Implement X509Certificate::IsEV for NSS....

net/base/x509_certificate_nss.cc

Index: net/base/x509_certificate_nss.cc
===================================================================
--- net/base/x509_certificate_nss.cc	(revision 22702)
+++ net/base/x509_certificate_nss.cc	(working copy)
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include "base/nss_init.h"
 #include "net/base/cert_status_flags.h"
 #include "net/base/cert_verify_result.h"
+#include "net/base/ev_root_ca_metadata.h"
 #include "net/base/net_errors.h"
 
 namespace net {
@@ -201,7 +202,6 @@
 
 void ParsePrincipal(SECItem* der_name,
                     X509Certificate::Principal* principal) {
-
   CERTName name;
   PRArenaPool* arena = NULL;
 
@@ -286,7 +286,6 @@
 void GetCertSubjectAltNamesOfType(X509Certificate::OSCertHandle cert_handle,
                                   CERTGeneralNameType name_type,
                                   std::vector<std::string>* result) {
-
   SECItem alt_name;
   SECStatus rv = CERT_FindCertExtension(cert_handle,
       SEC_OID_X509_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, &alt_name);
@@ -320,8 +319,159 @@
   PORT_Free(alt_name.data);
 }
 
-} // namespace
+// TODO(ukai): make a Linux-only method of the EVRootCAMetadata.

[wtc, 2009/08/07 04:01:20]

Nit: make => this should be

Add "class" at the end, or remove "the".

+void GetPolicyOidTags(net::EVRootCAMetadata* metadata,
+                      std::vector<SECOidTag>* policies) {
+  const char* const* policy_oids = metadata->GetPolicyOIDs();
+  for (int i = 0; i < metadata->NumPolicyOIDs(); i++) {
+    PRUint8 buf[1024];
+    SECItem oid_item;
+    oid_item.data = buf;
+    oid_item.len = sizeof(buf);
+    SECStatus status = SEC_StringToOID(NULL, &oid_item, policy_oids[i], 0);
+    if (status != SECSuccess) {
+      LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to convert to OID: " << policy_oids[i];
+      continue;
+    }
+    SECOidTag policy = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&oid_item);
+    if (policy == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
+      // Register the OID.
+      SECOidData od;
+      od.oid.len = oid_item.len;
+      od.oid.data = oid_item.data;
+      od.offset = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+      od.desc = policy_oids[i];
+      od.mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM;
+      od.supportedExtension = INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION;
+      policy = SECOID_AddEntry(&od);
+      DCHECK(policy != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN);
+    }
+    policies->push_back(policy);
+  }
+  return;
+}
 
+// Call CERT_PKIXVerifyCert for the cert_handle.
+// Verification results are stored in an array of CERTValOutParam.
+// If metadata is not NULL, policies are also checked.

[wtc, 2009/08/07 04:01:20]

This sentence needs to be updated because 'metadata'
has been replaced by policy_oids and num_policy_oids.

+// Caller must initialize cvout before calling this function.
+SECStatus PKIXVerifyCert(X509Certificate::OSCertHandle cert_handle,
+                         const SECOidTag* policy_oids,
+                         int num_policy_oids,
+                         CERTValOutParam* cvout) {
+  PRUint64 revocation_method_flags =
+      CERT_REV_M_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD |
+      CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_NETWORK_FETCHING |
+      CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_IMPLICIT_DEFAULT_SOURCE |

[alv, 2009/08/08 00:47:15]

if you plan to allow user to use default source then you will need to call
CERT_EnableOCSPChecking and then call CERT_SetOCSPDefaultResponder to set the
source. Otherwise I would just set CERT_REV_M_IGNORE_IMPLICIT_DEFAULT_SOURCE.

+      CERT_REV_M_REQUIRE_INFO_ON_MISSING_SOURCE |
+      CERT_REV_M_STOP_TESTING_ON_FRESH_INFO;

[alv, 2009/08/08 00:47:15]

I would also list here the defalt CERT_REV_M_IGNORE_MISSING_FRESH_INFO flag
since it would improve understanding of the code.

+  PRUint64 revocation_method_independent_flags =
+      CERT_REV_MI_TEST_ALL_LOCAL_INFORMATION_FIRST |
+      CERT_REV_MI_REQUIRE_SOME_FRESH_INFO_AVAILABLE;
+  PRUint64 method_flags[2];
+  method_flags[cert_revocation_method_crl] = revocation_method_flags;
+  method_flags[cert_revocation_method_ocsp] = revocation_method_flags;
+
+  // TODO(ukai): need to find out if we need to call OCSP-related NSS functions,
+  // CERT_EnableOCSPChecking, CERT_DisableOCSPDefaultResponder and
+  // CERT_SetOCSPFailureMode.
+  CERTRevocationMethodIndex preferred_revocation_methods[1];
+  preferred_revocation_methods[0] = cert_revocation_method_ocsp;
+
+  CERTRevocationFlags revocation_flags;
+  revocation_flags.leafTests.number_of_defined_methods =
+      arraysize(method_flags);
+  revocation_flags.leafTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method = method_flags;
+  revocation_flags.leafTests.number_of_preferred_methods =
+      arraysize(preferred_revocation_methods);
+  revocation_flags.leafTests.preferred_methods = preferred_revocation_methods;
+  revocation_flags.leafTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags =
+      revocation_method_independent_flags;
+
+  revocation_flags.chainTests.number_of_defined_methods =
+      arraysize(method_flags);
+  revocation_flags.chainTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method = method_flags;
+  revocation_flags.chainTests.number_of_preferred_methods =
+      arraysize(preferred_revocation_methods);
+  revocation_flags.chainTests.preferred_methods = preferred_revocation_methods;
+  revocation_flags.chainTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags =
+      revocation_method_independent_flags;
+
+  CERTValInParam cvin[3];
+  int cvin_index = 0;
+  // No need to set cert_pi_trustAnchors here.
+  // TODO(ukai): use cert_pi_useAIACertFetch (new feature in NSS 3.12.1).
+  cvin[cvin_index].type = cert_pi_revocationFlags;
+  cvin[cvin_index].value.pointer.revocation = &revocation_flags;
+  cvin_index++;
+  std::vector<SECOidTag> policies;
+  if (policy_oids && num_policy_oids > 0) {
+    cvin[cvin_index].type = cert_pi_policyOID;
+    cvin[cvin_index].value.arraySize = num_policy_oids;
+    cvin[cvin_index].value.array.oids = policy_oids;
+    cvin_index++;
+  }
+  cvin[cvin_index].type = cert_pi_end;
+
+  return CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, certificateUsageSSLServer,
+                             cvin, cvout, NULL);
+}
+
+// TODO(ukai): make a Linux-only method of the EVRootCAMetadata.
+bool GetEvPolicyOidTag(net::EVRootCAMetadata* metadata,

[alv, 2009/08/08 00:47:15]

Seems like this method and GetPolicyOidTags belong to EVRootCAMetadata object.
Same for policy oid tags: this way you will do string conversion only ones when
it was not yet converted, and use existing tag in all other cases.

+                       const X509Certificate::Fingerprint& fingerprint,
+                       SECOidTag* ev_policy_tag) {
+  std::string ev_policy_oid;
+  if (!metadata->GetPolicyOID(fingerprint, &ev_policy_oid)) {
+    LOG(ERROR) << "GetPolicyOID failed";
+    return false;
+  }
+  DCHECK(!ev_policy_oid.empty());
+
+  PRUint8 buf[1024];
+  SECItem oid_item;
+  oid_item.data = buf;
+  oid_item.len = sizeof(buf);
+  SECStatus status = SEC_StringToOID(NULL, &oid_item, ev_policy_oid.data(),
+                                     ev_policy_oid.length());
+  if (status != SECSuccess) {
+    LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to convert OID:" << ev_policy_oid;
+    return false;
+  }
+  *ev_policy_tag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&oid_item);
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool CheckCertPolicies(X509Certificate::OSCertHandle cert_handle,
+                       SECOidTag ev_policy_tag) {
+  SECItem policy_ext;
+  SECStatus rv = CERT_FindCertExtension(
+      cert_handle, SEC_OID_X509_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES, &policy_ext);
+  if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+    LOG(ERROR) << "Cert has no policies extension.";
+    return false;
+  }
+  CERTCertificatePolicies* policies =

[alv, 2009/08/08 00:47:15]

Does this function leak policies?

+      CERT_DecodeCertificatePoliciesExtension(&policy_ext);
+  if (!policies) {
+    LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to decode certificate policy.";
+    return false;
+  }
+  CERTPolicyInfo** policy_infos = policies->policyInfos;
+  while (*policy_infos != NULL) {
+    CERTPolicyInfo* policy_info = *policy_infos++;
+    SECOidTag oid_tag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&policy_info->policyID);

[wtc, 2009/08/07 04:01:20]

Does it work to just use policy_info->oid?  Mozilla code
is not always right or the best.

[alv, 2009/08/08 00:47:15]

You right. Decoder for cert policy extension has already populated oid tags. See
http://mxr.mozilla.org/security/source/security/nss/lib/certdb/polcyxtn.c#228

+    if (oid_tag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
+      continue;
+    if (oid_tag == ev_policy_tag)
+      return true;
+  }
+  LOG(ERROR) << "No EV Policy Tag";
+  return false;
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
 void X509Certificate::Initialize() {
   ParsePrincipal(&cert_handle_->derSubject, &subject_);
   ParsePrincipal(&cert_handle_->derIssuer, &issuer_);
@@ -365,11 +515,6 @@
     dns_names->push_back(subject_.common_name);
 }
 
-// TODO(ukai): fix to use this method to verify certificate on SSL channel.
-// Note that it's not being used yet.  We need to fix SSLClientSocketNSS to
-// use this method to verify ssl certificate.
-// The problem is that we get segfault when unit tests is going to terminate
-// if PR_Cleanup is called in NSSInitSingleton destructor.
 int X509Certificate::Verify(const std::string& hostname,
                             int flags,
                             CertVerifyResult* verify_result) const {
@@ -386,75 +531,9 @@
   if (validity != secCertTimeValid)
     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID;
 
-  CERTRevocationFlags revocation_flags;
-  // TODO(ukai): Fix to use OCSP.
-  // OCSP mode would fail with SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER.
-  // We need to set up OCSP and install an HTTP client for NSS.
-  bool use_ocsp = false;
-  // EV requires revocation checking.
-  if (!(flags & VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED))
-    flags &= ~VERIFY_EV_CERT;
-
-  // TODO(wtc): Use CERT_REV_M_REQUIRE_INFO_ON_MISSING_SOURCE and
-  // CERT_REV_MI_REQUIRE_SOME_FRESH_INFO_AVAILABLE for EV certificate
-  // verification.
-  PRUint64 revocation_method_flags =
-      CERT_REV_M_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD |
-      CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_NETWORK_FETCHING |
-      CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_IMPLICIT_DEFAULT_SOURCE |
-      CERT_REV_M_SKIP_TEST_ON_MISSING_SOURCE |
-      CERT_REV_M_STOP_TESTING_ON_FRESH_INFO;
-  PRUint64 revocation_method_independent_flags =
-      CERT_REV_MI_TEST_ALL_LOCAL_INFORMATION_FIRST |
-      CERT_REV_MI_NO_OVERALL_INFO_REQUIREMENT;
-  PRUint64 method_flags[2];
-  method_flags[cert_revocation_method_crl] = revocation_method_flags;
-  method_flags[cert_revocation_method_ocsp] = revocation_method_flags;
-
-  int number_of_defined_methods;
-  CERTRevocationMethodIndex preferred_revocation_methods[1];
-  if (use_ocsp) {
-    number_of_defined_methods = 2;
-    preferred_revocation_methods[0] = cert_revocation_method_ocsp;
-  } else {
-    number_of_defined_methods = 1;
-    preferred_revocation_methods[0] = cert_revocation_method_crl;
-  }
-
-  revocation_flags.leafTests.number_of_defined_methods =
-      number_of_defined_methods;
-  revocation_flags.leafTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method = method_flags;
-  revocation_flags.leafTests.number_of_preferred_methods =
-      arraysize(preferred_revocation_methods);
-  revocation_flags.leafTests.preferred_methods = preferred_revocation_methods;
-  revocation_flags.leafTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags =
-      revocation_method_independent_flags;
-  revocation_flags.chainTests.number_of_defined_methods =
-      number_of_defined_methods;
-  revocation_flags.chainTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method = method_flags;
-  revocation_flags.chainTests.number_of_preferred_methods =
-      arraysize(preferred_revocation_methods);
-  revocation_flags.chainTests.preferred_methods = preferred_revocation_methods;
-  revocation_flags.chainTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags =
-      revocation_method_independent_flags;
-
-  CERTValInParam cvin[2];
-  int cvin_index = 0;
-  // We can't use PK11_ListCerts(PK11CertListCA, NULL) for cert_pi_trustAnchors.
-  // We get SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER (-8172) for our test root CA cert with
-  // it by NSS 3.12.0.3.
-  // No need to set cert_pi_trustAnchors here.
-  // TODO(ukai): use cert_pi_useAIACertFetch (new feature in NSS 3.12.1).
-  cvin[cvin_index].type = cert_pi_revocationFlags;
-  cvin[cvin_index].value.pointer.revocation = &revocation_flags;
-  cvin_index++;
-  cvin[cvin_index].type = cert_pi_end;
-
   CERTValOutParam cvout[3];
   int cvout_index = 0;
-  cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_trustAnchor;
-  cvout[cvout_index].value.pointer.cert = NULL;
-  cvout_index++;
+  // We don't need the trust anchor for the first PKIXVerifyCert call.
   cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_certList;
   cvout[cvout_index].value.pointer.chain = NULL;
   int cvout_cert_list_index = cvout_index;
@@ -462,8 +541,8 @@
   cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_end;
   ScopedCERTValOutParam scoped_cvout(cvout);
 
-  status = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle_, certificateUsageSSLServer,
-                               cvin, cvout, NULL);
+  verify_result->cert_status |= net::CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
+  status = PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle_, NULL, 0, cvout);
   if (status != SECSuccess) {
     int err = PORT_GetError();
     LOG(ERROR) << "CERT_PKIXVerifyCert failed err=" << err;
@@ -480,15 +559,56 @@
                    verify_result);
   if (IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status))
     return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
-  if ((flags & VERIFY_EV_CERT) && VerifyEV())
-    verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_IS_EV;
+
+  if (flags & VERIFY_EV_CERT) {

[wtc, 2009/08/07 04:01:20]

Nit: use the original form:

  if ((flags & VERIFY_EV_CERT) && VerifyEV())
    verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_IS_EV;

+    if (VerifyEV())
+      verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_IS_EV;
+  }
   return OK;
 }
 
-// TODO(port): Implement properly on Linux.
+// Studied Mozilla's code (esp. security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSCertHelper.cpp)

[wtc, 2009/08/07 04:01:20]

Isn't nsIdentityChecking.cpp the most useful file for EV
verification?

+// to learn how to verify EV certificate.
+// TODO(wtc): We may be able to request cert_po_policyOID and just
+// check if any of the returned policies is the EV policy of the trust anchor.
+// Another possible optimization is that we get the trust anchor from
+// the first PKIXVerifyCert call.  We look up the EV policy for the trust
+// anchor.  If the trust anchor has no EV policy, we know the cert isn't EV.
+// Otherwise, we pass just that EV policy (as opposed to all the EV policies)
+// to the second PKIXVerifyCert call.

[alv, 2009/08/08 00:47:15]

The first option does not seem to be a working solution, since you would still
need to run verification for the second time to make sure EE cert policy is
properly propagated through the chain. The second option should be easy to
implement. 

[wtc, 2009/08/13 00:22:06]

Alexei, you may have misunderstood me.

What I meant is:
1. We specify cert_po_policyOID in cvout.
2. Call CERT_PKIXVerifyCert
3. On return, cvout should contain all the policies that
   were found to be valid for cert chain.
4. If any of the returned policies is the EV policy of the
   trust anchor, the cert is EV.

Did I miss something?

 bool X509Certificate::VerifyEV() const {
-  NOTIMPLEMENTED();
-  return false;
+  net::EVRootCAMetadata* metadata = net::EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance();
+
+  CERTValOutParam cvout[3];
+  int cvout_index = 0;
+  cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_trustAnchor;
+  cvout[cvout_index].value.pointer.cert = NULL;
+  int cvout_trust_anchor_index = cvout_index;
+  cvout_index++;
+  cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_end;
+  ScopedCERTValOutParam scoped_cvout(cvout);
+
+  std::vector<SECOidTag> policies;
+  GetPolicyOidTags(metadata, &policies);
+  SECStatus status = PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle_,
+                                    &policies[0], policies.size(), cvout);
+  if (status != SECSuccess)
+    return false;
+
+  CERTCertificate* root_ca =
+      cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert;
+  if (root_ca == NULL)
+    return false;
+  X509Certificate::Fingerprint fingerprint =
+      X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint(root_ca);
+  SECOidTag ev_policy_tag;
+  if (!GetEvPolicyOidTag(metadata, fingerprint, &ev_policy_tag))
+    return false;
+
+  if (!CheckCertPolicies(cert_handle_, ev_policy_tag))
+    return false;
+
+  return true;
 }
 
 // static