Class for parsing and evaluating RFC 5280 NameConstraints.

net/cert/internal/name_constraints.cc

+// Copyright 2015 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include "net/cert/internal/name_constraints.h"
+
+#include "base/strings/string_util.h"
+#include "net/cert/internal/verify_name_match.h"
+#include "net/der/input.h"
+#include "net/der/parser.h"
+#include "net/der/tag.h"
+
+namespace net {
+
+namespace {
+
+// The name types of GeneralName that are fully supported in name constraints.
+//
+// (The other types will have the minimal checking described by RFC 5280
+// section 4.2.1.10: If a name constraints extension that is marked as critical
+// imposes constraints on a particular name form, and an instance of
+// that name form appears in the subject field or subjectAltName
+// extension of a subsequent certificate, then the application MUST
+// either process the constraint or reject the certificate.)
+const int kSupportedNameTypes = GENERAL_NAME_DNS_NAME |
+                                GENERAL_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME |
+                                GENERAL_NAME_IP_ADDRESS;
+
+// Controls wildcard handling of DNSNameMatches.
+// If WildcardMatchType is WILDCARD_PARTIAL_MATCH "*.bar.com" is considered to
+// match the constraint "foo.bar.com". If it is WILDCARD_FULL_MATCH, "*.bar.com"
+// will match "bar.com" but not "foo.bar.com".
+enum WildcardMatchType { WILDCARD_PARTIAL_MATCH, WILDCARD_FULL_MATCH };
+
+// Returns true if |name| falls in the subtree defined by |dns_constraint|.
+// RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.10:
+// DNS name restrictions are expressed as host.example.com. Any DNS
+// name that can be constructed by simply adding zero or more labels
+// to the left-hand side of the name satisfies the name constraint. For
+// example, www.host.example.com would satisfy the constraint but
+// host1.example.com would not.
+//
+// |wildcard_matching| controls handling of wildcard names (|name| starts with
+// "*."). Wildcard handling is not specified by RFC 5280, but certificate
+// verification allows it, name constraints must check it similarly.
+bool DNSNameMatches(base::StringPiece name,
+                    base::StringPiece dns_constraint,
+                    WildcardMatchType wildcard_matching) {
+  // Everything matches the empty DNS name constraint.
+  if (dns_constraint.empty())
+    return true;
+
+  // Normalize absolute DNS names by removing the trailing dot, if any.
+  if (!name.empty() && *name.rbegin() == '.')
+    name.remove_suffix(1);
+  if (!dns_constraint.empty() && *dns_constraint.rbegin() == '.')
+    dns_constraint.remove_suffix(1);
+
+  // Wildcard partial-match handling ("*.bar.com" matching name constraint
+  // "foo.bar.com"). This only handles the case where the the dnsname and the
+  // constraint match after removing the leftmost label, otherwise it is handled
+  // by falling through to the check of whether the dnsname is fully within or
+  // fully outside of the constraint.
+  if (wildcard_matching == WILDCARD_PARTIAL_MATCH && name.size() > 2 &&
+      name[0] == '*' && name[1] == '.') {
+    size_t dns_constraint_dot_pos = dns_constraint.find('.');
+    if (dns_constraint_dot_pos != std::string::npos) {
+      base::StringPiece dns_constraint_domain(
+          dns_constraint.begin() + dns_constraint_dot_pos + 1,
+          dns_constraint.size() - dns_constraint_dot_pos - 1);
+      base::StringPiece wildcard_domain(name.begin() + 2, name.size() - 2);
+      if (base::EqualsCaseInsensitiveASCII(wildcard_domain,
+                                           dns_constraint_domain)) {
+        return true;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!base::EndsWith(name, dns_constraint,
+                      base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  // Exact match.
+  if (name.size() == dns_constraint.size())
+    return true;
+  // Subtree match.
+  if (name.size() > dns_constraint.size() &&
+      name[name.size() - dns_constraint.size() - 1] == '.') {
+    return true;
+  }
+  // Trailing text matches, but not in a subtree (e.g., "foobar.com" is not a
+  // match for "bar.com").
+  return false;
+}
+
+// Return true if the bitmask |mask| contains only zeros after the first
+// |prefix_length| bits.
+bool IsSuffixZero(const std::vector<uint8_t>& mask, unsigned prefix_length) {
+  size_t zero_bits = mask.size() * CHAR_BIT - prefix_length;
+  size_t zero_bytes = zero_bits / CHAR_BIT;
+  std::vector<uint8_t> zeros(zero_bytes, 0);
+  if (memcmp(zeros.data(), mask.data() + mask.size() - zero_bytes, zero_bytes))
+    return false;
+  size_t leftover_bits = zero_bits % CHAR_BIT;
+  if (leftover_bits) {
+    uint8_t b = mask[mask.size() - zero_bytes - 1];
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < leftover_bits; ++i) {
+      if (b & (1 << i))
+        return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+// Controls handling of unsupported name types in ParseGeneralName. (Unsupported
+// types are those not in kSupportedNameTypes.)
+// RECORD_UNSUPPORTED causes unsupported types to be recorded in
+// |present_name_types|.
+// IGNORE_UNSUPPORTED causes unsupported types to not be recorded.
+enum ParseGeneralNameUnsupportedTypeBehavior {
+  RECORD_UNSUPPORTED,
+  IGNORE_UNSUPPORTED,
+};
+
+// Controls parsing of iPAddress names in ParseGeneralName.
+// IP_ADDRESS_ONLY parses the iPAddress names as a 4 or 16 byte IP address.
+// IP_ADDRESS_AND_NETMASK parses the iPAddress names as 8 or 32 bytes containing
+// an IP address followed by a netmask.
+enum ParseGeneralNameIPAddressType {
+  IP_ADDRESS_ONLY,
+  IP_ADDRESS_AND_NETMASK,
+};
+
+// Parses a GeneralName value and adds it to |subtrees|.
+WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool ParseGeneralName(
+    const der::Input& input,
+    ParseGeneralNameUnsupportedTypeBehavior unsupported_type_behavior,
+    ParseGeneralNameIPAddressType ip_address_type,
+    NameConstraints::GeneralNames* subtrees) {
+  der::Parser parser(input);
+  der::Tag tag;
+  der::Input value;
+  if (!parser.ReadTagAndValue(&tag, &value))
+    return false;
+  if (!der::IsContextSpecific(tag))
+    return false;
+  GeneralNameTypes name_type = GENERAL_NAME_NONE;
+  // GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
+  switch (der::GetTagNumber(tag)) {
+    // otherName                       [0]     OtherName,
+    case 0:
+      if (!der::IsConstructed(tag))
+        return false;
+      name_type = GENERAL_NAME_OTHER_NAME;
+      break;
+    // rfc822Name                      [1]     IA5String,
+    case 1:
+      if (der::IsConstructed(tag))
+        return false;
+      name_type = GENERAL_NAME_RFC822_NAME;
+      break;
+    // dNSName                         [2]     IA5String,
+    case 2: {
+      if (der::IsConstructed(tag))
+        return false;
+      name_type = GENERAL_NAME_DNS_NAME;
+      const std::string s = value.AsString();
+      if (!base::IsStringASCII(s))
+        return false;
+      subtrees->dns_names.push_back(s);
+      break;
+    }
+    // x400Address                     [3]     ORAddress,
+    case 3:
+      if (!der::IsConstructed(tag))
+        return false;
+      name_type = GENERAL_NAME_X400_ADDRESS;
+      break;
+    // directoryName                   [4]     Name,
+    case 4:
+      if (!der::IsConstructed(tag))
+        return false;
+      name_type = GENERAL_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME;
+      subtrees->directory_names.push_back(std::vector<uint8_t>(
+          value.UnsafeData(), value.UnsafeData() + value.Length()));
+      break;
+    // ediPartyName                    [5]     EDIPartyName,
+    case 5:
+      if (!der::IsConstructed(tag))
+        return false;
+      name_type = GENERAL_NAME_EDI_PARTY_NAME;
+      break;
+    // uniformResourceIdentifier       [6]     IA5String,
+    case 6:
+      if (der::IsConstructed(tag))
+        return false;
+      name_type = GENERAL_NAME_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER;
+      break;
+    // iPAddress                       [7]     OCTET STRING,
+    case 7:
+      if (der::IsConstructed(tag))
+        return false;
+      name_type = GENERAL_NAME_IP_ADDRESS;
+      if (ip_address_type == IP_ADDRESS_ONLY) {
+        // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6:
+        // When the subjectAltName extension contains an iPAddress, the address
+        // MUST be stored in the octet string in "network byte order", as
+        // specified in [RFC791].  The least significant bit (LSB) of each octet
+        // is the LSB of the corresponding byte in the network address.  For IP
+        // version 4, as specified in [RFC791], the octet string MUST contain
+        // exactly four octets.  For IP version 6, as specified in [RFC2460],
+        // the octet string MUST contain exactly sixteen octets.
+        if ((value.Length() != kIPv4AddressSize &&
+             value.Length() != kIPv6AddressSize)) {
+          return false;
+        }
+        subtrees->ip_addresses.push_back(std::vector<uint8_t>(
+            value.UnsafeData(), value.UnsafeData() + value.Length()));
+      } else {
+        DCHECK_EQ(ip_address_type, IP_ADDRESS_AND_NETMASK);
+        // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.10:
+        // The syntax of iPAddress MUST be as described in Section 4.2.1.6 with
+        // the following additions specifically for name constraints. For IPv4
+        // addresses, the iPAddress field of GeneralName MUST contain eight (8)
+        // octets, encoded in the style of RFC 4632 (CIDR) to represent an
+        // address range [RFC4632]. For IPv6 addresses, the iPAddress field
+        // MUST contain 32 octets similarly encoded. For example, a name
+        // constraint for "class C" subnet 192.0.2.0 is represented as the
+        // octets C0 00 02 00 FF FF FF 00, representing the CIDR notation
+        // 192.0.2.0/24 (mask 255.255.255.0).
+        if (value.Length() != kIPv4AddressSize * 2 &&
+            value.Length() != kIPv6AddressSize * 2) {
+          return false;
+        }
+        const std::vector<uint8_t> mask(value.UnsafeData() + value.Length() / 2,
+                                        value.UnsafeData() + value.Length());
+        const unsigned mask_prefix_length = MaskPrefixLength(mask);
+        if (!IsSuffixZero(mask, mask_prefix_length))
+          return false;
+        subtrees->ip_address_ranges.push_back(std::make_pair(
+            std::vector<uint8_t>(value.UnsafeData(),
+                                 value.UnsafeData() + value.Length() / 2),
+            mask_prefix_length));
+      }
+      break;
+    // registeredID                    [8]     OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
+    case 8:
+      if (der::IsConstructed(tag))
+        return false;
+      name_type = GENERAL_NAME_REGISTERED_ID;
+      break;
+    default:
+      return false;
+  }
+  DCHECK_NE(GENERAL_NAME_NONE, name_type);
+  if ((name_type & kSupportedNameTypes) ||
+      unsupported_type_behavior == RECORD_UNSUPPORTED) {
+    subtrees->present_name_types |= name_type;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+// Parses a GeneralSubtrees |value| and store the contents in |subtrees|.
+// The individual values stored into |subtrees| are not validated by this
+// function.
+// NOTE: |subtrees| will be modified regardless of the return.
+WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool ParseGeneralSubtrees(
+    const der::Input& value,
+    bool is_critical,
+    NameConstraints::GeneralNames* subtrees) {
+  // GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree
+  //
+  // GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE {
+  //      base                    GeneralName,
+  //      minimum         [0]     BaseDistance DEFAULT 0,
+  //      maximum         [1]     BaseDistance OPTIONAL }
+  //
+  // BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
+  der::Parser sequence_parser(value);
+  // The GeneralSubtrees sequence should have at least 1 element.
+  if (!sequence_parser.HasMore())
+    return false;
+  while (sequence_parser.HasMore()) {
+    der::Parser subtree_sequence;
+    if (!sequence_parser.ReadSequence(&subtree_sequence))
+      return false;
+
+    der::Input raw_general_name;
+    if (!subtree_sequence.ReadRawTLV(&raw_general_name))
+      return false;
+
+    if (!ParseGeneralName(raw_general_name,
+                          is_critical ? RECORD_UNSUPPORTED : IGNORE_UNSUPPORTED,
+                          IP_ADDRESS_AND_NETMASK, subtrees)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.10:
+    // Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with any
+    // name forms, thus, the minimum MUST be zero, and maximum MUST be absent.
+    // However, if an application encounters a critical name constraints
+    // extension that specifies other values for minimum or maximum for a name
+    // form that appears in a subsequent certificate, the application MUST
+    // either process these fields or reject the certificate.
+
+    // Note that technically failing here isn't required: rather only need to
+    // fail if a name of this type actually appears in a subsequent cert and
+    // this extension was marked critical. However the minimum and maximum
+    // fields appear uncommon enough that implementing that isn't useful.
+    if (subtree_sequence.HasMore())
+      return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+NameConstraints::GeneralNames::GeneralNames() {}
+
+NameConstraints::GeneralNames::~GeneralNames() {}
+
+NameConstraints::~NameConstraints() {}
+
+// static
+scoped_ptr<NameConstraints> NameConstraints::CreateFromDer(
+    const der::Input& extension_value,
+    bool is_critical) {
+  scoped_ptr<NameConstraints> name_constraints(new NameConstraints());
+  if (!name_constraints->Parse(extension_value, is_critical))
+    return nullptr;
+  return name_constraints;
+}
+
+bool NameConstraints::Parse(const der::Input& extension_value,
+                            bool is_critical) {
+  der::Parser extension_parser(extension_value);
+  der::Parser sequence_parser;
+
+  // NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
+  //      permittedSubtrees       [0]     GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL,
+  //      excludedSubtrees        [1]     GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL }
+  if (!extension_parser.ReadSequence(&sequence_parser))
+    return false;
+  if (extension_parser.HasMore())
+    return false;
+
+  bool had_permitted_subtrees = false;
+  der::Input permitted_subtrees_value;
+  if (!sequence_parser.ReadOptionalTag(der::ContextSpecificConstructed(0),
+                                       &permitted_subtrees_value,
+                                       &had_permitted_subtrees)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (had_permitted_subtrees &&
+      !ParseGeneralSubtrees(permitted_subtrees_value, is_critical,
+                            &permitted_subtrees_)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  bool had_excluded_subtrees = false;
+  der::Input excluded_subtrees_value;
+  if (!sequence_parser.ReadOptionalTag(der::ContextSpecificConstructed(1),
+                                       &excluded_subtrees_value,
+                                       &had_excluded_subtrees)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (had_excluded_subtrees &&
+      !ParseGeneralSubtrees(excluded_subtrees_value, is_critical,
+                            &excluded_subtrees_)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.10:
+  // Conforming CAs MUST NOT issue certificates where name constraints is an
+  // empty sequence. That is, either the permittedSubtrees field or the
+  // excludedSubtrees MUST be present.
+  if (!had_permitted_subtrees && !had_excluded_subtrees)
+    return false;
+
+  if (sequence_parser.HasMore())
+    return false;
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool NameConstraints::IsPermittedCert(
+    const der::Input& subject_rdn_sequence,
+    const der::Input& subject_alt_name_extnvalue_tlv) const {
+  // Subject Alternative Name handling:
+  //
+  // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6:
+  // id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 17 }
+  //
+  // SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames
+  //
+  // GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
+
+  GeneralNames san_names;
+  if (subject_alt_name_extnvalue_tlv.Length()) {
+    der::Parser extnvalue_parser(subject_alt_name_extnvalue_tlv);
+    der::Input subject_alt_name_tlv;
+    if (!extnvalue_parser.ReadTag(der::kOctetString, &subject_alt_name_tlv))
+      return false;
+
+    der::Parser subject_alt_name_parser(subject_alt_name_tlv);
+    der::Parser san_sequence_parser;
+    if (!subject_alt_name_parser.ReadSequence(&san_sequence_parser))
+      return false;
+    // Should not have trailing data after subjectAltName sequence.
+    if (subject_alt_name_parser.HasMore())
+      return false;
+    // The subjectAltName sequence should have at least 1 element.
+    if (!san_sequence_parser.HasMore())
+      return false;
+
+    while (san_sequence_parser.HasMore()) {
+      der::Input raw_general_name;
+      if (!san_sequence_parser.ReadRawTLV(&raw_general_name))
+        return false;
+
+      if (!ParseGeneralName(raw_general_name, RECORD_UNSUPPORTED,
+                            IP_ADDRESS_ONLY, &san_names))
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    // Check unsupported name types:
+    // ConstrainedNameTypes for the unsupported types will only be true if that
+    // type of name was present in a name constraint that was marked critical.
+    //
+    // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.10:
+    // If a name constraints extension that is marked as critical
+    // imposes constraints on a particular name form, and an instance of
+    // that name form appears in the subject field or subjectAltName
+    // extension of a subsequent certificate, then the application MUST
+    // either process the constraint or reject the certificate.
+    if (ConstrainedNameTypes() & san_names.present_name_types &
+        ~kSupportedNameTypes) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // Check supported name types:
+    for (const auto& dns_name : san_names.dns_names) {
+      if (!IsPermittedDNSName(dns_name))
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    for (const auto& directory_name : san_names.directory_names) {
+      if (!IsPermittedDirectoryName(
+              der::Input(directory_name.data(), directory_name.size()))) {
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+
+    for (const auto& ip_address : san_names.ip_addresses) {
+      if (!IsPermittedIP(ip_address))
+        return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Subject handling:
+
+  // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.10:
+  // Legacy implementations exist where an electronic mail address is embedded
+  // in the subject distinguished name in an attribute of type emailAddress
+  // (Section 4.1.2.6). When constraints are imposed on the rfc822Name name
+  // form, but the certificate does not include a subject alternative name, the
+  // rfc822Name constraint MUST be applied to the attribute of type emailAddress
+  // in the subject distinguished name.
+  if (!subject_alt_name_extnvalue_tlv.Length() &&
+      (ConstrainedNameTypes() & GENERAL_NAME_RFC822_NAME)) {
+    bool contained_email_address = false;
+    if (!NameContainsEmailAddress(subject_rdn_sequence,
+                                  &contained_email_address)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (contained_email_address)
+      return false;
+  }
+
+  // RFC 5280 4.1.2.6:
+  // If subject naming information is present only in the subjectAltName
+  // extension (e.g., a key bound only to an email address or URI), then the
+  // subject name MUST be an empty sequence and the subjectAltName extension
+  // MUST be critical.
+  // This code assumes that criticality condition is checked by the caller, and
+  // therefore only needs to avoid the IsPermittedDirectoryName check against an
+  // empty subject in such a case.
+  if (subject_alt_name_extnvalue_tlv.Length() &&
+      subject_rdn_sequence.Length() == 0) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return IsPermittedDirectoryName(subject_rdn_sequence);
+}
+
+bool NameConstraints::IsPermittedDNSName(const std::string& name) const {
+  // If there are no name constraints for DNS names, all names are accepted.
+  if (!(ConstrainedNameTypes() & GENERAL_NAME_DNS_NAME))
+    return true;
+
+  for (const std::string& excluded_name : excluded_subtrees_.dns_names) {
+    // When matching wildcard hosts against excluded subtrees, consider it a
+    // match if the constraint would match any expansion of the wildcard. Eg,
+    // *.bar.com should match a constraint of foo.bar.com.
+    if (DNSNameMatches(name, excluded_name, WILDCARD_PARTIAL_MATCH))
+      return false;
+  }
+  for (const std::string& permitted_name : permitted_subtrees_.dns_names) {
+    // When matching wildcard hosts against permitted subtrees, consider it a
+    // match only if the constraint would match all expansions of the wildcard.
+    // Eg, *.bar.com should match a constraint of bar.com, but not foo.bar.com.
+    if (DNSNameMatches(name, permitted_name, WILDCARD_FULL_MATCH))
+      return true;
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+bool NameConstraints::IsPermittedDirectoryName(
+    const der::Input& name_rdn_sequence) const {
+  // If there are no name constraints for directory names, all names are
+  // accepted.
+  if (!(ConstrainedNameTypes() & GENERAL_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME))
+    return true;
+
+  for (const auto& excluded_name : excluded_subtrees_.directory_names) {
+    if (VerifyNameInSubtree(
+            name_rdn_sequence,
+            der::Input(excluded_name.data(), excluded_name.size()))) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  for (const auto& permitted_name : permitted_subtrees_.directory_names) {
+    if (VerifyNameInSubtree(
+            name_rdn_sequence,
+            der::Input(permitted_name.data(), permitted_name.size()))) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+bool NameConstraints::IsPermittedIP(const IPAddressNumber& ip) const {
+  // If there are no name constraints for IP Address names, all names are
+  // accepted.
+  if (!(ConstrainedNameTypes() & GENERAL_NAME_IP_ADDRESS))
+    return true;
+
+  for (const auto& excluded_ip : excluded_subtrees_.ip_address_ranges) {
+    if (IPNumberMatchesPrefix(ip, excluded_ip.first, excluded_ip.second))
+      return false;
+  }
+  for (const auto& permitted_ip : permitted_subtrees_.ip_address_ranges) {
+    if (IPNumberMatchesPrefix(ip, permitted_ip.first, permitted_ip.second))
+      return true;
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+int NameConstraints::ConstrainedNameTypes() const {
+  return (permitted_subtrees_.present_name_types |
+          excluded_subtrees_.present_name_types);
+}
+
+}  // namespace net