Chromium Code Reviews| Index: content/browser/renderer_host/resource_loader.cc |
| diff --git a/content/browser/renderer_host/resource_loader.cc b/content/browser/renderer_host/resource_loader.cc |
| index be893d7c97440ff2068932fe1b17f50374fdd48b..f167ad440e95c57f016845ee99ba4ff503c0e19a 100644 |
| --- a/content/browser/renderer_host/resource_loader.cc |
| +++ b/content/browser/renderer_host/resource_loader.cc |
| @@ -211,6 +211,28 @@ void ResourceLoader::OnReceivedRedirect(net::URLRequest* unused, |
| return; |
| } |
| + // This will block all of the Cross-site redirect for Sub_Frame. |
| + // TODO(irobert): We should allow the following case: |
| + // Iframe page (a.com/svrRedirect.php) in page (a.com/index.html) |
| + // do the server-side redirect to page (b.com/svrRedirect.php) which |
| + // eventually redirect the iframe back to page (a.com/static.html). |
| + // Since server-side redirect does not load the page into the render |
| + // process, we are safe in this situation and should allow it. |
| + // |
| + // But we need to block the following case: |
| + // Iframe page (a.com/svrRedirect.php) in page (a.com/index.html) |
| + // do the server-side redirect to page (b.com/clientRedirect.php) which |
| + // eventually redirect the iframe back to page (a.com/static.html). |
| + // Since client-side redirect DOES load the page into the render |
| + // process, we should block it. |
|
Charlie Reis
2012/11/29 22:00:54
This comment is correct. That makes me think we s
|
| + if (!ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()-> |
| + CanLoadPage(info->GetChildID(), new_url, |
| + info->GetResourceType())) { |
| + // Tell the renderer that this request was disallowed. |
| + Cancel(); |
| + return; |
| + } |
| + |
| delegate_->DidReceiveRedirect(this, new_url); |
| if (delegate_->HandleExternalProtocol(this, new_url)) { |