net: implement CBC processing in constant-time in libssl.

net/third_party/nss/patches/cbc.patch

Index: net/third_party/nss/patches/cbc.patch
diff --git a/net/third_party/nss/patches/cbc.patch b/net/third_party/nss/patches/cbc.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..aa36bcd918eb059bf044aad340a5500583073c99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/third_party/nss/patches/cbc.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,511 @@
+diff --git a/mozilla/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/mozilla/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
+index c3706fe..4247f44 100644
+--- a/mozilla/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
++++ b/mozilla/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
+@@ -1844,7 +1844,6 @@ static const unsigned char mac_pad_2 [60] = {
+ };
+ 
+ /* Called from: ssl3_SendRecord()
+-**		ssl3_HandleRecord()
+ ** Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!)
+ */
+ static SECStatus
+@@ -2026,6 +2025,128 @@ ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(
+     return rv;
+ }
+ 
++/* This is a bodge to allow this code to be compiled against older NSS headers
++ * that don't contain the CBC constant-time changes. */
++#ifndef CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME
++#define CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME (CKM_NSS + 19)
++#define CKM_NSS_SSLV3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME (CKM_NSS + 20)
++
++typedef struct CK_NSS_MACConstantTimeParams {
++    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg;  /* in */
++    CK_ULONG ulBodyTotalLength; /* in */
++    CK_BYTE * pHeader;          /* in */
++    CK_ULONG ulHeaderLength;    /* in */
++} CK_NSS_MACConstantTimeParams;
++#endif
++
++/* Called from: ssl3_HandleRecord()
++ * Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!)
++ *
++ * On entry:
++ *   originalLen >= inputLen >= MAC size
++*/
++static SECStatus
++ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime(
++    ssl3CipherSpec *   spec,
++    PRBool             useServerMacKey,
++    PRBool             isDTLS,
++    SSL3ContentType    type,
++    SSL3ProtocolVersion version,
++    SSL3SequenceNumber seq_num,
++    const SSL3Opaque * input,
++    int                inputLen,
++    int                originalLen,
++    unsigned char *    outbuf,
++    unsigned int *     outLen)
++{
++    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE            macType;
++    CK_NSS_MACConstantTimeParams params;
++    PK11Context *                mac_context;
++    SECItem                      param;
++    SECStatus                    rv;
++    unsigned char                header[13];
++    PK11SymKey *                 key;
++    int                          recordLength;
++
++    PORT_Assert(inputLen >= spec->mac_size);
++    PORT_Assert(originalLen >= inputLen);
++
++    if (spec->bypassCiphers) {
++	/* This function doesn't support PKCS#11 bypass. We fallback on the
++	 * non-constant time version. */
++	goto fallback;
++    }
++
++    if (spec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) {
++	*outLen = 0;
++	return SECSuccess;
++    }
++
++    header[0] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 24);
++    header[1] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 16);
++    header[2] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >>  8);
++    header[3] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >>  0);
++    header[4] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low  >> 24);
++    header[5] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low  >> 16);
++    header[6] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low  >>  8);
++    header[7] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low  >>  0);
++    header[8] = type;
++
++    macType = CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME;
++    recordLength = inputLen - spec->mac_size;
++    if (spec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
++	macType = CKM_NSS_SSLV3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME;
++	header[9] = recordLength >> 8;
++	header[10] = recordLength;
++	params.ulHeaderLength = 11;
++    } else {
++	header[9] = version >> 8;
++	header[10] = version;
++	header[11] = recordLength >> 8;
++	header[12] = recordLength;
++	params.ulHeaderLength = 13;
++    }
++
++    params.hashAlg = spec->mac_def->mmech;
++    params.ulBodyTotalLength = originalLen;
++    params.pHeader = header;
++
++    param.data = (unsigned char*) &params;
++    param.len = sizeof(params);
++    param.type = 0;
++
++    key = spec->server.write_mac_key;
++    if (!useServerMacKey) {
++	key = spec->client.write_mac_key;
++    }
++    mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(macType, CKA_SIGN, key, &param);
++    if (mac_context == NULL) {
++	/* Older versions of NSS may not support constant-time MAC. */
++	goto fallback;
++    }
++
++    rv  = PK11_DigestBegin(mac_context);
++    rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, input, inputLen);
++    rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(mac_context, outbuf, outLen, spec->mac_size);
++    PK11_DestroyContext(mac_context, PR_TRUE);
++
++    PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || *outLen == (unsigned)spec->mac_size);
++
++    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
++	rv = SECFailure;
++	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE);
++    }
++    return rv;
++
++fallback:
++    /* ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC expects the MAC to have been removed from the
++     * length already. */
++    inputLen -= spec->mac_size;
++    return ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(spec, useServerMacKey, isDTLS, type,
++				 version, seq_num, input, inputLen,
++				 outbuf, outLen);
++}
++
+ static PRBool
+ ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sslSessionID *sid) {
+     PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
+@@ -9530,6 +9651,177 @@ ssl3_HandleHandshake(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf)
+     return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ 
++/* These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
++ * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
++ * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace
++ * them with something else for odd compilers. */
++#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ( (unsigned)( (int)(x) >> (sizeof(int)*8-1) ) )
++#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x)))
++
++/* SECStatusToMask returns, in constant time, a mask value of all ones if rv ==
++ * SECSuccess.  Otherwise it returns zero. */
++static unsigned SECStatusToMask(SECStatus rv)
++{
++    unsigned int good;
++    /* rv ^ SECSuccess is zero iff rv == SECSuccess. Subtracting one results in
++     * the MSB being set to one iff it was zero before. */
++    good = rv ^ SECSuccess;
++    good--;
++    return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
++}
++
++/* ssl_ConstantTimeGE returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */
++static unsigned char ssl_ConstantTimeGE(unsigned a, unsigned b)
++{
++    a -= b;
++    return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a);
++}
++
++/* ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */
++static unsigned char ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8(unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
++{
++    unsigned c = a ^ b;
++    c--;
++    return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c);
++}
++
++static SECStatus ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext,
++					   unsigned blockSize,
++					   unsigned macSize) {
++    unsigned int paddingLength, good, t;
++    const unsigned int overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + macSize;
++
++    /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
++     * time. */
++    if (overhead > plaintext->len) {
++	return SECFailure;
++    }
++
++    paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len-1];
++    /* SSLv3 padding bytes are random and cannot be checked. */
++    t = plaintext->len;
++    t -= paddingLength+overhead;
++    /* If len >= padding_length+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */
++    good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
++    /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
++    t = blockSize - (paddingLength+1);
++    good &= DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
++    plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength+1);
++    return (good & SECSuccess) | (~good & SECFailure);
++}
++
++
++static SECStatus ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext,
++					 unsigned macSize) {
++    unsigned int paddingLength, good, t, toCheck, i;
++    const unsigned int overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + macSize;
++
++    /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
++     * time. */
++    if (overhead > plaintext->len) {
++	return SECFailure;
++    }
++
++    paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len-1];
++    t = plaintext->len;
++    t -= paddingLength+overhead;
++    /* If len >= paddingLength+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */
++    good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
++
++    /* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and then
++     * that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length byte.
++     * Thus, with the length byte included, there are paddingLength+1 bytes of
++     * padding.
++     *
++     * We can't check just |paddingLength+1| bytes because that leaks
++     * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum
++     * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is
++     * public information so we can use it.) */
++    toCheck = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */
++    if (toCheck > plaintext->len-1) {
++	toCheck = plaintext->len-1;
++    }
++
++    for (i = 0; i < toCheck; i++) {
++	unsigned int t = paddingLength - i;
++	/* If i <= paddingLength then the MSB of t is zero and mask is
++	 * 0xff.  Otherwise, mask is 0. */
++	unsigned char mask = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
++	unsigned char b = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len-1-i];
++	/* The final |paddingLength+1| bytes should all have the value
++	 * |paddingLength|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */
++	good &= ~(mask&(paddingLength ^ b));
++    }
++
++    /* If any of the final |paddingLength+1| bytes had the wrong value,
++     * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We
++     * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the
++     * bits. */
++    good &= good >> 4;
++    good &= good >> 2;
++    good &= good >> 1;
++    good <<= sizeof(good)*8-1;
++    good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
++
++    plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength+1);
++    return (good & SECSuccess) | (~good & SECFailure);
++}
++
++/* On entry:
++ *   originalLength >= macSize
++ *   macSize <= MAX_MAC_LENGTH
++ *   plaintext->len >= macSize
++ */
++static void ssl_CBCExtractMAC(sslBuffer *plaintext,
++			      unsigned int originalLength,
++			      SSL3Opaque* out,
++			      unsigned int macSize) {
++    unsigned char rotatedMac[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
++    /* macEnd is the index of |plaintext->buf| just after the end of the MAC. */
++    unsigned macEnd = plaintext->len;
++    unsigned macStart = macEnd - macSize;
++    /* scanStart contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because
++     * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */
++    unsigned scanStart = 0;
++    unsigned i, j, divSpoiler;
++    unsigned char rotateOffset;
++
++    if (originalLength > macSize + 255 + 1)
++	scanStart = originalLength - (macSize + 255 + 1);
++
++    /* divSpoiler contains a multiple of macSize that is used to cause the
++     * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies
++     * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least.
++     *
++     * The aim of right-shifting macSize is so that the compiler doesn't
++     * figure out that it can remove divSpoiler as that would require it
++     * to prove that macSize is always even, which I hope is beyond it. */
++    divSpoiler = macSize >> 1;
++    divSpoiler <<= (sizeof(divSpoiler)-1)*8;
++    rotateOffset = (divSpoiler + macStart - scanStart) % macSize;
++
++    memset(rotatedMac, 0, macSize);
++    for (i = scanStart; i < originalLength;) {
++	for (j = 0; j < macSize && i < originalLength; i++, j++) {
++	    unsigned char macStarted = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macStart);
++	    unsigned char macEnded = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macEnd);
++	    unsigned char b = 0;
++	    b = plaintext->buf[i];
++	    rotatedMac[j] |= b & macStarted & ~macEnded;
++	}
++    }
++
++    /* Now rotate the MAC. If we knew that the MAC fit into a CPU cache line we
++     * could line-align |rotatedMac| and rotate in place. */
++    memset(out, 0, macSize);
++    for (i = 0; i < macSize; i++) {
++	unsigned char offset = (divSpoiler + macSize - rotateOffset + i) % macSize;
++	for (j = 0; j < macSize; j++) {
++	    out[j] |= rotatedMac[i] & ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8(j, offset);
++	}
++    }
++}
++
+ /* if cText is non-null, then decipher, check MAC, and decompress the
+  * SSL record from cText->buf (typically gs->inbuf)
+  * into databuf (typically gs->buf), and any previous contents of databuf
+@@ -9559,15 +9851,18 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf)
+     ssl3CipherSpec *     crSpec;
+     SECStatus            rv;
+     unsigned int         hashBytes = MAX_MAC_LENGTH + 1;
+-    unsigned int         padding_length;
+     PRBool               isTLS;
+-    PRBool               padIsBad = PR_FALSE;
+     SSL3ContentType      rType;
+     SSL3Opaque           hash[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
++    SSL3Opaque           givenHashBuf[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
++    SSL3Opaque          *givenHash;
+     sslBuffer           *plaintext;
+     sslBuffer            temp_buf;
+     PRUint64             dtls_seq_num;
+     unsigned int         ivLen = 0;
++    unsigned int         originalLen = 0;
++    unsigned int         good;
++    unsigned int         minLength;
+ 
+     PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
+ 
+@@ -9635,6 +9930,30 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf)
+ 	}
+     }
+ 
++    good = (unsigned)-1;
++    minLength = crSpec->mac_size;
++    if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
++	/* CBC records have a padding length byte at the end. */
++	minLength++;
++	if (crSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
++	    /* With >= TLS 1.1, CBC records have an explicit IV. */
++	    minLength += cipher_def->iv_size;
++	}
++    }
++
++    /* We can perform this test in variable time because the record's total
++     * length and the ciphersuite are both public knowledge. */
++    if (cText->buf->len < minLength) {
++	SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, record too small.",
++		 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
++	/* must not hold spec lock when calling SSL3_SendAlert. */
++	ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
++	SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_record_mac);
++	/* always log mac error, in case attacker can read server logs. */
++	PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
++	return SECFailure;
++    }
++
+     if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
+ 	crSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) {
+ 	/* Consume the per-record explicit IV. RFC 4346 Section 6.2.3.2 states
+@@ -9652,16 +9971,6 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf)
+ 	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ 	    return SECFailure;
+ 	}
+-	if (ivLen > cText->buf->len) {
+-	    SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, IV length check failed",
+-		     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+-	    /* must not hold spec lock when calling SSL3_SendAlert. */
+-	    ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+-	    SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_record_mac);
+-	    /* always log mac error, in case attacker can read server logs. */
+-	    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
+-	    return SECFailure;
+-	}
+ 
+ 	PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "IV (ciphertext):", cText->buf->buf, ivLen));
+ 
+@@ -9672,12 +9981,7 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf)
+ 	rv = crSpec->decode(crSpec->decodeContext, iv, &decoded,
+ 			    sizeof(iv), cText->buf->buf, ivLen);
+ 
+-	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+-	    /* All decryption failures must be treated like a bad record
+-	     * MAC; see RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2). 
+-	     */
+-	    padIsBad = PR_TRUE;
+-	}
++	good &= SECStatusToMask(rv);
+     }
+ 
+     /* If we will be decompressing the buffer we need to decrypt somewhere
+@@ -9719,54 +10023,70 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf)
+     rv = crSpec->decode(
+ 	crSpec->decodeContext, plaintext->buf, (int *)&plaintext->len,
+ 	plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf + ivLen, cText->buf->len - ivLen);
++    good &= SECStatusToMask(rv);
+ 
+     PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "cleartext:", plaintext->buf, plaintext->len));
+-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+-        /* All decryption failures must be treated like a bad record
+-         * MAC; see RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2). 
+-         */
+-        padIsBad = PR_TRUE;
+-    }
++
++    originalLen = plaintext->len;
+ 
+     /* If it's a block cipher, check and strip the padding. */
+-    if (cipher_def->type == type_block && !padIsBad) {
+-        PRUint8 * pPaddingLen = plaintext->buf + plaintext->len - 1;
+-	padding_length = *pPaddingLen;
+-	/* TLS permits padding to exceed the block size, up to 255 bytes. */
+-	if (padding_length + 1 + crSpec->mac_size > plaintext->len)
+-	    padIsBad = PR_TRUE;
+-	else {
+-            plaintext->len -= padding_length + 1;
+-            /* In TLS all padding bytes must be equal to the padding length. */
+-            if (isTLS) {
+-                PRUint8 *p;
+-                for (p = pPaddingLen - padding_length; p < pPaddingLen; ++p) {
+-                    padIsBad |= *p ^ padding_length;
+-                }
+-            }
+-        }
+-    }
++    if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
++	const unsigned int blockSize = cipher_def->iv_size;
++	const unsigned int macSize = crSpec->mac_size;
+ 
+-    /* Remove the MAC. */
+-    if (plaintext->len >= crSpec->mac_size)
+-	plaintext->len -= crSpec->mac_size;
+-    else
+-    	padIsBad = PR_TRUE;	/* really macIsBad */
++	if (crSpec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
++	    good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(
++			plaintext, blockSize, macSize));
++	} else {
++	    good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(
++			plaintext, macSize));
++	}
++    }
+ 
+     /* compute the MAC */
+     rType = cText->type;
+-    rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( crSpec, (PRBool)(!ss->sec.isServer),
+-        IS_DTLS(ss), rType, cText->version,
+-        IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : crSpec->read_seq_num,
+-	plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, hash, &hashBytes);
+-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+-        padIsBad = PR_TRUE;     /* really macIsBad */
++    if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
++	rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime(
++	    crSpec, (PRBool)(!ss->sec.isServer),
++	    IS_DTLS(ss), rType, cText->version,
++	    IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : crSpec->read_seq_num,
++	    plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, originalLen,
++	    hash, &hashBytes);
++
++	ssl_CBCExtractMAC(plaintext, originalLen, givenHashBuf,
++			  crSpec->mac_size);
++	givenHash = givenHashBuf;
++
++	/* plaintext->len will always have enough space to remove the MAC
++	 * because in ssl_Remove{SSLv3|TLS}CBCPadding we only adjust
++	 * plaintext->len if the result has enough space for the MAC and we
++	 * tested the unadjusted size against minLength, above. */
++	plaintext->len -= crSpec->mac_size;
++    } else {
++	/* This is safe because we checked the minLength above. */
++	plaintext->len -= crSpec->mac_size;
++
++	rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(
++	    crSpec, (PRBool)(!ss->sec.isServer),
++	    IS_DTLS(ss), rType, cText->version,
++	    IS_DTLS(ss) ? cText->seq_num : crSpec->read_seq_num,
++	    plaintext->buf, plaintext->len,
++	    hash, &hashBytes);
++
++	/* We can read the MAC directly from the record because its location is
++	 * public when a stream cipher is used. */
++	givenHash = plaintext->buf + plaintext->len;
++    }
++
++    good &= SECStatusToMask(rv);
++
++    if (hashBytes != (unsigned)crSpec->mac_size ||
++	NSS_SecureMemcmp(givenHash, hash, crSpec->mac_size) != 0) {
++	/* We're allowed to leak whether or not the MAC check was correct */
++	good = 0;
+     }
+ 
+-    /* Check the MAC */
+-    if (hashBytes != (unsigned)crSpec->mac_size || padIsBad || 
+-	NSS_SecureMemcmp(plaintext->buf + plaintext->len, hash,
+-	                 crSpec->mac_size) != 0) {
++    if (good == 0) {
+ 	/* must not hold spec lock when calling SSL3_SendAlert. */
+ 	ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+