Kill renderers for bad password forms in --site-per-process.

content/browser/site_instance_impl.cc

 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 #include "content/browser/site_instance_impl.h"
 
 #include "base/command_line.h"
 #include "content/browser/browsing_instance.h"
 #include "content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.h"
 #include "content/browser/frame_host/debug_urls.h"
@@ skipping 336 matching lines @@
       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
   if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kSitePerProcess)) {
     // Guest processes cannot be locked to its site because guests always have
     // a fixed SiteInstance. The site of GURLs a guest loads doesn't match that
     // SiteInstance. So we skip locking the guest process to the site.
     // TODO(ncarter): Remove this exclusion once we can make origin lock per
     // RenderFrame routing id.
     if (site_.SchemeIs(content::kGuestScheme))
       return;
 
+    // TODO(creis, nick) https://crbug.com/510588 Chrome UI pages use the same
+    // site (chrome://chrome), so they can't be locked because the site being
+    // loaded doesn't match the SiteInstance.
+    if (site_.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme))
+      return;
+
     ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* policy =
         ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
     policy->LockToOrigin(process_->GetID(), site_);
   }
 }
 
 }  // namespace content