Revert of Linux Sandbox: split the GPU policies to their own file.

content/common/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc

+// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <ucontext.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <vector>
+
+#include "base/basictypes.h"
+#include "base/command_line.h"
+#include "base/logging.h"
+#include "build/build_config.h"
+#include "content/common/sandbox_linux.h"
+#include "content/common/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.h"
+#include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/services/broker_process.h"
+
+// These are the only architectures supported for now.
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
+    (defined(__arm__) && (defined(__thumb__) || defined(__ARM_EABI__)))
+#define SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX)
+#include "base/posix/eintr_wrapper.h"
+#include "content/common/sandbox_bpf_base_policy_linux.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/sigsys_handlers.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf_policy.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/services/linux_syscalls.h"
+
+using sandbox::BaselinePolicy;
+using sandbox::BrokerProcess;
+using sandbox::ErrorCode;
+using sandbox::SandboxBPF;
+using sandbox::SyscallSets;
+using sandbox::arch_seccomp_data;
+
+namespace content {
+
+namespace {
+
+void StartSandboxWithPolicy(sandbox::SandboxBPFPolicy* policy);
+
+inline bool IsChromeOS() {
+#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
+  return true;
+#else
+  return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+inline bool IsArchitectureX86_64() {
+#if defined(__x86_64__)
+  return true;
+#else
+  return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+inline bool IsArchitectureI386() {
+#if defined(__i386__)
+  return true;
+#else
+  return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+inline bool IsArchitectureArm() {
+#if defined(__arm__)
+  return true;
+#else
+  return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+inline bool IsUsingToolKitGtk() {
+#if defined(TOOLKIT_GTK)
+  return true;
+#else
+  return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+// Policies for the GPU process.
+// TODO(jln): move to gpu/
+
+bool IsAcceleratedVideoDecodeEnabled() {
+  // Accelerated video decode is currently enabled on Chrome OS,
+  // but not on Linux: crbug.com/137247.
+  bool is_enabled = IsChromeOS();
+
+  const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
+  is_enabled = is_enabled &&
+      !command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAcceleratedVideoDecode);
+
+  return is_enabled;
+}
+
+intptr_t GpuSIGSYS_Handler(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args,
+                           void* aux_broker_process) {
+  RAW_CHECK(aux_broker_process);
+  BrokerProcess* broker_process =
+      static_cast<BrokerProcess*>(aux_broker_process);
+  switch (args.nr) {
+    case __NR_access:
+      return broker_process->Access(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(args.args[0]),
+                                    static_cast<int>(args.args[1]));
+    case __NR_open:
+      return broker_process->Open(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(args.args[0]),
+                                  static_cast<int>(args.args[1]));
+    case __NR_openat:
+      // Allow using openat() as open().
+      if (static_cast<int>(args.args[0]) == AT_FDCWD) {
+        return
+            broker_process->Open(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(args.args[1]),
+                                 static_cast<int>(args.args[2]));
+      } else {
+        return -EPERM;
+      }
+    default:
+      RAW_CHECK(false);
+      return -ENOSYS;
+  }
+}
+
+class GpuProcessPolicy : public SandboxBPFBasePolicy {
+ public:
+  explicit GpuProcessPolicy(void* broker_process)
+      : broker_process_(broker_process) {}
+  virtual ~GpuProcessPolicy() {}
+
+  virtual ErrorCode EvaluateSyscall(SandboxBPF* sandbox_compiler,
+                                    int system_call_number) const OVERRIDE;
+
+ private:
+  const void* broker_process_;  // Non-owning pointer.
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(GpuProcessPolicy);
+};
+
+// Main policy for x86_64/i386. Extended by ArmGpuProcessPolicy.
+ErrorCode GpuProcessPolicy::EvaluateSyscall(SandboxBPF* sandbox,
+                                            int sysno) const {
+  switch (sysno) {
+    case __NR_ioctl:
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
+    // The Nvidia driver uses flags not in the baseline policy
+    // (MAP_LOCKED | MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_32BIT)
+    case __NR_mmap:
+#endif
+    // We also hit this on the linux_chromeos bot but don't yet know what
+    // weird flags were involved.
+    case __NR_mprotect:
+    case __NR_sched_getaffinity:
+    case __NR_sched_setaffinity:
+    case __NR_setpriority:
+      return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
+    case __NR_access:
+    case __NR_open:
+    case __NR_openat:
+      return sandbox->Trap(GpuSIGSYS_Handler, broker_process_);
+    default:
+      if (SyscallSets::IsEventFd(sysno))
+        return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
+
+      // Default on the baseline policy.
+      return SandboxBPFBasePolicy::EvaluateSyscall(sandbox, sysno);
+  }
+}
+
+class GpuBrokerProcessPolicy : public GpuProcessPolicy {
+ public:
+  GpuBrokerProcessPolicy() : GpuProcessPolicy(NULL) {}
+  virtual ~GpuBrokerProcessPolicy() {}
+
+  virtual ErrorCode EvaluateSyscall(SandboxBPF* sandbox_compiler,
+                                    int system_call_number) const OVERRIDE;
+
+ private:
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(GpuBrokerProcessPolicy);
+};
+
+// x86_64/i386.
+// A GPU broker policy is the same as a GPU policy with open and
+// openat allowed.
+ErrorCode GpuBrokerProcessPolicy::EvaluateSyscall(SandboxBPF* sandbox,
+                                                  int sysno) const {
+  switch (sysno) {
+    case __NR_access:
+    case __NR_open:
+    case __NR_openat:
+      return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
+    default:
+      return GpuProcessPolicy::EvaluateSyscall(sandbox, sysno);
+  }
+}
+
+class ArmGpuProcessPolicy : public GpuProcessPolicy {
+ public:
+  explicit ArmGpuProcessPolicy(void* broker_process, bool allow_shmat)
+      : GpuProcessPolicy(broker_process), allow_shmat_(allow_shmat) {}
+  virtual ~ArmGpuProcessPolicy() {}
+
+  virtual ErrorCode EvaluateSyscall(SandboxBPF* sandbox_compiler,
+                                    int system_call_number) const OVERRIDE;
+
+ private:
+  const bool allow_shmat_;  // Allow shmat(2).
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ArmGpuProcessPolicy);
+};
+
+// Generic ARM GPU process sandbox, inheriting from GpuProcessPolicy.
+ErrorCode ArmGpuProcessPolicy::EvaluateSyscall(SandboxBPF* sandbox,
+                                               int sysno) const {
+#if defined(__arm__)
+  if (allow_shmat_ && sysno == __NR_shmat)
+    return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
+#endif  // defined(__arm__)
+
+  switch (sysno) {
+#if defined(__arm__)
+    // ARM GPU sandbox is started earlier so we need to allow networking
+    // in the sandbox.
+    case __NR_connect:
+    case __NR_getpeername:
+    case __NR_getsockname:
+    case __NR_sysinfo:
+    case __NR_uname:
+      return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
+    // Allow only AF_UNIX for |domain|.
+    case __NR_socket:
+    case __NR_socketpair:
+      return sandbox->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT,
+                           ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, AF_UNIX,
+                           ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
+                           ErrorCode(EPERM));
+#endif  // defined(__arm__)
+    default:
+      if (SyscallSets::IsAdvancedScheduler(sysno))
+        return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
+
+      // Default to the generic GPU policy.
+      return GpuProcessPolicy::EvaluateSyscall(sandbox, sysno);
+  }
+}
+
+class ArmGpuBrokerProcessPolicy : public ArmGpuProcessPolicy {
+ public:
+  ArmGpuBrokerProcessPolicy() : ArmGpuProcessPolicy(NULL, false) {}
+  virtual ~ArmGpuBrokerProcessPolicy() {}
+
+  virtual ErrorCode EvaluateSyscall(SandboxBPF* sandbox_compiler,
+                                    int system_call_number) const OVERRIDE;
+
+ private:
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ArmGpuBrokerProcessPolicy);
+};
+
+// A GPU broker policy is the same as a GPU policy with open and
+// openat allowed.
+ErrorCode ArmGpuBrokerProcessPolicy::EvaluateSyscall(SandboxBPF* sandbox,
+                                                     int sysno) const {
+  switch (sysno) {
+    case __NR_access:
+    case __NR_open:
+    case __NR_openat:
+      return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
+    default:
+      return ArmGpuProcessPolicy::EvaluateSyscall(sandbox, sysno);
+  }
+}
+
+// Policy for renderer and worker processes.
+// TODO(jln): move to renderer/
+
+class RendererOrWorkerProcessPolicy : public SandboxBPFBasePolicy {
+ public:
+  RendererOrWorkerProcessPolicy() {}
+  virtual ~RendererOrWorkerProcessPolicy() {}
+
+  virtual ErrorCode EvaluateSyscall(SandboxBPF* sandbox_compiler,
+                                    int system_call_number) const OVERRIDE;
+
+ private:
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(RendererOrWorkerProcessPolicy);
+};
+
+ErrorCode RendererOrWorkerProcessPolicy::EvaluateSyscall(SandboxBPF* sandbox,
+                                                         int sysno) const {
+  switch (sysno) {
+    case __NR_clone:
+      return sandbox::RestrictCloneToThreadsAndEPERMFork(sandbox);
+    case __NR_ioctl:
+      return sandbox::RestrictIoctl(sandbox);
+    case __NR_prctl:
+      return sandbox::RestrictPrctl(sandbox);
+    // Allow the system calls below.
+    case __NR_fdatasync:
+    case __NR_fsync:
+    case __NR_getpriority:
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
+    case __NR_getrlimit:
+#endif
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__arm__)
+    case __NR_ugetrlimit:
+#endif
+    case __NR_mremap:   // See crbug.com/149834.
+    case __NR_pread64:
+    case __NR_pwrite64:
+    case __NR_sched_getaffinity:
+    case __NR_sched_get_priority_max:
+    case __NR_sched_get_priority_min:
+    case __NR_sched_getparam:
+    case __NR_sched_getscheduler:
+    case __NR_sched_setscheduler:
+    case __NR_setpriority:
+    case __NR_sysinfo:
+    case __NR_times:
+    case __NR_uname:
+      return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
+    case __NR_prlimit64:
+      return ErrorCode(EPERM);  // See crbug.com/160157.
+    default:
+      if (IsUsingToolKitGtk()) {
+#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__)
+        if (SyscallSets::IsSystemVSharedMemory(sysno))
+          return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
+#endif
+#if defined(__i386__)
+        if (SyscallSets::IsSystemVIpc(sysno))
+          return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
+#endif
+      }
+
+      // Default on the content baseline policy.
+      return SandboxBPFBasePolicy::EvaluateSyscall(sandbox, sysno);
+  }
+}
+
+// Policy for PPAPI plugins.
+// TODO(jln): move to ppapi_plugin/.
+class FlashProcessPolicy : public SandboxBPFBasePolicy {
+ public:
+  FlashProcessPolicy() {}
+  virtual ~FlashProcessPolicy() {}
+
+  virtual ErrorCode EvaluateSyscall(SandboxBPF* sandbox_compiler,
+                                    int system_call_number) const OVERRIDE;
+
+ private:
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(FlashProcessPolicy);
+};
+
+ErrorCode FlashProcessPolicy::EvaluateSyscall(SandboxBPF* sandbox,
+                                              int sysno) const {
+  switch (sysno) {
+    case __NR_clone:
+      return sandbox::RestrictCloneToThreadsAndEPERMFork(sandbox);
+    case __NR_pread64:
+    case __NR_pwrite64:
+    case __NR_sched_get_priority_max:
+    case __NR_sched_get_priority_min:
+    case __NR_sched_getaffinity:
+    case __NR_sched_getparam:
+    case __NR_sched_getscheduler:
+    case __NR_sched_setscheduler:
+    case __NR_times:
+      return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
+    case __NR_ioctl:
+      return ErrorCode(ENOTTY);  // Flash Access.
+    default:
+      if (IsUsingToolKitGtk()) {
+#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__)
+        if (SyscallSets::IsSystemVSharedMemory(sysno))
+          return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
+#endif
+#if defined(__i386__)
+        if (SyscallSets::IsSystemVIpc(sysno))
+          return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
+#endif
+      }
+
+      // Default on the baseline policy.
+      return SandboxBPFBasePolicy::EvaluateSyscall(sandbox, sysno);
+  }
+}
+
+class BlacklistDebugAndNumaPolicy : public SandboxBPFBasePolicy {
+ public:
+  BlacklistDebugAndNumaPolicy() {}
+  virtual ~BlacklistDebugAndNumaPolicy() {}
+
+  virtual ErrorCode EvaluateSyscall(SandboxBPF* sandbox_compiler,
+                                    int system_call_number) const OVERRIDE;
+
+ private:
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(BlacklistDebugAndNumaPolicy);
+};
+
+ErrorCode BlacklistDebugAndNumaPolicy::EvaluateSyscall(SandboxBPF* sandbox,
+                                                       int sysno) const {
+  if (!SandboxBPF::IsValidSyscallNumber(sysno)) {
+    // TODO(jln) we should not have to do that in a trivial policy.
+    return ErrorCode(ENOSYS);
+  }
+  if (SyscallSets::IsDebug(sysno) || SyscallSets::IsNuma(sysno))
+    return sandbox->Trap(sandbox::CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL);
+
+  return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
+}
+
+class AllowAllPolicy : public SandboxBPFBasePolicy {
+ public:
+  AllowAllPolicy() {}
+  virtual ~AllowAllPolicy() {}
+
+  virtual ErrorCode EvaluateSyscall(SandboxBPF* sandbox_compiler,
+                                    int system_call_number) const OVERRIDE;
+
+ private:
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(AllowAllPolicy);
+};
+
+// Allow all syscalls.
+// This will still deny x32 or IA32 calls in 64 bits mode or
+// 64 bits system calls in compatibility mode.
+ErrorCode AllowAllPolicy::EvaluateSyscall(SandboxBPF*, int sysno) const {
+  if (!SandboxBPF::IsValidSyscallNumber(sysno)) {
+    // TODO(jln) we should not have to do that in a trivial policy.
+    return ErrorCode(ENOSYS);
+  } else {
+    return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
+  }
+}
+
+// If a BPF policy is engaged for |process_type|, run a few sanity checks.
+void RunSandboxSanityChecks(const std::string& process_type) {
+  if (process_type == switches::kRendererProcess ||
+      process_type == switches::kWorkerProcess ||
+      process_type == switches::kGpuProcess ||
+      process_type == switches::kPpapiPluginProcess) {
+    int syscall_ret;
+    errno = 0;
+
+    // Without the sandbox, this would EBADF.
+    syscall_ret = fchmod(-1, 07777);
+    CHECK_EQ(-1, syscall_ret);
+    CHECK_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+
+    // Run most of the sanity checks only in DEBUG mode to avoid a perf.
+    // impact.
+#if !defined(NDEBUG)
+    // open() must be restricted.
+    syscall_ret = open("/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
+    CHECK_EQ(-1, syscall_ret);
+    CHECK_EQ(SandboxBPFBasePolicy::GetFSDeniedErrno(), errno);
+
+    // We should never allow the creation of netlink sockets.
+    syscall_ret = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+    CHECK_EQ(-1, syscall_ret);
+    CHECK_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+#endif  // !defined(NDEBUG)
+  }
+}
+
+bool EnableGpuBrokerPolicyCallback() {
+  StartSandboxWithPolicy(new GpuBrokerProcessPolicy);
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool EnableArmGpuBrokerPolicyCallback() {
+  StartSandboxWithPolicy(new ArmGpuBrokerProcessPolicy);
+  return true;
+}
+
+// Files needed by the ARM GPU userspace.
+static const char kLibGlesPath[] = "/usr/lib/libGLESv2.so.2";
+static const char kLibEglPath[] = "/usr/lib/libEGL.so.1";
+
+void AddArmMaliGpuWhitelist(std::vector<std::string>* read_whitelist,
+                            std::vector<std::string>* write_whitelist) {
+  // Device file needed by the ARM GPU userspace.
+  static const char kMali0Path[] = "/dev/mali0";
+
+  // Devices needed for video decode acceleration on ARM.
+  static const char kDevMfcDecPath[] = "/dev/mfc-dec";
+  static const char kDevGsc1Path[] = "/dev/gsc1";
+
+  // Devices needed for video encode acceleration on ARM.
+  static const char kDevMfcEncPath[] = "/dev/mfc-enc";
+
+  read_whitelist->push_back(kMali0Path);
+  read_whitelist->push_back(kDevMfcDecPath);
+  read_whitelist->push_back(kDevGsc1Path);
+  read_whitelist->push_back(kDevMfcEncPath);
+
+  write_whitelist->push_back(kMali0Path);
+  write_whitelist->push_back(kDevMfcDecPath);
+  write_whitelist->push_back(kDevGsc1Path);
+  write_whitelist->push_back(kDevMfcEncPath);
+}
+
+void AddArmTegraGpuWhitelist(std::vector<std::string>* read_whitelist,
+                             std::vector<std::string>* write_whitelist) {
+  // Device files needed by the Tegra GPU userspace.
+  static const char kDevNvhostCtrlPath[] = "/dev/nvhost-ctrl";
+  static const char kDevNvhostGr2dPath[] = "/dev/nvhost-gr2d";
+  static const char kDevNvhostGr3dPath[] = "/dev/nvhost-gr3d";
+  static const char kDevNvhostIspPath[] = "/dev/nvhost-isp";
+  static const char kDevNvhostViPath[] = "/dev/nvhost-vi";
+  static const char kDevNvmapPath[] = "/dev/nvmap";
+  static const char kDevTegraSemaPath[] = "/dev/tegra_sema";
+
+  read_whitelist->push_back(kDevNvhostCtrlPath);
+  read_whitelist->push_back(kDevNvhostGr2dPath);
+  read_whitelist->push_back(kDevNvhostGr3dPath);
+  read_whitelist->push_back(kDevNvhostIspPath);
+  read_whitelist->push_back(kDevNvhostViPath);
+  read_whitelist->push_back(kDevNvmapPath);
+  read_whitelist->push_back(kDevTegraSemaPath);
+
+  write_whitelist->push_back(kDevNvhostCtrlPath);
+  write_whitelist->push_back(kDevNvhostGr2dPath);
+  write_whitelist->push_back(kDevNvhostGr3dPath);
+  write_whitelist->push_back(kDevNvhostIspPath);
+  write_whitelist->push_back(kDevNvhostViPath);
+  write_whitelist->push_back(kDevNvmapPath);
+  write_whitelist->push_back(kDevTegraSemaPath);
+}
+
+void AddArmGpuWhitelist(std::vector<std::string>* read_whitelist,
+                        std::vector<std::string>* write_whitelist) {
+  // On ARM we're enabling the sandbox before the X connection is made,
+  // so we need to allow access to |.Xauthority|.
+  static const char kXAuthorityPath[] = "/home/chronos/.Xauthority";
+  static const char kLdSoCache[] = "/etc/ld.so.cache";
+
+  read_whitelist->push_back(kXAuthorityPath);
+  read_whitelist->push_back(kLdSoCache);
+  read_whitelist->push_back(kLibGlesPath);
+  read_whitelist->push_back(kLibEglPath);
+
+  AddArmMaliGpuWhitelist(read_whitelist, write_whitelist);
+  AddArmTegraGpuWhitelist(read_whitelist, write_whitelist);
+}
+
+// Start a broker process to handle open() inside the sandbox.
+void InitGpuBrokerProcess(bool for_chromeos_arm,
+                          BrokerProcess** broker_process) {
+  static const char kDriRcPath[] = "/etc/drirc";
+  static const char kDriCard0Path[] = "/dev/dri/card0";
+
+  CHECK(broker_process);
+  CHECK(*broker_process == NULL);
+
+  bool (*sandbox_callback)(void) = NULL;
+
+  // All GPU process policies need these files brokered out.
+  std::vector<std::string> read_whitelist;
+  read_whitelist.push_back(kDriCard0Path);
+  read_whitelist.push_back(kDriRcPath);
+
+  std::vector<std::string> write_whitelist;
+  write_whitelist.push_back(kDriCard0Path);
+
+  if (for_chromeos_arm) {
+    // We shouldn't be using this policy on non-ARM architectures.
+    DCHECK(IsArchitectureArm());
+    AddArmGpuWhitelist(&read_whitelist, &write_whitelist);
+    sandbox_callback = EnableArmGpuBrokerPolicyCallback;
+  } else {
+    sandbox_callback = EnableGpuBrokerPolicyCallback;
+  }
+
+  *broker_process = new BrokerProcess(SandboxBPFBasePolicy::GetFSDeniedErrno(),
+                                      read_whitelist,
+                                      write_whitelist);
+  // Initialize the broker process and give it a sandbox callback.
+  CHECK((*broker_process)->Init(sandbox_callback));
+}
+
+// Warms up/preloads resources needed by the policies.
+// Eventually start a broker process and return it in broker_process.
+void WarmupPolicy(bool chromeos_arm_gpu,
+                  BrokerProcess** broker_process) {
+  if (!chromeos_arm_gpu) {
+    // Create a new broker process.
+    InitGpuBrokerProcess(false /* not for ChromeOS ARM */, broker_process);
+
+    if (IsArchitectureX86_64() || IsArchitectureI386()) {
+      // Accelerated video decode dlopen()'s some shared objects
+      // inside the sandbox, so preload them now.
+      if (IsAcceleratedVideoDecodeEnabled()) {
+        const char* I965DrvVideoPath = NULL;
+
+        if (IsArchitectureX86_64()) {
+          I965DrvVideoPath = "/usr/lib64/va/drivers/i965_drv_video.so";
+        } else if (IsArchitectureI386()) {
+          I965DrvVideoPath = "/usr/lib/va/drivers/i965_drv_video.so";
+        }
+
+        dlopen(I965DrvVideoPath, RTLD_NOW|RTLD_GLOBAL|RTLD_NODELETE);
+        dlopen("libva.so.1", RTLD_NOW|RTLD_GLOBAL|RTLD_NODELETE);
+        dlopen("libva-x11.so.1", RTLD_NOW|RTLD_GLOBAL|RTLD_NODELETE);
+      }
+    }
+  } else {
+    // ChromeOS ARM GPU policy.
+    // Create a new broker process.
+    InitGpuBrokerProcess(true /* for ChromeOS ARM */, broker_process);
+
+    // Preload the Mali library.
+    dlopen("/usr/lib/libmali.so", RTLD_NOW|RTLD_GLOBAL|RTLD_NODELETE);
+
+    // Preload the Tegra libraries.
+    dlopen("/usr/lib/libnvrm.so", RTLD_NOW|RTLD_GLOBAL|RTLD_NODELETE);
+    dlopen("/usr/lib/libnvrm_graphics.so", RTLD_NOW|RTLD_GLOBAL|RTLD_NODELETE);
+    dlopen("/usr/lib/libnvos.so", RTLD_NOW|RTLD_GLOBAL|RTLD_NODELETE);
+    dlopen("/usr/lib/libnvddk_2d.so", RTLD_NOW|RTLD_GLOBAL|RTLD_NODELETE);
+    dlopen("/usr/lib/libardrv_dynamic.so", RTLD_NOW|RTLD_GLOBAL|RTLD_NODELETE);
+    dlopen("/usr/lib/libnvwsi.so", RTLD_NOW|RTLD_GLOBAL|RTLD_NODELETE);
+    dlopen("/usr/lib/libnvglsi.so", RTLD_NOW|RTLD_GLOBAL|RTLD_NODELETE);
+    dlopen("/usr/lib/libcgdrv.so", RTLD_NOW|RTLD_GLOBAL|RTLD_NODELETE);
+  }
+}
+
+void StartGpuProcessSandbox(const CommandLine& command_line,
+                            const std::string& process_type) {
+  bool chromeos_arm_gpu = false;
+  bool allow_sysv_shm = false;
+
+  if (process_type == switches::kGpuProcess) {
+    // On Chrome OS ARM, we need a specific GPU process policy.
+    if (IsChromeOS() && IsArchitectureArm()) {
+      chromeos_arm_gpu = true;
+      if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kGpuSandboxAllowSysVShm)) {
+        allow_sysv_shm = true;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // This should never be destroyed, as after the sandbox is started it is
+  // vital to the process. Ownership is transfered to the policies and then to
+  // the BPF sandbox which will keep it around to service SIGSYS traps from the
+  // kernel.
+  BrokerProcess* broker_process = NULL;
+  // Warm up resources needed by the policy we're about to enable and
+  // eventually start a broker process.
+  WarmupPolicy(chromeos_arm_gpu, &broker_process);
+
+  scoped_ptr<SandboxBPFBasePolicy> gpu_policy;
+  if (chromeos_arm_gpu) {
+    gpu_policy.reset(new ArmGpuProcessPolicy(broker_process, allow_sysv_shm));
+  } else {
+    gpu_policy.reset(new GpuProcessPolicy(broker_process));
+  }
+  StartSandboxWithPolicy(gpu_policy.release());
+}
+
+// This function takes ownership of |policy|.
+void StartSandboxWithPolicy(sandbox::SandboxBPFPolicy* policy) {
+  // Starting the sandbox is a one-way operation. The kernel doesn't allow
+  // us to unload a sandbox policy after it has been started. Nonetheless,
+  // in order to make the use of the "Sandbox" object easier, we allow for
+  // the object to be destroyed after the sandbox has been started. Note that
+  // doing so does not stop the sandbox.
+  SandboxBPF sandbox;
+  sandbox.SetSandboxPolicy(policy);
+  sandbox.StartSandbox();
+}
+
+void StartNonGpuSandbox(const std::string& process_type) {
+  scoped_ptr<SandboxBPFBasePolicy> policy;
+
+  if (process_type == switches::kRendererProcess ||
+      process_type == switches::kWorkerProcess) {
+    policy.reset(new RendererOrWorkerProcessPolicy);
+  } else if (process_type == switches::kPpapiPluginProcess) {
+    policy.reset(new FlashProcessPolicy);
+  } else if (process_type == switches::kUtilityProcess) {
+    policy.reset(new BlacklistDebugAndNumaPolicy);
+  } else {
+    NOTREACHED();
+    policy.reset(new AllowAllPolicy);
+  }
+
+  StartSandboxWithPolicy(policy.release());
+}
+
+// Initialize the seccomp-bpf sandbox.
+bool StartBPFSandbox(const CommandLine& command_line,
+                     const std::string& process_type) {
+
+  if (process_type == switches::kGpuProcess) {
+    StartGpuProcessSandbox(command_line, process_type);
+  } else {
+    StartNonGpuSandbox(process_type);
+  }
+
+  RunSandboxSanityChecks(process_type);
+  return true;
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+#endif  // SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX
+
+// Is seccomp BPF globally enabled?
+bool SandboxSeccompBPF::IsSeccompBPFDesired() {
+  const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
+  if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) &&
+      !command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableSeccompFilterSandbox)) {
+    return true;
+  } else {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+bool SandboxSeccompBPF::ShouldEnableSeccompBPF(
+    const std::string& process_type) {
+#if defined(SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX)
+  const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
+  if (process_type == switches::kGpuProcess)
+    return !command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuSandbox);
+
+  return true;
+#endif  // SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX
+  return false;
+}
+
+bool SandboxSeccompBPF::SupportsSandbox() {
+#if defined(SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX)
+  // TODO(jln): pass the saved proc_fd_ from the LinuxSandbox singleton
+  // here.
+  SandboxBPF::SandboxStatus bpf_sandbox_status =
+      SandboxBPF::SupportsSeccompSandbox(-1);
+  // Kernel support is what we are interested in here. Other status
+  // such as STATUS_UNAVAILABLE (has threads) still indicate kernel support.
+  // We make this a negative check, since if there is a bug, we would rather
+  // "fail closed" (expect a sandbox to be available and try to start it).
+  if (bpf_sandbox_status != SandboxBPF::STATUS_UNSUPPORTED) {
+    return true;
+  }
+#endif
+  return false;
+}
+
+bool SandboxSeccompBPF::StartSandbox(const std::string& process_type) {
+#if defined(SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX)
+  const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
+
+  if (IsSeccompBPFDesired() &&  // Global switches policy.
+      ShouldEnableSeccompBPF(process_type) &&  // Process-specific policy.
+      SupportsSandbox()) {
+    // If the kernel supports the sandbox, and if the command line says we
+    // should enable it, enable it or die.
+    bool started_sandbox = StartBPFSandbox(command_line, process_type);
+    CHECK(started_sandbox);
+    return true;
+  }
+#endif
+  return false;
+}
+
+bool SandboxSeccompBPF::StartSandboxWithExternalPolicy(
+    scoped_ptr<sandbox::SandboxBPFPolicy> policy) {
+#if defined(SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX)
+  if (IsSeccompBPFDesired() && SupportsSandbox()) {
+    CHECK(policy);
+    StartSandboxWithPolicy(policy.release());
+    return true;
+  }
+#endif  // defined(SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX)
+  return false;
+}
+
+scoped_ptr<sandbox::SandboxBPFPolicy>
+SandboxSeccompBPF::GetBaselinePolicy() {
+#if defined(SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX)
+  return scoped_ptr<sandbox::SandboxBPFPolicy>(new BaselinePolicy);
+#else
+  return scoped_ptr<sandbox::SandboxBPFPolicy>();
+#endif  // defined(SECCOMP_BPF_SANDBOX)
+}
+
+}  // namespace content