Move existing kSitePerProcess checks to a policy-oracle object

content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc

 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 #include "content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.h"
 
 #include "base/command_line.h"
 #include "base/files/file_path.h"
 #include "base/logging.h"
 #include "base/metrics/histogram.h"
 #include "base/stl_util.h"
 #include "base/strings/string_util.h"
 #include "content/browser/plugin_process_host.h"
 #include "content/browser/site_instance_impl.h"
 #include "content/public/browser/child_process_data.h"
 #include "content/public/browser/content_browser_client.h"
 #include "content/public/browser/render_process_host.h"
 #include "content/public/common/bindings_policy.h"
-#include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
+#include "content/public/common/site_isolation_policy.h"
 #include "content/public/common/url_constants.h"
 #include "net/base/filename_util.h"
 #include "net/url_request/url_request.h"
 #include "storage/browser/fileapi/file_permission_policy.h"
 #include "storage/browser/fileapi/file_system_url.h"
 #include "storage/browser/fileapi/isolated_context.h"
 #include "storage/common/fileapi/file_system_util.h"
 #include "url/gurl.h"
 
 namespace content {
@@ skipping 529 matching lines @@
     return;
 
   state->second->RevokeReadRawCookies();
 }
 
 bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanLoadPage(int child_id,
                                                  const GURL& url,
                                                  ResourceType resource_type) {
   // If --site-per-process flag is passed, we should enforce
   // stronger security restrictions on page navigation.
-  if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
-          switches::kSitePerProcess) &&
+  if (SiteIsolationPolicy::DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess(url) &&
       IsResourceTypeFrame(resource_type)) {
     // TODO(nasko): Do the proper check for site-per-process, once
     // out-of-process iframes is ready to go.
+    // TODO(nick): Can we trust |resource_type| here?
     return true;

[Charlie Reis, 2015/07/13 22:13:14]

This whole function is in kind of a weird state.  Robert introduced it way back
in https://codereview.chromium.org/11416121/, and Nasko disabled it when
starting the OOPIF prototype in https://codereview.chromium.org/11772005.

It seems to me that we don't need it anymore.  It was meant as a way to block
cross-site iframes before we had OOPIFs (https://crbug.com/159215).  With
document blocking (https://crbug.com/268640) and killing renderers that commit
bad URLs (https://crbug.com/85128), we don't need to also block the request in
the ResourceLoader in this way.

I'd propose ripping it out entirely, either before or after this CL lands.

[ncarter (slow), 2015/07/20 17:45:46]

I've got another CL to rip this out completely.

   }
   return true;
 }
 
 bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanRequestURL(
     int child_id, const GURL& url) {
   if (!url.is_valid())
     return false;  // Can't request invalid URLs.
 
   if (IsWebSafeScheme(url.scheme()))
@@ skipping 262 matching lines @@
   base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
 
   SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id);
   if (state == security_state_.end())
     return false;
 
   return state->second->can_send_midi_sysex();
 }
 
 }  // namespace content