Index: openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c |
=================================================================== |
--- openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c (revision 105093) |
+++ openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c (working copy) |
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ |
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
*/ |
/* ==================================================================== |
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
* |
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
@@ -108,6 +108,32 @@ |
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
* |
*/ |
+/* ==================================================================== |
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
+ * |
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by |
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
+ * license. |
+ * |
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of |
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites |
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. |
+ * |
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in |
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received |
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. |
+ * |
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not |
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third |
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights |
+ * to make use of the Contribution. |
+ * |
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN |
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA |
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY |
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR |
+ * OTHERWISE. |
+ */ |
#include <stdio.h> |
#include "ssl_locl.h" |
@@ -121,94 +147,148 @@ |
#include <openssl/des.h> |
#endif |
-static void tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, |
- int sec_len, unsigned char *seed, int seed_len, |
+/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ |
+static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, |
+ int sec_len, |
+ const void *seed1, int seed1_len, |
+ const void *seed2, int seed2_len, |
+ const void *seed3, int seed3_len, |
+ const void *seed4, int seed4_len, |
+ const void *seed5, int seed5_len, |
unsigned char *out, int olen) |
{ |
- int chunk,n; |
+ int chunk; |
unsigned int j; |
HMAC_CTX ctx; |
HMAC_CTX ctx_tmp; |
unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
unsigned int A1_len; |
+ int ret = 0; |
chunk=EVP_MD_size(md); |
+ OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0); |
HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx); |
HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp); |
- HMAC_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); |
- HMAC_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); |
- HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,sec,sec_len,md, NULL); |
- HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,sec,sec_len,md, NULL); |
- HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed,seed_len); |
- HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len); |
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,sec,sec_len,md, NULL)) |
+ goto err; |
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,sec,sec_len,md, NULL)) |
+ goto err; |
+ if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len)) |
+ goto err; |
+ if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len)) |
+ goto err; |
+ if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len)) |
+ goto err; |
+ if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len)) |
+ goto err; |
+ if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len)) |
+ goto err; |
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len)) |
+ goto err; |
- n=0; |
for (;;) |
{ |
- HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); /* re-init */ |
- HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); /* re-init */ |
- HMAC_Update(&ctx,A1,A1_len); |
- HMAC_Update(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len); |
- HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed,seed_len); |
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */ |
+ goto err; |
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */ |
+ goto err; |
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx,A1,A1_len)) |
+ goto err; |
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len)) |
+ goto err; |
+ if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len)) |
+ goto err; |
+ if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len)) |
+ goto err; |
+ if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len)) |
+ goto err; |
+ if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len)) |
+ goto err; |
+ if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len)) |
+ goto err; |
if (olen > chunk) |
{ |
- HMAC_Final(&ctx,out,&j); |
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,out,&j)) |
+ goto err; |
out+=j; |
olen-=j; |
- HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len); /* calc the next A1 value */ |
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len)) /* calc the next A1 value */ |
+ goto err; |
} |
else /* last one */ |
{ |
- HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len); |
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len)) |
+ goto err; |
memcpy(out,A1,olen); |
break; |
} |
} |
+ ret = 1; |
+err: |
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp); |
OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1)); |
+ return ret; |
} |
-static void tls1_PRF(const EVP_MD *md5, const EVP_MD *sha1, |
- unsigned char *label, int label_len, |
- const unsigned char *sec, int slen, unsigned char *out1, |
+/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ |
+static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask, |
+ const void *seed1, int seed1_len, |
+ const void *seed2, int seed2_len, |
+ const void *seed3, int seed3_len, |
+ const void *seed4, int seed4_len, |
+ const void *seed5, int seed5_len, |
+ const unsigned char *sec, int slen, |
+ unsigned char *out1, |
unsigned char *out2, int olen) |
{ |
- int len,i; |
- const unsigned char *S1,*S2; |
+ int len,i,idx,count; |
+ const unsigned char *S1; |
+ long m; |
+ const EVP_MD *md; |
+ int ret = 0; |
- len=slen/2; |
+ /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */ |
+ count=0; |
+ for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) { |
+ if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++; |
+ } |
+ len=slen/count; |
S1=sec; |
- S2= &(sec[len]); |
- len+=(slen&1); /* add for odd, make longer */ |
- |
- |
- tls1_P_hash(md5 ,S1,len,label,label_len,out1,olen); |
- tls1_P_hash(sha1,S2,len,label,label_len,out2,olen); |
- |
- for (i=0; i<olen; i++) |
- out1[i]^=out2[i]; |
+ memset(out1,0,olen); |
+ for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) { |
+ if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) { |
+ if (!md) { |
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, |
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE); |
+ goto err; |
+ } |
+ if (!tls1_P_hash(md ,S1,len+(slen&1), |
+ seed1,seed1_len,seed2,seed2_len,seed3,seed3_len,seed4,seed4_len,seed5,seed5_len, |
+ out2,olen)) |
+ goto err; |
+ S1+=len; |
+ for (i=0; i<olen; i++) |
+ { |
+ out1[i]^=out2[i]; |
+ } |
+ } |
} |
- |
-static void tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, |
+ ret = 1; |
+err: |
+ return ret; |
+} |
+static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, |
unsigned char *tmp, int num) |
{ |
- unsigned char *p; |
- unsigned char buf[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2+ |
- TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE]; |
- p=buf; |
- |
- memcpy(p,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, |
- TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE); |
- p+=TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE; |
- memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; |
- memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; |
- |
- tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,(int)(p-buf), |
+ int ret; |
+ ret = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2, |
+ TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, |
+ s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
+ s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
+ NULL,0,NULL,0, |
s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length, |
km,tmp,num); |
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
@@ -222,19 +302,19 @@ |
} |
printf("\n"); } |
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
+ return ret; |
} |
int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) |
{ |
static const unsigned char empty[]=""; |
- unsigned char *p,*key_block,*mac_secret; |
- unsigned char *exp_label,buf[TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE+ |
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2]; |
+ unsigned char *p,*mac_secret; |
+ unsigned char *exp_label; |
unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; |
unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; |
unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2]; |
unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2]; |
- unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv,*er1,*er2; |
+ unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv; |
int client_write; |
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd; |
const EVP_CIPHER *c; |
@@ -242,34 +322,45 @@ |
const SSL_COMP *comp; |
#endif |
const EVP_MD *m; |
+ int mac_type; |
+ int *mac_secret_size; |
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; |
+ EVP_PKEY *mac_key; |
int is_export,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl; |
int reuse_dd = 0; |
is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); |
c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; |
m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash; |
+ mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; |
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression; |
#endif |
- key_block=s->s3->tmp.key_block; |
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
printf("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which); |
- printf("\talg= %ld, comp= %p\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms, |
- (void *)comp); |
- printf("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", (void *)c); |
+ printf("\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n", |
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, |
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, |
+ comp); |
+ printf("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c); |
printf("\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n", |
c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len); |
printf("\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length); |
{ |
- int ki; |
- for (ki=0; ki<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; ki++) |
- printf("%02x", key_block[ki]); printf("\n"); |
+ int i; |
+ for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++) |
+ printf("%02x", key_block[i]); printf("\n"); |
} |
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) |
{ |
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) |
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; |
+ else |
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; |
+ |
if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) |
reuse_dd = 1; |
else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL) |
@@ -278,7 +369,7 @@ |
/* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */ |
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx); |
dd= s->enc_read_ctx; |
- s->read_hash=m; |
+ mac_ctx=ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,NULL); |
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
if (s->expand != NULL) |
{ |
@@ -304,9 +395,14 @@ |
if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8); |
mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); |
+ mac_secret_size=&(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size); |
} |
else |
{ |
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) |
+ s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; |
+ else |
+ s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; |
if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) |
reuse_dd = 1; |
else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL) |
@@ -315,7 +411,7 @@ |
/* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */ |
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx); |
dd= s->enc_write_ctx; |
- s->write_hash=m; |
+ mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL); |
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
if (s->compress != NULL) |
{ |
@@ -336,20 +432,20 @@ |
if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8); |
mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); |
+ mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size); |
} |
if (reuse_dd) |
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd); |
p=s->s3->tmp.key_block; |
- i=EVP_MD_size(m); |
+ i=*mac_secret_size=s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size; |
+ |
cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); |
j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ? |
cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl; |
/* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */ |
k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); |
- er1= &(s->s3->client_random[0]); |
- er2= &(s->s3->server_random[0]); |
if ( (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || |
(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) |
{ |
@@ -378,6 +474,10 @@ |
} |
memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i); |
+ mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, |
+ mac_secret,*mac_secret_size); |
+ EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key); |
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); |
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which); |
{ int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } |
@@ -387,29 +487,24 @@ |
/* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the |
* same value since only the correct one will be used :-). |
*/ |
- p=buf; |
- memcpy(p,exp_label,exp_label_len); |
- p+=exp_label_len; |
- memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; |
- memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; |
- tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,(int)(p-buf),key,j, |
- tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)); |
+ if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2, |
+ exp_label,exp_label_len, |
+ s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
+ s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
+ NULL,0,NULL,0, |
+ key,j,tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) |
+ goto err2; |
key=tmp1; |
if (k > 0) |
{ |
- p=buf; |
- memcpy(p,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST, |
- TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE); |
- p+=TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE; |
- memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; |
- memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; |
- tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,p-buf,empty,0, |
- iv1,iv2,k*2); |
+ if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2, |
+ TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE, |
+ s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
+ s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
+ NULL,0,NULL,0, |
+ empty,0,iv1,iv2,k*2)) |
+ goto err2; |
if (client_write) |
iv=iv1; |
else |
@@ -420,13 +515,11 @@ |
s->session->key_arg_length=0; |
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
{ |
- int ki; |
+ int i; |
printf("EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n"); |
- printf("\tkey= "); |
- for (ki=0; ki<c->key_len; ki++) printf("%02x", key[ki]); |
+ printf("\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) printf("%02x", key[i]); |
printf("\n"); |
- printf("\t iv= "); |
- for (ki=0; ki<c->iv_len; ki++) printf("%02x", iv[ki]); |
+ printf("\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) printf("%02x", iv[i]); |
printf("\n"); |
} |
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
@@ -453,11 +546,13 @@ |
int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) |
{ |
- unsigned char *p1,*p2; |
+ unsigned char *p1,*p2=NULL; |
const EVP_CIPHER *c; |
const EVP_MD *hash; |
int num; |
SSL_COMP *comp; |
+ int mac_type= NID_undef,mac_secret_size=0; |
+ int ret=0; |
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n"); |
@@ -466,7 +561,7 @@ |
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0) |
return(1); |
- if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&comp)) |
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size,&comp)) |
{ |
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); |
return(0); |
@@ -474,20 +569,27 @@ |
s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c; |
s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash; |
- |
- num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+EVP_MD_size(hash)+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); |
+ s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; |
+ s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; |
+ num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+mac_secret_size+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); |
num*=2; |
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) |
+ { |
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
goto err; |
- if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) |
- goto err; |
+ } |
s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num; |
s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1; |
+ if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) |
+ { |
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
+ goto err; |
+ } |
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
printf("client random\n"); |
@@ -497,9 +599,8 @@ |
printf("pre-master\n"); |
{ int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } |
#endif |
- tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num); |
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num); |
- OPENSSL_free(p2); |
+ if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num)) |
+ goto err; |
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
printf("\nkey block\n"); |
{ int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } |
@@ -514,20 +615,24 @@ |
if (s->session->cipher != NULL) |
{ |
- if ((s->session->cipher->algorithms & SSL_ENC_MASK) == SSL_eNULL) |
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) |
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; |
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 |
- if ((s->session->cipher->algorithms & SSL_ENC_MASK) == SSL_RC4) |
+ if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) |
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; |
#endif |
} |
} |
- return(1); |
+ ret = 1; |
err: |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
- return(0); |
+ if (p2) |
+ { |
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num); |
+ OPENSSL_free(p2); |
+ } |
+ return(ret); |
} |
int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) |
@@ -540,8 +645,11 @@ |
if (send) |
{ |
- if (s->write_hash != NULL) |
- n=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash); |
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) |
+ { |
+ n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); |
+ OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); |
+ } |
ds=s->enc_write_ctx; |
rec= &(s->s3->wrec); |
if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) |
@@ -551,8 +659,11 @@ |
} |
else |
{ |
- if (s->read_hash != NULL) |
- n=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash); |
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) |
+ { |
+ n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); |
+ OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); |
+ } |
ds=s->enc_read_ctx; |
rec= &(s->s3->rrec); |
if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) |
@@ -599,11 +710,10 @@ |
{ |
unsigned long ui; |
printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n", |
- (void *)ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); |
- printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%ld %ld], %d iv_len\n", |
+ ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); |
+ printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n", |
ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len, |
- (unsigned long)DES_KEY_SZ, |
- (unsigned long)DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, |
+ DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, |
ds->cipher->iv_len); |
printf("\t\tIV: "); |
for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]); |
@@ -628,10 +738,10 @@ |
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
{ |
- unsigned long ki; |
+ unsigned long i; |
printf("\trec->data="); |
- for (ki=0; ki<l; i++) |
- printf(" %02x", rec->data[ki]); printf("\n"); |
+ for (i=0; i<l; i++) |
+ printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]); printf("\n"); |
} |
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
@@ -679,109 +789,154 @@ |
} |
return(1); |
} |
- |
-int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *in_ctx, unsigned char *out) |
+int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out) |
{ |
unsigned int ret; |
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx; |
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d=NULL; |
+ int i; |
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) |
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) |
+ return 0; |
+ |
+ for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++) |
+ { |
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid) |
+ { |
+ d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]; |
+ break; |
+ } |
+ } |
+ if (!d) { |
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC,SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST); |
+ return 0; |
+ } |
+ |
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); |
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,in_ctx); |
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d); |
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&ret); |
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
return((int)ret); |
} |
-int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, EVP_MD_CTX *in1_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *in2_ctx, |
+int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, |
const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out) |
{ |
unsigned int i; |
EVP_MD_CTX ctx; |
- unsigned char buf[TLS_MD_MAX_CONST_SIZE+MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
+ unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
unsigned char *q,buf2[12]; |
+ int idx; |
+ long mask; |
+ int err=0; |
+ const EVP_MD *md; |
q=buf; |
- memcpy(q,str,slen); |
- q+=slen; |
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) |
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) |
+ return 0; |
+ |
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); |
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,in1_ctx); |
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i); |
- q+=i; |
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,in2_ctx); |
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i); |
- q+=i; |
- tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1,buf,(int)(q-buf), |
- s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length, |
- out,buf2,sizeof buf2); |
+ for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&mask,&md);idx++) |
+ { |
+ if (mask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2) |
+ { |
+ int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); |
+ if (hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf))) |
+ { |
+ /* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */ |
+ err = 1; |
+ } |
+ else |
+ { |
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]); |
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i); |
+ if (i != (unsigned int)hashsize) /* can't really happen */ |
+ err = 1; |
+ q+=i; |
+ } |
+ } |
+ } |
+ |
+ if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2, |
+ str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0, |
+ s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length, |
+ out,buf2,sizeof buf2)) |
+ err = 1; |
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
- return sizeof buf2; |
+ if (err) |
+ return 0; |
+ else |
+ return sizeof buf2; |
} |
int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) |
{ |
SSL3_RECORD *rec; |
- unsigned char *mac_sec,*seq; |
- const EVP_MD *hash; |
- unsigned int md_size; |
+ unsigned char *seq; |
+ EVP_MD_CTX *hash; |
+ size_t md_size; |
int i; |
- HMAC_CTX hmac; |
+ EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx; |
unsigned char buf[5]; |
+ int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); |
+ int t; |
if (send) |
{ |
rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec); |
- mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); |
seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]); |
hash=ssl->write_hash; |
} |
else |
{ |
rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec); |
- mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); |
seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]); |
hash=ssl->read_hash; |
} |
- md_size=EVP_MD_size(hash); |
+ t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); |
+ OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); |
+ md_size=t; |
buf[0]=rec->type; |
- if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
- { |
- buf[1]=TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR; |
- buf[2]=TLS1_VERSION_MINOR; |
- } |
- else { |
- buf[1]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8); |
- buf[2]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version); |
- } |
- |
+ buf[1]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8); |
+ buf[2]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version); |
buf[3]=rec->length>>8; |
buf[4]=rec->length&0xff; |
/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ |
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac); |
- HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac,mac_sec,EVP_MD_size(hash),hash,NULL); |
+ if (stream_mac) |
+ { |
+ mac_ctx = hash; |
+ } |
+ else |
+ { |
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash); |
+ mac_ctx = &hmac; |
+ } |
- if (ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER || |
- (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)) |
+ if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
{ |
unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq; |
+ |
s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p); |
memcpy (p,&seq[2],6); |
- HMAC_Update(&hmac,dtlsseq,8); |
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,dtlsseq,8); |
} |
else |
- HMAC_Update(&hmac,seq,8); |
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,seq,8); |
- HMAC_Update(&hmac,buf,5); |
- HMAC_Update(&hmac,rec->input,rec->length); |
- HMAC_Final(&hmac,md,&md_size); |
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); |
- |
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,buf,5); |
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length); |
+ t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size); |
+ OPENSSL_assert(t > 0); |
+ |
+ if (!stream_mac) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); |
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
printf("sec="); |
{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); } |
@@ -793,7 +948,7 @@ |
{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); } |
#endif |
- if ( SSL_version(ssl) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(ssl) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
+ if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
{ |
for (i=7; i>=0; i--) |
{ |
@@ -811,23 +966,35 @@ |
int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, |
int len) |
{ |
- unsigned char buf[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2+TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE]; |
unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; |
+ const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL; |
+ int col = 0, sol = 0; |
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
- printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", (void *)s,out, p,len); |
+ printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len); |
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
- /* Setup the stuff to munge */ |
- memcpy(buf,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, |
- TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE); |
- memcpy(&(buf[TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE]), |
- s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
- memcpy(&(buf[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE+TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE]), |
- s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
- tls1_PRF(s->ctx->md5,s->ctx->sha1, |
- buf,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE+SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE*2,p,len, |
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && |
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0 && |
+ s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) |
+ { |
+ co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input; |
+ col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; |
+ so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input; |
+ sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; /* must be same as col (see draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1) */ |
+ } |
+#endif |
+ |
+ tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2, |
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, |
+ s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
+ co, col, |
+ s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
+ so, sol, |
+ p,len, |
s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff); |
+ |
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n"); |
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
@@ -862,7 +1029,13 @@ |
case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return(TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED); |
case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return(TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); |
-#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE |
+ case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return(TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); |
+ case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return(TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE); |
+ case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: return(TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); |
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); |
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); |
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); |
+#if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */ |
case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return |
(DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); |
#endif |