Index: net/url_request/url_request.cc |
diff --git a/net/url_request/url_request.cc b/net/url_request/url_request.cc |
index f84fca48064eea65ad733b1bd9ef0d89f229f2c0..9e4816bce6ad8bc5c8649562e8598fe4df2eb56a 100644 |
--- a/net/url_request/url_request.cc |
+++ b/net/url_request/url_request.cc |
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ |
#include "net/url_request/url_request_job_manager.h" |
#include "net/url_request/url_request_netlog_params.h" |
#include "net/url_request/url_request_redirect_job.h" |
+#include "url/gurl.h" |
+#include "url/origin.h" |
using base::Time; |
using std::string; |
@@ -942,6 +944,26 @@ int URLRequest::Redirect(const RedirectInfo& redirect_info) { |
method_ = redirect_info.new_method; |
} |
+ // Cross-origin redirects should not result in an Origin header value that is |
+ // equal to the original request's Origin header. This is necessary to prevent |
+ // a reflection of POST requests to bypass CSRF protections. If the header was |
+ // not set to "null", a POST request from origin A to a malicious origin M |
+ // could be redirected by M back to A. |
+ // |
+ // RFC 6454, The Web Origin Concept, suggests that a User Agent may add a |
+ // *list* of origins to the Origin header on redirect, but this is not what |
+ // Firefox or IE do in practice. Additionally, it could be argued that the |
+ // "privacy-sensitive contexts" that require a "null" Origin header described |
+ // in section 7.3 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6454#section-7.3) apply |
+ // here. |
davidben
2015/03/24 23:47:38
This should cite CORS or Fetch (see my comment on
jww
2015/03/27 22:16:15
See my response to your other comment (tl;dr "Done
|
+ // |
+ // See also https://crbug.com/465517. |
+ if (redirect_info.new_url.GetOrigin() != url().GetOrigin() && |
+ extra_request_headers_.HasHeader(HttpRequestHeaders::kOrigin)) { |
+ extra_request_headers_.SetHeader(HttpRequestHeaders::kOrigin, |
+ url::Origin().string()); |
+ } |
+ |
referrer_ = redirect_info.new_referrer; |
first_party_for_cookies_ = redirect_info.new_first_party_for_cookies; |