| 773 CERTCertificate* cert_handle = cert->os_cert_handle(); | |
| 774 #endif // defined(OS_IOS) | |
| 775 | |
| 776 // Make sure that the hostname matches with the common name of the cert. | |
| 777 SECStatus status = CERT_VerifyCertName(cert_handle, hostname.c_str()); | |
| 778 if (status != SECSuccess) | |
| 779 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID; | |
| 780 | |
| 781 // Make sure that the cert is valid now. | |
| 782 SECCertTimeValidity validity = CERT_CheckCertValidTimes( | |
| 783 cert_handle, PR_Now(), PR_TRUE); | |
| 784 if (validity != secCertTimeValid) | |
| 785 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID; | |
| 786 | |
| 787 CERTValOutParam cvout[3]; | |
| 788 int cvout_index = 0; | |
| 789 cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_certList; | |
| 790 cvout[cvout_index].value.pointer.chain = NULL; | |
| 791 int cvout_cert_list_index = cvout_index; | |
| 792 cvout_index++; | |
| 793 cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_trustAnchor; | |
| 794 cvout[cvout_index].value.pointer.cert = NULL; | |
| 795 int cvout_trust_anchor_index = cvout_index; | |
| 796 cvout_index++; | |
| 797 cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_end; | |
| 798 ScopedCERTValOutParam scoped_cvout(cvout); | |
| 799 | |
| 800 EVRootCAMetadata* metadata = EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(); | |
| 801 SECOidTag ev_policy_oid = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; | |
| 802 bool is_ev_candidate = | |
| 803 (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT) && | |
| 804 IsEVCandidate(metadata, cert_handle, &ev_policy_oid); | |
| 805 bool cert_io_enabled = flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_CERT_IO_ENABLED; | |
| 806 bool check_revocation = | |
| 807 cert_io_enabled && | |
| 808 ((flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED) || | |
| 809 ((flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY) && | |
| 810 is_ev_candidate)); | |
| 811 if (check_revocation) | |
| 812 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED; | |
| 813 | |
| 814 ScopedCERTCertList trust_anchors; | |
| 815 if (SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() && !additional_trust_anchors.empty()) { | |
| 816 trust_anchors.reset( | |
| 817 CertificateListToCERTCertList(additional_trust_anchors)); | |
| 818 } | |
| 819 | |
| 820 status = PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, check_revocation, cert_io_enabled, | |
| 821 NULL, 0, trust_anchors.get(), cvout); | |
| 822 | |
| 823 if (status == SECSuccess) { | |
| 824 AppendPublicKeyHashes(cvout[cvout_cert_list_index].value.pointer.chain, | |
| 825 cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert, | |
| 826 &verify_result->public_key_hashes); | |
| 827 | |
| 828 verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root = | |
| 829 IsKnownRoot(cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert); | |
| 830 verify_result->is_issued_by_additional_trust_anchor = | |
| 831 IsAdditionalTrustAnchor( | |
| 832 trust_anchors.get(), | |
| 833 cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert); | |
| 834 | |
| 835 GetCertChainInfo(cvout[cvout_cert_list_index].value.pointer.chain, | |
| 836 cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert, | |
| 837 verify_result); | |
| 838 } | |
| 839 | |
| 840 if (crl_set) { | |
| 841 CRLSetResult crl_set_result = CheckRevocationWithCRLSet( | |
| 842 cvout[cvout_cert_list_index].value.pointer.chain, | |
| 843 cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert, | |
| 844 crl_set); | |
| 845 if (crl_set_result == kCRLSetRevoked) { | |
| 846 PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE); | |
| 847 status = SECFailure; | |
| 848 } | |
| 849 } | |
| 850 | |
| 851 if (status != SECSuccess) { | |
| 852 int err = PORT_GetError(); | |
| 853 LOG(ERROR) << "CERT_PKIXVerifyCert for " << hostname | |
| 854 << " failed err=" << err; | |
| 855 // CERT_PKIXVerifyCert rerports the wrong error code for | |
| 856 // expired certificates (NSS bug 491174) | |
| 857 if (err == SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID && | |
| 858 (verify_result->cert_status & CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID)) | |
| 859 err = SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE; | |
| 860 CertStatus cert_status = MapCertErrorToCertStatus(err); | |
| 861 if (cert_status) { | |
| 862 verify_result->cert_status |= cert_status; | |
| 863 return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); | |
| 864 } | |
| 865 // |err| is not a certificate error. | |
| 866 return MapSecurityError(err); | |
| 867 } | |
| 868 | |
| 869 if (IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status)) | |
| 870 return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); | |
| 871 | |
| 872 if ((flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT) && is_ev_candidate && | |
| 873 VerifyEV(cert_handle, flags, crl_set, metadata, ev_policy_oid, | |
| 874 trust_anchors.get())) { | |
| 875 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_IS_EV; | |
| 876 } | |
| 877 | |
| 878 return OK; | |
| 879 } | |
| 880 | |
| 881 } // namespace net | |
| OLD | NEW |
|---|
Chromium Code Reviews
Issue 13006020:
net: extract net/cert out of net/base (Closed)
Base URL: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src