| Index: third_party/google_input_tools/third_party/closure_library/closure/goog/dom/safe.js
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| diff --git a/third_party/google_input_tools/third_party/closure_library/closure/goog/dom/safe.js b/third_party/google_input_tools/third_party/closure_library/closure/goog/dom/safe.js
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| new file mode 100644
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| index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e38d999103e2ccf1167c01b48cdcfff712a0d64b
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| +++ b/third_party/google_input_tools/third_party/closure_library/closure/goog/dom/safe.js
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| @@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
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| +// Copyright 2013 The Closure Library Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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| +//
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| +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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| +// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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| +// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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| +//
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| +// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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| +//
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| +// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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| +// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS-IS" BASIS,
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| +// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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| +// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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| +// limitations under the License.
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| +
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| +/**
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| + * @fileoverview Type-safe wrappers for unsafe DOM APIs.
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| + *
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| + * This file provides type-safe wrappers for DOM APIs that can result in
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| + * cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities, if the API is supplied with
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| + * untrusted (attacker-controlled) input. Instead of plain strings, the type
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| + * safe wrappers consume values of types from the goog.html package whose
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| + * contract promises that values are safe to use in the corresponding context.
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| + *
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| + * Hence, a program that exclusively uses the wrappers in this file (i.e., whose
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| + * only reference to security-sensitive raw DOM APIs are in this file) is
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| + * guaranteed to be free of XSS due to incorrect use of such DOM APIs (modulo
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| + * correctness of code that produces values of the respective goog.html types,
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| + * and absent code that violates type safety).
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| + *
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| + * For example, assigning to an element's .innerHTML property a string that is
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| + * derived (even partially) from untrusted input typically results in an XSS
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| + * vulnerability. The type-safe wrapper goog.html.setInnerHtml consumes a value
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| + * of type goog.html.SafeHtml, whose contract states that using its values in a
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| + * HTML context will not result in XSS. Hence a program that is free of direct
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| + * assignments to any element's innerHTML property (with the exception of the
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| + * assignment to .innerHTML in this file) is guaranteed to be free of XSS due to
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| + * assignment of untrusted strings to the innerHTML property.
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| + */
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| +
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| +goog.provide('goog.dom.safe');
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| +goog.provide('goog.dom.safe.InsertAdjacentHtmlPosition');
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| +
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| +goog.require('goog.asserts');
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| +goog.require('goog.html.SafeHtml');
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| +goog.require('goog.html.SafeUrl');
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| +goog.require('goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl');
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| +goog.require('goog.string');
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| +goog.require('goog.string.Const');
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| +
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| +
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| +/** @enum {string} */
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| +goog.dom.safe.InsertAdjacentHtmlPosition = {
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| + AFTERBEGIN: 'afterbegin',
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| + AFTEREND: 'afterend',
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| + BEFOREBEGIN: 'beforebegin',
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| + BEFOREEND: 'beforeend'
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| +};
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| +
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| +
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| +/**
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| + * Inserts known-safe HTML into a Node, at the specified position.
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| + * @param {!Node} node The node on which to call insertAdjacentHTML.
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| + * @param {!goog.dom.safe.InsertAdjacentHtmlPosition} position Position where
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| + * to insert the HTML.
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| + * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to insert.
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| + */
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| +goog.dom.safe.insertAdjacentHtml = function(node, position, html) {
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| + node.insertAdjacentHTML(position, goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html));
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| +};
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| +
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| +
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| +/**
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| + * Assigns known-safe HTML to an element's innerHTML property.
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| + * @param {!Element} elem The element whose innerHTML is to be assigned to.
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| + * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to assign.
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| + */
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| +goog.dom.safe.setInnerHtml = function(elem, html) {
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| + elem.innerHTML = goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html);
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| +};
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| +
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| +
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| +/**
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| + * Assigns known-safe HTML to an element's outerHTML property.
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| + * @param {!Element} elem The element whose outerHTML is to be assigned to.
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| + * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to assign.
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| + */
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| +goog.dom.safe.setOuterHtml = function(elem, html) {
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| + elem.outerHTML = goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html);
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| +};
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| +
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| +
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| +/**
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| + * Writes known-safe HTML to a document.
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| + * @param {!Document} doc The document to be written to.
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| + * @param {!goog.html.SafeHtml} html The known-safe HTML to assign.
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| + */
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| +goog.dom.safe.documentWrite = function(doc, html) {
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| + doc.write(goog.html.SafeHtml.unwrap(html));
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| +};
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| +
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| +
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| +/**
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| + * Safely assigns a URL to an anchor element's href property.
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| + *
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| + * If url is of type goog.html.SafeUrl, its value is unwrapped and assigned to
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| + * anchor's href property. If url is of type string however, it is first
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| + * sanitized using goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize.
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| + *
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| + * Example usage:
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| + * goog.dom.safe.setAnchorHref(anchorEl, url);
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| + * which is a safe alternative to
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| + * anchorEl.href = url;
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| + * The latter can result in XSS vulnerabilities if url is a
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| + * user-/attacker-controlled value.
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| + *
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| + * @param {!HTMLAnchorElement} anchor The anchor element whose href property
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| + * is to be assigned to.
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| + * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl} url The URL to assign.
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| + * @see goog.html.SafeUrl#sanitize
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| + */
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| +goog.dom.safe.setAnchorHref = function(anchor, url) {
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| + /** @type {!goog.html.SafeUrl} */
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| + var safeUrl;
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| + if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) {
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| + safeUrl = url;
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| + } else {
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| + safeUrl = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize(url);
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| + }
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| + anchor.href = goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(safeUrl);
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| +};
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| +
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| +
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| +/**
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| + * Safely assigns a URL to an embed element's src property.
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| + *
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| + * Example usage:
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| + * goog.dom.safe.setEmbedSrc(embedEl, url);
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| + * which is a safe alternative to
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| + * embedEl.src = url;
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| + * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that
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| + * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource.
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| + *
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| + * @param {!HTMLEmbedElement} embed The embed element whose src property
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| + * is to be assigned to.
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| + * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign.
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| + */
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| +goog.dom.safe.setEmbedSrc = function(embed, url) {
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| + embed.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
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| +};
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| +
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| +
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| +/**
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| + * Safely assigns a URL to a frame element's src property.
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| + *
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| + * Example usage:
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| + * goog.dom.safe.setFrameSrc(frameEl, url);
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| + * which is a safe alternative to
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| + * frameEl.src = url;
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| + * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that
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| + * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource.
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| + *
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| + * @param {!HTMLFrameElement} frame The frame element whose src property
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| + * is to be assigned to.
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| + * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign.
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| + */
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| +goog.dom.safe.setFrameSrc = function(frame, url) {
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| + frame.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
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| +};
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| +
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| +
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| +/**
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| + * Safely assigns a URL to an iframe element's src property.
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| + *
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| + * Example usage:
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| + * goog.dom.safe.setIframeSrc(iframeEl, url);
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| + * which is a safe alternative to
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| + * iframeEl.src = url;
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| + * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that
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| + * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource.
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| + *
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| + * @param {!HTMLIFrameElement} iframe The iframe element whose src property
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| + * is to be assigned to.
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| + * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign.
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| + */
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| +goog.dom.safe.setIframeSrc = function(iframe, url) {
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| + iframe.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
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| +};
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| +
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| +
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| +/**
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| + * Safely sets a link element's href and rel properties. Whether or not
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| + * the URL assigned to href has to be a goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl
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| + * depends on the value of the rel property. If rel contains "stylesheet"
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| + * then a TrustedResourceUrl is required.
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| + *
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| + * Example usage:
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| + * goog.dom.safe.setLinkHrefAndRel(linkEl, url, 'stylesheet');
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| + * which is a safe alternative to
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| + * linkEl.rel = 'stylesheet';
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| + * linkEl.href = url;
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| + * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that
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| + * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource.
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| + *
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| + * @param {!HTMLLinkElement} link The link element whose href property
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| + * is to be assigned to.
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| + * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl|!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL
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| + * to assign to the href property. Must be a TrustedResourceUrl if the
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| + * value assigned to rel contains "stylesheet". A string value is
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| + * sanitized with goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize.
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| + * @param {string} rel The value to assign to the rel property.
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| + * @throws {Error} if rel contains "stylesheet" and url is not a
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| + * TrustedResourceUrl
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| + * @see goog.html.SafeUrl#sanitize
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| + */
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| +goog.dom.safe.setLinkHrefAndRel = function(link, url, rel) {
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| + link.rel = rel;
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| + if (goog.string.caseInsensitiveContains(rel, 'stylesheet')) {
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| + goog.asserts.assert(
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| + url instanceof goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl,
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| + 'URL must be TrustedResourceUrl because "rel" contains "stylesheet"');
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| + link.href = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
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| + } else if (url instanceof goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl) {
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| + link.href = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
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| + } else if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) {
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| + link.href = goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(url);
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| + } else { // string
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| + // SafeUrl.sanitize must return legitimate SafeUrl when passed a string.
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| + link.href = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize(url).getTypedStringValue();
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| + }
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| +};
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| +
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| +
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| +/**
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| + * Safely assigns a URL to an object element's data property.
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| + *
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| + * Example usage:
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| + * goog.dom.safe.setObjectData(objectEl, url);
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| + * which is a safe alternative to
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| + * objectEl.data = url;
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| + * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless setit is ensured that
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| + * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource.
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| + *
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| + * @param {!HTMLObjectElement} object The object element whose data property
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| + * is to be assigned to.
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| + * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign.
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| + */
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| +goog.dom.safe.setObjectData = function(object, url) {
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| + object.data = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
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| +};
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| +
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| +
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| +/**
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| + * Safely assigns a URL to an iframe element's src property.
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| + *
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| + * Example usage:
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| + * goog.dom.safe.setScriptSrc(scriptEl, url);
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| + * which is a safe alternative to
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| + * scriptEl.src = url;
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| + * The latter can result in loading untrusted code unless it is ensured that
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| + * the URL refers to a trustworthy resource.
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| + *
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| + * @param {!HTMLScriptElement} script The script element whose src property
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| + * is to be assigned to.
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| + * @param {!goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl} url The URL to assign.
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| + */
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| +goog.dom.safe.setScriptSrc = function(script, url) {
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| + script.src = goog.html.TrustedResourceUrl.unwrap(url);
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| +};
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| +
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| +
|
| +/**
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| + * Safely assigns a URL to a Location object's href property.
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| + *
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| + * If url is of type goog.html.SafeUrl, its value is unwrapped and assigned to
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| + * loc's href property. If url is of type string however, it is first sanitized
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| + * using goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize.
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| + *
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| + * Example usage:
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| + * goog.dom.safe.setLocationHref(document.location, redirectUrl);
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| + * which is a safe alternative to
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| + * document.location.href = redirectUrl;
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| + * The latter can result in XSS vulnerabilities if redirectUrl is a
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| + * user-/attacker-controlled value.
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| + *
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| + * @param {!Location} loc The Location object whose href property is to be
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| + * assigned to.
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| + * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl} url The URL to assign.
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| + * @see goog.html.SafeUrl#sanitize
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| + */
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| +goog.dom.safe.setLocationHref = function(loc, url) {
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| + /** @type {!goog.html.SafeUrl} */
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| + var safeUrl;
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| + if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) {
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| + safeUrl = url;
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| + } else {
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| + safeUrl = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize(url);
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| + }
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| + loc.href = goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(safeUrl);
|
| +};
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| +
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| +
|
| +/**
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| + * Safely opens a URL in a new window (via window.open).
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| + *
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| + * If url is of type goog.html.SafeUrl, its value is unwrapped and passed in to
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| + * window.open. If url is of type string however, it is first sanitized
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| + * using goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize.
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| + *
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| + * Note that this function does not prevent leakages via the referer that is
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| + * sent by window.open. It is advised to only use this to open 1st party URLs.
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| + *
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| + * Example usage:
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| + * goog.dom.safe.openInWindow(url);
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| + * which is a safe alternative to
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| + * window.open(url);
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| + * The latter can result in XSS vulnerabilities if redirectUrl is a
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| + * user-/attacker-controlled value.
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| + *
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| + * @param {string|!goog.html.SafeUrl} url The URL to open.
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| + * @param {Window=} opt_openerWin Window of which to call the .open() method.
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| + * Defaults to the global window.
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| + * @param {!goog.string.Const=} opt_name Name of the window to open in. Can be
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| + * _top, etc as allowed by window.open().
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| + * @param {string=} opt_specs Comma-separated list of specifications, same as
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| + * in window.open().
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| + * @param {boolean=} opt_replace Whether to replace the current entry in browser
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| + * history, same as in window.open().
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| + * @return {Window} Window the url was opened in.
|
| + */
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| +goog.dom.safe.openInWindow = function(
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| + url, opt_openerWin, opt_name, opt_specs, opt_replace) {
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| + /** @type {!goog.html.SafeUrl} */
|
| + var safeUrl;
|
| + if (url instanceof goog.html.SafeUrl) {
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| + safeUrl = url;
|
| + } else {
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| + safeUrl = goog.html.SafeUrl.sanitize(url);
|
| + }
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| + var win = opt_openerWin || window;
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| + return win.open(goog.html.SafeUrl.unwrap(safeUrl),
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| + // If opt_name is undefined, simply passing that in to open() causes IE to
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| + // reuse the current window instead of opening a new one. Thus we pass ''
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| + // in instead, which according to spec opens a new window. See
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| + // https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/browsers.html#dom-open .
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| + opt_name ? goog.string.Const.unwrap(opt_name) : '',
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| + opt_specs, opt_replace);
|
| +};
|
|
|