Upgrade chrome's OpenSSL to same version Android ships with.

patches/next_proto_neg.patch

Index: patches/next_proto_neg.patch
===================================================================
--- patches/next_proto_neg.patch	(revision 105093)
+++ patches/next_proto_neg.patch	(working copy)
@@ -1,1124 +0,0 @@
-commit ed5845e49b3c76f8735ec00e151a7b234acc266c
-Author: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
-Date:   Thu Nov 4 16:06:58 2010 -0400
-
-    next_proto_neg.patch
-
-diff --git a/apps/apps.c b/apps/apps.c
-index ab60b70..eede8a8 100644
---- a/apps/apps.c
-+++ b/apps/apps.c
-@@ -2579,3 +2579,45 @@ void jpake_server_auth(BIO *out, BIO *conn, const char *secret)
- 	}
- 
- #endif
-+
-+/* next_protos_parse parses a comma separated list of strings into a string
-+ * in a format suitable for passing to SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised.
-+ *   outlen: (output) set to the length of the resulting buffer on success.
-+ *   err: (maybe NULL) on failure, an error message line is written to this BIO.
-+ *   in: a NUL termianted string like "abc,def,ghi"
-+ *
-+ *   returns: a malloced buffer
-+ */
-+unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in)
-+	{
-+	size_t len;
-+	unsigned char *out;
-+	size_t i, start = 0;
-+
-+	len = strlen(in);
-+	if (len > 65535)
-+		return NULL;
-+
-+	out = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(in) + 1);
-+	if (!out)
-+		return NULL;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i <= len; ++i)
-+		{
-+		if (i == len || in[i] == ',')
-+			{
-+			if (i - start > 255)
-+				{
-+				OPENSSL_free(out);
-+				return NULL;
-+				}
-+			out[start] = i - start;
-+			start = i + 1;
-+			}
-+		else
-+			out[i+1] = in[i];
-+		}
-+
-+	*outlen = len + 1;
-+	return out;
-+	}
-diff --git a/apps/s_apps.h b/apps/s_apps.h
-index f5a39ba..513bcfe 100644
---- a/apps/s_apps.h
-+++ b/apps/s_apps.h
-@@ -174,3 +174,5 @@ void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
- 
- int MS_CALLBACK generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len);
- int MS_CALLBACK verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len);
-+
-+unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in);
-diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c
-index c071658..6033e77 100644
---- a/apps/s_client.c
-+++ b/apps/s_client.c
-@@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
- 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -status           - request certificate status from server\n");
- 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket        - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
- 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -cutthrough       - enable 1-RTT full-handshake for strong ciphers\n");
-+	BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - enable NPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)\n");
- #endif
- 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
- 	}
-@@ -284,6 +285,38 @@ enum
- 	PROTO_XMPP
- };
- 
-+/* This the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */
-+typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st {
-+	unsigned char *data;
-+	unsigned short len;
-+	int status;
-+} tlsextnextprotoctx;
-+
-+static tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto;
-+
-+static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
-+	{
-+	tlsextnextprotoctx *ctx = arg;
-+
-+	if (!c_quiet)
-+		{
-+		/* We can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. */
-+		unsigned i;
-+		BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Protocols advertised by server: ");
-+		for (i = 0; i < inlen; )
-+			{
-+			if (i)
-+				BIO_write(bio_c_out, ", ", 2);
-+			BIO_write(bio_c_out, &in[i + 1], in[i]);
-+			i += in[i] + 1;
-+			}
-+		BIO_write(bio_c_out, "\n", 1);
-+		}
-+
-+	ctx->status = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, ctx->data, ctx->len);
-+	return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-+	}
-+
- int MAIN(int, char **);
- 
- int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
-@@ -336,6 +369,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
- 	char *servername = NULL; 
-         tlsextctx tlsextcbp = 
-         {NULL,0};
-+	const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL;
- #endif
- 	char *sess_in = NULL;
- 	char *sess_out = NULL;
-@@ -536,6 +570,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-no_ticket") == 0)
- 			{ off|=SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; }
-+		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nextprotoneg") == 0)
-+			{
-+			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-+			next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv);
-+			}
- #endif
- 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cutthrough") == 0)
- 			cutthrough=1;
-@@ -624,6 +663,21 @@ bad:
- 	OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
- 	SSL_load_error_strings();
- 
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-+	next_proto.status = -1;
-+	if (next_proto_neg_in)
-+		{
-+		next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&next_proto.len, next_proto_neg_in);
-+		if (next_proto.data == NULL)
-+			{
-+			BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -nextprotoneg argument\n");
-+			goto end;
-+			}
-+		}
-+	else
-+		next_proto.data = NULL;
-+#endif
-+
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-         e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine_id, 1);
- 	if (ssl_client_engine_id)
-@@ -738,6 +792,9 @@ bad:
- 		SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, ssl_mode);
- 		}
- 
-+	if (next_proto.data)
-+		SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto);
-+
- 	if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx,apps_ssl_info_callback);
- 	if (cipher != NULL)
- 		if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx,cipher)) {
-@@ -1555,6 +1612,20 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full)
- 	BIO_printf(bio,"Expansion: %s\n",
- 		expansion ? SSL_COMP_get_name(expansion) : "NONE");
- #endif
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-+	{
-+		if (next_proto.status != -1) {
-+			const unsigned char *proto;
-+			unsigned int proto_len;
-+			SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(s, &proto, &proto_len);
-+			BIO_printf(bio, "Next protocol: (%d) ", next_proto.status);
-+			BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len);
-+			BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
-+		}
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	SSL_SESSION_print(bio,SSL_get_session(s));
- 	BIO_printf(bio,"---\n");
- 	if (peer != NULL)
-diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c
-index 88b308c..c4e19c9 100644
---- a/apps/s_server.c
-+++ b/apps/s_server.c
-@@ -405,6 +405,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
- 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug  - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n");
- 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket    - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
- 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
-+	BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - set the advertised protocols for the NPN extension (comma-separated list)\n");
- #endif
- 	}
- 
-@@ -740,6 +741,26 @@ BIO_printf(err, "cert_status: received %d ids\n", sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(ids));
- 	goto done;
- 	}
- #endif
-+
-+
-+/* This the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */
-+typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st {
-+	unsigned char *data;
-+	unsigned int len;
-+} tlsextnextprotoctx;
-+
-+
-+static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned int *len, void *arg)
-+	{
-+	tlsextnextprotoctx *next_proto = arg;
-+
-+	*data = next_proto->data;
-+	*len = next_proto->len;
-+
-+	return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-+	}
-+
-+
- int MAIN(int, char **);
- 
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
-@@ -779,6 +800,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
- #endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-         tlsextctx tlsextcbp = {NULL, NULL, SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING};
-+	const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL;
-+	tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto;
- #endif
- 
- #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
-@@ -1077,7 +1100,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
- 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
- 			s_key_file2= *(++argv);
- 			}
--			
-+		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-nextprotoneg") == 0)
-+			{
-+			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
-+			next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv);
-+			}
- #endif
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
- 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-jpake") == 0)
-@@ -1162,6 +1189,20 @@ bad:
- 				goto end;
- 				}
- 			}
-+
-+		if (next_proto_neg_in)
-+			{
-+			unsigned short len;
-+			next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&len,
-+				next_proto_neg_in);
-+			if (next_proto.data == NULL)
-+				goto end;
-+			next_proto.len = len;
-+			}
-+		else
-+			{
-+			next_proto.data = NULL;
-+			}
- #endif
- 		}
- 	if (s_dcert_file)
-@@ -1341,6 +1382,11 @@ bad:
- 		store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx2);
- 		X509_STORE_set_flags(store, vflags);
- 		}
-+
-+	if (next_proto.data)
-+		{
-+		SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto);
-+		}
- #endif 
- 
- 
-@@ -1980,6 +2026,10 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
- 	X509 *peer;
- 	long verify_error;
- 	MS_STATIC char buf[BUFSIZ];
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-+	const unsigned char *next_proto_neg;
-+	unsigned next_proto_neg_len;
-+#endif
- 
- 	if ((i=SSL_accept(con)) <= 0)
- 		{
-@@ -2019,6 +2069,14 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
- 		BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Shared ciphers:%s\n",buf);
- 	str=SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(con));
- 	BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"CIPHER is %s\n",(str != NULL)?str:"(NONE)");
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-+	SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(con, &next_proto_neg, &next_proto_neg_len);
-+	if (next_proto_neg) {
-+		BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"NEXTPROTO is ");
-+		BIO_write(bio_s_out, next_proto_neg, next_proto_neg_len);
-+		BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n");
-+	}
-+#endif
- 	if (con->hit) BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Reused session-id\n");
- 	if (SSL_ctrl(con,SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS,0,NULL) &
- 		TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-diff --git a/ssl/s3_both.c b/ssl/s3_both.c
-index 869a25d..b88288e 100644
---- a/ssl/s3_both.c
-+++ b/ssl/s3_both.c
-@@ -204,16 +204,34 @@ int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
- 	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- 	}
- 
-+/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to far. */
-+void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) {
-+	const char *sender;
-+	int slen;
-+
-+	if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-+		{
-+		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
-+		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
-+		}
-+	else
-+		{
-+		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
-+		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
-+		}
-+
-+	s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
-+		&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
-+		&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
-+		sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
-+}
-+
- int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
- 	{
- 	int al,i,ok;
- 	long n;
- 	unsigned char *p;
- 
--	/* the mac has already been generated when we received the
--	 * change cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md
--	 */ 
--
- 	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- 		a,
- 		b,
-@@ -516,6 +534,11 @@ long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
- 		s->init_num += i;
- 		n -= i;
- 		}
-+	/* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
-+	 * Finished verification. */
-+	if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
-+		ssl3_take_mac(s);
-+	/* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
- 	ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
- 	if (s->msg_callback)
- 		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
-index 6173dbe..f9e1554 100644
---- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
-+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
-@@ -404,7 +404,11 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
- 			ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
- 				SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
- 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
--			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
-+
-+			if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
-+				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-+			else
-+				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
- 			s->init_num=0;
- 
- 			s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
-@@ -432,6 +436,13 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
- 
- 			break;
- 
-+		case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
-+		case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
-+			ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
-+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-+			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
-+			break;
-+
- 		case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
- 		case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
- 			ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
-@@ -2752,6 +2763,30 @@ static int curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
- }
- #endif
- 
-+int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
-+	{
-+	unsigned int len, padding_len;
-+	unsigned char *d;
-+
-+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A)
-+		{
-+		len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
-+		padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
-+		d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-+		d[4] = len;
-+		memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
-+		d[5 + len] = padding_len;
-+		memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
-+		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
-+		l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
-+		s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
-+		s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
-+		s->init_off = 0;
-+		}
-+
-+	return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
-+}
-+
- /* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
-  * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
-  * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
-diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
-index 2c44bde..84bff8d 100644
---- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
-+++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
-@@ -1751,6 +1751,14 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
- 	s->s3->num_renegotiations=0;
- 	s->s3->in_read_app_data=0;
- 	s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
-+
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-+	if (s->next_proto_negotiated) {
-+		OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
-+		s->next_proto_negotiated = 0;
-+		s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
-+	}
-+#endif
- 	}
- 
- long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
-diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
-index 5e3583c..6853058 100644
---- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
-+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
-@@ -1264,8 +1264,6 @@ err:
- int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
- 	{
- 	int i;
--	const char *sender;
--	int slen;
- 
- 	if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- 		i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
-@@ -1288,25 +1286,6 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
- 	if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
- 		return(0);
- 
--	/* we have to record the message digest at
--	 * this point so we can get it before we read
--	 * the finished message */
--	if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
--		{
--		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
--		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
--		}
--	else
--		{
--		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
--		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
--		}
--
--	s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
--		&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
--		&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
--		sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
--
- 	return(1);
- 	}
- 
-diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
-index e696450..8e0a504 100644
---- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
-+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
-@@ -499,7 +499,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
- 				 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
- 				 * message is not sent.
- 				 */
--				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-+				if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
-+					s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-+				else
-+					s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
- 				s->init_num = 0;
- 				}
- 			else   
-@@ -526,10 +529,21 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
- 			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
- 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- 
--			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-+			if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
-+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-+			else
-+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
- 			s->init_num=0;
- 			break;
- 
-+		case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
-+		case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
-+			ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
-+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-+			s->init_num = 0;
-+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-+			break;
-+
- 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
- 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
- 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
-@@ -597,7 +611,12 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
- 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- 			if (s->hit)
--				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-+				{
-+				if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
-+					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-+				else
-+					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-+				}
- 			else
- 				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
- 			s->init_num=0;
-@@ -2324,6 +2343,70 @@ err:
- 	return(-1);
- 	}
- 
-+/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
-+ * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
-+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
-+	{
-+	int ok;
-+	unsigned proto_len, padding_len;
-+	long n;
-+	const unsigned char *p;
-+
-+	/* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
-+	 * extension in their ClientHello */
-+	if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
-+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
-+		SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
-+		SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
-+		SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
-+		129,
-+		&ok);
-+
-+	if (!ok)
-+		return((int)n);
-+
-+	/* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
-+	 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
-+	 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
-+	if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
-+		{
-+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
-+		return -1;
-+		}
-+
-+	if (n < 2)
-+		return 0;  // The body must be > 1 bytes long */
-+
-+	p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-+
-+	/* The payload looks like:
-+	 *   uint8 proto_len;
-+	 *   uint8 proto[proto_len];
-+	 *   uint8 padding_len;
-+	 *   uint8 padding[padding_len];
-+	 */
-+	proto_len = p[0];
-+	if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
-+		return 0;
-+	padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
-+	if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
-+	if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
-+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+	memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
-+	s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
-+
-+	return 1;
-+	}
-+
- int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
- 	{
- 	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h
-index 9ab9495..dc8dff8 100644
---- a/ssl/ssl.h
-+++ b/ssl/ssl.h
-@@ -801,6 +801,23 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st
- 	/* Callback for status request */
- 	int (*tlsext_status_cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg);
- 	void *tlsext_status_arg;
-+
-+	/* Next protocol negotiation information */
-+	/* (for experimental NPN extension). */
-+
-+	/* For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of
-+	 * advertised protocols can be provided. */
-+	int (*next_protos_advertised_cb)(SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf,
-+			                 unsigned int *len, void *arg);
-+	void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg;
-+	/* For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the
-+	 * next protocol from the list provided by the server. */
-+	int (*next_proto_select_cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char **out,
-+				    unsigned char *outlen,
-+				    const unsigned char *in,
-+				    unsigned int inlen,
-+				    void *arg);
-+	void *next_proto_select_cb_arg;
- #endif
- 
- 	};
-@@ -857,6 +874,15 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e);
- #endif
- void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_gen_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len));
- void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_verify_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len));
-+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg);
-+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg);
-+
-+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len);
-+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len);
-+
-+#define OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED	0
-+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED	1
-+#define OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP	2
- 
- #define SSL_NOTHING	1
- #define SSL_WRITING	2
-@@ -1054,6 +1080,16 @@ struct ssl_st
- 	/* RFC4507 session ticket expected to be received or sent */
- 	int tlsext_ticket_expected;
- 	SSL_CTX * initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */
-+
-+	/* Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that
-+	 * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello
-+	 * extensions.
-+	 *
-+	 * For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from
-+	 * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message,
-+	 * before the Finished message. */
-+	unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated;
-+	unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len;
- #define session_ctx initial_ctx
- #else
- #define session_ctx ctx
-@@ -1761,6 +1797,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE			 141
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE				 142
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET		 283
-+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO			 297
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD				 143
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE		 144
- #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE			 145
-@@ -1827,6 +1864,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
- #define SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER			 184
- #define SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE			 185
- #define SSL_F_SSL_NEW					 186
-+#define SSL_F_SSL_NEXT_PROTOS_PARSE			 298
- #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT	 287
- #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT		 290
- #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT	 289
-@@ -1869,6 +1907,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
- #define SSL_F_TLS1_ENC					 210
- #define SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK			 211
- #define SSL_F_WRITE_PENDING				 212
-+/* Next entry: 299 */
- 
- /* Reason codes. */
- #define SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE			 100
-@@ -1939,6 +1978,8 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
- #define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE			 152
- #define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE			 153
- #define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS			 154
-+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS		 334
-+#define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION		 335
- #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST			 155
- #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST				 156
- #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING				 283
-@@ -2120,6 +2161,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
- #define SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER			 267
- #define SSL_R_X509_LIB					 268
- #define SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS		 269
-+/* Next entry: 335 or 1115 */
- 
- #ifdef  __cplusplus
- }
-diff --git a/ssl/ssl3.h b/ssl/ssl3.h
-index afbdd70..54b73b7 100644
---- a/ssl/ssl3.h
-+++ b/ssl/ssl3.h
-@@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- 
- 	int in_read_app_data;
- 
-+	/* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer. */
-+	int next_proto_neg_seen;
-+
- 	struct	{
- 		/* actually only needs to be 16+20 */
- 		unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
-@@ -484,6 +487,8 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B		(0x191|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A		(0x1A0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B		(0x1A1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A		(0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-+#define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B		(0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A		(0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B		(0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- /* read from server */
-@@ -529,6 +534,8 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B		(0x1A1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A		(0x1B0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B		(0x1B1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A		(0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-+#define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B		(0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A		(0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B		(0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- /* write to client */
-@@ -553,6 +560,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
- #define SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE		16
- #define SSL3_MT_FINISHED			20
- #define SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS		22
-+#define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO			67
- #define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST    3
- 
- 
-diff --git a/ssl/ssl_err.c b/ssl/ssl_err.c
-index 7eb5202..ff9c856 100644
---- a/ssl/ssl_err.c
-+++ b/ssl/ssl_err.c
-@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE),	"SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE),	"SSL3_GET_MESSAGE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET),	"SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"},
-+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO),	"SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD),	"SSL3_GET_RECORD"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE),	"SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE),	"SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE"},
-@@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER),	"SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE),	"SSL_load_client_CA_file"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_NEW),	"SSL_new"},
-+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_NEXT_PROTOS_PARSE),	"SSL_next_protos_parse"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),	"SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT),	"SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT"},
- {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT),	"SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT"},
-@@ -335,6 +337,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE),"excessive message size"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE) ,"extra data in message"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got a fin before a ccs"},
-+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got next proto before a ccs"},
-+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION),"got next proto without seeing extension"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST)   ,"https proxy request"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST)          ,"http request"},
- {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING)       ,"illegal padding"},
-diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
-index 96e056d..cfa70ec 100644
---- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
-+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
-@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
- 	s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
- 	CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- 	s->initial_ctx=ctx;
-+	s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
- #endif
- 	s->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
- 
-@@ -532,6 +533,11 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s)
- 		kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
- #endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
- 
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-+	if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
-+		OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
-+#endif
-+
- 	OPENSSL_free(s);
- 	}
- 
-@@ -1576,6 +1582,8 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth)
- 	ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
- 	ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;
- 
-+	ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0;
-+	ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0;
- #endif
- 
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-@@ -1677,6 +1685,7 @@ void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
- 	if (a->client_cert_engine)
- 		ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
- #endif
-+
- 	OPENSSL_free(a);
- 	}
- 
-@@ -2752,6 +2761,123 @@ void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int con
- 	SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
- 	}
- 
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-+/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
-+ * expected that this function is called from the callback set by
-+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb.
-+ *
-+ * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte
-+ * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte
-+ * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated.
-+ *
-+ * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is:
-+ *
-+ * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the
-+ * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection
-+ * or have a default application level protocol.
-+ *
-+ * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the
-+ * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the
-+ * API that this fallback case was enacted.
-+ *
-+ * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list
-+ * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's
-+ * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol
-+ * a client should use.
-+ *
-+ * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised
-+ * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2.
-+ *
-+ * It returns either
-+ * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or
-+ * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
-+ */
-+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
-+	{
-+	unsigned int i, j;
-+	const unsigned char *result;
-+	int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
-+
-+	/* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */
-+	for (i = 0; i < server_len; )
-+		{
-+		for (j = 0; j < client_len; )
-+			{
-+			if (server[i] == client[j] &&
-+			    memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0)
-+				{
-+				/* We found a match */
-+				result = &server[i];
-+				status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
-+				goto found;
-+				}
-+			j += client[j];
-+			j++;
-+			}
-+		i += server[i];
-+		i++;
-+		}
-+
-+	/* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
-+	result = client;
-+	status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
-+
-+	found:
-+	*out = (unsigned char *) result + 1;
-+	*outlen = result[0];
-+	return status;
-+	}
-+
-+/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's
-+ * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't
-+ * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL.
-+ *
-+ * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned
-+ * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
-+ * provided by the callback.
-+ */
-+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len)
-+	{
-+	*data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
-+	if (!*data) {
-+		*len = 0;
-+	} else {
-+		*len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a
-+ * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
-+ * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format.  The list is returned
-+ * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will
-+ * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to
-+ * it.
-+ *
-+ * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no
-+ * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */
-+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg)
-+	{
-+	ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
-+	ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
-+	}
-+
-+/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
-+ * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
-+ * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
-+ * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's
-+ * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can
-+ * assume that |in| is syntactically valid.
-+ *
-+ * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this
-+ * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
-+ */
-+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg)
-+	{
-+	ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
-+	ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s)
- 	{
- 	return (!s->server &&                 /* cutthrough only applies to clients */
-diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
-index e305db4..a9183ff 100644
---- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
-+++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
-@@ -895,6 +895,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s);
- int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s);
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
-+int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s);
- #endif
- 
- int dtls1_client_hello(SSL *s);
-@@ -913,6 +914,7 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s);
- int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s);
- int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
- int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
-+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s);
- 
- int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
- int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
-diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
-index 8b53112..fd35b18 100644
---- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
-+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
-@@ -271,6 +271,16 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
- 			i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
- 		}
- 
-+	if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb)
-+		{
-+		/* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
-+		 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
-+		if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
-+			return NULL;
-+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
-+		s2n(0,ret);
-+		}
-+
- 	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
- 		return p;
- 
-@@ -282,6 +292,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
- 	{
- 	int extdatalen=0;
- 	unsigned char *ret = p;
-+	char next_proto_neg_seen;
- 
- 	/* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
- 	if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
-@@ -337,6 +348,26 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
- 		s2n(0,ret);
- 		}
- 
-+	next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
-+	s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-+	if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
-+		{
-+		const unsigned char *npa;
-+		unsigned int npalen;
-+		int r;
-+
-+		r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
-+		if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
-+			{
-+			if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
-+			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
-+			s2n(npalen,ret);
-+			memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
-+			ret += npalen;
-+			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
-+			}
-+		}
-+
- 	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
- 		return p;
- 
-@@ -576,6 +607,25 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
- 				else
- 					s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
- 			}
-+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
-+			{
-+			/* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
-+			 * renegotiation, but we currently do.
-+			 *
-+			 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
-+			 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
-+			 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
-+			 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
-+			 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
-+			 * anything like that, but this might change).
-+
-+			 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
-+			 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
-+			 * 0.  (We are talking about a check that will happen
-+			 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
-+			 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
-+			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
-+			}
- 
- 		/* session ticket processed earlier */
- 
-@@ -599,6 +649,24 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
- 	return 1;
- 	}
- 
-+/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
-+ * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
-+ * the length of the block. */
-+static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
-+	{
-+	unsigned int off = 0;
-+
-+	while (off < len)
-+		{
-+		if (d[off] == 0)
-+			return 0;
-+		off += d[off];
-+		off++;
-+		}
-+
-+	return off == len;
-+	}
-+
- int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
- 	{
- 	unsigned short type;
-@@ -658,6 +726,37 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
- 			/* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
- 			s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
- 			}
-+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
-+			{
-+			unsigned char *selected;
-+			unsigned char selected_len;
-+
-+			/* We must have requested it. */
-+			if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
-+				{
-+				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-+				return 0;
-+				}
-+			/* The data must be valid */
-+			if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
-+				{
-+				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-+				return 0;
-+				}
-+			if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
-+				{
-+				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+				return 0;
-+				}
-+			s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
-+			if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
-+				{
-+				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+				return 0;
-+				}
-+			memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
-+			s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
-+			}
- 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
- 			{
- 			if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
-diff --git a/ssl/tls1.h b/ssl/tls1.h
-index afe4807..71d76de 100644
---- a/ssl/tls1.h
-+++ b/ssl/tls1.h
-@@ -118,6 +118,9 @@ extern "C" {
- /* Temporary extension type */
- #define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate                 0xff01
- 
-+/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */
-+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg		13172
-+
- /* NameType value from RFC 3546 */
- #define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0
- /* status request value from RFC 3546 */