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Unified Diff: content/common/sandbox_policy.cc

Issue 12805004: Remove mention of the nacl process in content. (Closed) Base URL: svn://chrome-svn/chrome/trunk/src/
Patch Set: Created 7 years, 9 months ago
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Index: content/common/sandbox_policy.cc
===================================================================
--- content/common/sandbox_policy.cc (revision 189099)
+++ content/common/sandbox_policy.cc (working copy)
@@ -1,913 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
-// found in the LICENSE file.
-
-#include "content/common/sandbox_policy.h"
-
-#include <string>
-
-#include "base/command_line.h"
-#include "base/debug/debugger.h"
-#include "base/debug/trace_event.h"
-#include "base/file_util.h"
-#include "base/lazy_instance.h"
-#include "base/logging.h"
-#include "base/path_service.h"
-#include "base/process_util.h"
-#include "base/string_util.h"
-#include "base/stringprintf.h"
-#include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h"
-#include "base/win/scoped_handle.h"
-#include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h"
-#include "base/win/windows_version.h"
-#include "content/common/debug_flags.h"
-#include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
-#include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
-#include "content/public/common/process_type.h"
-#include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
-#include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h"
-#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
-#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h"
-#include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h"
-#include "ui/gl/gl_switches.h"
-
-static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL;
-static sandbox::TargetServices* g_target_services = NULL;
-
-namespace {
-
-// The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes
-// when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short
-// versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension.
-const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = {
- L"adialhk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security.
- L"acpiz.dll", // Unknown.
- L"avgrsstx.dll", // AVG 8.
- L"babylonchromepi.dll", // Babylon translator.
- L"btkeyind.dll", // Widcomm Bluetooth.
- L"cmcsyshk.dll", // CMC Internet Security.
- L"cmsetac.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware).
- L"cooliris.dll", // CoolIris.
- L"dockshellhook.dll", // Stardock Objectdock.
- L"easyhook32.dll", // GDIPP and others.
- L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll", // Google Desktop Search v5.
- L"fwhook.dll", // PC Tools Firewall Plus.
- L"hookprocesscreation.dll", // Blumentals Program protector.
- L"hookterminateapis.dll", // Blumentals and Cyberprinter.
- L"hookprintapis.dll", // Cyberprinter.
- L"imon.dll", // NOD32 Antivirus.
- L"ioloHL.dll", // Iolo (System Mechanic).
- L"kloehk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security.
- L"lawenforcer.dll", // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro).
- L"libdivx.dll", // DivX.
- L"lvprcinj01.dll", // Logitech QuickCam.
- L"madchook.dll", // Madshi (generic hooking library).
- L"mdnsnsp.dll", // Bonjour.
- L"moonsysh.dll", // Moon Secure Antivirus.
- L"mpk.dll", // KGB Spy.
- L"npdivx32.dll", // DivX.
- L"npggNT.des", // GameGuard 2008.
- L"npggNT.dll", // GameGuard (older).
- L"oawatch.dll", // Online Armor.
- L"owexplorer-10513.dll", // Overwolf.
- L"owexplorer-10514.dll", // Overwolf.
- L"owexplorer-10515.dll", // Overwolf.
- L"owexplorer-10516.dll", // Overwolf.
- L"owexplorer-10517.dll", // Overwolf.
- L"owexplorer-10518.dll", // Overwolf.
- L"owexplorer-10519.dll", // Overwolf.
- L"owexplorer-10520.dll", // Overwolf.
- L"owexplorer-10521.dll", // Overwolf.
- L"owexplorer-10522.dll", // Overwolf.
- L"owexplorer-10523.dll", // Overwolf.
- L"pavhook.dll", // Panda Internet Security.
- L"pavlsphook.dll", // Panda Antivirus.
- L"pavshook.dll", // Panda Antivirus.
- L"pavshookwow.dll", // Panda Antivirus.
- L"pctavhook.dll", // PC Tools Antivirus.
- L"pctgmhk.dll", // PC Tools Spyware Doctor.
- L"prntrack.dll", // Pharos Systems.
- L"protector.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware).
- L"radhslib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
- L"radprlib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
- L"rapportnikko.dll", // Trustware Rapport.
- L"rlhook.dll", // Trustware Bufferzone.
- L"rooksdol.dll", // Trustware Rapport.
- L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
- L"r3hook.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security.
- L"sahook.dll", // McAfee Site Advisor.
- L"sbrige.dll", // Unknown.
- L"sc2hook.dll", // Supercopier 2.
- L"sdhook32.dll", // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection.
- L"sguard.dll", // Iolo (System Guard).
- L"smum32.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 6.
- L"smumhook.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 5.
- L"ssldivx.dll", // DivX.
- L"syncor11.dll", // SynthCore Midi interface.
- L"systools.dll", // Panda Antivirus.
- L"tfwah.dll", // Threatfire (PC tools).
- L"wblind.dll", // Stardock Object desktop.
- L"wbhelp.dll", // Stardock Object desktop.
- L"winstylerthemehelper.dll" // Tuneup utilities 2006.
-};
-
-// The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes
-// when they are loaded in the GPU process.
-const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeGpuDlls[] = {
- L"cmsetac.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware).
-};
-
-// Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|.
-// If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also
-// apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders.
-bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
- base::FilePath directory;
- if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory))
- return false;
-
- if (sub_dir) {
- directory = directory.Append(sub_dir);
- file_util::AbsolutePath(&directory);
- }
-
- sandbox::ResultCode result;
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
- directory.value().c_str());
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
- std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\";
- if (children)
- directory_str += L"*";
- // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator.
-
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
- directory_str.c_str());
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
- return true;
-}
-
-// Adds the policy rules for the path and path\* with the semantic |access|.
-// We need to add the wildcard rules to also apply the rule to the subkeys.
-bool AddKeyAndSubkeys(std::wstring key,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
- sandbox::ResultCode result;
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
- key.c_str());
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
- key += L"\\*";
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
- key.c_str());
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
- return true;
-}
-
-// Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|.
-bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) {
- wchar_t path[MAX_PATH];
- DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path));
- if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) {
- // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway.
- return false;
- }
- if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path)))
- return false;
- base::FilePath fname(path);
- return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name);
-}
-
-// Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist.
-// If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll
-// is also loaded in this process.
-void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name,
- bool check_in_browser,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
- HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL;
- if (!module) {
- // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check
- // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes
- // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'.
- std::wstring name(module_name);
- size_t period = name.rfind(L'.');
- DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period);
- DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period));
- if (period <= 8)
- return;
- for (int ix = 0; ix < 3; ++ix) {
- const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ('1' + ix), 0};
- std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix;
- alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size());
- if (check_in_browser) {
- module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str());
- if (!module)
- return;
- // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we
- // want to make sure it is the right one.
- if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name))
- return;
- }
- // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy.
- policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str());
- }
- }
- policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name);
- DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name;
- return;
-}
-
-// Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash.
-// Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module
-// does not get a chance to execute any code.
-void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
- for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix)
- BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy);
-}
-
-// Same as AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy but specifically for the GPU process.
-// In this we add the blacklisted dlls even if they are not loaded in this
-// process.
-void AddGpuDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
- for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeGpuDlls); ++ix)
- BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeGpuDlls[ix], false, policy);
-}
-
-// Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session.
-string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const char16* object) {
- // Cache this because it can't change after process creation.
- static uintptr_t s_session_id = 0;
- if (s_session_id == 0) {
- HANDLE token;
- DWORD session_id_length;
- DWORD session_id = 0;
-
- CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token));
- CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id,
- sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length));
- CloseHandle(token);
- if (session_id)
- s_session_id = session_id;
- }
-
- return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%d%ls", s_session_id, object);
-}
-
-// Checks if the sandbox should be let to run without a job object assigned.
-bool ShouldSetJobLevel(const CommandLine& cmd_line) {
- if (!cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob))
- return true;
-
- // Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other
- // job.
- if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
- return true;
-
- BOOL in_job = true;
- // Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job,
- if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job))
- NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError();
- if (!in_job)
- return true;
-
- // ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set.
- JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {0};
- if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL,
- JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &job_info,
- sizeof(job_info), NULL)) {
- NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError();
- return true;
- }
- if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK)
- return true;
-
- return false;
-}
-
-void SetJobLevel(const CommandLine& cmd_line,
- sandbox::JobLevel job_level,
- uint32 ui_exceptions,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
- if (ShouldSetJobLevel(cmd_line))
- policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions);
- else
- policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_NONE, 0);
-}
-
-// Closes handles that are opened at process creation and initialization.
-void AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
- // Being able to manipulate anything BaseNamedObjects is bad.
- string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath(L"\\BaseNamedObjects");
- policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Directory", object_path.data());
- object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath(
- L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters");
- policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data());
-}
-
-// Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy.
-bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
- sandbox::ResultCode result;
-
- // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
- // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
- // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
- L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
- // Allow the server side of a pipe restricted to the "chrome.nacl."
- // namespace so that it cannot impersonate other system or other chrome
- // service pipes.
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
- L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*");
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
- // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have
- // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix.
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
- L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*");
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
- // Add the policy for debug message only in debug
-#ifndef NDEBUG
- base::FilePath app_dir;
- if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir))
- return false;
-
- wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH];
- DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(),
- long_path_buf,
- MAX_PATH);
- if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH)
- return false;
-
- base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf);
- debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe");
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC,
- debug_message.value().c_str());
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-#endif // NDEBUG
- return true;
-}
-
-// For the GPU process we gotten as far as USER_LIMITED. The next level
-// which is USER_RESTRICTED breaks both the DirectX backend and the OpenGL
-// backend. Note that the GPU process is connected to the interactive
-// desktop.
-// TODO(cpu): Lock down the sandbox more if possible.
-bool AddPolicyForGPU(CommandLine* cmd_line, sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
-#if !defined(NACL_WIN64) // We don't need this code on win nacl64.
- if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
- if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) ==
- gfx::kGLImplementationDesktopName) {
- // Open GL path.
- policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
- sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
- SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0, policy);
- policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
- } else {
- if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) ==
- gfx::kGLImplementationSwiftShaderName ||
- cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kReduceGpuSandbox) ||
- cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableImageTransportSurface)) {
- // Swiftshader path.
- policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
- sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
- } else {
- // Angle + DirectX path.
- policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
- sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED);
- // This is a trick to keep the GPU out of low-integrity processes. It
- // starts at low-integrity for UIPI to work, then drops below
- // low-integrity after warm-up.
- policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
- }
-
- // UI restrictions break when we access Windows from outside our job.
- // However, we don't want a proxy window in this process because it can
- // introduce deadlocks where the renderer blocks on the gpu, which in
- // turn blocks on the browser UI thread. So, instead we forgo a window
- // message pump entirely and just add job restrictions to prevent child
- // processes.
- SetJobLevel(*cmd_line,
- sandbox::JOB_LIMITED_USER,
- JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_SYSTEMPARAMETERS |
- JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DESKTOP |
- JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_EXITWINDOWS |
- JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DISPLAYSETTINGS,
- policy);
-
- policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
- }
- } else {
- SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0, policy);
- policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED,
- sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
- }
-
- // Allow the server side of GPU sockets, which are pipes that have
- // the "chrome.gpu" namespace and an arbitrary suffix.
- sandbox::ResultCode result = policy->AddRule(
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
- L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.gpu.*");
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
- // GPU needs to copy sections to renderers.
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
- L"Section");
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
-#ifdef USE_AURA
- // GPU also needs to add sections to the browser for aura
- // TODO(jschuh): refactor the GPU channel to remove this. crbug.com/128786
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_BROKER,
- L"Section");
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-#endif
-
- AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
- AddGpuDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
-
- if (cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableLogging)) {
- string16 log_file_path = logging::GetLogFileFullPath();
- if (!log_file_path.empty()) {
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
- log_file_path.c_str());
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
- }
- }
-#endif
- return true;
-}
-
-bool AddPolicyForRenderer(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
- // Renderers need to copy sections for plugin DIBs and GPU.
- sandbox::ResultCode result;
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
- L"Section");
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
- // Renderers need to share events with plugins.
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
- L"Event");
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
- // Renderers need to send named pipe handles and shared memory
- // segment handles to NaCl loader processes.
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
- L"File");
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return false;
-
- sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
- if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
- // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main
- // token is restricted.
- initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
- }
-
- policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
- // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes.
- policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
-
- bool use_winsta = !CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
- switches::kDisableAltWinstation);
-
- if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != policy->SetAlternateDesktop(use_winsta)) {
- DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
- }
-
- AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
-
- return true;
-}
-
-// The Pepper process as locked-down as a renderer execpt that it can
-// create the server side of chrome pipes.
-bool AddPolicyForPepperPlugin(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
- sandbox::ResultCode result;
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
- L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.*");
- return result == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
-}
-
-// This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of
-// DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes.
-#ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
-base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle;
-
-BOOL (WINAPI *g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle)(HANDLE source_process_handle,
- HANDLE source_handle,
- HANDLE target_process_handle,
- LPHANDLE target_handle,
- DWORD desired_access,
- BOOL inherit_handle,
- DWORD options);
-
-NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL;
-
-static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning =
- "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed"
- " process.\n Please use the sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle API or"
- " contact security@chromium.org for assistance.";
-
-void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) {
- // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14).
- BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)];
- OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info =
- reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer);
- ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t);
- NTSTATUS error;
- error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size);
- CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
- type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0';
-
- // Get the object basic information.
- OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info;
- size = sizeof(basic_info);
- error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size,
- &size);
- CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
-
- if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) {
- const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask = ~(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION |
- SYNCHRONIZE);
- CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) <<
- kDuplicateHandleWarning;
- }
-}
-
-BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle,
- HANDLE source_handle,
- HANDLE target_process_handle,
- LPHANDLE target_handle,
- DWORD desired_access,
- BOOL inherit_handle,
- DWORD options) {
- // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask.
- if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle,
- target_process_handle, target_handle,
- desired_access, inherit_handle, options))
- return FALSE;
-
- // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries.
- if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle ||
- target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess())
- return TRUE;
-
- // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them.
- BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
- if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) {
- // We need a handle with permission to check the job object.
- if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
- base::win::ScopedHandle process;
- CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(),
- target_process_handle,
- ::GetCurrentProcess(),
- process.Receive(),
- PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
- FALSE, 0));
- CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process, NULL, &is_in_job));
- }
- }
-
- if (is_in_job) {
- // We never allow inheritable child handles.
- CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning;
-
- // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions.
- base::win::ScopedHandle handle;
- CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle,
- ::GetCurrentProcess(), handle.Receive(),
- 0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS));
-
- // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack.
- CheckDuplicateHandle(handle);
- }
-
- return TRUE;
-}
-#endif
-
-} // namespace
-
-namespace content {
-
-bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) {
- // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
- // See <http://b/1287166>.
- DCHECK(broker_services);
- DCHECK(!g_broker_services);
- sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init();
- g_broker_services = broker_services;
-
-// In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle.
- BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
-#ifdef NACL_WIN64
- CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job));
-#endif
-#ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
- if (!is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) {
- HMODULE module = NULL;
- wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH];
- CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS,
- reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices),
- &module));
- DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH);
- if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) {
- ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject);
- g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle = ::DuplicateHandle;
- g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch(
- module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle",
- DuplicateHandlePatch);
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
-}
-
-bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services) {
- DCHECK(target_services);
- DCHECK(!g_target_services);
- sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init();
- g_target_services = target_services;
- return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
-}
-
-base::ProcessHandle StartProcessWithAccess(CommandLine* cmd_line,
- const base::FilePath& exposed_dir) {
- const CommandLine& browser_command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
- ProcessType type;
- std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
- if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess) {
- type = PROCESS_TYPE_RENDERER;
- } else if (type_str == switches::kPluginProcess) {
- type = PROCESS_TYPE_PLUGIN;
- } else if (type_str == switches::kWorkerProcess) {
- type = PROCESS_TYPE_WORKER;
- } else if (type_str == switches::kNaClLoaderProcess) {
- type = PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_LOADER;
- } else if (type_str == switches::kUtilityProcess) {
- type = PROCESS_TYPE_UTILITY;
- } else if (type_str == switches::kNaClBrokerProcess) {
- type = PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_BROKER;
- } else if (type_str == switches::kGpuProcess) {
- type = PROCESS_TYPE_GPU;
- } else if (type_str == switches::kPpapiPluginProcess) {
- type = PROCESS_TYPE_PPAPI_PLUGIN;
- } else if (type_str == switches::kPpapiBrokerProcess) {
- type = PROCESS_TYPE_PPAPI_BROKER;
- } else {
- NOTREACHED();
- return 0;
- }
-
- TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
-
- // To decide if the process is going to be sandboxed we have two cases.
- // First case: all process types except the nacl broker, and the plugin
- // process are sandboxed by default.
- bool in_sandbox =
- (type != PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_BROKER) &&
- (type != PROCESS_TYPE_PLUGIN) &&
- (type != PROCESS_TYPE_PPAPI_BROKER);
-
- // If it is the GPU process then it can be disabled by a command line flag.
- if ((type == PROCESS_TYPE_GPU) &&
- (cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuSandbox))) {
- in_sandbox = false;
- DVLOG(1) << "GPU sandbox is disabled";
- }
-
- if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) ||
- cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
- // The user or the caller has explicity opted-out from all sandboxing.
- in_sandbox = false;
- }
-
-#if !defined (GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD)
- if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessPlugins)) {
- // In process plugins won't work if the sandbox is enabled.
- in_sandbox = false;
- }
-#endif
- if (!browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisable3DAPIs) &&
- !browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableExperimentalWebGL) &&
- browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessWebGL)) {
- // In process WebGL won't work if the sandbox is enabled.
- in_sandbox = false;
- }
-
- // Propagate the Chrome Frame flag to sandboxed processes if present.
- if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame)) {
- if (!cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame)) {
- cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame);
- }
- }
-
- // Propagate the --allow-no-job flag if present.
- if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob) &&
- !cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) {
- cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob);
- }
-
- bool child_needs_help = ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line, type, in_sandbox);
-
- // Prefetch hints on windows:
- // Using a different prefetch profile per process type will allow Windows
- // to create separate pretetch settings for browser, renderer etc.
- cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", type));
-
- if (!in_sandbox) {
- base::ProcessHandle process = 0;
- base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, base::LaunchOptions(), &process);
- g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(process);
- return process;
- }
-
- base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target;
- sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
-
- sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
- sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
- sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP |
- sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
- sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP;
-
- if (policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return 0;
-
- mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
- sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
-
- if (policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return 0;
-
- SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy);
-
- if (type == PROCESS_TYPE_GPU) {
- if (!AddPolicyForGPU(cmd_line, policy))
- return 0;
- } else {
- if (!AddPolicyForRenderer(policy))
- return 0;
- // TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper.
- // Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first.
- if (type == PROCESS_TYPE_RENDERER ||
- type == PROCESS_TYPE_WORKER) {
- AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(policy);
- // Pepper uses the renderer's policy, whith some tweaks.
- } else if (type == PROCESS_TYPE_PPAPI_PLUGIN) {
- if (!AddPolicyForPepperPlugin(policy))
- return 0;
- }
-
-
- if (type_str != switches::kRendererProcess) {
- // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into
- // this subprocess. See
- // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580
- cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer ");
- }
- }
-
- sandbox::ResultCode result;
- if (!exposed_dir.empty()) {
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
- exposed_dir.value().c_str());
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return 0;
-
- base::FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*");
- result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
- sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
- exposed_files.value().c_str());
- if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) {
- NOTREACHED();
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableLogging)) {
- // If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will
- // have no effect.
- policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE));
- policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE));
- }
-
- TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
-
- result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget(
- cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(),
- cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(),
- policy, target.Receive());
- policy->Release();
-
- TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
-
- if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
- DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result;
- return 0;
- }
-
-#if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
- // For Native Client sel_ldr processes on 32-bit Windows, reserve 1 GB of
- // address space to prevent later failure due to address space fragmentation
- // from .dll loading. The NaCl process will attempt to locate this space by
- // scanning the address space using VirtualQuery.
- // TODO(bbudge) Handle the --no-sandbox case.
- // http://code.google.com/p/nativeclient/issues/detail?id=2131
- if (type == PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_LOADER) {
- const SIZE_T kOneGigabyte = 1 << 30;
- void* nacl_mem = VirtualAllocEx(target.process_handle(),
- NULL,
- kOneGigabyte,
- MEM_RESERVE,
- PAGE_NOACCESS);
- if (!nacl_mem) {
- DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to reserve address space for Native Client";
- }
- }
-#endif // !defined(NACL_WIN64)
-
- ResumeThread(target.thread_handle());
-
- // Help the process a little. It can't start the debugger by itself if
- // the process is in a sandbox.
- if (child_needs_help)
- base::debug::SpawnDebuggerOnProcess(target.process_id());
-
- return target.TakeProcessHandle();
-}
-
-bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle,
- DWORD target_process_id,
- HANDLE* target_handle,
- DWORD desired_access,
- DWORD options) {
- // If our process is the target just duplicate the handle.
- if (::GetCurrentProcessId() == target_process_id) {
- return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
- ::GetCurrentProcess(), target_handle,
- desired_access, FALSE, options);
-
- }
-
- // Try the broker next
- if (g_target_services &&
- g_target_services->DuplicateHandle(source_handle, target_process_id,
- target_handle, desired_access,
- options) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
- return true;
- }
-
- // Finally, see if we already have access to the process.
- base::win::ScopedHandle target_process;
- target_process.Set(::OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE,
- target_process_id));
- if (target_process.IsValid()) {
- return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
- target_process, target_handle,
- desired_access, FALSE, options);
- }
-
- return false;
-}
-
-bool BrokerAddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process) {
- return g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(peer_process) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
-}
-
-} // namespace content
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