| Index: openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c.orig
|
| ===================================================================
|
| --- openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c.orig (revision 0)
|
| +++ openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c.orig (revision 0)
|
| @@ -0,0 +1,3224 @@
|
| +/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
|
| +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
|
| + * All rights reserved.
|
| + *
|
| + * This package is an SSL implementation written
|
| + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
|
| + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
|
| + *
|
| + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
|
| + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
|
| + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
|
| + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
|
| + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
|
| + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
| + *
|
| + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
|
| + * the code are not to be removed.
|
| + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
|
| + * as the author of the parts of the library used.
|
| + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
|
| + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
|
| + *
|
| + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
| + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
| + * are met:
|
| + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
|
| + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
| + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
| + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
| + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
| + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
|
| + * must display the following acknowledgement:
|
| + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
|
| + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
|
| + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
|
| + * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
|
| + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
|
| + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
|
| + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
|
| + *
|
| + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
|
| + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
| + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
| + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
| + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
| + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
| + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
| + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
| + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
| + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
| + * SUCH DAMAGE.
|
| + *
|
| + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
|
| + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
|
| + * copied and put under another distribution licence
|
| + * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
|
| + */
|
| +/* ====================================================================
|
| + * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
|
| + *
|
| + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
| + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
| + * are met:
|
| + *
|
| + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
| + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
| + *
|
| + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
| + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
|
| + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
|
| + * distribution.
|
| + *
|
| + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
|
| + * software must display the following acknowledgment:
|
| + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
| + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
|
| + *
|
| + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
|
| + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
|
| + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
|
| + * openssl-core@openssl.org.
|
| + *
|
| + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
|
| + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
|
| + * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
|
| + *
|
| + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
|
| + * acknowledgment:
|
| + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
| + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
|
| + *
|
| + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
|
| + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
| + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
|
| + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
|
| + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
|
| + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
|
| + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
|
| + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
| + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
| + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
|
| + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
|
| + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
| + * ====================================================================
|
| + *
|
| + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
|
| + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
|
| + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
| + *
|
| + */
|
| +/* ====================================================================
|
| + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
|
| + *
|
| + * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
|
| + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
|
| + *
|
| + * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
|
| + * license provided above.
|
| + *
|
| + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
|
| + * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
|
| + *
|
| + */
|
| +/* ====================================================================
|
| + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
|
| + *
|
| + * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
|
| + * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
|
| + * license.
|
| + *
|
| + * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
|
| + * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
|
| + * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
|
| + *
|
| + * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
|
| + * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
|
| + * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
|
| + *
|
| + * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
|
| + * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
|
| + * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
|
| + * to make use of the Contribution.
|
| + *
|
| + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
|
| + * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
|
| + * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
|
| + * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
|
| + * OTHERWISE.
|
| + */
|
| +
|
| +#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
|
| +#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
|
| +
|
| +#include <stdio.h>
|
| +#include "ssl_locl.h"
|
| +#include "kssl_lcl.h"
|
| +#include <openssl/buffer.h>
|
| +#include <openssl/rand.h>
|
| +#include <openssl/objects.h>
|
| +#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
| +#include <openssl/hmac.h>
|
| +#include <openssl/x509.h>
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
| +#include <openssl/dh.h>
|
| +#endif
|
| +#include <openssl/bn.h>
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
| +#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
|
| +#endif
|
| +#include <openssl/md5.h>
|
| +
|
| +static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
|
| +
|
| +static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
|
| + {
|
| + if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
|
| + return(SSLv3_server_method());
|
| + else
|
| + return(NULL);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
|
| + ssl3_accept,
|
| + ssl_undefined_function,
|
| + ssl3_get_server_method)
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + BUF_MEM *buf;
|
| + unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
|
| + void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
|
| + int ret= -1;
|
| + int new_state,state,skip=0;
|
| +
|
| + RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
|
| + ERR_clear_error();
|
| + clear_sys_error();
|
| +
|
| + if (s->info_callback != NULL)
|
| + cb=s->info_callback;
|
| + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
|
| + cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
|
| +
|
| + /* init things to blank */
|
| + s->in_handshake++;
|
| + if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
|
| +
|
| + if (s->cert == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
|
| + return(-1);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + for (;;)
|
| + {
|
| + state=s->state;
|
| +
|
| + switch (s->state)
|
| + {
|
| + case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
|
| + s->new_session=1;
|
| + /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
|
| +
|
| + case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
|
| + case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
|
| + case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
|
| + case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
|
| +
|
| + s->server=1;
|
| + if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
|
| +
|
| + if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + return -1;
|
| + }
|
| + s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
|
| +
|
| + if (s->init_buf == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + ret= -1;
|
| + goto end;
|
| + }
|
| + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
|
| + {
|
| + ret= -1;
|
| + goto end;
|
| + }
|
| + s->init_buf=buf;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
|
| + {
|
| + ret= -1;
|
| + goto end;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
|
| +
|
| + if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
|
| + {
|
| + /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
|
| + * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
|
| + */
|
| + if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
|
| +
|
| + ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
|
| + s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
|
| + }
|
| + else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
|
| + !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
|
| + {
|
| + /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
|
| + * client that doesn't support secure
|
| + * renegotiation.
|
| + */
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
| + ret = -1;
|
| + goto end;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
|
| + * we will just send a HelloRequest */
|
| + s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
|
| + }
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
|
| +
|
| + s->shutdown=0;
|
| + ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| +
|
| + ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
|
| + s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
|
| +
|
| + s->shutdown=0;
|
| + ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| +
|
| + s->new_session = 2;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
|
| + ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| + if (s->hit)
|
| + {
|
| + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
|
| + else
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
|
| + }
|
| +#else
|
| + if (s->hit)
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
|
| +#endif
|
| + else
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
|
| + /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
|
| + /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
|
| + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
|
| + && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
|
| + && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
|
| + {
|
| + ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| + if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
|
| + else
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + skip = 1;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
| + }
|
| +#else
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + skip=1;
|
| +
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
| +#endif
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
|
| + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
| +
|
| + /* clear this, it may get reset by
|
| + * send_server_key_exchange */
|
| + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
| + && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
|
| +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
| + )
|
| + /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
|
| + * even when forbidden by protocol specs
|
| + * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
|
| + * be able to handle this) */
|
| + s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
|
| + else
|
| + s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
|
| +
|
| +
|
| + /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
|
| + * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
|
| + *
|
| + * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
|
| + *
|
| + * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
|
| + * message only if the cipher suite is either
|
| + * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
|
| + * server certificate contains the server's
|
| + * public key for key exchange.
|
| + */
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
|
| + /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
|
| + * hint if provided */
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
| + || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
|
| +#endif
|
| + || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
|
| + || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
|
| + || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
|
| + && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
|
| + || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
|
| + && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
|
| + )
|
| + )
|
| + )
|
| + )
|
| + {
|
| + ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + skip=1;
|
| +
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
|
| + if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
|
| + !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
|
| + /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
|
| + * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
|
| + ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
|
| + (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
|
| + /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
|
| + * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
|
| + * and in RFC 2246): */
|
| + ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
|
| + /* ... except when the application insists on verification
|
| + * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
|
| + !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
|
| + /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
|
| + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
|
| + /* With normal PSK Certificates and
|
| + * Certificate Requests are omitted */
|
| + || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
|
| + {
|
| + /* no cert request */
|
| + skip=1;
|
| + s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
|
| + ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| +#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
|
| +#else
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
| + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
|
| +#endif
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + }
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
|
| + ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
|
| +
|
| + /* This code originally checked to see if
|
| + * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
|
| + * and then flushed. This caused problems
|
| + * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
|
| + * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
|
| + * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
|
| + * still exist. So instead we just flush
|
| + * unconditionally.
|
| + */
|
| +
|
| + s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
|
| + if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + ret= -1;
|
| + goto end;
|
| + }
|
| + s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
| +
|
| + s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
|
| + /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
|
| + ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0)
|
| + goto end;
|
| + if (ret == 2)
|
| + s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
|
| + else {
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
|
| + {
|
| + ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + }
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
| + }
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
|
| + ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0)
|
| + goto end;
|
| + if (ret == 2)
|
| + {
|
| + /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
|
| + * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
|
| + * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
|
| + * message is not sent.
|
| + * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
|
| + * the client uses its key from the certificate
|
| + * for key exchange.
|
| + */
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
| + s->init_num = 0;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + int offset=0;
|
| + int dgst_num;
|
| +
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| +
|
| + /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
|
| + * a client cert, it can be verified
|
| + * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
|
| + * should be generalized. But it is next step
|
| + */
|
| + if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
|
| + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
|
| + return -1;
|
| + for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
|
| + if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
|
| + {
|
| + int dgst_size;
|
| +
|
| + s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
|
| + dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
|
| + if (dgst_size < 0)
|
| + {
|
| + ret = -1;
|
| + goto end;
|
| + }
|
| + offset+=dgst_size;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
|
| +
|
| + /* we should decide if we expected this one */
|
| + ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| +
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
|
| + ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
|
| + SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
|
| + else if (s->hit)
|
| + s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
| +#else
|
| + if (s->hit)
|
| + s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
| +#endif
|
| + else
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
|
| + ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
|
| + ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
|
| +
|
| + s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
| + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
|
| + { ret= -1; goto end; }
|
| +
|
| + ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
|
| + SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
|
| +
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| +
|
| + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
| + SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
|
| + {
|
| + ret= -1;
|
| + goto end;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
|
| + ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
|
| + SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
|
| + s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
|
| + s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
| + if (s->hit)
|
| + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
| + else
|
| + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL_ST_OK:
|
| + /* clean a few things up */
|
| + ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
|
| +
|
| + BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
|
| + s->init_buf=NULL;
|
| +
|
| + /* remove buffering on output */
|
| + ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
|
| +
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| +
|
| + if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
|
| + {
|
| + /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
|
| + * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
|
| +
|
| + s->new_session=0;
|
| +
|
| + ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
|
| +
|
| + s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
|
| + /* s->server=1; */
|
| + s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
|
| +
|
| + if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + ret = 1;
|
| + goto end;
|
| + /* break; */
|
| +
|
| + default:
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
|
| + ret= -1;
|
| + goto end;
|
| + /* break; */
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
|
| + {
|
| + if (s->debug)
|
| + {
|
| + if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
|
| + goto end;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +
|
| + if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
|
| + {
|
| + new_state=s->state;
|
| + s->state=state;
|
| + cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
|
| + s->state=new_state;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + skip=0;
|
| + }
|
| +end:
|
| + /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
|
| +
|
| + s->in_handshake--;
|
| + if (cb != NULL)
|
| + cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
|
| + return(ret);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + unsigned char *p;
|
| +
|
| + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
|
| + {
|
| + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
| + *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
|
| + *(p++)=0;
|
| + *(p++)=0;
|
| + *(p++)=0;
|
| +
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
|
| + /* number of bytes to write */
|
| + s->init_num=4;
|
| + s->init_off=0;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
|
| + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + int ok;
|
| + long n;
|
| +
|
| + /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
|
| + * negotiation. */
|
| + if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
|
| + return -1;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
|
| + * so permit appropriate message length */
|
| + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
| + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
|
| + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
|
| + -1,
|
| + s->max_cert_list,
|
| + &ok);
|
| + if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
| + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
|
| + {
|
| + /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
|
| + * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
|
| + s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
|
| + s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
|
| + return 2;
|
| + }
|
| + return 1;
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
|
| + unsigned int cookie_len;
|
| + long n;
|
| + unsigned long id;
|
| + unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
|
| + SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
| + SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
|
| +#endif
|
| + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
|
| +
|
| + /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
|
| + * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
|
| + * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
|
| + * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
|
| + * TLSv1.
|
| + */
|
| + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
|
| + {
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
|
| + }
|
| + s->first_packet=1;
|
| + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
| + SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
|
| + SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
|
| + SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
| + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
|
| + &ok);
|
| +
|
| + if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
| + s->first_packet=0;
|
| + d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
| +
|
| + /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
|
| + * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
|
| + s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
|
| + p+=2;
|
| +
|
| + if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
|
| + (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
|
| + if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
|
| + {
|
| + /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
|
| + s->version = s->client_version;
|
| + }
|
| + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
|
| + * contain one, just return since we do not want to
|
| + * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
|
| + */
|
| + if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
|
| + {
|
| + unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
|
| +
|
| + session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
| + cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
|
| +
|
| + if (cookie_length == 0)
|
| + return 1;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* load the client random */
|
| + memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
| + p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
| +
|
| + /* get the session-id */
|
| + j= *(p++);
|
| +
|
| + s->hit=0;
|
| + /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
|
| + * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
|
| + * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
|
| + * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
|
| + * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
|
| + * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
|
| + * an earlier library version)
|
| + */
|
| + if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
|
| + {
|
| + if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
|
| + {
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
|
| + if (i == 1)
|
| + { /* previous session */
|
| + s->hit=1;
|
| + }
|
| + else if (i == -1)
|
| + goto err;
|
| + else /* i == 0 */
|
| + {
|
| + if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
|
| + {
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + p+=j;
|
| +
|
| + if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
| + {
|
| + /* cookie stuff */
|
| + cookie_len = *(p++);
|
| +
|
| + /*
|
| + * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
|
| + * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
|
| + * does not cause an overflow.
|
| + */
|
| + if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
|
| + {
|
| + /* too much data */
|
| + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
|
| + if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
|
| + cookie_len > 0)
|
| + {
|
| + memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
|
| +
|
| + if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
|
| + cookie_len) == 0)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
| + SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + /* else cookie verification succeeded */
|
| + }
|
| + else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
|
| + s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
| + SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + ret = 2;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + p += cookie_len;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + n2s(p,i);
|
| + if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
|
| + {
|
| + /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
|
| + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
|
| + {
|
| + /* not enough data */
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
|
| + == NULL))
|
| + {
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + p+=i;
|
| +
|
| + /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
|
| + if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
|
| + {
|
| + j=0;
|
| + id=s->session->cipher->id;
|
| +
|
| +#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
|
| + printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
|
| +#endif
|
| + for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
|
| + {
|
| + c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
|
| +#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
|
| + printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
|
| + i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
|
| +#endif
|
| + if (c->id == id)
|
| + {
|
| + j=1;
|
| + break;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
|
| + * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
|
| + */
|
| +#if 0
|
| + if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
|
| + {
|
| + /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
|
| + * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
|
| + * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
|
| + * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
|
| + * enabled, though. */
|
| + c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
|
| + if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + s->session->cipher = c;
|
| + j = 1;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| + if (j == 0)
|
| + {
|
| + /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
|
| + * list if we are asked to reuse it */
|
| + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* compression */
|
| + i= *(p++);
|
| + if ((p+i) > (d+n))
|
| + {
|
| + /* not enough data */
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + q=p;
|
| + for (j=0; j<i; j++)
|
| + {
|
| + if (p[j] == 0) break;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + p+=i;
|
| + if (j >= i)
|
| + {
|
| + /* no compress */
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| + /* TLS extensions*/
|
| + if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
|
| + {
|
| + if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
|
| + {
|
| + /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
|
| + * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
|
| + * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
|
| + * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
|
| + {
|
| + unsigned long Time;
|
| + unsigned char *pos;
|
| + Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
|
| + pos=s->s3->server_random;
|
| + l2n(Time,pos);
|
| + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
|
| + {
|
| + SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
|
| +
|
| + s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
|
| + if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
|
| + ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
|
| + {
|
| + s->hit=1;
|
| + s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
|
| + s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
|
| +
|
| + ciphers=NULL;
|
| +
|
| + /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
|
| + pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
|
| + if (pref_cipher == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
|
| +
|
| + if (s->cipher_list)
|
| + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
|
| +
|
| + if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
|
| + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
|
| +
|
| + s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
|
| + s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| + /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
|
| + * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
|
| + * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
|
| + s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
| + /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
|
| + if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
|
| + {
|
| + int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
|
| + /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
|
| + /* Can't disable compression */
|
| + if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + /* Look for resumed compression method */
|
| + for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
|
| + {
|
| + comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
|
| + if (comp_id == comp->id)
|
| + {
|
| + s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
|
| + break;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
|
| + for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
|
| + {
|
| + if (q[m] == comp_id)
|
| + break;
|
| + }
|
| + if (m >= i)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + else if (s->hit)
|
| + comp = NULL;
|
| + else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
|
| + { /* See if we have a match */
|
| + int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
|
| +
|
| + nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
|
| + for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
|
| + {
|
| + comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
|
| + v=comp->id;
|
| + for (o=0; o<i; o++)
|
| + {
|
| + if (v == q[o])
|
| + {
|
| + done=1;
|
| + break;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + if (done) break;
|
| + }
|
| + if (done)
|
| + s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
|
| + else
|
| + comp=NULL;
|
| + }
|
| +#else
|
| + /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
|
| + * using compression.
|
| + */
|
| + if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| + /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
|
| + * pick a cipher */
|
| +
|
| + if (!s->hit)
|
| + {
|
| +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
| + s->session->compress_meth=0;
|
| +#else
|
| + s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
|
| +#endif
|
| + if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
|
| + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
|
| + s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
|
| + if (ciphers == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + ciphers=NULL;
|
| + c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
|
| + SSL_get_ciphers(s));
|
| +
|
| + if (c == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + /* Session-id reuse */
|
| +#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
|
| + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
| + SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
|
| + SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
|
| +
|
| + if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
|
| + {
|
| + sk=s->session->ciphers;
|
| + for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
|
| + {
|
| + c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
|
| + if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
|
| + nc=c;
|
| + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
|
| + ec=c;
|
| + }
|
| + if (nc != NULL)
|
| + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
|
| + else if (ec != NULL)
|
| + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
|
| + else
|
| + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| +
|
| + /* we now have the following setup.
|
| + * client_random
|
| + * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
|
| + * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
|
| + * compression - basically ignored right now
|
| + * ssl version is set - sslv3
|
| + * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
|
| + * s->hit - session reuse flag
|
| + * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
|
| + */
|
| +
|
| + if (ret < 0) ret=1;
|
| + if (0)
|
| + {
|
| +f_err:
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
| + }
|
| +err:
|
| + if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
|
| + return(ret);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + unsigned char *buf;
|
| + unsigned char *p,*d;
|
| + int i,sl;
|
| + unsigned long l;
|
| +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| + unsigned long Time;
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
|
| + {
|
| + buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
| +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| + p=s->s3->server_random;
|
| + /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
|
| + Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
|
| + l2n(Time,p);
|
| + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
|
| + return -1;
|
| +#endif
|
| + /* Do the message type and length last */
|
| + d=p= &(buf[4]);
|
| +
|
| + *(p++)=s->version>>8;
|
| + *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
|
| +
|
| + /* Random stuff */
|
| + memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
| + p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
| +
|
| + /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
|
| + * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
|
| + * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
|
| + * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
|
| + * session-id if we want it to be single use.
|
| + * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
|
| + * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
|
| + *
|
| + * We also have an additional case where stateless session
|
| + * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
|
| + * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
|
| + * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
|
| + * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
|
| + * is unaffected.
|
| + */
|
| + if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
|
| + && !s->hit)
|
| + s->session->session_id_length=0;
|
| +
|
| + sl=s->session->session_id_length;
|
| + if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + return -1;
|
| + }
|
| + *(p++)=sl;
|
| + memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
|
| + p+=sl;
|
| +
|
| + /* put the cipher */
|
| + i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
|
| + p+=i;
|
| +
|
| + /* put the compression method */
|
| +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
| + *(p++)=0;
|
| +#else
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
|
| + *(p++)=0;
|
| + else
|
| + *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| + if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
| + return -1;
|
| + }
|
| + if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + return -1;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| + /* do the header */
|
| + l=(p-d);
|
| + d=buf;
|
| + *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
|
| + l2n3(l,d);
|
| +
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
|
| + /* number of bytes to write */
|
| + s->init_num=p-buf;
|
| + s->init_off=0;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
|
| + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + unsigned char *p;
|
| +
|
| + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
|
| + {
|
| + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
| +
|
| + /* do the header */
|
| + *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
|
| + *(p++)=0;
|
| + *(p++)=0;
|
| + *(p++)=0;
|
| +
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
|
| + /* number of bytes to write */
|
| + s->init_num=4;
|
| + s->init_off=0;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
|
| + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + unsigned char *q;
|
| + int j,num;
|
| + RSA *rsa;
|
| + unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
| + unsigned int u;
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
| + DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| + EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
|
| + unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
|
| + int encodedlen = 0;
|
| + int curve_id = 0;
|
| + BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
|
| +#endif
|
| + EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
| + unsigned char *p,*d;
|
| + int al,i;
|
| + unsigned long type;
|
| + int n;
|
| + CERT *cert;
|
| + BIGNUM *r[4];
|
| + int nr[4],kn;
|
| + BUF_MEM *buf;
|
| + EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
|
| +
|
| + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
|
| + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
|
| + {
|
| + type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
| + cert=s->cert;
|
| +
|
| + buf=s->init_buf;
|
| +
|
| + r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
|
| + n=0;
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + if (type & SSL_kRSA)
|
| + {
|
| + rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
|
| + if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
|
| + {
|
| + rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
|
| + SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
|
| + SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
|
| + if(rsa == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + RSA_up_ref(rsa);
|
| + cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
|
| + }
|
| + if (rsa == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + r[0]=rsa->n;
|
| + r[1]=rsa->e;
|
| + s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
| + if (type & SSL_kEDH)
|
| + {
|
| + dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
|
| + if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
|
| + dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
|
| + SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
|
| + SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
|
| + if (dhp == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
|
| + if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
|
| + dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
|
| + (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
|
| + {
|
| + if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
|
| + dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
|
| + if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
|
| + (dh->priv_key == NULL))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + r[0]=dh->p;
|
| + r[1]=dh->g;
|
| + r[2]=dh->pub_key;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| + if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
|
| + {
|
| + const EC_GROUP *group;
|
| +
|
| + ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
|
| + if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
|
| + {
|
| + ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
|
| + SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
|
| + SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
|
| + }
|
| + if (ecdhp == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
|
| + if (ecdhp == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
|
| + if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
|
| + (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
|
| + (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
|
| + {
|
| + if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
|
| + (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
|
| + (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
|
| + (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
|
| + * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
|
| + * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
|
| + */
|
| + if ((curve_id =
|
| + tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
|
| + == 0)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* Encode the public key.
|
| + * First check the size of encoding and
|
| + * allocate memory accordingly.
|
| + */
|
| + encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
|
| + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
|
| + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
| + NULL, 0, NULL);
|
| +
|
| + encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
|
| + OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
|
| + bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
| + if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +
|
| + encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
|
| + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
|
| + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
| + encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
|
| +
|
| + if (encodedlen == 0)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
|
| +
|
| + /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
|
| + * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
|
| + * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
|
| + * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
|
| + * structure.
|
| + */
|
| + n = 4 + encodedlen;
|
| +
|
| + /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
|
| + * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
|
| + */
|
| + r[0]=NULL;
|
| + r[1]=NULL;
|
| + r[2]=NULL;
|
| + r[3]=NULL;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
| + if (type & SSL_kPSK)
|
| + {
|
| + /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
|
| + n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
|
| + {
|
| + nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
|
| + n+=2+nr[i];
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
|
| + && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
|
| + {
|
| + if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
|
| + == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + pkey=NULL;
|
| + kn=0;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
| + p= &(d[4]);
|
| +
|
| + for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
|
| + {
|
| + s2n(nr[i],p);
|
| + BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
|
| + p+=nr[i];
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| + if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
|
| + {
|
| + /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
|
| + * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
|
| + * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
|
| + * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
|
| + * the actual encoded point itself
|
| + */
|
| + *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
|
| + p += 1;
|
| + *p = 0;
|
| + p += 1;
|
| + *p = curve_id;
|
| + p += 1;
|
| + *p = encodedlen;
|
| + p += 1;
|
| + memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
|
| + (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
|
| + encodedlen);
|
| + OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
| + encodedPoint = NULL;
|
| + p += encodedlen;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
| + if (type & SSL_kPSK)
|
| + {
|
| + /* copy PSK identity hint */
|
| + s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
|
| + strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
|
| + p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| + /* not anonymous */
|
| + if (pkey != NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
|
| + * and p points to the space at the end. */
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
|
| + {
|
| + q=md_buf;
|
| + j=0;
|
| + for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
|
| + {
|
| + EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
|
| + ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
|
| + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
| + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
| + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
|
| + EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
|
| + (unsigned int *)&i);
|
| + q+=i;
|
| + j+=i;
|
| + }
|
| + if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
|
| + &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + s2n(u,p);
|
| + n+=u+2;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
|
| + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
|
| + {
|
| + /* lets do DSS */
|
| + EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
|
| + EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
| + EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
| + EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
|
| + if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
|
| + (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + s2n(i,p);
|
| + n+=i+2;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
|
| + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
|
| + {
|
| + /* let's do ECDSA */
|
| + EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
|
| + EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
| + EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
| + EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
|
| + if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
|
| + (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + s2n(i,p);
|
| + n+=i+2;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| + {
|
| + /* Is this error check actually needed? */
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
|
| + l2n3(n,d);
|
| +
|
| + /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
|
| + * it off */
|
| + s->init_num=n+4;
|
| + s->init_off=0;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
|
| + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
| + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
| +f_err:
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
| +err:
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| + if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
| + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
| +#endif
|
| + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
| + return(-1);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + unsigned char *p,*d;
|
| + int i,j,nl,off,n;
|
| + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
|
| + X509_NAME *name;
|
| + BUF_MEM *buf;
|
| +
|
| + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
|
| + {
|
| + buf=s->init_buf;
|
| +
|
| + d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
|
| +
|
| + /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
|
| + p++;
|
| + n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
|
| + d[0]=n;
|
| + p+=n;
|
| + n++;
|
| +
|
| + off=n;
|
| + p+=2;
|
| + n+=2;
|
| +
|
| + sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
|
| + nl=0;
|
| + if (sk != NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
|
| + {
|
| + name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
|
| + j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
|
| + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
|
| + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
|
| + {
|
| + s2n(j,p);
|
| + i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
|
| + n+=2+j;
|
| + nl+=2+j;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + d=p;
|
| + i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
|
| + j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
|
| + n+=j;
|
| + nl+=j;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + /* else no CA names */
|
| + p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
|
| + s2n(nl,p);
|
| +
|
| + d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
|
| + *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
|
| + l2n3(n,d);
|
| +
|
| + /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
|
| + * it off */
|
| +
|
| + s->init_num=n+4;
|
| + s->init_off=0;
|
| +#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
|
| + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
|
| +
|
| + /* do the header */
|
| + *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
|
| + *(p++)=0;
|
| + *(p++)=0;
|
| + *(p++)=0;
|
| + s->init_num += 4;
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
|
| + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
| +err:
|
| + return(-1);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + int i,al,ok;
|
| + long n;
|
| + unsigned long alg_k;
|
| + unsigned char *p;
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + RSA *rsa=NULL;
|
| + EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
| + BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
|
| + DH *dh_srvr;
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
| + KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
|
| +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
| +
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| + EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
|
| + EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
|
| + EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
|
| + BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
| + SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
|
| + SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
|
| + SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + 2048, /* ??? */
|
| + &ok);
|
| +
|
| + if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
| + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
| +
|
| + alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
| +
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
|
| + {
|
| + /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
|
| + {
|
| + if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
|
| + rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
|
| + /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
|
| + * be sent already */
|
| + if (rsa == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| +
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
|
| + if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
|
| + (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
|
| + (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
|
| + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
| + {
|
| + n2s(p,i);
|
| + if (n != i+2)
|
| + {
|
| + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + p-=2;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + n=i;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
|
| +
|
| + al = -1;
|
| +
|
| + if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
|
| + {
|
| + /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
|
| + * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
|
| + * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
|
| + * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
|
| + * version instead if the server does not support the requested
|
| + * protocol version.
|
| + * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
|
| + if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
|
| + (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
|
| +
|
| + /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
|
| + * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
|
| + * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
|
| + * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
|
| + * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
|
| + * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
|
| + * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (al != -1)
|
| + {
|
| + /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
|
| + * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
|
| + * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
|
| + ERR_clear_error();
|
| + i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
|
| + p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
|
| + p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
|
| + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + s->session->master_key_length=
|
| + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
| + s->session->master_key,
|
| + p,i);
|
| + OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
| + if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
|
| + {
|
| + n2s(p,i);
|
| + if (n != i+2)
|
| + {
|
| + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + p-=2;
|
| + i=(int)n;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
|
| + if (pub == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
|
| +
|
| + if (i <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
| + BN_clear_free(pub);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
|
| + s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
|
| +
|
| + BN_clear_free(pub);
|
| + pub=NULL;
|
| + s->session->master_key_length=
|
| + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
| + s->session->master_key,p,i);
|
| + OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
| + if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
|
| + {
|
| + krb5_error_code krb5rc;
|
| + krb5_data enc_ticket;
|
| + krb5_data authenticator;
|
| + krb5_data enc_pms;
|
| + KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
|
| + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
|
| + const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
|
| + unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
| + unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
|
| + + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
|
| + int padl, outl;
|
| + krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
|
| + krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
|
| +
|
| + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
|
| +
|
| + if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
|
| +
|
| + n2s(p,i);
|
| + enc_ticket.length = i;
|
| +
|
| + if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
|
| + p+=enc_ticket.length;
|
| +
|
| + n2s(p,i);
|
| + authenticator.length = i;
|
| +
|
| + if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + authenticator.data = (char *)p;
|
| + p+=authenticator.length;
|
| +
|
| + n2s(p,i);
|
| + enc_pms.length = i;
|
| + enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
|
| + p+=enc_pms.length;
|
| +
|
| + /* Note that the length is checked again below,
|
| + ** after decryption
|
| + */
|
| + if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
|
| + enc_pms.length + 6))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
|
| + &kssl_err)) != 0)
|
| + {
|
| +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
| + printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
|
| + krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
|
| + if (kssl_err.text)
|
| + printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
|
| +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + kssl_err.reason);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
|
| + ** but will return authtime == 0.
|
| + */
|
| + if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
|
| + &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
|
| + {
|
| +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
| + printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
|
| + krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
|
| + if (kssl_err.text)
|
| + printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
|
| +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + kssl_err.reason);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
| + kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
|
| +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
| +
|
| + enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
|
| + if (enc == NULL)
|
| + goto err;
|
| +
|
| + memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
|
| +
|
| + if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
|
| + (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + outl += padl;
|
| + if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
|
| + {
|
| + /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
|
| + * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
|
| + * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
|
| + * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
|
| + * the protocol version.
|
| + * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
|
| + * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
|
| + */
|
| + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
|
| +
|
| + s->session->master_key_length=
|
| + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
| + s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
|
| +
|
| + if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
|
| + {
|
| + size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
|
| + if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
|
| + {
|
| + s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
|
| + memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +
|
| + /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
|
| + ** but it caused problems for apache.
|
| + ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
|
| + ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
|
| + */
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
| +
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| + if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
|
| + {
|
| + int ret = 1;
|
| + int field_size = 0;
|
| + const EC_KEY *tkey;
|
| + const EC_GROUP *group;
|
| + const BIGNUM *priv_key;
|
| +
|
| + /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
|
| + if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* Let's get server private key and group information */
|
| + if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
|
| + {
|
| + /* use the certificate */
|
| + tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
|
| + * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
|
| + */
|
| + tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
|
| + priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
|
| +
|
| + if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
|
| + !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* Let's get client's public key */
|
| + if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (n == 0L)
|
| + {
|
| + /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
|
| +
|
| + if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
|
| + == NULL) ||
|
| + (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
|
| + {
|
| + /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
|
| + * authentication using ECDH certificates
|
| + * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
|
| + * never executed. When that support is
|
| + * added, we ought to ensure the key
|
| + * received in the certificate is
|
| + * authorized for key agreement.
|
| + * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
|
| + * the two ECDH shares are for the same
|
| + * group.
|
| + */
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
|
| + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + /* Get client's public key from encoded point
|
| + * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
|
| + */
|
| + if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* Get encoded point length */
|
| + i = *p;
|
| + p += 1;
|
| + if (n != 1 + i)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
|
| + clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
|
| + * currently, so set it to the start
|
| + */
|
| + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
|
| + field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
|
| + if (field_size <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
|
| + if (i <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
|
| + EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
|
| + EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
|
| + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
| + EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
|
| + s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
|
| +
|
| + /* Compute the master secret */
|
| + s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
|
| + generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
|
| +
|
| + OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
|
| + return (ret);
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
| + if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
|
| + {
|
| + unsigned char *t = NULL;
|
| + unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
|
| + unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
|
| + int psk_err = 1;
|
| + char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
|
| +
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| +
|
| + n2s(p,i);
|
| + if (n != i+2)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
| + goto psk_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
| + goto psk_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
|
| + goto psk_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
|
| + * string for the callback */
|
| + memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
|
| + memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
|
| + psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
|
| + psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
|
| + OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
|
| +
|
| + if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + goto psk_err;
|
| + }
|
| + else if (psk_len == 0)
|
| + {
|
| + /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
|
| + al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
|
| + goto psk_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
|
| + pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
|
| + t = psk_or_pre_ms;
|
| + memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
|
| + s2n(psk_len, t);
|
| + memset(t, 0, psk_len);
|
| + t+=psk_len;
|
| + s2n(psk_len, t);
|
| +
|
| + if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
|
| + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
|
| + s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
|
| + if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto psk_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
|
| + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
|
| + s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
| + if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
|
| + s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto psk_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + s->session->master_key_length=
|
| + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
| + s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
|
| + psk_err = 0;
|
| + psk_err:
|
| + OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
|
| + if (psk_err != 0)
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| + if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
|
| + {
|
| + int ret = 0;
|
| + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
|
| + EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
|
| + unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
|
| + size_t outlen=32, inlen;
|
| + unsigned long alg_a;
|
| +
|
| + /* Get our certificate private key*/
|
| + alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
| + if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
|
| + pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
|
| + else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
|
| + pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
|
| +
|
| + pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
|
| + EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
|
| + /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
|
| + * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
|
| + * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
|
| + * a client certificate for authorization only. */
|
| + client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
|
| + if (client_pub_pkey)
|
| + {
|
| + if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
|
| + ERR_clear_error();
|
| + }
|
| + /* Decrypt session key */
|
| + if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
| + goto gerr;
|
| + }
|
| + if (p[1] == 0x81)
|
| + {
|
| + start = p+3;
|
| + inlen = p[2];
|
| + }
|
| + else if (p[1] < 0x80)
|
| + {
|
| + start = p+2;
|
| + inlen = p[1];
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
| + goto gerr;
|
| + }
|
| + if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
|
| +
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
| + goto gerr;
|
| + }
|
| + /* Generate master secret */
|
| + s->session->master_key_length=
|
| + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
| + s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
|
| + /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
|
| + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
|
| + ret = 2;
|
| + else
|
| + ret = 1;
|
| + gerr:
|
| + EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
|
| + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
|
| + if (ret)
|
| + return ret;
|
| + else
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + return(1);
|
| +f_err:
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
| +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
|
| +err:
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| + EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
|
| + EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
|
| + if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
|
| + EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
|
| + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
| +#endif
|
| + return(-1);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
| + unsigned char *p;
|
| + int al,ok,ret=0;
|
| + long n;
|
| + int type=0,i,j;
|
| + X509 *peer;
|
| +
|
| + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
| + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
|
| + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
|
| + -1,
|
| + 514, /* 514? */
|
| + &ok);
|
| +
|
| + if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
| +
|
| + if (s->session->peer != NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + peer=s->session->peer;
|
| + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
|
| + type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + peer=NULL;
|
| + pkey=NULL;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
|
| + {
|
| + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
|
| + if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + ret=1;
|
| + goto end;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (peer == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
|
| + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
|
| + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
|
| + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
|
| + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
| + /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
|
| + /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
|
| + * signature without length field */
|
| + if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
|
| + pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
|
| + {
|
| + i=64;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + n2s(p,i);
|
| + n-=2;
|
| + if (i > n)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
| + if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
|
| + {
|
| + i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
|
| + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
|
| + pkey->pkey.rsa);
|
| + if (i < 0)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (i == 0)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
| + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
|
| + {
|
| + j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
|
| + &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
|
| + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
|
| + if (j <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + /* bad signature */
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
|
| + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
|
| + {
|
| + j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
|
| + &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
|
| + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
|
| + if (j <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + /* bad signature */
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
|
| + SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| + if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
|
| + { unsigned char signature[64];
|
| + int idx;
|
| + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
|
| + EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
|
| + if (i!=64) {
|
| + fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
|
| + }
|
| + for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
|
| + signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
|
| + }
|
| + j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
|
| + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
| + if (j<=0)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
|
| + SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +
|
| + ret=1;
|
| + if (0)
|
| + {
|
| +f_err:
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
| + }
|
| +end:
|
| + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
| + return(ret);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
|
| + X509 *x=NULL;
|
| + unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
|
| + const unsigned char *p,*q;
|
| + unsigned char *d;
|
| + STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
|
| +
|
| + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
| + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
|
| + SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
|
| + -1,
|
| + s->max_cert_list,
|
| + &ok);
|
| +
|
| + if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
| +
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
|
| + {
|
| + if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
|
| + (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
|
| + if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
|
| + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
|
| + return(1);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
| +
|
| + if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + n2l3(p,llen);
|
| + if (llen+3 != n)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
|
| + {
|
| + n2l3(p,l);
|
| + if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + q=p;
|
| + x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
|
| + if (x == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (p != (q+l))
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + x=NULL;
|
| + nc+=l+3;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
|
| + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
|
| + else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
|
| + (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
|
| + if (i <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
|
| + X509_free(s->session->peer);
|
| + s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
|
| + s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
|
| +
|
| + /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
|
| + * when we arrive here. */
|
| + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
|
| + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
|
| + sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
|
| + s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
|
| + /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
|
| + * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
|
| +
|
| + sk=NULL;
|
| +
|
| + ret=1;
|
| + if (0)
|
| + {
|
| +f_err:
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
| + }
|
| +err:
|
| + if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
|
| + if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
|
| + return(ret);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + unsigned long l;
|
| + X509 *x;
|
| +
|
| + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
|
| + {
|
| + x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
|
| + if (x == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
|
| + if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
|
| + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + return(0);
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
|
| + s->init_num=(int)l;
|
| + s->init_off=0;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
|
| + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
| + }
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| +int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
|
| + {
|
| + unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
|
| + int len, slen;
|
| + unsigned int hlen;
|
| + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
|
| + HMAC_CTX hctx;
|
| + SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
|
| + unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
| + unsigned char key_name[16];
|
| +
|
| + /* get session encoding length */
|
| + slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
|
| + /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
|
| + * too long
|
| + */
|
| + if (slen > 0xFF00)
|
| + return -1;
|
| + /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
|
| + * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
|
| + * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
|
| + * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
|
| + * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
|
| + * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
|
| + */
|
| + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
|
| + 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
|
| + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
|
| + return -1;
|
| + senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
|
| + if (!senc)
|
| + return -1;
|
| + p = senc;
|
| + i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
|
| +
|
| + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
| + /* do the header */
|
| + *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
|
| + /* Skip message length for now */
|
| + p += 3;
|
| + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
| + HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
|
| + /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
|
| + * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
|
| + * from parent ctx.
|
| + */
|
| + if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
|
| + {
|
| + if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
|
| + &hctx, 1) < 0)
|
| + {
|
| + OPENSSL_free(senc);
|
| + return -1;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
|
| + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
|
| + tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
|
| + HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
|
| + tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
|
| + memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
|
| + }
|
| + l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
|
| + /* Skip ticket length for now */
|
| + p += 2;
|
| + /* Output key name */
|
| + macstart = p;
|
| + memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
|
| + p += 16;
|
| + /* output IV */
|
| + memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
|
| + p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
|
| + /* Encrypt session data */
|
| + EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
|
| + p += len;
|
| + EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
|
| + p += len;
|
| + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
| +
|
| + HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
|
| + HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
|
| + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
|
| +
|
| + p += hlen;
|
| + /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
|
| + /* Total length */
|
| + len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
| + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
|
| + l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
|
| + p += 4;
|
| + s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
|
| +
|
| + /* number of bytes to write */
|
| + s->init_num= len;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
|
| + s->init_off=0;
|
| + OPENSSL_free(senc);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
|
| + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
|
| + {
|
| + unsigned char *p;
|
| + /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
|
| + * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
|
| + * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
|
| + * + (ocsp response)
|
| + */
|
| + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
|
| + return -1;
|
| +
|
| + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
| +
|
| + /* do the header */
|
| + *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
|
| + /* message length */
|
| + l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
|
| + /* status type */
|
| + *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
|
| + /* length of OCSP response */
|
| + l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
|
| + /* actual response */
|
| + memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
|
| + /* number of bytes to write */
|
| + s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
|
| + s->init_off = 0;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
|
| + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
|
|
Chromium Code Reviews
Issue 9254031:
Upgrade chrome's OpenSSL to same version Android ships with. (Closed)
Base URL: http://src.chromium.org/svn/trunk/deps/third_party/openssl/