Uprev NSS to 3.18 RTM

nss/lib/freebl/cts.c

 /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
 
 #ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND
 #include "stubs.h"
 #endif
 #include "blapit.h"
 #include "blapii.h"
 #include "cts.h"
@@ skipping 221 matching lines @@
     if (rv != SECSuccess) {
         return SECFailure;
     }
     *outlen = fullblocks; /* AES low level doesn't set outlen */
     inbuf += fullblocks;
     inlen -= fullblocks;
     if (inlen == 0) {
         return SECSuccess;
     }
     outbuf += fullblocks;
-    maxout -= fullblocks;
 
     /* recover the stolen text */
     PORT_Memset(lastBlock, 0, blocksize);
     PORT_Memcpy(lastBlock, inbuf, inlen);
     PORT_Memcpy(Cn_1, inbuf, inlen);
     Pn = outbuf-blocksize;
     /* inbuf points to Cn-1* in the input buffer */
     /* NOTE: below there are 2 sections marked "make up for the out of order
      * cbc decryption". You may ask, what is going on here.
      *   Short answer: CBC automatically xors the plain text with the previous
@@ skipping 40 matching lines @@
      * only the side effect of setting the internal IV */
     (void) (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, lastBlock, &tmpLen, blocksize, Cn,
                 blocksize, blocksize);
     /* clear last block. At this point last block contains Pn xor Cn_1 xor
      * Cn_2, both of with an attacker would know, so we need to clear this
      * buffer out */
     PORT_Memset(lastBlock, 0, blocksize);
     /* Cn, Cn_1, and Cn_2 have encrypted data, so no need to clear them */
     return SECSuccess;
 }