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| 1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. | |
| 2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be | |
| 3 // found in the LICENSE file. | |
| 4 | |
| 5 #include "net/base/cert_verify_proc_mac.h" | |
| 6 | |
| 7 #include <CommonCrypto/CommonDigest.h> | |
| 8 #include <CoreServices/CoreServices.h> | |
| 9 #include <Security/Security.h> | |
| 10 | |
| 11 #include <string> | |
| 12 #include <vector> | |
| 13 | |
| 14 #include "base/logging.h" | |
| 15 #include "base/mac/mac_logging.h" | |
| 16 #include "base/mac/scoped_cftyperef.h" | |
| 17 #include "base/sha1.h" | |
| 18 #include "base/string_piece.h" | |
| 19 #include "base/synchronization/lock.h" | |
| 20 #include "crypto/mac_security_services_lock.h" | |
| 21 #include "crypto/nss_util.h" | |
| 22 #include "crypto/sha2.h" | |
| 23 #include "net/base/asn1_util.h" | |
| 24 #include "net/base/cert_status_flags.h" | |
| 25 #include "net/base/cert_verifier.h" | |
| 26 #include "net/base/cert_verify_result.h" | |
| 27 #include "net/base/crl_set.h" | |
| 28 #include "net/base/net_errors.h" | |
| 29 #include "net/base/test_root_certs.h" | |
| 30 #include "net/base/x509_certificate.h" | |
| 31 #include "net/base/x509_certificate_known_roots_mac.h" | |
| 32 #include "net/base/x509_util_mac.h" | |
| 33 | |
| 34 // From 10.7.2 libsecurity_keychain-55035/lib/SecTrustPriv.h, for use with | |
| 35 // SecTrustCopyExtendedResult. | |
| 36 #ifndef kSecEVOrganizationName | |
| 37 #define kSecEVOrganizationName CFSTR("Organization") | |
| 38 #endif | |
| 39 | |
| 40 using base::mac::ScopedCFTypeRef; | |
| 41 | |
| 42 namespace net { | |
| 43 | |
| 44 namespace { | |
| 45 | |
| 46 typedef OSStatus (*SecTrustCopyExtendedResultFuncPtr)(SecTrustRef, | |
| 47 CFDictionaryRef*); | |
| 48 | |
| 49 int NetErrorFromOSStatus(OSStatus status) { | |
| 50 switch (status) { | |
| 51 case noErr: | |
| 52 return OK; | |
| 53 case errSecNotAvailable: | |
| 54 case errSecNoCertificateModule: | |
| 55 case errSecNoPolicyModule: | |
| 56 return ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; | |
| 57 case errSecAuthFailed: | |
| 58 return ERR_ACCESS_DENIED; | |
| 59 default: { | |
| 60 OSSTATUS_LOG(ERROR, status) << "Unknown error mapped to ERR_FAILED"; | |
| 61 return ERR_FAILED; | |
| 62 } | |
| 63 } | |
| 64 } | |
| 65 | |
| 66 CertStatus CertStatusFromOSStatus(OSStatus status) { | |
| 67 switch (status) { | |
| 68 case noErr: | |
| 69 return 0; | |
| 70 | |
| 71 case CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_ANCHOR_CERT: | |
| 72 case CSSMERR_TP_NOT_TRUSTED: | |
| 73 case CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_CERT_AUTHORITY: | |
| 74 return CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID; | |
| 75 | |
| 76 case CSSMERR_TP_CERT_EXPIRED: | |
| 77 case CSSMERR_TP_CERT_NOT_VALID_YET: | |
| 78 // "Expired" and "not yet valid" collapse into a single status. | |
| 79 return CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID; | |
| 80 | |
| 81 case CSSMERR_TP_CERT_REVOKED: | |
| 82 case CSSMERR_TP_CERT_SUSPENDED: | |
| 83 return CERT_STATUS_REVOKED; | |
| 84 | |
| 85 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: | |
| 86 return CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID; | |
| 87 | |
| 88 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_NOT_FOUND: | |
| 89 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_UNAVAILABLE: | |
| 90 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_INCOMPLETE_REVOCATION_CHECK: | |
| 91 return CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM; | |
| 92 | |
| 93 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_EXPIRED: | |
| 94 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_NOT_VALID_YET: | |
| 95 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_SERVER_DOWN: | |
| 96 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_NOT_TRUSTED: | |
| 97 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_INVALID_ANCHOR_CERT: | |
| 98 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_POLICY_FAIL: | |
| 99 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_BAD_RESPONSE: | |
| 100 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_BAD_REQUEST: | |
| 101 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_STATUS_UNRECOGNIZED: | |
| 102 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_NETWORK_FAILURE: | |
| 103 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_NOT_TRUSTED: | |
| 104 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_INVALID_ANCHOR_CERT: | |
| 105 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_SIG_ERROR: | |
| 106 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_NO_SIGNER: | |
| 107 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_RESP_MALFORMED_REQ: | |
| 108 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_RESP_INTERNAL_ERR: | |
| 109 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_RESP_TRY_LATER: | |
| 110 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_RESP_SIG_REQUIRED: | |
| 111 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_RESP_UNAUTHORIZED: | |
| 112 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_OCSP_NONCE_MISMATCH: | |
| 113 // We asked for a revocation check, but didn't get it. | |
| 114 return CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION; | |
| 115 | |
| 116 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_CRL_BAD_URI: | |
| 117 case CSSMERR_APPLETP_IDP_FAIL: | |
| 118 return CERT_STATUS_INVALID; | |
| 119 | |
| 120 case CSSMERR_CSP_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE: | |
| 121 // Mapping UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE to CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY is not strictly | |
| 122 // accurate, as the error may have been returned due to a key size | |
| 123 // that exceeded the maximum supported. However, within | |
| 124 // CertVerifyProcMac::VerifyInternal(), this code should only be | |
| 125 // encountered as a certificate status code, and only when the key size | |
| 126 // is smaller than the minimum required (1024 bits). | |
| 127 return CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY; | |
| 128 | |
| 129 default: { | |
| 130 // Failure was due to something Chromium doesn't define a | |
| 131 // specific status for (such as basic constraints violation, or | |
| 132 // unknown critical extension) | |
| 133 OSSTATUS_LOG(WARNING, status) | |
| 134 << "Unknown error mapped to CERT_STATUS_INVALID"; | |
| 135 return CERT_STATUS_INVALID; | |
| 136 } | |
| 137 } | |
| 138 } | |
| 139 | |
| 140 // Creates a series of SecPolicyRefs to be added to a SecTrustRef used to | |
| 141 // validate a certificate for an SSL server. |hostname| contains the name of | |
| 142 // the SSL server that the certificate should be verified against. |flags| is | |
| 143 // a bitwise-OR of VerifyFlags that can further alter how trust is validated, | |
| 144 // such as how revocation is checked. If successful, returns noErr, and | |
| 145 // stores the resultant array of SecPolicyRefs in |policies|. | |
| 146 OSStatus CreateTrustPolicies(const std::string& hostname, | |
| 147 int flags, | |
| 148 ScopedCFTypeRef<CFArrayRef>* policies) { | |
| 149 ScopedCFTypeRef<CFMutableArrayRef> local_policies( | |
| 150 CFArrayCreateMutable(kCFAllocatorDefault, 0, &kCFTypeArrayCallBacks)); | |
| 151 if (!local_policies) | |
| 152 return memFullErr; | |
| 153 | |
| 154 SecPolicyRef ssl_policy; | |
| 155 OSStatus status = x509_util::CreateSSLServerPolicy(hostname, &ssl_policy); | |
| 156 if (status) | |
| 157 return status; | |
| 158 CFArrayAppendValue(local_policies, ssl_policy); | |
| 159 CFRelease(ssl_policy); | |
| 160 | |
| 161 // Explicitly add revocation policies, in order to override system | |
| 162 // revocation checking policies and instead respect the application-level | |
| 163 // revocation preference. | |
| 164 status = x509_util::CreateRevocationPolicies( | |
| 165 (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED), | |
| 166 (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY), | |
| 167 local_policies); | |
| 168 if (status) | |
| 169 return status; | |
| 170 | |
| 171 policies->reset(local_policies.release()); | |
| 172 return noErr; | |
| 173 } | |
| 174 | |
| 175 // Saves some information about the certificate chain |cert_chain| in | |
| 176 // |*verify_result|. The caller MUST initialize |*verify_result| before | |
| 177 // calling this function. | |
| 178 void GetCertChainInfo(CFArrayRef cert_chain, | |
| 179 CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_INFO* chain_info, | |
| 180 CertVerifyResult* verify_result) { | |
| 181 SecCertificateRef verified_cert = NULL; | |
| 182 std::vector<SecCertificateRef> verified_chain; | |
| 183 for (CFIndex i = 0, count = CFArrayGetCount(cert_chain); i < count; ++i) { | |
| 184 SecCertificateRef chain_cert = reinterpret_cast<SecCertificateRef>( | |
| 185 const_cast<void*>(CFArrayGetValueAtIndex(cert_chain, i))); | |
| 186 if (i == 0) { | |
| 187 verified_cert = chain_cert; | |
| 188 } else { | |
| 189 verified_chain.push_back(chain_cert); | |
| 190 } | |
| 191 | |
| 192 if ((chain_info[i].StatusBits & CSSM_CERT_STATUS_IS_IN_ANCHORS) || | |
| 193 (chain_info[i].StatusBits & CSSM_CERT_STATUS_IS_ROOT)) { | |
| 194 // The current certificate is either in the user's trusted store or is | |
| 195 // a root (self-signed) certificate. Ignore the signature algorithm for | |
| 196 // these certificates, as it is meaningless for security. We allow | |
| 197 // self-signed certificates (i == 0 & IS_ROOT), since we accept that | |
| 198 // any security assertions by such a cert are inherently meaningless. | |
| 199 continue; | |
| 200 } | |
| 201 | |
| 202 x509_util::CSSMCachedCertificate cached_cert; | |
| 203 OSStatus status = cached_cert.Init(chain_cert); | |
| 204 if (status) | |
| 205 continue; | |
| 206 x509_util::CSSMFieldValue signature_field; | |
| 207 status = cached_cert.GetField(&CSSMOID_X509V1SignatureAlgorithm, | |
| 208 &signature_field); | |
| 209 if (status || !signature_field.field()) | |
| 210 continue; | |
| 211 // Match the behaviour of OS X system tools and defensively check that | |
| 212 // sizes are appropriate. This would indicate a critical failure of the | |
| 213 // OS X certificate library, but based on history, it is best to play it | |
| 214 // safe. | |
| 215 const CSSM_X509_ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER* sig_algorithm = | |
| 216 signature_field.GetAs<CSSM_X509_ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER>(); | |
| 217 if (!sig_algorithm) | |
| 218 continue; | |
| 219 | |
| 220 const CSSM_OID* alg_oid = &sig_algorithm->algorithm; | |
| 221 if (CSSMOIDEqual(alg_oid, &CSSMOID_MD2WithRSA)) { | |
| 222 verify_result->has_md2 = true; | |
| 223 if (i != 0) | |
| 224 verify_result->has_md2_ca = true; | |
| 225 } else if (CSSMOIDEqual(alg_oid, &CSSMOID_MD4WithRSA)) { | |
| 226 verify_result->has_md4 = true; | |
| 227 } else if (CSSMOIDEqual(alg_oid, &CSSMOID_MD5WithRSA)) { | |
| 228 verify_result->has_md5 = true; | |
| 229 if (i != 0) | |
| 230 verify_result->has_md5_ca = true; | |
| 231 } | |
| 232 } | |
| 233 if (!verified_cert) | |
| 234 return; | |
| 235 | |
| 236 verify_result->verified_cert = | |
| 237 X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(verified_cert, verified_chain); | |
| 238 } | |
| 239 | |
| 240 void AppendPublicKeyHashes(CFArrayRef chain, | |
| 241 HashValueVector* hashes) { | |
| 242 const CFIndex n = CFArrayGetCount(chain); | |
| 243 for (CFIndex i = 0; i < n; i++) { | |
| 244 SecCertificateRef cert = reinterpret_cast<SecCertificateRef>( | |
| 245 const_cast<void*>(CFArrayGetValueAtIndex(chain, i))); | |
| 246 | |
| 247 CSSM_DATA cert_data; | |
| 248 OSStatus err = SecCertificateGetData(cert, &cert_data); | |
| 249 DCHECK_EQ(err, noErr); | |
| 250 base::StringPiece der_bytes(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(cert_data.Data), | |
| 251 cert_data.Length); | |
| 252 base::StringPiece spki_bytes; | |
| 253 if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der_bytes, &spki_bytes)) | |
| 254 continue; | |
| 255 | |
| 256 HashValue sha1(HASH_VALUE_SHA1); | |
| 257 CC_SHA1(spki_bytes.data(), spki_bytes.size(), sha1.data()); | |
| 258 hashes->push_back(sha1); | |
| 259 | |
| 260 HashValue sha256(HASH_VALUE_SHA256); | |
| 261 CC_SHA256(spki_bytes.data(), spki_bytes.size(), sha256.data()); | |
| 262 hashes->push_back(sha256); | |
| 263 } | |
| 264 } | |
| 265 | |
| 266 bool CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(CFArrayRef chain, CRLSet* crl_set) { | |
| 267 if (CFArrayGetCount(chain) == 0) | |
| 268 return true; | |
| 269 | |
| 270 // We iterate from the root certificate down to the leaf, keeping track of | |
| 271 // the issuer's SPKI at each step. | |
| 272 std::string issuer_spki_hash; | |
| 273 for (CFIndex i = CFArrayGetCount(chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { | |
| 274 SecCertificateRef cert = reinterpret_cast<SecCertificateRef>( | |
| 275 const_cast<void*>(CFArrayGetValueAtIndex(chain, i))); | |
| 276 | |
| 277 CSSM_DATA cert_data; | |
| 278 OSStatus err = SecCertificateGetData(cert, &cert_data); | |
| 279 if (err != noErr) { | |
| 280 NOTREACHED(); | |
| 281 continue; | |
| 282 } | |
| 283 base::StringPiece der_bytes(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(cert_data.Data), | |
| 284 cert_data.Length); | |
| 285 base::StringPiece spki; | |
| 286 if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der_bytes, &spki)) { | |
| 287 NOTREACHED(); | |
| 288 continue; | |
| 289 } | |
| 290 | |
| 291 const std::string spki_hash = crypto::SHA256HashString(spki); | |
| 292 x509_util::CSSMCachedCertificate cached_cert; | |
| 293 if (cached_cert.Init(cert) != CSSM_OK) { | |
| 294 NOTREACHED(); | |
| 295 continue; | |
| 296 } | |
| 297 x509_util::CSSMFieldValue serial_number; | |
| 298 err = cached_cert.GetField(&CSSMOID_X509V1SerialNumber, &serial_number); | |
| 299 if (err || !serial_number.field()) { | |
| 300 NOTREACHED(); | |
| 301 continue; | |
| 302 } | |
| 303 | |
| 304 base::StringPiece serial( | |
| 305 reinterpret_cast<const char*>(serial_number.field()->Data), | |
| 306 serial_number.field()->Length); | |
| 307 | |
| 308 CRLSet::Result result = crl_set->CheckSPKI(spki_hash); | |
| 309 | |
| 310 if (result != CRLSet::REVOKED && !issuer_spki_hash.empty()) | |
| 311 result = crl_set->CheckSerial(serial, issuer_spki_hash); | |
| 312 | |
| 313 issuer_spki_hash = spki_hash; | |
| 314 | |
| 315 switch (result) { | |
| 316 case CRLSet::REVOKED: | |
| 317 return false; | |
| 318 case CRLSet::UNKNOWN: | |
| 319 case CRLSet::GOOD: | |
| 320 continue; | |
| 321 default: | |
| 322 NOTREACHED(); | |
| 323 return false; | |
| 324 } | |
| 325 } | |
| 326 | |
| 327 return true; | |
| 328 } | |
| 329 | |
| 330 // IsIssuedByKnownRoot returns true if the given chain is rooted at a root CA | |
| 331 // that we recognise as a standard root. | |
| 332 // static | |
| 333 bool IsIssuedByKnownRoot(CFArrayRef chain) { | |
| 334 int n = CFArrayGetCount(chain); | |
| 335 if (n < 1) | |
| 336 return false; | |
| 337 SecCertificateRef root_ref = reinterpret_cast<SecCertificateRef>( | |
| 338 const_cast<void*>(CFArrayGetValueAtIndex(chain, n - 1))); | |
| 339 SHA1HashValue hash = X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint(root_ref); | |
| 340 return IsSHA1HashInSortedArray( | |
| 341 hash, &kKnownRootCertSHA1Hashes[0][0], sizeof(kKnownRootCertSHA1Hashes)); | |
| 342 } | |
| 343 | |
| 344 } // namespace | |
| 345 | |
| 346 CertVerifyProcMac::CertVerifyProcMac() {} | |
| 347 | |
| 348 CertVerifyProcMac::~CertVerifyProcMac() {} | |
| 349 | |
| 350 bool CertVerifyProcMac::SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() const { | |
| 351 return false; | |
| 352 } | |
| 353 | |
| 354 int CertVerifyProcMac::VerifyInternal( | |
| 355 X509Certificate* cert, | |
| 356 const std::string& hostname, | |
| 357 int flags, | |
| 358 CRLSet* crl_set, | |
| 359 const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors, | |
| 360 CertVerifyResult* verify_result) { | |
| 361 ScopedCFTypeRef<CFArrayRef> trust_policies; | |
| 362 OSStatus status = CreateTrustPolicies(hostname, flags, &trust_policies); | |
| 363 if (status) | |
| 364 return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status); | |
| 365 | |
| 366 // Create and configure a SecTrustRef, which takes our certificate(s) | |
| 367 // and our SSL SecPolicyRef. SecTrustCreateWithCertificates() takes an | |
| 368 // array of certificates, the first of which is the certificate we're | |
| 369 // verifying, and the subsequent (optional) certificates are used for | |
| 370 // chain building. | |
| 371 ScopedCFTypeRef<CFArrayRef> cert_array(cert->CreateOSCertChainForCert()); | |
| 372 | |
| 373 // Serialize all calls that may use the Keychain, to work around various | |
| 374 // issues in OS X 10.6+ with multi-threaded access to Security.framework. | |
| 375 base::AutoLock lock(crypto::GetMacSecurityServicesLock()); | |
| 376 | |
| 377 SecTrustRef trust_ref = NULL; | |
| 378 status = SecTrustCreateWithCertificates(cert_array, trust_policies, | |
| 379 &trust_ref); | |
| 380 if (status) | |
| 381 return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status); | |
| 382 ScopedCFTypeRef<SecTrustRef> scoped_trust_ref(trust_ref); | |
| 383 | |
| 384 if (TestRootCerts::HasInstance()) { | |
| 385 status = TestRootCerts::GetInstance()->FixupSecTrustRef(trust_ref); | |
| 386 if (status) | |
| 387 return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status); | |
| 388 } | |
| 389 | |
| 390 CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_DATA tp_action_data; | |
| 391 memset(&tp_action_data, 0, sizeof(tp_action_data)); | |
| 392 tp_action_data.Version = CSSM_APPLE_TP_ACTION_VERSION; | |
| 393 // Allow CSSM to download any missing intermediate certificates if an | |
| 394 // authorityInfoAccess extension or issuerAltName extension is present. | |
| 395 tp_action_data.ActionFlags = CSSM_TP_ACTION_FETCH_CERT_FROM_NET | | |
| 396 CSSM_TP_ACTION_TRUST_SETTINGS; | |
| 397 | |
| 398 // Note: For EV certificates, the Apple TP will handle setting these flags | |
| 399 // as part of EV evaluation. | |
| 400 if (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED) { | |
| 401 // Require a positive result from an OCSP responder or a CRL (or both) | |
| 402 // for every certificate in the chain. The Apple TP automatically | |
| 403 // excludes the self-signed root from this requirement. If a certificate | |
| 404 // is missing both a crlDistributionPoints extension and an | |
| 405 // authorityInfoAccess extension with an OCSP responder URL, then we | |
| 406 // will get a kSecTrustResultRecoverableTrustFailure back from | |
| 407 // SecTrustEvaluate(), with a | |
| 408 // CSSMERR_APPLETP_INCOMPLETE_REVOCATION_CHECK error code. In that case, | |
| 409 // we'll set our own result to include | |
| 410 // CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM. If one or both extensions are | |
| 411 // present, and a check fails (server unavailable, OCSP retry later, | |
| 412 // signature mismatch), then we'll set our own result to include | |
| 413 // CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION. | |
| 414 tp_action_data.ActionFlags |= CSSM_TP_ACTION_REQUIRE_REV_PER_CERT; | |
| 415 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED; | |
| 416 | |
| 417 // Note, even if revocation checking is disabled, SecTrustEvaluate() will | |
| 418 // modify the OCSP options so as to attempt OCSP checking if it believes a | |
| 419 // certificate may chain to an EV root. However, because network fetches | |
| 420 // are disabled in CreateTrustPolicies() when revocation checking is | |
| 421 // disabled, these will only go against the local cache. | |
| 422 } | |
| 423 | |
| 424 CFDataRef action_data_ref = | |
| 425 CFDataCreateWithBytesNoCopy(kCFAllocatorDefault, | |
| 426 reinterpret_cast<UInt8*>(&tp_action_data), | |
| 427 sizeof(tp_action_data), kCFAllocatorNull); | |
| 428 if (!action_data_ref) | |
| 429 return ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; | |
| 430 ScopedCFTypeRef<CFDataRef> scoped_action_data_ref(action_data_ref); | |
| 431 status = SecTrustSetParameters(trust_ref, CSSM_TP_ACTION_DEFAULT, | |
| 432 action_data_ref); | |
| 433 if (status) | |
| 434 return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status); | |
| 435 | |
| 436 // Verify the certificate. A non-zero result from SecTrustGetResult() | |
| 437 // indicates that some fatal error occurred and the chain couldn't be | |
| 438 // processed, not that the chain contains no errors. We need to examine the | |
| 439 // output of SecTrustGetResult() to determine that. | |
| 440 SecTrustResultType trust_result; | |
| 441 status = SecTrustEvaluate(trust_ref, &trust_result); | |
| 442 if (status) | |
| 443 return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status); | |
| 444 CFArrayRef completed_chain = NULL; | |
| 445 CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_INFO* chain_info; | |
| 446 status = SecTrustGetResult(trust_ref, &trust_result, &completed_chain, | |
| 447 &chain_info); | |
| 448 if (status) | |
| 449 return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status); | |
| 450 ScopedCFTypeRef<CFArrayRef> scoped_completed_chain(completed_chain); | |
| 451 | |
| 452 if (crl_set && !CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(completed_chain, crl_set)) | |
| 453 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED; | |
| 454 | |
| 455 GetCertChainInfo(scoped_completed_chain.get(), chain_info, verify_result); | |
| 456 | |
| 457 // As of Security Update 2012-002/OS X 10.7.4, when an RSA key < 1024 bits | |
| 458 // is encountered, CSSM returns CSSMERR_TP_VERIFY_ACTION_FAILED and adds | |
| 459 // CSSMERR_CSP_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE as a certificate status. Avoid mapping | |
| 460 // the CSSMERR_TP_VERIFY_ACTION_FAILED to CERT_STATUS_INVALID if the only | |
| 461 // error was due to an unsupported key size. | |
| 462 bool policy_failed = false; | |
| 463 bool weak_key = false; | |
| 464 | |
| 465 // Evaluate the results | |
| 466 OSStatus cssm_result; | |
| 467 switch (trust_result) { | |
| 468 case kSecTrustResultUnspecified: | |
| 469 case kSecTrustResultProceed: | |
| 470 // Certificate chain is valid and trusted ("unspecified" indicates that | |
| 471 // the user has not explicitly set a trust setting) | |
| 472 break; | |
| 473 | |
| 474 case kSecTrustResultDeny: | |
| 475 case kSecTrustResultConfirm: | |
| 476 // Certificate chain is explicitly untrusted. For kSecTrustResultConfirm, | |
| 477 // we're following what Secure Transport does and treating it as | |
| 478 // "deny". | |
| 479 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID; | |
| 480 break; | |
| 481 | |
| 482 case kSecTrustResultRecoverableTrustFailure: | |
| 483 // Certificate chain has a failure that can be overridden by the user. | |
| 484 status = SecTrustGetCssmResultCode(trust_ref, &cssm_result); | |
| 485 if (status) | |
| 486 return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status); | |
| 487 if (cssm_result == CSSMERR_TP_VERIFY_ACTION_FAILED) { | |
| 488 policy_failed = true; | |
| 489 } else { | |
| 490 verify_result->cert_status |= CertStatusFromOSStatus(cssm_result); | |
| 491 } | |
| 492 // Walk the chain of error codes in the CSSM_TP_APPLE_EVIDENCE_INFO | |
| 493 // structure which can catch multiple errors from each certificate. | |
| 494 for (CFIndex index = 0, chain_count = CFArrayGetCount(completed_chain); | |
| 495 index < chain_count; ++index) { | |
| 496 if (chain_info[index].StatusBits & CSSM_CERT_STATUS_EXPIRED || | |
| 497 chain_info[index].StatusBits & CSSM_CERT_STATUS_NOT_VALID_YET) | |
| 498 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID; | |
| 499 if (!IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status) && | |
| 500 chain_info[index].NumStatusCodes == 0) { | |
| 501 LOG(WARNING) << "chain_info[" << index << "].NumStatusCodes is 0" | |
| 502 ", chain_info[" << index << "].StatusBits is " | |
| 503 << chain_info[index].StatusBits; | |
| 504 } | |
| 505 for (uint32 status_code_index = 0; | |
| 506 status_code_index < chain_info[index].NumStatusCodes; | |
| 507 ++status_code_index) { | |
| 508 CertStatus mapped_status = CertStatusFromOSStatus( | |
| 509 chain_info[index].StatusCodes[status_code_index]); | |
| 510 if (mapped_status == CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY) | |
| 511 weak_key = true; | |
| 512 verify_result->cert_status |= mapped_status; | |
| 513 } | |
| 514 } | |
| 515 if (policy_failed && !weak_key) { | |
| 516 // If CSSMERR_TP_VERIFY_ACTION_FAILED wasn't returned due to a weak | |
| 517 // key, map it back to an appropriate error code. | |
| 518 verify_result->cert_status |= CertStatusFromOSStatus(cssm_result); | |
| 519 } | |
| 520 if (!IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status)) { | |
| 521 LOG(ERROR) << "cssm_result=" << cssm_result; | |
| 522 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; | |
| 523 NOTREACHED(); | |
| 524 } | |
| 525 break; | |
| 526 | |
| 527 default: | |
| 528 status = SecTrustGetCssmResultCode(trust_ref, &cssm_result); | |
| 529 if (status) | |
| 530 return NetErrorFromOSStatus(status); | |
| 531 verify_result->cert_status |= CertStatusFromOSStatus(cssm_result); | |
| 532 if (!IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status)) { | |
| 533 LOG(WARNING) << "trust_result=" << trust_result; | |
| 534 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; | |
| 535 } | |
| 536 break; | |
| 537 } | |
| 538 | |
| 539 // Perform hostname verification independent of SecTrustEvaluate. In order to | |
| 540 // do so, mask off any reported name errors first. | |
| 541 verify_result->cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID; | |
| 542 if (!cert->VerifyNameMatch(hostname)) | |
| 543 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID; | |
| 544 | |
| 545 // TODO(wtc): Suppress CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM for now to be | |
| 546 // compatible with Windows, which in turn implements this behavior to be | |
| 547 // compatible with WinHTTP, which doesn't report this error (bug 3004). | |
| 548 verify_result->cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM; | |
| 549 | |
| 550 AppendPublicKeyHashes(completed_chain, &verify_result->public_key_hashes); | |
| 551 verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root = IsIssuedByKnownRoot(completed_chain); | |
| 552 | |
| 553 if (IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status)) | |
| 554 return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); | |
| 555 | |
| 556 if (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT) { | |
| 557 // Determine the certificate's EV status using SecTrustCopyExtendedResult(), | |
| 558 // which we need to look up because the function wasn't added until | |
| 559 // Mac OS X 10.5.7. | |
| 560 // Note: "ExtendedResult" means extended validation results. | |
| 561 CFBundleRef bundle = | |
| 562 CFBundleGetBundleWithIdentifier(CFSTR("com.apple.security")); | |
| 563 if (bundle) { | |
| 564 SecTrustCopyExtendedResultFuncPtr copy_extended_result = | |
| 565 reinterpret_cast<SecTrustCopyExtendedResultFuncPtr>( | |
| 566 CFBundleGetFunctionPointerForName(bundle, | |
| 567 CFSTR("SecTrustCopyExtendedResult"))); | |
| 568 if (copy_extended_result) { | |
| 569 CFDictionaryRef ev_dict_temp = NULL; | |
| 570 status = copy_extended_result(trust_ref, &ev_dict_temp); | |
| 571 ScopedCFTypeRef<CFDictionaryRef> ev_dict(ev_dict_temp); | |
| 572 ev_dict_temp = NULL; | |
| 573 if (status == noErr && ev_dict) { | |
| 574 // In 10.7.3, SecTrustCopyExtendedResult returns noErr and populates | |
| 575 // ev_dict even for non-EV certificates, but only EV certificates | |
| 576 // will cause ev_dict to contain kSecEVOrganizationName. In previous | |
| 577 // releases, SecTrustCopyExtendedResult would only return noErr and | |
| 578 // populate ev_dict for EV certificates, but would always include | |
| 579 // kSecEVOrganizationName in that case, so checking for this key is | |
| 580 // appropriate for all known versions of SecTrustCopyExtendedResult. | |
| 581 // The actual organization name is unneeded here and can be accessed | |
| 582 // through other means. All that matters here is the OS' conception | |
| 583 // of whether or not the certificate is EV. | |
| 584 if (CFDictionaryContainsKey(ev_dict, | |
| 585 kSecEVOrganizationName)) { | |
| 586 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_IS_EV; | |
| 587 if (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY) | |
| 588 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED; | |
| 589 } | |
| 590 } | |
| 591 } | |
| 592 } | |
| 593 } | |
| 594 | |
| 595 return OK; | |
| 596 } | |
| 597 | |
| 598 } // namespace net | |
| OLD | NEW |
|---|
Chromium Code Reviews
Issue 13006020:
net: extract net/cert out of net/base (Closed)
Base URL: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src