Upgrade chrome's OpenSSL to same version Android ships with.

openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c

Index: openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
===================================================================
--- openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c	(revision 105093)
+++ openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c	(working copy)
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -115,6 +115,32 @@
  * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
  * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
  */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
 
 #ifdef REF_CHECK
 #  include <assert.h>
@@ -143,9 +169,9 @@
 	ssl_undefined_function,
 	(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
 	(int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function,
-	(int (*)(SSL *, EVP_MD_CTX *, EVP_MD_CTX *, const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
+	(int (*)(SSL *,  const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
 	0,	/* finish_mac_length */
-	(int (*)(SSL *, EVP_MD_CTX *, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
+	(int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
 	NULL,	/* client_finished_label */
 	0,	/* client_finished_label_len */
 	NULL,	/* server_finished_label */
@@ -204,6 +230,8 @@
 		}
 
 	ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
 
 	s->first_packet=0;
 
@@ -224,14 +252,15 @@
 	}
 
 /** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */
-int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_METHOD *meth)
+int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,const SSL_METHOD *meth)
 	{
 	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
 
 	ctx->method=meth;
 
 	sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&(ctx->cipher_list),
-		&(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
+		&(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
+		meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
 	if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0))
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
@@ -297,6 +326,7 @@
 	OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
 	memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
 	s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback;
+	s->session_creation_enabled=1;
 	s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id;
 
 	s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
@@ -308,6 +338,7 @@
 	s->trust = ctx->trust;
 #endif
 	s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown;
+	s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
 
 	CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
 	s->ctx=ctx;
@@ -323,8 +354,11 @@
 	s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
 	CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
 	s->initial_ctx=ctx;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
+# endif
 #endif
+
 	s->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
 
 	s->method=ctx->method;
@@ -339,6 +373,11 @@
 
 	CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+	s->psk_client_callback=ctx->psk_client_callback;
+	s->psk_server_callback=ctx->psk_server_callback;
+#endif
+
 	return(s);
 err:
 	if (s != NULL)
@@ -426,7 +465,7 @@
 		}
 
 	CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-	p = (SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
+	p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
 	CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
 	return (p != NULL);
 	}
@@ -451,6 +490,16 @@
 	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
 	}
 
+int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+	{
+	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
+	}
+
+int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+	{
+	return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm);
+	}
+
 void SSL_free(SSL *s)
 	{
 	int i;
@@ -505,6 +554,8 @@
 		}
 
 	ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
 
 	if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
 	/* Free up if allocated */
@@ -513,6 +564,11 @@
 	if (s->tlsext_hostname)
 		OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
 	if (s->initial_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+	if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+	if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
 	if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
 		sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
 						X509_EXTENSION_free);
@@ -521,6 +577,7 @@
 	if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
 		OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
 #endif
+
 	if (s->client_CA != NULL)
 		sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
 
@@ -533,7 +590,7 @@
 		kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
 #endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
 	if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
 		OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
 #endif
@@ -850,7 +907,7 @@
 		}
 	if (ssl->cert == NULL)
 		{
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
 		return 0;
 		}
 	if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL)
@@ -1006,6 +1063,11 @@
 		s->max_cert_list=larg;
 		return(l);
 	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
+		if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu())
+			return 0;
+#endif
+
 		if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION ||
 		    SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 			{
@@ -1013,6 +1075,11 @@
 			return larg;
 			}
 		return 0;
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+		if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+			return 0;
+		s->max_send_fragment = larg;
+		return 1;
 	case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
 		if (s->s3)
 			return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
@@ -1035,7 +1102,7 @@
 		}
 	}
 
-struct lhash_st *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
 	{
 	return ctx->sessions;
 	}
@@ -1078,7 +1145,7 @@
 		return(ctx->session_cache_mode);
 
 	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER:
-		return(ctx->sessions->num_items);
+		return(lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions));
 	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT:
 		return(ctx->stats.sess_connect);
 	case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD:
@@ -1109,6 +1176,11 @@
 		return(ctx->mode|=larg);
 	case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
 		return(ctx->mode&=~larg);
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+		if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+			return 0;
+		ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
+		return 1;
 	default:
 		return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg));
 		}
@@ -1213,8 +1285,8 @@
 	/* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it
 	 * was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string
 	 * (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which
-	 * has been disabled). This is not an error as far as 
-	 * ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence 
+	 * has been disabled). This is not an error as far as
+	 * ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
 	 * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been
 	 * updated. */
 	if (sk == NULL)
@@ -1245,6 +1317,32 @@
 	return 1;
 	}
 
+/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
+int SSL_set_cipher_lists(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk)
+	{
+	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list;
+
+	if (sk == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+        /* Based on end of ssl_create_cipher_list */
+	tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(sk);
+	if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL)
+		{
+		return 0;
+		}
+	if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
+		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+	s->cipher_list = sk;
+	if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+	s->cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list;
+	(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(s->cipher_list_by_id,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+
+	sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+	return 1;
+	}
+
 /* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */
 char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len)
 	{
@@ -1282,13 +1380,13 @@
 	}
 
 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
-                             int (*put_cb)(const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *))
+			     int (*put_cb)(const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *))
 	{
 	int i,j=0;
 	SSL_CIPHER *c;
 	unsigned char *q;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-        int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx);
+	int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx);
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
 
 	if (sk == NULL) return(0);
@@ -1298,10 +1396,16 @@
 		{
 		c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-                if ((c->algorithms & SSL_KRB5) && nokrb5)
-                    continue;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */                    
-
+		if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) &&
+		    nokrb5)
+		    continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+		/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
+		if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) &&
+		    s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
+			continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
 		j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
 		p+=j;
 		}
@@ -1312,7 +1416,7 @@
 		{
 		static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
 			{
-			0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+			0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
 			};
 		j = put_cb ? put_cb(&scsv,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,&scsv,p);
 		p+=j;
@@ -1327,7 +1431,7 @@
 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
 					       STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp)
 	{
-	SSL_CIPHER *c;
+	const SSL_CIPHER *c;
 	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
 	int i,n;
 	if (s->s3)
@@ -1390,6 +1494,7 @@
 	return(NULL);
 	}
 
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 /** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL.
  * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546).
@@ -1411,9 +1516,127 @@
 		return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
 	return -1;
 	}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
+ * expected that this function is called from the callback set by
+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb.
+ *
+ * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte
+ * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte
+ * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated.
+ *
+ * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is:
+ *
+ * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the
+ * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection
+ * or have a default application level protocol.
+ *
+ * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the
+ * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the
+ * API that this fallback case was enacted.
+ *
+ * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list
+ * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's
+ * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol
+ * a client should use.
+ *
+ * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised
+ * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2.
+ *
+ * It returns either
+ * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or
+ * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
+ */
+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
+	{
+	unsigned int i, j;
+	const unsigned char *result;
+	int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+	/* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */
+	for (i = 0; i < server_len; )
+		{
+		for (j = 0; j < client_len; )
+			{
+			if (server[i] == client[j] &&
+			    memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0)
+				{
+				/* We found a match */
+				result = &server[i];
+				status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+				goto found;
+				}
+			j += client[j];
+			j++;
+			}
+		i += server[i];
+		i++;
+		}
+
+	/* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
+	result = client;
+	status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+
+	found:
+	*out = (unsigned char *) result + 1;
+	*outlen = result[0];
+	return status;
+	}
+
+/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's
+ * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't
+ * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL.
+ *
+ * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned
+ * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
+ * provided by the callback.
+ */
+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len)
+	{
+	*data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
+	if (!*data) {
+		*len = 0;
+	} else {
+		*len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
+	}
+}
+
+/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a
+ * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
+ * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format.  The list is returned
+ * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will
+ * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to
+ * it.
+ *
+ * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no
+ * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg)
+	{
+	ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
+	ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
+	}
+
+/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
+ * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
+ * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
+ * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's
+ * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can
+ * assume that |in| is syntactically valid.
+ *
+ * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this
+ * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
+ */
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg)
+	{
+	ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
+	ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
+	}
+
+# endif
 #endif
 
-unsigned long SSL_SESSION_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
+static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
 	{
 	unsigned long l;
 
@@ -1430,7 +1653,7 @@
  * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being
  * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session
  * with a matching session ID. */
-int SSL_SESSION_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b)
+static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b)
 	{
 	if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
 		return(1);
@@ -1443,27 +1666,19 @@
  * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each
  * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed via
  * ssl.h. */
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(SSL_SESSION_hash, SSL_SESSION *)
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(SSL_SESSION_cmp, SSL_SESSION *)
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
 
-SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth)
+SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
 	{
 	SSL_CTX *ret=NULL;
-	
+
 	if (meth == NULL)
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
 		return(NULL);
 		}
 
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION))	
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
-		return NULL;
-		}
-#endif
-
 	if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0)
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
@@ -1526,15 +1741,14 @@
 	ret->app_gen_cookie_cb=0;
 	ret->app_verify_cookie_cb=0;
 
-	ret->sessions=lh_new(LHASH_HASH_FN(SSL_SESSION_hash),
-			LHASH_COMP_FN(SSL_SESSION_cmp));
+	ret->sessions=lh_SSL_SESSION_new();
 	if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err;
 	ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new();
 	if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err;
 
 	ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
 		&ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id,
-		SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
+		meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
 	if (ret->cipher_list == NULL
 	    || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0)
 		{
@@ -1570,6 +1784,8 @@
 	ret->extra_certs=NULL;
 	ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
 
+	ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 	ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0;
 	ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL;
@@ -1582,10 +1798,34 @@
 	ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
 	ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;
 
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0;
 	ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0;
+# endif
 #endif
-
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+	ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
+	ret->psk_client_callback=NULL;
+	ret->psk_server_callback=NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+	ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT;
+	ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
+	if (!ret->rbuf_freelist)
+		goto err;
+	ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
+	ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0;
+	ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
+	ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
+	if (!ret->wbuf_freelist)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(ret->rbuf_freelist);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
+	ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0;
+	ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 	ret->client_cert_engine = NULL;
 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
@@ -1624,6 +1864,20 @@
     { OPENSSL_free(comp); }
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+static void
+ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list)
+	{
+	SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next;
+	for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next)
+		{
+		next = ent->next;
+		OPENSSL_free(ent);
+		}
+	OPENSSL_free(list);
+	}
+#endif
+
 void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
 	{
 	int i;
@@ -1661,7 +1915,7 @@
 	CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
 
 	if (a->sessions != NULL)
-		lh_free(a->sessions);
+		lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);
 
 	if (a->cert_store != NULL)
 		X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
@@ -1681,11 +1935,23 @@
 #else
 	a->comp_methods = NULL;
 #endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+	if (a->psk_identity_hint)
+		OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint);
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 	if (a->client_cert_engine)
 		ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+	if (a->wbuf_freelist)
+		ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist);
+	if (a->rbuf_freelist)
+		ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist);
+#endif
+
 	OPENSSL_free(a);
 	}
 
@@ -1716,20 +1982,20 @@
 	X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
 	}
 
-void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
+void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
 	{
 	CERT_PKEY *cpk;
 	int rsa_enc,rsa_tmp,rsa_sign,dh_tmp,dh_rsa,dh_dsa,dsa_sign;
 	int rsa_enc_export,dh_rsa_export,dh_dsa_export;
 	int rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp_export,kl;
-	unsigned long mask,emask;
+	unsigned long mask_k,mask_a,emask_k,emask_a;
 	int have_ecc_cert, ecdh_ok, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
 	int have_ecdh_tmp;
 #endif
 	X509 *x = NULL;
 	EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL;
-	int signature_nid = 0;
+	int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0;
 
 	if (c == NULL) return;
 
@@ -1769,60 +2035,77 @@
 	dh_dsa_export=(dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
 	cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
 	have_ecc_cert= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
-	mask=0;
-	emask=0;
+	mask_k=0;
+	mask_a=0;
+	emask_k=0;
+	emask_a=0;
 
+	
+
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-	printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
-		rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,
+	printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
+	        rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,have_ecdh_tmp,
 		rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa);
 #endif
+	
+	cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]);
+	if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
+		mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
+		mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01;
+	}
+	cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]);
+	if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
+		mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
+		mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94;
+	}
 
 	if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign))
-		mask|=SSL_kRSA;
+		mask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
 	if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc)))
-		emask|=SSL_kRSA;
+		emask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
 
 #if 0
 	/* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */
-	if (	(dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) && 
+	if (	(dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) &&
 		(rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
-		mask|=SSL_kEDH;
+		mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
 	if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) &&
 		(rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
-		emask|=SSL_kEDH;
+		emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
 #endif
 
-	if (dh_tmp_export) 
-		emask|=SSL_kEDH;
+	if (dh_tmp_export)
+		emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
 
 	if (dh_tmp)
-		mask|=SSL_kEDH;
+		mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
 
-	if (dh_rsa) mask|=SSL_kDHr;
-	if (dh_rsa_export) emask|=SSL_kDHr;
+	if (dh_rsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHr;
+	if (dh_rsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHr;
 
-	if (dh_dsa) mask|=SSL_kDHd;
-	if (dh_dsa_export) emask|=SSL_kDHd;
+	if (dh_dsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHd;
+	if (dh_dsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHd;
 
 	if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign)
 		{
-		mask|=SSL_aRSA;
-		emask|=SSL_aRSA;
+		mask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
+		emask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
 		}
 
 	if (dsa_sign)
 		{
-		mask|=SSL_aDSS;
-		emask|=SSL_aDSS;
+		mask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
+		emask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
 		}
 
-	mask|=SSL_aNULL;
-	emask|=SSL_aNULL;
+	mask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
+	emask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-	mask|=SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5;
-	emask|=SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5;
+	mask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
+	mask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
+	emask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
+	emask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
 #endif
 
 	/* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or
@@ -1830,7 +2113,7 @@
 	 */
 	if (have_ecc_cert)
 		{
-                /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
+		/* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
 		x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509;
 		X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
 		ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
@@ -1838,35 +2121,46 @@
 		ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
 		    (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
 		ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
-		ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? 
+		ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ?
 		    EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
 		EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
 		if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
+			{
 			signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+			OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
+			}
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
 		if (ecdh_ok)
 			{
-			if ((signature_nid == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption) ||
-			    (signature_nid == NID_md4WithRSAEncryption) ||
-			    (signature_nid == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption))
+
+			if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa)
 				{
-				mask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aRSA;
+				mask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
+				mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
 				if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
-					emask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aRSA;
+					{
+					emask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
+					emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
+					}
 				}
-			if (signature_nid == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1)
+
+			if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
 				{
-				mask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aECDSA;
+				mask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
+				mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
 				if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
-					emask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aECDSA;
+					{
+					emask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
+					emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
+					}
 				}
 			}
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
 		if (ecdsa_ok)
 			{
-			mask|=SSL_aECDSA;
-			emask|=SSL_aECDSA;
+			mask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
+			emask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
 			}
 #endif
 		}
@@ -1874,12 +2168,22 @@
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
 	if (have_ecdh_tmp)
 		{
-		mask|=SSL_kECDHE;
-		emask|=SSL_kECDHE;
+		mask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
+		emask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
 		}
 #endif
-	c->mask=mask;
-	c->export_mask=emask;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+	mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+	mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+	emask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+	emask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+#endif
+
+	c->mask_k=mask_k;
+	c->mask_a=mask_a;
+	c->export_mask_k=emask_k;
+	c->export_mask_a=emask_a;
 	c->valid=1;
 	}
 
@@ -1887,13 +2191,18 @@
 #define ku_reject(x, usage) \
 	(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
 
-int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHER *cs)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
+int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, const SSL_CIPHER *cs)
 	{
-	unsigned long alg = cs->algorithms;
+	unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
 	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
 	int keysize = 0;
-	int signature_nid = 0;
+	int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
 
+	alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey;
+	alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;
+
 	if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs))
 		{
 		/* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */
@@ -1907,38 +2216,44 @@
 	/* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
 	X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
 	if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
+		{
 		signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
-	if (alg & SSL_kECDH) 
+		OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
+		}
+	if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr)
 		{
 		/* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
 		if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
 			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT);
 			return 0;
 			}
-		if (alg & SSL_aECDSA) 
+		if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe)
 			{
 			/* signature alg must be ECDSA */
-			if (signature_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1)
+			if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
 				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE);
 				return 0;
 				}
 			}
-		if (alg & SSL_aRSA)
+		if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHr)
 			{
 			/* signature alg must be RSA */
-			if ((signature_nid != NID_md5WithRSAEncryption) &&
-			    (signature_nid != NID_md4WithRSAEncryption) &&
-			    (signature_nid != NID_md2WithRSAEncryption))
+
+			if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa)
 				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE);
 				return 0;
 				}
 			}
-		} 
-	else if (alg & SSL_aECDSA)
+		}
+	if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
 		{
 		/* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
 		if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
 			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
 			return 0;
 			}
 		}
@@ -1946,58 +2261,63 @@
 	return 1;  /* all checks are ok */
 	}
 
+#endif
+
 /* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */
 X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s)
 	{
-	unsigned long alg,mask,kalg;
+	unsigned long alg_k,alg_a;
 	CERT *c;
-	int i,is_export;
+	int i;
 
 	c=s->cert;
 	ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
-	alg=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
-	is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
-	mask=is_export?c->export_mask:c->mask;
-	kalg=alg&(SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK);
+	
+	alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+	alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
 
-	if (kalg & SSL_kECDH)
+	if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
 		{
-		/* we don't need to look at SSL_kECDHE 
+		/* we don't need to look at SSL_kEECDH
 		 * since no certificate is needed for
 		 * anon ECDH and for authenticated
-		 * ECDHE, the check for the auth 
+		 * EECDH, the check for the auth
 		 * algorithm will set i correctly
 		 * NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC
-		 * not an RSA cert but for ECDHE-RSA
+		 * not an RSA cert but for EECDH-RSA
 		 * we need an RSA cert. Placing the
 		 * checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA
 		 * checks ensures the correct cert is chosen.
 		 */
 		i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
 		}
-	else if (kalg & SSL_aECDSA)
+	else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
 		{
 		i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
 		}
-	else if (kalg & SSL_kDHr)
+	else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
 		i=SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
-	else if (kalg & SSL_kDHd)
+	else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
 		i=SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
-	else if (kalg & SSL_aDSS)
+	else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
 		i=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
-	else if (kalg & SSL_aRSA)
+	else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
 		{
 		if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL)
 			i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
 		else
 			i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
 		}
-	else if (kalg & SSL_aKRB5)
+	else if (alg_a & SSL_aKRB5)
 		{
 		/* VRS something else here? */
 		return(NULL);
 		}
-	else /* if (kalg & SSL_aNULL) */
+	else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) 
+		i=SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
+	else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
+		i=SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
+	else /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 		return(NULL);
@@ -2007,18 +2327,18 @@
 	return(c->pkeys[i].x509);
 	}
 
-EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
+EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
 	{
-	unsigned long alg;
+	unsigned long alg_a;
 	CERT *c;
 
-	alg=cipher->algorithms;
+	alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
 	c=s->cert;
 
-	if ((alg & SSL_aDSS) &&
+	if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) &&
 		(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
 		return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey);
-	else if (alg & SSL_aRSA)
+	else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
 		{
 		if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
 			return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey);
@@ -2027,10 +2347,10 @@
 		else
 			return(NULL);
 		}
-	else if ((alg & SSL_aECDSA) &&
+	else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
 	         (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
 		return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
-	else /* if (alg & SSL_aNULL) */
+	else /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 		return(NULL);
@@ -2045,14 +2365,14 @@
 	 * and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */
 	if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return;
 
-	i=s->ctx->session_cache_mode;
+	i=s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
 	if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
 		&& ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
-		    || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,s->session))
-		&& (s->ctx->new_session_cb != NULL))
+		    || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx,s->session))
+		&& (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL))
 		{
 		CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-		if (!s->ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session))
+		if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session))
 			SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
 		}
 
@@ -2061,20 +2381,20 @@
 		((i & mode) == mode))
 		{
 		if (  (((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
-			?s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
-			:s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff)
+			?s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
+			:s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff)
 			{
-			SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->ctx,(unsigned long)time(NULL));
+			SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx,(unsigned long)time(NULL));
 			}
 		}
 	}
 
-SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
+const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
 	{
 	return(s->method);
 	}
 
-int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s,SSL_METHOD *meth)
+int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
 	{
 	int conn= -1;
 	int ret=1;
@@ -2119,9 +2439,6 @@
 			return(SSL_ERROR_SSL);
 		}
 
-	if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_server_random_validation(s))
-		return(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_RANDOM_VALIDATION_PENDING);
-
 	if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s))
 		{
 		bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
@@ -2220,6 +2537,8 @@
 	s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
 	/* clear the current cipher */
 	ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
 	}
 
 void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s)
@@ -2230,6 +2549,8 @@
 	s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect;
 	/* clear the current cipher */
 	ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
 	}
 
 int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s)
@@ -2256,25 +2577,52 @@
 	return(NULL);
 	}
 
-const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
+static const char *ssl_get_version(int version)
 	{
-	if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+	if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
 		return("TLSv1");
-	else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+	else if (version == SSL3_VERSION)
 		return("SSLv3");
-	else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
+	else if (version == SSL2_VERSION)
 		return("SSLv2");
 	else
 		return("unknown");
 	}
 
+const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
+	{
+		return ssl_get_version(s->version);
+	}
+
+const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+	{
+		return ssl_get_version(s->ssl_version);
+	}
+
+const char* SSL_authentication_method(const SSL* ssl)
+	{
+	if (ssl->cert != NULL && ssl->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+		return SSL_TXT_RSA "_" SSL_TXT_EXPORT;
+	switch (ssl->version)
+		{
+	case SSL2_VERSION:
+		return SSL_TXT_RSA;
+	case SSL3_VERSION:
+	case TLS1_VERSION:
+	case DTLS1_VERSION:
+		return SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+	default:
+		return "UNKNOWN";
+		}
+	}
+
 SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
 	{
 	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
 	X509_NAME *xn;
 	SSL *ret;
 	int i;
-		 
+	
 	if ((ret=SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
 	    return(NULL);
 
@@ -2444,7 +2792,7 @@
 		return(NULL);
 	}
 
-SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
 	{
 	if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
 		return(s->session->cipher);
@@ -2522,7 +2870,7 @@
 		s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
 #ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids adding one more preprocessor symbol */
 		assert(s->wbio != NULL);
-#endif	
+#endif
 	}
 	BIO_free(s->bbio);
 	s->bbio=NULL;
@@ -2607,7 +2955,7 @@
 
 /* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned
    function pointer.  */
-void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/) 
+void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/)
 	{
 	return ssl->info_callback;
 	}
@@ -2728,13 +3076,13 @@
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
 void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
-							int keylength))
+                                                        int keylength))
 	{
 	SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
 	}
 
 void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
-						int keylength))
+                                                int keylength))
 	{
 	SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
 	}
@@ -2742,200 +3090,119 @@
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
 void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
-							int keylength))
+                                                                int keylength))
 	{
 	SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
 	}
 
 void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
-						int keylength))
+                                                        int keylength))
 	{
 	SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
 	}
 #endif
 
-
-void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint)
 	{
-	SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
+	if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+	if (identity_hint != NULL)
+		{
+		ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+		if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+			return 0;
+		}
+	else
+		ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+	return 1;
 	}
-void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
-	{
-	SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
-	}
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
- * expected that this function is called from the callback set by
- * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb.
- *
- * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte
- * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte
- * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated.
- *
- * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is:
- *
- * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the
- * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection
- * or have a default application level protocol.
- *
- * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the
- * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the
- * API that this fallback case was enacted.
- *
- * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list
- * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's
- * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol
- * a client should use.
- *
- * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised
- * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2.
- *
- * It returns either
- * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or
- * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
- */
-int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
+int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint)
 	{
-	unsigned int i, j;
-	const unsigned char *result;
-	int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
+	if (s == NULL)
+		return 0;
 
-	/* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */
-	for (i = 0; i < server_len; )
+	if (s->session == NULL)
+		return 1; /* session not created yet, ignored */
+
+	if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
 		{
-		for (j = 0; j < client_len; )
-			{
-			if (server[i] == client[j] &&
-			    memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0)
-				{
-				/* We found a match */
-				result = &server[i];
-				status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
-				goto found;
-				}
-			j += client[j];
-			j++;
-			}
-		i += server[i];
-		i++;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+		return 0;
 		}
+	if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+	if (identity_hint != NULL)
+		{
+		s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+		if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+			return 0;
+		}
+	else
+		s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+	return 1;
+	}
 
-	/* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
-	result = client;
-	status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
-
-	found:
-	*out = (unsigned char *) result + 1;
-	*outlen = result[0];
-	return status;
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	return(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
 	}
 
-/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's
- * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't
- * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL.
- *
- * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned
- * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
- * provided by the callback.
- */
-void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len)
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s)
 	{
-	*data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
-	if (!*data) {
-		*len = 0;
-	} else {
-		*len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
+	if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	return(s->session->psk_identity);
 	}
-}
 
-/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a
- * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
- * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format.  The list is returned
- * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will
- * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to
- * it.
- *
- * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no
- * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */
-void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg)
+void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s,
+    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+                       char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
+                       unsigned int max_psk_len))
 	{
-	ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
-	ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
+	s->psk_client_callback = cb;
 	}
 
-/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
- * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
- * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
- * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's
- * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can
- * assume that |in| is syntactically valid.
- *
- * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this
- * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
- */
-void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg)
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+                       char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
+                       unsigned int max_psk_len))
 	{
-	ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
-	ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
+	ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
 	}
 
-/* SSL_CTX_set_snap_start_orbit sets the orbit value which will be echoed back
- * to the client and enables Snap Start for this context.
- *
- * An orbit value can be used to spatially partition the state needed to support
- * Snap Start. See the comments above SSL_set_suggested_server_random_validity
- * (below).  */
-void SSL_CTX_set_snap_start_orbit(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char orbit[8])
+void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s,
+    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+                       unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
 	{
-	memcpy(ctx->snap_start_orbit, orbit, sizeof(ctx->snap_start_orbit));
-	ctx->snap_start_orbit_valid = 1;
+	s->psk_server_callback = cb;
 	}
 
-/* Once SSL_accept has returned with SSL_SERVER_RANDOM_VALIDATE, then one can
- * call this function in order to get the client's suggested server random
- * value. */
-void SSL_get0_suggested_server_random(const SSL* s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *length)
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+                       unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
 	{
-	if (!s->s3->snap_start_requested)
-		{
-		*data = NULL;
-		*length = 0;
-		return;
-		}
-	*length = 32;
-	*data = s->s3->server_random;
+	ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
 	}
+#endif
 
-/* SSL_set_suggested_server_random_validity passes judgement on a
- * client-suggested random value (obtained from
- * SSL_get0_suggested_server_random). Rejecting the value triggers a recovery,
- * while accepting the value /may/ result in a successful Snap Start, as long
- * as the client predicted the handshake correctly.
- *
- * In order to accept a random value the user must ensure that it has NEVER
- * been used before by this server, or any server configured with any of the
- * same certificates. It may reject more if necessary.
- *
- * The first four bytes of the random value contain a timestamp (UNIX seconds
- * since the epoch) which can be used to manage a time window.  Additionally,
- * the following eight bytes contain the orbit which which can also bound the
- * state required if geographically separate servers share certificates.
- *
- * It's recommended that the time window have a maximum size, independent of
- * the resources available, in order to prevent an attacker from arbitrarily
- * delaying a Snap Start handshake.
- */
-void SSL_set_suggested_server_random_validity(SSL *s, char is_valid)
+void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
 	{
-	if (is_valid)
-		s->s3->server_random_suggestion_valid = 1;
-	else
-		ssl3_snap_start_reset_for_recovery(s);
+	SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
 	}
+void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+	{
+	SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
+	}
 
-#endif
-
 int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s)
 	{
 	return (!s->server &&                 /* cutthrough only applies to clients */
@@ -2949,9 +3216,32 @@
 			s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A));
 	}
 
+/* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
+ * vairable, freeing  EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if
+ * any. If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md
+ * Returns newly allocated ctx;
+ */
+
+EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash,const EVP_MD *md) 
+{
+	ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
+	*hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+	if (md) EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash,md,NULL);
+	return *hash;
+}
+void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash) 
+{
+
+	if (*hash) EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
+	*hash=NULL;
+}
+
 #if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
 #include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c"
 #endif
 
 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER,
+				    ssl_cipher_id);
+