| Index: openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c.orig
|
| ===================================================================
|
| --- openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c.orig (revision 0)
|
| +++ openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c.orig (revision 0)
|
| @@ -0,0 +1,3109 @@
|
| +/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */
|
| +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
|
| + * All rights reserved.
|
| + *
|
| + * This package is an SSL implementation written
|
| + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
|
| + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
|
| + *
|
| + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
|
| + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
|
| + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
|
| + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
|
| + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
|
| + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
| + *
|
| + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
|
| + * the code are not to be removed.
|
| + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
|
| + * as the author of the parts of the library used.
|
| + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
|
| + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
|
| + *
|
| + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
| + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
| + * are met:
|
| + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
|
| + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
| + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
| + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
| + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
| + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
|
| + * must display the following acknowledgement:
|
| + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
|
| + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
|
| + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
|
| + * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
|
| + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
|
| + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
|
| + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
|
| + *
|
| + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
|
| + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
| + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
| + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
| + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
| + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
| + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
| + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
| + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
| + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
| + * SUCH DAMAGE.
|
| + *
|
| + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
|
| + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
|
| + * copied and put under another distribution licence
|
| + * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
|
| + */
|
| +/* ====================================================================
|
| + * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
|
| + *
|
| + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
| + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
| + * are met:
|
| + *
|
| + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
| + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
| + *
|
| + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
| + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
|
| + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
|
| + * distribution.
|
| + *
|
| + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
|
| + * software must display the following acknowledgment:
|
| + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
| + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
|
| + *
|
| + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
|
| + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
|
| + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
|
| + * openssl-core@openssl.org.
|
| + *
|
| + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
|
| + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
|
| + * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
|
| + *
|
| + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
|
| + * acknowledgment:
|
| + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
| + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
|
| + *
|
| + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
|
| + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
| + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
|
| + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
|
| + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
|
| + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
|
| + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
|
| + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
| + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
| + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
|
| + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
|
| + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
| + * ====================================================================
|
| + *
|
| + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
|
| + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
|
| + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
| + *
|
| + */
|
| +/* ====================================================================
|
| + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
|
| + *
|
| + * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
|
| + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
|
| + *
|
| + * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
|
| + * license provided above.
|
| + *
|
| + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
|
| + * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
|
| + *
|
| + */
|
| +/* ====================================================================
|
| + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
|
| + *
|
| + * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
|
| + * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
|
| + * license.
|
| + *
|
| + * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
|
| + * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
|
| + * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
|
| + *
|
| + * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
|
| + * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
|
| + * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
|
| + *
|
| + * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
|
| + * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
|
| + * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
|
| + * to make use of the Contribution.
|
| + *
|
| + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
|
| + * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
|
| + * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
|
| + * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
|
| + * OTHERWISE.
|
| + */
|
| +
|
| +#include <stdio.h>
|
| +#include "ssl_locl.h"
|
| +#include "kssl_lcl.h"
|
| +#include <openssl/buffer.h>
|
| +#include <openssl/rand.h>
|
| +#include <openssl/objects.h>
|
| +#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
| +#include <openssl/md5.h>
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
| +#include <openssl/dh.h>
|
| +#endif
|
| +#include <openssl/bn.h>
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
| +#include <openssl/engine.h>
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| +static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
|
| +static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b);
|
| +
|
| +static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
|
| + {
|
| + if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
|
| + return(SSLv3_client_method());
|
| + else
|
| + return(NULL);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
|
| + ssl_undefined_function,
|
| + ssl3_connect,
|
| + ssl3_get_client_method)
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
|
| + unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
|
| + void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
|
| + int ret= -1;
|
| + int new_state,state,skip=0;
|
| +
|
| + RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
|
| + ERR_clear_error();
|
| + clear_sys_error();
|
| +
|
| + if (s->info_callback != NULL)
|
| + cb=s->info_callback;
|
| + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
|
| + cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
|
| +
|
| + s->in_handshake++;
|
| + if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
|
| +#if 0 /* Send app data in separate packet, otherwise, some particular site
|
| + * (only one site so far) closes the socket.
|
| + * Note: there is a very small chance that two TCP packets
|
| + * could be arriving at server combined into a single TCP packet,
|
| + * then trigger that site to break. We haven't encounter that though.
|
| + */
|
| + if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH)
|
| + {
|
| + /* Send app data along with CCS/Finished */
|
| + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| + for (;;)
|
| + {
|
| + state=s->state;
|
| +
|
| + switch(s->state)
|
| + {
|
| + case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
|
| + s->new_session=1;
|
| + s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
|
| + s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
|
| + /* break */
|
| + case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
|
| + case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
|
| + case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
|
| + case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
|
| +
|
| + s->server=0;
|
| + if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
|
| +
|
| + if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + ret = -1;
|
| + goto end;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
|
| + s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
|
| +
|
| + if (s->init_buf == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + ret= -1;
|
| + goto end;
|
| + }
|
| + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
|
| + {
|
| + ret= -1;
|
| + goto end;
|
| + }
|
| + s->init_buf=buf;
|
| + buf=NULL;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
|
| +
|
| + /* setup buffing BIO */
|
| + if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
|
| +
|
| + /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
|
| +
|
| + ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
|
| +
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
|
| + s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
|
| +
|
| + s->shutdown=0;
|
| + ret=ssl3_client_hello(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| +
|
| + /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
|
| + if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
|
| + s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio);
|
| +
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
|
| + ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| +
|
| + if (s->hit)
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
|
| + else
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| + ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + if (ret == 2)
|
| + {
|
| + s->hit = 1;
|
| + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
|
| + else
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| + /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */
|
| + /* or PSK */
|
| + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
|
| + !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
|
| + {
|
| + ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| + if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
|
| + else
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + skip = 1;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
| + }
|
| +#else
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + skip=1;
|
| +
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
| +#endif
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
|
| + ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| +
|
| + /* at this point we check that we have the
|
| + * required stuff from the server */
|
| + if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
|
| + {
|
| + ret= -1;
|
| + goto end;
|
| + }
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
|
| + ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
|
| + ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
|
| + else
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| +
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
|
| + ret=ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
|
| + ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + /* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
|
| + * sent back */
|
| + /* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
|
| + * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */
|
| + /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
|
| + * authentication in ECDH cipher suites with
|
| + * ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates.
|
| + * We need to skip the certificate verify
|
| + * message when client's ECDH public key is sent
|
| + * inside the client certificate.
|
| + */
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
|
| + {
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
|
| + s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
|
| + }
|
| + if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
|
| + {
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
|
| + s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
|
| + ret=ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
|
| + ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
|
| + SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| +
|
| + s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
| +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
| + s->session->compress_meth=0;
|
| +#else
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
|
| + s->session->compress_meth=0;
|
| + else
|
| + s->session->compress_meth=
|
| + s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
|
| +#endif
|
| + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
|
| + {
|
| + ret= -1;
|
| + goto end;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
| + SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
|
| + {
|
| + ret= -1;
|
| + goto end;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
|
| + ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
|
| + SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
|
| + s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
|
| + s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
|
| +
|
| + /* clear flags */
|
| + s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
|
| + if (s->hit)
|
| + {
|
| + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
| + if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
|
| + {
|
| + s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
| + s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
|
| + s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + if ((SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) && SSL_get_cipher_bits(s, NULL) >= 128
|
| + && s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 /* no cutthrough on renegotiation (would complicate the state machine) */
|
| + )
|
| + {
|
| + if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
|
| + {
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE;
|
| + s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
|
| + s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| + /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
|
| + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
|
| + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| + s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
|
| + ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
|
| + ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
|
| +
|
| + ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
|
| + SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
|
| + if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
| +
|
| + if (s->hit)
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
|
| + else
|
| + s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
|
| + s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
|
| + if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + ret= -1;
|
| + goto end;
|
| + }
|
| + s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
| + s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
|
| + break;
|
| +
|
| + case SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE:
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| + /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
|
| + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
|
| +
|
| + /* SSL_write() will take care of flushing buffered data if
|
| + * DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED is set.
|
| + */
|
| + if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED))
|
| + ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
|
| + ret = 1;
|
| + goto end;
|
| + /* break; */
|
| +
|
| + case SSL_ST_OK:
|
| + /* clean a few things up */
|
| + ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
|
| +
|
| + if (s->init_buf != NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
|
| + s->init_buf=NULL;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets,
|
| + * remove the buffering now */
|
| + if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
|
| + ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
|
| + /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
|
| +
|
| + s->init_num=0;
|
| + s->new_session=0;
|
| +
|
| + ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
|
| + if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
|
| +
|
| + ret=1;
|
| + /* s->server=0; */
|
| + s->handshake_func=ssl3_connect;
|
| + s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
|
| +
|
| + if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
|
| +
|
| + goto end;
|
| + /* break; */
|
| +
|
| + default:
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
|
| + ret= -1;
|
| + goto end;
|
| + /* break; */
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* did we do anything */
|
| + if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
|
| + {
|
| + if (s->debug)
|
| + {
|
| + if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
|
| + goto end;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
|
| + {
|
| + new_state=s->state;
|
| + s->state=state;
|
| + cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
|
| + s->state=new_state;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + skip=0;
|
| + }
|
| +end:
|
| + s->in_handshake--;
|
| + if (buf != NULL)
|
| + BUF_MEM_free(buf);
|
| + if (cb != NULL)
|
| + cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
|
| + return(ret);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + unsigned char *buf;
|
| + unsigned char *p,*d;
|
| + int i;
|
| + unsigned long Time,l;
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
| + int j;
|
| + SSL_COMP *comp;
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| + buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
| + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
|
| + {
|
| + SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
|
| + if ((sess == NULL) ||
|
| + (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
|
| +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| + !sess->session_id_length ||
|
| +#else
|
| + (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
|
| +#endif
|
| + (sess->not_resumable))
|
| + {
|
| + if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
|
| + {
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + /* else use the pre-loaded session */
|
| +
|
| + p=s->s3->client_random;
|
| + Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
|
| + l2n(Time,p);
|
| + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
|
| + goto err;
|
| +
|
| + /* Do the message type and length last */
|
| + d=p= &(buf[4]);
|
| +
|
| + *(p++)=s->version>>8;
|
| + *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
|
| + s->client_version=s->version;
|
| +
|
| + /* Random stuff */
|
| + memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
| + p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
| +
|
| + /* Session ID */
|
| + if (s->new_session)
|
| + i=0;
|
| + else
|
| + i=s->session->session_id_length;
|
| + *(p++)=i;
|
| + if (i != 0)
|
| + {
|
| + if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i);
|
| + p+=i;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* Ciphers supported */
|
| + i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0);
|
| + if (i == 0)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + s2n(i,p);
|
| + p+=i;
|
| +
|
| + /* COMPRESSION */
|
| +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
| + *(p++)=1;
|
| +#else
|
| +
|
| + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
|
| + || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
|
| + j=0;
|
| + else
|
| + j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
|
| + *(p++)=1+j;
|
| + for (i=0; i<j; i++)
|
| + {
|
| + comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,i);
|
| + *(p++)=comp->id;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| + *(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
|
| +
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| + /* TLS extensions*/
|
| + if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| + l=(p-d);
|
| + d=buf;
|
| + *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
|
| + l2n3(l,d);
|
| +
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
|
| + /* number of bytes to write */
|
| + s->init_num=p-buf;
|
| + s->init_off=0;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
|
| + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
| +err:
|
| + return(-1);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
| + const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
| + unsigned char *p,*d;
|
| + int i,al,ok;
|
| + unsigned int j;
|
| + long n;
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
| + SSL_COMP *comp;
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
| + SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
|
| + SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B,
|
| + -1,
|
| + 20000, /* ?? */
|
| + &ok);
|
| +
|
| + if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
| +
|
| + if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
| + {
|
| + if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
|
| + {
|
| + if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
|
| + {
|
| + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
|
| + return 1;
|
| + }
|
| + else /* already sent a cookie */
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
| +
|
| + if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version&0xff)))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
|
| + s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|p[1];
|
| + al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + p+=2;
|
| +
|
| + /* load the server hello data */
|
| + /* load the server random */
|
| + memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
| + p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
| +
|
| + /* get the session-id */
|
| + j= *(p++);
|
| +
|
| + if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE))
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| + /* check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared secret */
|
| + if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
|
| + {
|
| + SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
|
| + s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
|
| + if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
|
| + &s->session->master_key_length,
|
| + NULL, &pref_cipher,
|
| + s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
|
| + {
|
| + s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
|
| + pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
|
| +
|
| + if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
|
| + && memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0)
|
| + {
|
| + if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|
| + || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length))
|
| + {
|
| + /* actually a client application bug */
|
| + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + s->hit=1;
|
| + }
|
| + else /* a miss or crap from the other end */
|
| + {
|
| + /* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new
|
| + * SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */
|
| + s->hit=0;
|
| + if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
|
| + {
|
| + if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
|
| + {
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + s->session->session_id_length=j;
|
| + memcpy(s->session->session_id,p,j); /* j could be 0 */
|
| + }
|
| + p+=j;
|
| + c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
|
| + if (c == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + /* unknown cipher */
|
| + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
|
| +
|
| + sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
|
| + i=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk,c);
|
| + if (i < 0)
|
| + {
|
| + /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
|
| + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
|
| + and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that
|
| + cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */
|
| + if (s->session->cipher)
|
| + s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
|
| + if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id))
|
| + {
|
| +/* Workaround is now obsolete */
|
| +#if 0
|
| + if (!(s->options &
|
| + SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
|
| +#endif
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
|
| + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| +
|
| + /* lets get the compression algorithm */
|
| + /* COMPRESSION */
|
| +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
| + if (*(p++) != 0)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
|
| + * using compression.
|
| + */
|
| + if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +#else
|
| + j= *(p++);
|
| + if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (j == 0)
|
| + comp=NULL;
|
| + else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + comp=ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods,j);
|
| +
|
| + if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL))
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| + /* TLS extensions*/
|
| + if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
|
| + {
|
| + if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
|
| + {
|
| + /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| + if (p != (d+n))
|
| + {
|
| + /* wrong packet length */
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + return(1);
|
| +f_err:
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
| +err:
|
| + return(-1);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + int al,i,ok,ret= -1;
|
| + unsigned long n,nc,llen,l;
|
| + X509 *x=NULL;
|
| + const unsigned char *q,*p;
|
| + unsigned char *d;
|
| + STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
|
| + SESS_CERT *sc;
|
| + EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
| + int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
|
| +
|
| + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
| + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
|
| + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
|
| + -1,
|
| + s->max_cert_list,
|
| + &ok);
|
| +
|
| + if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
| +
|
| + if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
|
| + ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
|
| + (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)))
|
| + {
|
| + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
|
| + return(1);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
| +
|
| + if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + n2l3(p,llen);
|
| + if (llen+3 != n)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
|
| + {
|
| + n2l3(p,l);
|
| + if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + q=p;
|
| + x=d2i_X509(NULL,&q,l);
|
| + if (x == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (q != (p+l))
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + x=NULL;
|
| + nc+=l+3;
|
| + p=q;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
|
| + if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
| + && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
|
| + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
|
| +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
| + )
|
| + {
|
| + al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
|
| +
|
| + sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
|
| + if (sc == NULL) goto err;
|
| +
|
| + if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
|
| + s->session->sess_cert=sc;
|
| +
|
| + sc->cert_chain=sk;
|
| + /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's
|
| + * certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */
|
| + x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
|
| + sk=NULL;
|
| + /* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/
|
| +
|
| + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
|
| +
|
| + /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
|
| + need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
|
| + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
|
| + ? 0 : 1;
|
| +
|
| +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
| + printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
|
| + printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
|
| + printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
|
| + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
|
| +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
| +
|
| + if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
|
| + {
|
| + x=NULL;
|
| + al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
| + SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey);
|
| + if (need_cert && i < 0)
|
| + {
|
| + x=NULL;
|
| + al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
| + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (need_cert)
|
| + {
|
| + sc->peer_cert_type=i;
|
| + CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
| + /* Why would the following ever happen?
|
| + * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
|
| + if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
|
| + X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
|
| + sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
|
| + sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
|
| +
|
| + if (s->session->peer != NULL)
|
| + X509_free(s->session->peer);
|
| + CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
| + s->session->peer=x;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + sc->peer_cert_type=i;
|
| + sc->peer_key= NULL;
|
| +
|
| + if (s->session->peer != NULL)
|
| + X509_free(s->session->peer);
|
| + s->session->peer=NULL;
|
| + }
|
| + s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
|
| +
|
| + x=NULL;
|
| + ret=1;
|
| +
|
| + if (0)
|
| + {
|
| +f_err:
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
| + }
|
| +err:
|
| + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
| + X509_free(x);
|
| + sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
|
| + return(ret);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
|
| +#endif
|
| + EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
|
| + unsigned char *param,*p;
|
| + int al,i,j,param_len,ok;
|
| + long n,alg_k,alg_a;
|
| + EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + RSA *rsa=NULL;
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
| + DH *dh=NULL;
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| + EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
|
| + BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
|
| + EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
|
| + int curve_nid = 0;
|
| + int encoded_pt_len = 0;
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| + /* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
|
| + * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
|
| + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
| + SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
|
| + SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
|
| + -1,
|
| + s->max_cert_list,
|
| + &ok);
|
| + if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
| +
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
|
| + {
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
| + /* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
|
| + omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
|
| + session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
|
| + later.*/
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
|
| + {
|
| + s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
|
| + if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
|
| + OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
| + s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
|
| + return(1);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
| + if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
|
| + {
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
|
| + s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
| + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp)
|
| + {
|
| + DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
|
| + s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp)
|
| + {
|
| + EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
|
| + s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + param_len=0;
|
| + alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
| + alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
| + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
|
| +
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
| + if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
|
| + {
|
| + char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
|
| +
|
| + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
| + n2s(p,i);
|
| + param_len=i+2;
|
| + /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used
|
| + * in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the
|
| + * maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as
|
| + * long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */
|
| + if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (param_len > n)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + /* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
|
| + * characters, the hint is truncated from the first
|
| + * NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
|
| + * NULL-terminated string. */
|
| + memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
|
| + memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
|
| + if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
|
| + OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
| + s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
|
| + if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + p+=i;
|
| + n-=param_len;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
|
| + {
|
| + if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + n2s(p,i);
|
| + param_len=i+2;
|
| + if (param_len > n)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + p+=i;
|
| +
|
| + n2s(p,i);
|
| + param_len+=i+2;
|
| + if (param_len > n)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + p+=i;
|
| + n-=param_len;
|
| +
|
| + /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
|
| + if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
|
| + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa;
|
| + rsa=NULL;
|
| + }
|
| +#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
|
| + if (0)
|
| + ;
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
| + else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
|
| + {
|
| + if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + n2s(p,i);
|
| + param_len=i+2;
|
| + if (param_len > n)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + p+=i;
|
| +
|
| + n2s(p,i);
|
| + param_len+=i+2;
|
| + if (param_len > n)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + p+=i;
|
| +
|
| + n2s(p,i);
|
| + param_len+=i+2;
|
| + if (param_len > n)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + p+=i;
|
| + n-=param_len;
|
| +
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
|
| + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
|
| +#else
|
| + if (0)
|
| + ;
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
| + else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
|
| + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
|
| +#endif
|
| + /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
|
| +
|
| + s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh;
|
| + dh=NULL;
|
| + }
|
| + else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd))
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
|
| +
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| + else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
|
| + {
|
| + EC_GROUP *ngroup;
|
| + const EC_GROUP *group;
|
| +
|
| + if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the
|
| + * server's ephemeral ECDH public key.
|
| + * Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
|
| + * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
|
| + */
|
| +
|
| + /* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
|
| + * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
|
| + */
|
| + param_len=3;
|
| + if ((param_len > n) ||
|
| + (*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
|
| + ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0))
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
|
| + if (ngroup == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
|
| +
|
| + group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
|
| +
|
| + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
|
| + (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + p+=3;
|
| +
|
| + /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
|
| + if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
|
| + ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
|
| + p+=1;
|
| + param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len);
|
| + if ((param_len > n) ||
|
| + (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
|
| + p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + n-=param_len;
|
| + p+=encoded_pt_len;
|
| +
|
| + /* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention
|
| + * the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server
|
| + * key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA.
|
| + */
|
| + if (0) ;
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
|
| + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
|
| + else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
|
| + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
|
| +#endif
|
| + /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
|
| + EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
|
| + s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
|
| + ecdh=NULL;
|
| + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
| + bn_ctx = NULL;
|
| + EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
|
| + srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
|
| + }
|
| + else if (alg_k)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
|
| +
|
| +
|
| + /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
|
| +
|
| + /* if it was signed, check the signature */
|
| + if (pkey != NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + n2s(p,i);
|
| + n-=2;
|
| + j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
| +
|
| + if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
|
| + {
|
| + /* wrong packet length */
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
|
| + {
|
| + int num;
|
| +
|
| + j=0;
|
| + q=md_buf;
|
| + for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
|
| + {
|
| + EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
|
| + ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
|
| + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
| + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
| + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
|
| + EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i);
|
| + q+=i;
|
| + j+=i;
|
| + }
|
| + i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
|
| + pkey->pkey.rsa);
|
| + if (i < 0)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (i == 0)
|
| + {
|
| + /* bad signature */
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
| + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
|
| + {
|
| + /* lets do DSS */
|
| + EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
|
| + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
| + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
| + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
|
| + if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + /* bad signature */
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
|
| + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
|
| + {
|
| + /* let's do ECDSA */
|
| + EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
|
| + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
| + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
| + EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
|
| + if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + /* bad signature */
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
|
| + /* aNULL or kPSK do not need public keys */
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + /* still data left over */
|
| + if (n != 0)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
| + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
| + return(1);
|
| +f_err:
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
| +err:
|
| + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + if (rsa != NULL)
|
| + RSA_free(rsa);
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
| + if (dh != NULL)
|
| + DH_free(dh);
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
| + EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
|
| + if (ecdh != NULL)
|
| + EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
|
| +#endif
|
| + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
| + return(-1);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + int ok,ret=0;
|
| + unsigned long n,nc,l;
|
| + unsigned int llen,ctype_num,i;
|
| + X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
|
| + const unsigned char *p,*q;
|
| + unsigned char *d;
|
| + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk=NULL;
|
| +
|
| + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
| + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
|
| + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
|
| + -1,
|
| + s->max_cert_list,
|
| + &ok);
|
| +
|
| + if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
| +
|
| + s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
|
| +
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)
|
| + {
|
| + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
|
| + return(1);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
|
| + {
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
|
| + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
|
| + {
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
|
| + {
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
| +
|
| + if ((ca_sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* get the certificate types */
|
| + ctype_num= *(p++);
|
| + if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
|
| + ctype_num=SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
|
| + for (i=0; i<ctype_num; i++)
|
| + s->s3->tmp.ctype[i]= p[i];
|
| + p+=ctype_num;
|
| +
|
| + /* get the CA RDNs */
|
| + n2s(p,llen);
|
| +#if 0
|
| +{
|
| +FILE *out;
|
| +out=fopen("/tmp/vsign.der","w");
|
| +fwrite(p,1,llen,out);
|
| +fclose(out);
|
| +}
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| + if ((llen+ctype_num+2+1) != n)
|
| + {
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
|
| + {
|
| + n2s(p,l);
|
| + if ((l+nc+2) > llen)
|
| + {
|
| + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
|
| + goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + q=p;
|
| +
|
| + if ((xn=d2i_X509_NAME(NULL,&q,l)) == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
|
| + if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
|
| + goto cont;
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (q != (p+l))
|
| + {
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk,xn))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + p+=l;
|
| + nc+=l+2;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (0)
|
| + {
|
| +cont:
|
| + ERR_clear_error();
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
|
| + s->s3->tmp.cert_req=1;
|
| + s->s3->tmp.ctype_num=ctype_num;
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
|
| + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free);
|
| + s->s3->tmp.ca_names=ca_sk;
|
| + ca_sk=NULL;
|
| +
|
| + ret=1;
|
| +err:
|
| + if (ca_sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk,X509_NAME_free);
|
| + return(ret);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
|
| + {
|
| + return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
|
| + }
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| +int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + int ok,al,ret=0, ticklen;
|
| + long n;
|
| + const unsigned char *p;
|
| + unsigned char *d;
|
| +
|
| + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
| + SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
|
| + SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
|
| + -1,
|
| + 16384,
|
| + &ok);
|
| +
|
| + if (!ok)
|
| + return((int)n);
|
| +
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
|
| + {
|
| + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
|
| + return(1);
|
| + }
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)
|
| + {
|
| + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (n < 6)
|
| + {
|
| + /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
|
| + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
| + n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
|
| + n2s(p, ticklen);
|
| + /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
|
| + if (ticklen + 6 != n)
|
| + {
|
| + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (s->session->tlsext_tick)
|
| + {
|
| + OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
|
| + s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
|
| + }
|
| + s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
|
| + if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
|
| + s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
|
| + /* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion.
|
| + * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server
|
| + * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
|
| + * client session ID matching to work and we know much
|
| + * earlier that the ticket has been accepted.
|
| + *
|
| + * The other way is to set zero length session ID when the
|
| + * ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine
|
| + * session resumption.
|
| + *
|
| + * We choose the former approach because this fits in with
|
| + * assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set
|
| + * to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the
|
| + * ticket.
|
| + */
|
| + EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
|
| + s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
|
| + EVP_sha256(), NULL);
|
| +#else
|
| + EVP_sha1(), NULL);
|
| +#endif
|
| + ret=1;
|
| + return(ret);
|
| +f_err:
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
| +err:
|
| + return(-1);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + int ok, al;
|
| + unsigned long resplen,n;
|
| + const unsigned char *p;
|
| +
|
| + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
| + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
|
| + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
|
| + SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS,
|
| + 16384,
|
| + &ok);
|
| +
|
| + if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
| + if (n < 4)
|
| + {
|
| + /* need at least status type + length */
|
| + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
| + if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
|
| + {
|
| + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + n2l3(p, resplen);
|
| + if (resplen + 4 != n)
|
| + {
|
| + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
|
| + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
|
| + s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
|
| + if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
|
| + {
|
| + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
|
| + if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
|
| + {
|
| + int ret;
|
| + ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
|
| + if (ret == 0)
|
| + {
|
| + al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (ret < 0)
|
| + {
|
| + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + return 1;
|
| +f_err:
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
| + return(-1);
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + int ok,ret=0;
|
| + long n;
|
| +
|
| + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
| + SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
|
| + SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
|
| + SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE,
|
| + 30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */
|
| + &ok);
|
| +
|
| + if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
| + if (n > 0)
|
| + {
|
| + /* should contain no data */
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
| + return -1;
|
| + }
|
| + ret=1;
|
| + return(ret);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + unsigned char *p,*d;
|
| + int n;
|
| + unsigned long alg_k;
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + unsigned char *q;
|
| + EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
| + KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
|
| +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| + EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
|
| + const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
|
| + EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
|
| + unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
|
| + int encoded_pt_len = 0;
|
| + BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL;
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
|
| + {
|
| + d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
| + p= &(d[4]);
|
| +
|
| + alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
| +
|
| + /* Fool emacs indentation */
|
| + if (0) {}
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
|
| + {
|
| + RSA *rsa;
|
| + unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
|
| +
|
| + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
|
| + rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
|
| + if ((pkey == NULL) ||
|
| + (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
|
| + (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
|
| + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
|
| + tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
|
| + if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
|
| + goto err;
|
| +
|
| + s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf;
|
| +
|
| + q=p;
|
| + /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
|
| + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
|
| + p+=2;
|
| + n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
|
| + tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
|
| +#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
|
| + if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++;
|
| + if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70;
|
| +#endif
|
| + if (n <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
|
| + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
|
| + {
|
| + s2n(n,q);
|
| + n+=2;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + s->session->master_key_length=
|
| + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
| + s->session->master_key,
|
| + tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
|
| + OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
| + else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
|
| + {
|
| + krb5_error_code krb5rc;
|
| + KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
|
| + /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
|
| + krb5_data *enc_ticket;
|
| + krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
|
| + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
|
| + const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
|
| + unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
| + unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
|
| + unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
|
| + + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
| + int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
|
| +
|
| + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
|
| +
|
| +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
| + printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
|
| + alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
|
| +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
| +
|
| + authp = NULL;
|
| +#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
|
| + if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator;
|
| +#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
|
| +
|
| + krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
|
| + &kssl_err);
|
| + enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
|
| + if (enc == NULL)
|
| + goto err;
|
| +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
| + {
|
| + printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
|
| + if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
|
| + printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
|
| + }
|
| +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
| +
|
| + if (krb5rc)
|
| + {
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
| + SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + kssl_err.reason);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
|
| + ** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
|
| + **
|
| + ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
|
| + ** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
|
| + ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
|
| + ** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
|
| + ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
|
| + **
|
| + ** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
|
| + ** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
|
| + ** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
|
| + ** with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
|
| + ** Example:
|
| + ** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
|
| + ** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
|
| + ** optional authenticator omitted.
|
| + */
|
| +
|
| + /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
|
| + s2n(enc_ticket->length,p);
|
| + memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
|
| + p+= enc_ticket->length;
|
| + n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
|
| +
|
| + /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
|
| + if (authp && authp->length)
|
| + {
|
| + s2n(authp->length,p);
|
| + memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
|
| + p+= authp->length;
|
| + n+= authp->length + 2;
|
| +
|
| + free(authp->data);
|
| + authp->data = NULL;
|
| + authp->length = 0;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + s2n(0,p);/* null authenticator length */
|
| + n+=2;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
|
| + tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
|
| + if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
|
| + goto err;
|
| +
|
| + /* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
|
| + ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
|
| + ** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
|
| + ** kssl_ctx->length);
|
| + ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
|
| + */
|
| +
|
| + memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
|
| + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,
|
| + kssl_ctx->key,iv);
|
| + EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf,
|
| + sizeof tmp_buf);
|
| + EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl);
|
| + outl += padl;
|
| + if (outl > (int)sizeof epms)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
|
| +
|
| + /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
|
| + s2n(outl,p);
|
| + memcpy(p, epms, outl);
|
| + p+=outl;
|
| + n+=outl + 2;
|
| +
|
| + s->session->master_key_length=
|
| + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
| + s->session->master_key,
|
| + tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
|
| +
|
| + OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
|
| + OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
| + else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
|
| + {
|
| + DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
|
| +
|
| + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
|
| + dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + /* we get them from the cert */
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* generate a new random key */
|
| + if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
| + DH_free(dh_clnt);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but
|
| + * make sure to clear it out afterwards */
|
| +
|
| + n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt);
|
| +
|
| + if (n <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
| + DH_free(dh_clnt);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* generate master key from the result */
|
| + s->session->master_key_length=
|
| + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
| + s->session->master_key,p,n);
|
| + /* clean up */
|
| + memset(p,0,n);
|
| +
|
| + /* send off the data */
|
| + n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
|
| + s2n(n,p);
|
| + BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p);
|
| + n+=2;
|
| +
|
| + DH_free(dh_clnt);
|
| +
|
| + /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| + else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
|
| + {
|
| + const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
|
| + EC_KEY *tkey;
|
| + int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
|
| + int field_size = 0;
|
| +
|
| + /* Did we send out the client's
|
| + * ECDH share for use in premaster
|
| + * computation as part of client certificate?
|
| + * If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
|
| + */
|
| + if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL))
|
| + {
|
| + /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
|
| + * authentication using ECDH certificates.
|
| + * To add such support, one needs to add
|
| + * code that checks for appropriate
|
| + * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
|
| + * For example, the cert have an ECC
|
| + * key on the same curve as the server's
|
| + * and the key should be authorized for
|
| + * key agreement.
|
| + *
|
| + * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
|
| + * to skip sending the certificate verify
|
| + * message.
|
| + *
|
| + * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
|
| + * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
|
| + * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
|
| + * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
|
| + */
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
|
| + srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \
|
| + sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
|
| + if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) ||
|
| + (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) ||
|
| + (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
|
| + srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
|
| +
|
| + if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
|
| + {
|
| + /* Reuse key info from our certificate
|
| + * We only need our private key to perform
|
| + * the ECDH computation.
|
| + */
|
| + const BIGNUM *priv_key;
|
| + tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
|
| + priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
|
| + if (priv_key == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
|
| + if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
|
| + * make sure to clear it out afterwards
|
| + */
|
| +
|
| + field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
|
| + if (field_size <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
|
| + if (n <= 0)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* generate master key from the result */
|
| + s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
|
| + -> generate_master_secret(s,
|
| + s->session->master_key,
|
| + p, n);
|
| +
|
| + memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
|
| +
|
| + if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
|
| + {
|
| + /* Send empty client key exch message */
|
| + n = 0;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + /* First check the size of encoding and
|
| + * allocate memory accordingly.
|
| + */
|
| + encoded_pt_len =
|
| + EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
|
| + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
|
| + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
| + NULL, 0, NULL);
|
| +
|
| + encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
|
| + OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len *
|
| + sizeof(unsigned char));
|
| + bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
| + if ((encodedPoint == NULL) ||
|
| + (bn_ctx == NULL))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* Encode the public key */
|
| + n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
|
| + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
|
| + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
| + encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
|
| +
|
| + *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
|
| + /* Encoded point will be copied here */
|
| + p += 1;
|
| + /* copy the point */
|
| + memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
|
| + /* increment n to account for length field */
|
| + n += 1;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* Free allocated memory */
|
| + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
| + if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
| + if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
|
| + EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
|
| + EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
|
| + }
|
| +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
|
| + else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
|
| + {
|
| + /* GOST key exchange message creation */
|
| + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
|
| + X509 *peer_cert;
|
| + size_t msglen;
|
| + unsigned int md_len;
|
| + int keytype;
|
| + unsigned char premaster_secret[32],shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
|
| + EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
|
| + EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
|
| +
|
| + /* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
|
| + peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
|
| + if (!peer_cert)
|
| + peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
|
| + if (!peer_cert) {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + pkey_ctx=EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key=X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert),NULL);
|
| + /* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
|
| +
|
| + * parameters match those of server certificate, use
|
| + * certificate key for key exchange
|
| + */
|
| +
|
| + /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
|
| +
|
| + EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
|
| + /* Generate session key */
|
| + RAND_bytes(premaster_secret,32);
|
| + /* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key */
|
| + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
|
| + if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) {
|
| + /* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
|
| + * would be used
|
| + */
|
| + ERR_clear_error();
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + /* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific
|
| + * context data */
|
| + ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
|
| + EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
|
| + EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
| + EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
| + EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
|
| + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
|
| + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx,-1,EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV,
|
| + 8,shared_ukm)<0) {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
|
| + /*Encapsulate it into sequence */
|
| + *(p++)=V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
|
| + msglen=255;
|
| + if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx,tmp,&msglen,premaster_secret,32)<0) {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + if (msglen >= 0x80)
|
| + {
|
| + *(p++)=0x81;
|
| + *(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
|
| + n=msglen+3;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + *(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
|
| + n=msglen+2;
|
| + }
|
| + memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
|
| + /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
|
| + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
|
| + {
|
| + /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
|
| + s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
|
| + }
|
| + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
|
| + s->session->master_key_length=
|
| + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
| + s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
|
| + EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
|
| +
|
| + }
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
| + else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
|
| + {
|
| + char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN];
|
| + unsigned char *t = NULL;
|
| + unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
|
| + unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
|
| + int psk_err = 1;
|
| +
|
| + n = 0;
|
| + if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
|
| + identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN,
|
| + psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
|
| + if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + goto psk_err;
|
| + }
|
| + else if (psk_len == 0)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
|
| + goto psk_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
|
| + pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
|
| + t = psk_or_pre_ms;
|
| + memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
|
| + s2n(psk_len, t);
|
| + memset(t, 0, psk_len);
|
| + t+=psk_len;
|
| + s2n(psk_len, t);
|
| +
|
| + if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
|
| + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
|
| + s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
| + if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
|
| + s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto psk_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
|
| + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
|
| + s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
|
| + if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| + goto psk_err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + s->session->master_key_length =
|
| + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
| + s->session->master_key,
|
| + psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
|
| + n = strlen(identity);
|
| + s2n(n, p);
|
| + memcpy(p, identity, n);
|
| + n+=2;
|
| + psk_err = 0;
|
| + psk_err:
|
| + OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
|
| + OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
|
| + if (psk_err != 0)
|
| + {
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
| + SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
| + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
|
| + l2n3(n,d);
|
| +
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
|
| + /* number of bytes to write */
|
| + s->init_num=n+4;
|
| + s->init_off=0;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
|
| + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
| +err:
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
| + if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
| + if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
|
| + EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
|
| + EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
|
| +#endif
|
| + return(-1);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + unsigned char *p,*d;
|
| + unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
| + EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
| + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx=NULL;
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + unsigned u=0;
|
| +#endif
|
| + unsigned long n;
|
| + int j;
|
| +
|
| + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A)
|
| + {
|
| + d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
| + p= &(d[4]);
|
| + pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey;
|
| +/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
|
| + pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
|
| + EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
|
| + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1())>0)
|
| + {
|
| + s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
|
| + NID_sha1,
|
| + &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + ERR_clear_error();
|
| + }
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
|
| + {
|
| + s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
|
| + NID_md5,
|
| + &(data[0]));
|
| + if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
|
| + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
|
| + &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 )
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + s2n(u,p);
|
| + n=u+2;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
| + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
|
| + {
|
| + if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
|
| + &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
|
| + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
|
| + (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.dsa))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + s2n(j,p);
|
| + n=j+2;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
|
| + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
|
| + {
|
| + if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
|
| + &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
|
| + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
|
| + (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.ec))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
|
| + ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + s2n(j,p);
|
| + n=j+2;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| + if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
|
| + {
|
| + unsigned char signbuf[64];
|
| + int i;
|
| + size_t sigsize=64;
|
| + s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
|
| + NID_id_GostR3411_94,
|
| + data);
|
| + if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
|
| + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + for (i=63,j=0; i>=0; j++, i--) {
|
| + p[2+j]=signbuf[i];
|
| + }
|
| + s2n(j,p);
|
| + n=j+2;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| + *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
|
| + l2n3(n,d);
|
| +
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
|
| + s->init_num=(int)n+4;
|
| + s->init_off=0;
|
| + }
|
| + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
| + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
| +err:
|
| + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
| + return(-1);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + X509 *x509=NULL;
|
| + EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
| + int i;
|
| + unsigned long l;
|
| +
|
| + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A)
|
| + {
|
| + if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
|
| + (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
|
| + (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
|
| + else
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* We need to get a client cert */
|
| + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B)
|
| + {
|
| + /* If we get an error, we need to
|
| + * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1);
|
| + * We then get retied later */
|
| + i=0;
|
| + i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
|
| + if (i < 0)
|
| + {
|
| + s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
|
| + return(-1);
|
| + }
|
| + s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
| + if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
|
| + {
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
|
| + if ( !SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) ||
|
| + !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
|
| + i=0;
|
| + }
|
| + else if (i == 1)
|
| + {
|
| + i=0;
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
|
| + if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
| + if (i == 0)
|
| + {
|
| + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
|
| + {
|
| + s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
|
| + return(1);
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + /* Ok, we have a cert */
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C)
|
| + {
|
| + s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
|
| + l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
|
| + (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509);
|
| + s->init_num=(int)l;
|
| + s->init_off=0;
|
| + }
|
| + /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
|
| + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
|
| +
|
| +int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + int i,idx;
|
| + long alg_k,alg_a;
|
| + EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
| + SESS_CERT *sc;
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + RSA *rsa;
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
| + DH *dh;
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| + alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
| + alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
| +
|
| + /* we don't have a certificate */
|
| + if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
|
| + return(1);
|
| +
|
| + sc=s->session->sess_cert;
|
| + if (sc == NULL)
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| + goto err;
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
| + dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| + /* This is the passed certificate */
|
| +
|
| + idx=sc->peer_cert_type;
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| + if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC)
|
| + {
|
| + if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,
|
| + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) == 0)
|
| + { /* check failed */
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| + {
|
| + return 1;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| + pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
|
| + i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey);
|
| + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
| +
|
| +
|
| + /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
|
| + if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
| + else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
|
| + !(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL)))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
| + if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) &&
|
| + !(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL)))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
| + else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))
|
| + {
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| + if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
|
| + {
|
| + if (rsa == NULL
|
| + || RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
| + if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
|
| + {
|
| + if (dh == NULL
|
| + || DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + else
|
| +#endif
|
| + {
|
| + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
|
| + goto f_err;
|
| + }
|
| + }
|
| + return(1);
|
| +f_err:
|
| + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
| +err:
|
| + return(0);
|
| + }
|
| +
|
| +/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
|
| + * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
|
| + * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
|
| + */
|
| +
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| +int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
|
| + {
|
| + int ok;
|
| + long n;
|
| + /* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */
|
| + if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
|
| + return 1;
|
| + /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate
|
| + * message, so permit appropriate message length */
|
| + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
| + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
|
| + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
|
| + -1,
|
| + s->max_cert_list,
|
| + &ok);
|
| + if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
| + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
|
| + if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
|
| + || (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET))
|
| + return 2;
|
| +
|
| + return 1;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| +
|
| +int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
|
| + {
|
| + int i = 0;
|
| +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
| + if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine)
|
| + {
|
| + i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
|
| + SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
|
| + px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
| + if (i != 0)
|
| + return i;
|
| + }
|
| +#endif
|
| + if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
|
| + i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,px509,ppkey);
|
| + return i;
|
| + }
|
|
|
Chromium Code Reviews
Issue 9254031:
Upgrade chrome's OpenSSL to same version Android ships with. (Closed)
Base URL: http://src.chromium.org/svn/trunk/deps/third_party/openssl/