Ignore certificate transparency by default.

net/socket/ssl_client_socket_openssl.cc

 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 // OpenSSL binding for SSLClientSocket. The class layout and general principle
 // of operation is derived from SSLClientSocketNSS.
 
 #include "net/socket/ssl_client_socket_openssl.h"
 
 #include <errno.h>
@@ skipping 1204 matching lines @@
   if (sct_list_len > 0)
     sct_list.assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(sct_list_raw), sct_list_len);
 
   // Note that this is a completely synchronous operation: The CT Log Verifier
   // gets all the data it needs for SCT verification and does not do any
   // external communication.
   cert_transparency_verifier_->Verify(
       server_cert_verify_result_.verified_cert.get(), ocsp_response, sct_list,
       &ct_verify_result_, net_log_);
 
-  if (!policy_enforcer_) {
-    server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_IS_EV;
-  } else {
-    if (server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV) {
-      scoped_refptr<ct::EVCertsWhitelist> ev_whitelist =
-          SSLConfigService::GetEVCertsWhitelist();
-      if (!policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
-              server_cert_verify_result_.verified_cert.get(),
-              ev_whitelist.get(), ct_verify_result_, net_log_)) {
-        // TODO(eranm): Log via the BoundNetLog, see crbug.com/437766
-        VLOG(1) << "EV certificate for "
-                << server_cert_verify_result_.verified_cert->subject()
-                       .GetDisplayName()
-                << " does not conform to CT policy, removing EV status.";
-        server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_IS_EV;
-      }
+  if (policy_enforcer_ &&
+      (server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV)) {
+    scoped_refptr<ct::EVCertsWhitelist> ev_whitelist =
+        SSLConfigService::GetEVCertsWhitelist();
+    if (!policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+            server_cert_verify_result_.verified_cert.get(), ev_whitelist.get(),
+            ct_verify_result_, net_log_)) {
+      // TODO(eranm): Log via the BoundNetLog, see crbug.com/437766
+      VLOG(1) << "EV certificate for "
+              << server_cert_verify_result_.verified_cert->subject()
+                     .GetDisplayName()
+              << " does not conform to CT policy, removing EV status.";
+      server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_IS_EV;
     }
   }
 }
 
 void SSLClientSocketOpenSSL::OnHandshakeIOComplete(int result) {
   int rv = DoHandshakeLoop(result);
   if (rv != ERR_IO_PENDING) {
     net_log_.EndEventWithNetErrorCode(NetLog::TYPE_SSL_CONNECT, rv);
     DoConnectCallback(rv);
   }
@@ skipping 670 matching lines @@
 
   NextProto next_proto = NextProtoFromString(npn_proto_);
   for (NextProto allowed : ssl_config_.renego_allowed_for_protos) {
     if (next_proto == allowed)
       return true;
   }
   return false;
 }
 
 }  // namespace net