Index: content/common/site_isolation_policy.h |
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+// Copyright 2015 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
+// found in the LICENSE file. |
+ |
+#ifndef CONTENT_COMMON_SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_H_ |
+#define CONTENT_COMMON_SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_H_ |
+ |
+#include "base/basictypes.h" |
+#include "content/common/content_export.h" |
+#include "url/gurl.h" |
+ |
+namespace content { |
+ |
+// A centralized place for making policy decisions about out-of-process iframes, |
+// site isolation, --site-per-process, and related features. |
+// |
+// This is currently static because all these modes are controlled by command- |
+// line flags. |
+// |
+// These methods can be called from any thread. |
+class CONTENT_EXPORT SiteIsolationPolicy { |
+ public: |
+ // Returns true if the current process model might allow the use of cross- |
+ // process iframes. This should typically used to avoid executing codepaths |
+ // that only matter for cross-process iframes, to protect the default |
+ // behavior. |
+ // |
+ // Note: Since cross-process frames will soon be possible by default (e.g. for |
+ // <iframe src="http://..."> in an extension process), usage should be limited |
+ // to temporary stop-gaps. |
+ // |
+ // Instead of calling this method, prefer to examine object state to see |
+ // whether a particular frame happens to have a cross-process relationship |
+ // with another, or to consult DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess() to see if a |
+ // particular site merits protection. |
+ static bool AreCrossProcessFramesPossible(); |
+ |
+ // Returns true if pages loaded from |url|'s site ought to be handled only by |
+ // a renderer process isolated from other sites. If --site-per-process is on |
+ // the command line, this is true for all sites. |
+ // |
+ // Eventually, this function will be made to return true for only some schemes |
+ // (e.g. extensions) or a whitelist of sites that we should protect for this |
+ // user. |
+ // |
+ // Although |url| is currently ignored, callers can assume for now that they |
+ // can pass a full URL here -- they needn't canonicalize it to a site. |
+ static bool DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess(const GURL& url); |
+ |
+ // Returns true if navigation and history code should maintain per-frame |
+ // navigation entries. This is an in-progress feature related to site |
+ // isolation, so the return value is currently tied to --site-per-process. |
+ // TODO(creis, avi): Make this the default, and eliminate this. |
+ static bool UseSubframeNavigationEntries(); |
+ |
+ private: |
+ SiteIsolationPolicy(); // Not instantiable. |
+ |
+ DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(SiteIsolationPolicy); |
+}; |
+ |
+} // namespace content |
+ |
+#endif // CONTENT_COMMON_SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_H_ |