Revert of Linux Sandbox: split the GPU policies to their own file.

content/common/sandbox_linux.h

Index: content/common/sandbox_linux.h
diff --git a/content/common/sandbox_linux.h b/content/common/sandbox_linux.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5101f23df61298433d165bc84661dd8b23ba0442
--- /dev/null
+++ b/content/common/sandbox_linux.h
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#ifndef CONTENT_COMMON_SANDBOX_LINUX_H_
+#define CONTENT_COMMON_SANDBOX_LINUX_H_
+
+#include <string>
+
+#include "base/basictypes.h"
+#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h"
+#include "content/public/common/sandbox_linux.h"
+
+template <typename T> struct DefaultSingletonTraits;
+namespace sandbox { class SetuidSandboxClient; }
+
+namespace content {
+
+// A singleton class to represent and change our sandboxing state for the
+// three main Linux sandboxes.
+class LinuxSandbox {
+ public:
+  // This is a list of sandbox IPC methods which the renderer may send to the
+  // sandbox host. See http://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxSandboxIPC
+  // This isn't the full list, values < 32 are reserved for methods called from
+  // Skia.
+  enum LinuxSandboxIPCMethods {
+    METHOD_GET_FONT_FAMILY_FOR_CHAR = 32,
+    METHOD_LOCALTIME = 33,
+    METHOD_GET_CHILD_WITH_INODE = 34,
+    METHOD_GET_STYLE_FOR_STRIKE = 35,
+    METHOD_MAKE_SHARED_MEMORY_SEGMENT = 36,
+    METHOD_MATCH_WITH_FALLBACK = 37,
+  };
+
+  // Get our singleton instance.
+  static LinuxSandbox* GetInstance();
+
+  // Do some initialization that can only be done before any of the sandboxes
+  // are enabled. If using the setuid sandbox, this should be called manually
+  // before the setuid sandbox is engaged.
+  void PreinitializeSandbox();
+
+  // Initialize the sandbox with the given pre-built configuration. Currently
+  // seccomp-bpf and address space limitations (the setuid sandbox works
+  // differently and is set-up in the Zygote). This will instantiate the
+  // LinuxSandbox singleton if it doesn't already exist.
+  static bool InitializeSandbox();
+
+  // Returns the Status of the renderers' sandbox. Can only be queried after
+  // going through PreinitializeSandbox(). This is a bitmask and uses the
+  // constants defined in "enum LinuxSandboxStatus". Since the status needs to
+  // be provided before the sandboxes are actually started, this returns what
+  // will actually happen once the various Start* functions are called from
+  // inside a renderer.
+  int GetStatus() const;
+  // Returns true if the current process is single-threaded or if the number
+  // of threads cannot be determined.
+  bool IsSingleThreaded() const;
+  // Did we start Seccomp BPF?
+  bool seccomp_bpf_started() const;
+
+  // Simple accessor for our instance of the setuid sandbox. Will never return
+  // NULL.
+  // There is no StartSetuidSandbox(), the SetuidSandboxClient instance should
+  // be used directly.
+  sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient* setuid_sandbox_client() const;
+
+  // Check the policy and eventually start the seccomp-bpf sandbox. This should
+  // never be called with threads started. If we detect that threads have
+  // started we will crash.
+  bool StartSeccompBPF(const std::string& process_type);
+
+  // Limit the address space of the current process (and its children).
+  // to make some vulnerabilities harder to exploit.
+  bool LimitAddressSpace(const std::string& process_type);
+
+ private:
+  friend struct DefaultSingletonTraits<LinuxSandbox>;
+
+  // We must have been pre_initialized_ before using this.
+  bool seccomp_bpf_supported() const;
+  // Returns true if it can be determined that the current process has open
+  // directories that are not managed by the LinuxSandbox class. This would
+  // be a vulnerability as it would allow to bypass the setuid sandbox.
+  bool HasOpenDirectories();
+  // The last part of the initialization is to make sure any temporary "hole"
+  // in the sandbox is closed. For now, this consists of closing proc_fd_.
+  void SealSandbox();
+
+  // A file descriptor to /proc. It's dangerous to have it around as it could
+  // allow for sandbox bypasses. It needs to be closed before we consider
+  // ourselves sandboxed.
+  int proc_fd_;
+  bool seccomp_bpf_started_;
+  // Did PreinitializeSandbox() run?
+  bool pre_initialized_;
+  bool seccomp_bpf_supported_;  // Accurate if pre_initialized_.
+  scoped_ptr<sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient> setuid_sandbox_client_;
+
+  ~LinuxSandbox();
+  DISALLOW_IMPLICIT_CONSTRUCTORS(LinuxSandbox);
+};
+
+}  // namespace content
+
+#endif  // CONTENT_COMMON_SANDBOX_LINUX_H_
+