WIP: Implement seccomp-bpf sandbox for nacl_helper_nonsfi.

content/common/sandbox_linux/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.cc

 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 #include "content/common/sandbox_linux/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.h"
 
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
@@ skipping 46 matching lines @@
 #endif  //
 
 namespace content {
 
 #if defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
 namespace {
 
 void StartSandboxWithPolicy(sandbox::bpf_dsl::Policy* policy,
                             base::ScopedFD proc_fd);
 
+#if !defined(OS_NACL_NONSFI)
+
 inline bool IsChromeOS() {
 #if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
   return true;
 #else
   return false;
 #endif
 }
 
 inline bool IsArchitectureArm() {
 #if defined(__arm__)
@@ skipping 60 matching lines @@
     CHECK_EQ(-1, syscall_ret);
     CHECK_EQ(SandboxBPFBasePolicy::GetFSDeniedErrno(), errno);
 
     // We should never allow the creation of netlink sockets.
     syscall_ret = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
     CHECK_EQ(-1, syscall_ret);
     CHECK_EQ(EPERM, errno);
 #endif  // !defined(NDEBUG)
   }
 }
-
+#endif  // !defined(OS_NACL_NONSFI)
 
 // This function takes ownership of |policy|.
 void StartSandboxWithPolicy(sandbox::bpf_dsl::Policy* policy,
                             base::ScopedFD proc_fd) {
   // Starting the sandbox is a one-way operation. The kernel doesn't allow
   // us to unload a sandbox policy after it has been started. Nonetheless,
   // in order to make the use of the "Sandbox" object easier, we allow for
   // the object to be destroyed after the sandbox has been started. Note that
   // doing so does not stop the sandbox.
   SandboxBPF sandbox(policy);
 
   sandbox.SetProcFd(proc_fd.Pass());
   CHECK(sandbox.StartSandbox(SandboxBPF::SeccompLevel::SINGLE_THREADED));
 }
 
+#if !defined(OS_NACL_NONSFI)
 // nacl_helper needs to be tiny and includes only part of content/
 // in its dependencies. Make sure to not link things that are not needed.
 #if !defined(IN_NACL_HELPER)
 scoped_ptr<SandboxBPFBasePolicy> GetGpuProcessSandbox() {
   const base::CommandLine& command_line =
       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
   bool allow_sysv_shm = false;
   if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kGpuSandboxAllowSysVShm)) {
     DCHECK(IsArchitectureArm());
     allow_sysv_shm = true;
@@ skipping 40 matching lines @@
 bool StartBPFSandbox(const base::CommandLine& command_line,
                      const std::string& process_type) {
   NOTREACHED();
   // Avoid -Wunused-function with no-op code.
   ignore_result(IsChromeOS);
   ignore_result(IsArchitectureArm);
   ignore_result(RunSandboxSanityChecks);
   return false;
 }
 #endif  // !defined(IN_NACL_HELPER)
+#endif  // !defined(OS_NACL_NONSFI)
 
 }  // namespace
 
 #endif  // USE_SECCOMP_BPF
 
 // Is seccomp BPF globally enabled?
 bool SandboxSeccompBPF::IsSeccompBPFDesired() {
   const base::CommandLine& command_line =
       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
   if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) &&
       !command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableSeccompFilterSandbox)) {
     return true;
   } else {
     return false;
   }
 }
 
+#if !defined(OS_NACL_NONSFI)
 bool SandboxSeccompBPF::ShouldEnableSeccompBPF(
     const std::string& process_type) {
 #if defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
   const base::CommandLine& command_line =
       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
   if (process_type == switches::kGpuProcess)
     return !command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuSandbox);
 
   return true;
 #endif  // USE_SECCOMP_BPF
   return false;
 }
+#endif  // !defined(OS_NACL_NONSFI)
 
 bool SandboxSeccompBPF::SupportsSandbox() {
 #if defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
   return SandboxBPF::SupportsSeccompSandbox(
       SandboxBPF::SeccompLevel::SINGLE_THREADED);
 #endif
   return false;
 }
 
+#if !defined(OS_NACL_NONSFI)
 bool SandboxSeccompBPF::SupportsSandboxWithTsync() {
 #if defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
   return SandboxBPF::SupportsSeccompSandbox(
       SandboxBPF::SeccompLevel::MULTI_THREADED);
 #endif
   return false;
 }
 
 bool SandboxSeccompBPF::StartSandbox(const std::string& process_type,
                                      base::ScopedFD proc_fd) {
 #if defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
   const base::CommandLine& command_line =
       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 
   if (IsSeccompBPFDesired() &&  // Global switches policy.
       ShouldEnableSeccompBPF(process_type) &&  // Process-specific policy.
       SupportsSandbox()) {
     // If the kernel supports the sandbox, and if the command line says we
     // should enable it, enable it or die.
     bool started_sandbox =
         StartBPFSandbox(command_line, process_type, proc_fd.Pass());
     CHECK(started_sandbox);
     return true;
   }
 #endif
   return false;
 }
+#endif  // !defined(OS_NACL_NONSFI)
 
 bool SandboxSeccompBPF::StartSandboxWithExternalPolicy(
     scoped_ptr<sandbox::bpf_dsl::Policy> policy,
     base::ScopedFD proc_fd) {
 #if defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
   if (IsSeccompBPFDesired() && SupportsSandbox()) {
     CHECK(policy);
     StartSandboxWithPolicy(policy.release(), proc_fd.Pass());
     return true;
   }
 #endif  // defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
   return false;
 }
 
+#if !defined(OS_NACL_NONSFI)
 scoped_ptr<sandbox::bpf_dsl::Policy> SandboxSeccompBPF::GetBaselinePolicy() {
 #if defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
   return scoped_ptr<sandbox::bpf_dsl::Policy>(new BaselinePolicy);
 #else
   return scoped_ptr<sandbox::bpf_dsl::Policy>();
 #endif  // defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
 }
+#endif  // !defined(OS_NACL_NONSFI)
 
 }  // namespace content