Upgrade chrome's OpenSSL to same version Android ships with.

openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c.orig

+/*! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c
+ *  \brief Version independent SSL functions.
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+#  include <assert.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+
+const char *SSL_version_str=OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={
+        /* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */
+        (int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function,
+        (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+        ssl_undefined_function,
+        (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+        (int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+        (int (*)(SSL *,  const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
+        0,      /* finish_mac_length */
+        (int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
+        NULL,   /* client_finished_label */
+        0,      /* client_finished_label_len */
+        NULL,   /* server_finished_label */
+        0,      /* server_finished_label_len */
+        (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function
+        };
+
+int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
+        {
+
+        if (s->method == NULL)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED);
+                return(0);
+                }
+
+        if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s))
+                {
+                SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+                s->session=NULL;
+                }
+
+        s->error=0;
+        s->hit=0;
+        s->shutdown=0;
+
+#if 0 /* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not
+       * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */
+        /* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
+         * the old cipher.  It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */
+        if (s->new_session) return(1);
+#else
+        if (s->new_session)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+                }
+#endif
+
+        s->type=0;
+
+        s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT);
+
+        s->version=s->method->version;
+        s->client_version=s->version;
+        s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+        s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+#if 0
+        s->read_ahead=s->ctx->read_ahead;
+#endif
+
+        if (s->init_buf != NULL)
+                {
+                BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+                s->init_buf=NULL;
+                }
+
+        ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+        ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+        ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+
+        s->first_packet=0;
+
+#if 1
+        /* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if
+         * so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */
+        if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method))
+                {
+                s->method->ssl_free(s);
+                s->method=s->ctx->method;
+                if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
+                        return(0);
+                }
+        else
+#endif
+                s->method->ssl_clear(s);
+        return(1);
+        }
+
+/** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */
+int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+        {
+        STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+        ctx->method=meth;
+
+        sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&(ctx->cipher_list),
+                &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
+                meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
+        if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0))
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
+                return(0);
+                }
+        return(1);
+        }
+
+SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+        SSL *s;
+
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
+                return(NULL);
+                }
+        if (ctx->method == NULL)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
+                return(NULL);
+                }
+
+        s=(SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
+        if (s == NULL) goto err;
+        memset(s,0,sizeof(SSL));
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+        s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
+#endif  /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+        s->options=ctx->options;
+        s->mode=ctx->mode;
+        s->max_cert_list=ctx->max_cert_list;
+
+        if (ctx->cert != NULL)
+                {
+                /* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to
+                 * the CERT, not its contents; only when setting new
+                 * parameters for the per-SSL copy, ssl_cert_new would be
+                 * called (and the direct reference to the per-SSL_CTX
+                 * settings would be lost, but those still were indirectly
+                 * accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they
+                 * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert).
+                 * Now we don't look at the SSL_CTX's CERT after having
+                 * duplicated it once. */
+
+                s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+                if (s->cert == NULL)
+                        goto err;
+                }
+        else
+                s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */
+
+        s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead;
+        s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback;
+        s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg;
+        s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode;
+#if 0
+        s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth;
+#endif
+        s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length;
+        OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
+        memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
+        s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback;
+        s->session_creation_enabled=1;
+        s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id;
+
+        s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+        if (!s->param)
+                goto err;
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
+#if 0
+        s->purpose = ctx->purpose;
+        s->trust = ctx->trust;
+#endif
+        s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown;
+        s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
+
+        CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        s->ctx=ctx;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+        s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0;
+        s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL;
+        s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+        s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+        s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+        s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
+        s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL;
+        s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
+        s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
+        CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        s->initial_ctx=ctx;
+#endif
+
+        s->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
+
+        s->method=ctx->method;
+
+        if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
+                goto err;
+
+        s->references=1;
+        s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1;
+
+        SSL_clear(s);
+
+        CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        s->psk_client_callback=ctx->psk_client_callback;
+        s->psk_server_callback=ctx->psk_server_callback;
+#endif
+
+        return(s);
+err:
+        if (s != NULL)
+                {
+                if (s->cert != NULL)
+                        ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
+                if (s->ctx != NULL)
+                        SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
+                OPENSSL_free(s);
+                }
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return(NULL);
+        }
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+                                   unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
+    {
+    if(sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx)
+        {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+        return 0;
+        }
+    ctx->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
+    memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);
+
+    return 1;
+    }
+
+int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+                               unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
+    {
+    if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH)
+        {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+        return 0;
+        }
+    ssl->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
+    memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);
+
+    return 1;
+    }
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
+        {
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        ctx->generate_session_id = cb;
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        return 1;
+        }
+
+int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
+        {
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+        ssl->generate_session_id = cb;
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+        return 1;
+        }
+
+int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
+                                unsigned int id_len)
+        {
+        /* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how
+         * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to
+         * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
+         * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in
+         * use by this SSL. */
+        SSL_SESSION r, *p;
+
+        if(id_len > sizeof r.session_id)
+                return 0;
+
+        r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
+        r.session_id_length = id_len;
+        memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
+        /* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a
+         * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it
+         * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be
+         * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */
+        if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) &&
+                        (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
+                {
+                memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0,
+                        SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len);
+                r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+                }
+
+        CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
+        CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        return (p != NULL);
+        }
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose)
+        {
+        return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
+        }
+
+int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose)
+        {
+        return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
+        }
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust)
+        {
+        return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
+        }
+
+int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
+        {
+        return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
+        }
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+        {
+        return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
+        }
+
+int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+        {
+        return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm);
+        }
+
+void SSL_free(SSL *s)
+        {
+        int i;
+
+        if(s == NULL)
+            return;
+
+        i=CRYPTO_add(&s->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+        REF_PRINT("SSL",s);
+#endif
+        if (i > 0) return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+        if (i < 0)
+                {
+                fprintf(stderr,"SSL_free, bad reference count\n");
+                abort(); /* ok */
+                }
+#endif
+
+        if (s->param)
+                X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);
+
+        CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
+
+        if (s->bbio != NULL)
+                {
+                /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */
+                if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
+                        {
+                        s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+                        }
+                BIO_free(s->bbio);
+                s->bbio=NULL;
+                }
+        if (s->rbio != NULL)
+                BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
+        if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio))
+                BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
+
+        if (s->init_buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+
+        /* add extra stuff */
+        if (s->cipher_list != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+        if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+
+        /* Make the next call work :-) */
+        if (s->session != NULL)
+                {
+                ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
+                SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+                }
+
+        ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+        ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+        ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+
+        if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
+        /* Free up if allocated */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+        if (s->tlsext_hostname)
+                OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
+        if (s->initial_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+        if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+        if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
+        if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
+                sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
+                                                X509_EXTENSION_free);
+        if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids)
+                sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
+        if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+                OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+#endif
+
+        if (s->client_CA != NULL)
+                sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
+
+        if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s);
+
+        if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+        if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL)
+                kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
+#endif  /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+        OPENSSL_free(s);
+        }
+
+void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s,BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio)
+        {
+        /* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it
+         */
+        if (s->bbio != NULL)
+                {
+                if (s->wbio == s->bbio)
+                        {
+                        s->wbio=s->wbio->next_bio;
+                        s->bbio->next_bio=NULL;
+                        }
+                }
+        if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio))
+                BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
+        if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio))
+                BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
+        s->rbio=rbio;
+        s->wbio=wbio;
+        }
+
+BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s)
+        { return(s->rbio); }
+
+BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s)
+        { return(s->wbio); }
+
+int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        return(SSL_get_rfd(s));
+        }
+
+int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        int ret= -1;
+        BIO *b,*r;
+
+        b=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+        r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
+        if (r != NULL)
+                BIO_get_fd(r,&ret);
+        return(ret);
+        }
+
+int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        int ret= -1;
+        BIO *b,*r;
+
+        b=SSL_get_wbio(s);
+        r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
+        if (r != NULL)
+                BIO_get_fd(r,&ret);
+        return(ret);
+        }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s,int fd)
+        {
+        int ret=0;
+        BIO *bio=NULL;
+
+        bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+        if (bio == NULL)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+                goto err;
+                }
+        BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
+        SSL_set_bio(s,bio,bio);
+        ret=1;
+err:
+        return(ret);
+        }
+
+int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s,int fd)
+        {
+        int ret=0;
+        BIO *bio=NULL;
+
+        if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
+                || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio,NULL) != fd))
+                {
+                bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+                if (bio == NULL)
+                        { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; }
+                BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
+                SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),bio);
+                }
+        else
+                SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),SSL_get_rbio(s));
+        ret=1;
+err:
+        return(ret);
+        }
+
+int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s,int fd)
+        {
+        int ret=0;
+        BIO *bio=NULL;
+
+        if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
+                || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio,NULL) != fd))
+                {
+                bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+                if (bio == NULL)
+                        {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+                        goto err;
+                        }
+                BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
+                SSL_set_bio(s,bio,SSL_get_wbio(s));
+                }
+        else
+                SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_wbio(s),SSL_get_wbio(s));
+        ret=1;
+err:
+        return(ret);
+        }
+#endif
+
+
+/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */
+size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
+        {
+        size_t ret = 0;
+        
+        if (s->s3 != NULL)
+                {
+                ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
+                if (count > ret)
+                        count = ret;
+                memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
+                }
+        return ret;
+        }
+
+/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */
+size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
+        {
+        size_t ret = 0;
+        
+        if (s->s3 != NULL)
+                {
+                ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+                if (count > ret)
+                        count = ret;
+                memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
+                }
+        return ret;
+        }
+
+
+int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        return(s->verify_mode);
+        }
+
+int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param);
+        }
+
+int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
+        {
+        return(s->verify_callback);
+        }
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+        return(ctx->verify_mode);
+        }
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+        return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
+        }
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
+        {
+        return(ctx->default_verify_callback);
+        }
+
+void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s,int mode,
+                    int (*callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))
+        {
+        s->verify_mode=mode;
+        if (callback != NULL)
+                s->verify_callback=callback;
+        }
+
+void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s,int depth)
+        {
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth);
+        }
+
+void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s,int yes)
+        {
+        s->read_ahead=yes;
+        }
+
+int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        return(s->read_ahead);
+        }
+
+int SSL_pending(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        /* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled
+         * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)),
+         * and it is impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report
+         * errors that may be observed while scanning the new data.
+         * (Note that SSL_pending() is often used as a boolean value,
+         * so we'd better not return -1.)
+         */
+        return(s->method->ssl_pending(s));
+        }
+
+X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        X509 *r;
+        
+        if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
+                r=NULL;
+        else
+                r=s->session->peer;
+
+        if (r == NULL) return(r);
+
+        CRYPTO_add(&r->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+
+        return(r);
+        }
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        STACK_OF(X509) *r;
+        
+        if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL))
+                r=NULL;
+        else
+                r=s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain;
+
+        /* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own
+         * certificate; if we are a server, it does not. */
+        
+        return(r);
+        }
+
+/* Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to
+ * modify.  We need to be able to read f without being hassled */
+void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t,const SSL *f)
+        {
+        CERT *tmp;
+
+        /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */
+        SSL_set_session(t,SSL_get_session(f));
+
+        /* what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or
+         * vice-versa */
+        if (t->method != f->method)
+                {
+                t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */
+                t->method=f->method;    /* change method */
+                t->method->ssl_new(t);  /* setup new */
+                }
+
+        tmp=t->cert;
+        if (f->cert != NULL)
+                {
+                CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
+                t->cert=f->cert;
+                }
+        else
+                t->cert=NULL;
+        if (tmp != NULL) ssl_cert_free(tmp);
+        SSL_set_session_id_context(t,f->sid_ctx,f->sid_ctx_length);
+        }
+
+/* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */
+int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+        if (    (ctx == NULL) ||
+                (ctx->cert == NULL) ||
+                (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL))
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+                return(0);
+                }
+        if      (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
+                return(0);
+                }
+        return(X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey));
+        }
+
+/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
+int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl)
+        {
+        if (ssl == NULL)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+                return(0);
+                }
+        if (ssl->cert == NULL)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+                return 0;
+                }
+        if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+                return(0);
+                }
+        if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
+                return(0);
+                }
+        return(X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509,
+                ssl->cert->key->privatekey));
+        }
+
+int SSL_accept(SSL *s)
+        {
+        if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+                /* Not properly initialized yet */
+                SSL_set_accept_state(s);
+
+        return(s->method->ssl_accept(s));
+        }
+
+int SSL_connect(SSL *s)
+        {
+        if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+                /* Not properly initialized yet */
+                SSL_set_connect_state(s);
+
+        return(s->method->ssl_connect(s));
+        }
+
+long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        return(s->method->get_timeout());
+        }
+
+int SSL_read(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
+        {
+        if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+                return -1;
+                }
+
+        if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
+                {
+                s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+                return(0);
+                }
+        return(s->method->ssl_read(s,buf,num));
+        }
+
+int SSL_peek(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
+        {
+        if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+                return -1;
+                }
+
+        if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
+                {
+                return(0);
+                }
+        return(s->method->ssl_peek(s,buf,num));
+        }
+
+int SSL_write(SSL *s,const void *buf,int num)
+        {
+        if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+                return -1;
+                }
+
+        if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)
+                {
+                s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE,SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
+                return(-1);
+                }
+        return(s->method->ssl_write(s,buf,num));
+        }
+
+int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s)
+        {
+        /* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might
+         * expect.  Return values are 0 for no success (yet),
+         * 1 for success; but calling it once is usually not enough,
+         * even if blocking I/O is used (see ssl3_shutdown).
+         */
+
+        if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+                return -1;
+                }
+
+        if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s))
+                return(s->method->ssl_shutdown(s));
+        else
+                return(1);
+        }
+
+int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
+        {
+        if (s->new_session == 0)
+                {
+                s->new_session=1;
+                }
+        return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
+        }
+
+int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s)
+        {
+        /* becomes true when negotiation is requested;
+         * false again once a handshake has finished */
+        return (s->new_session != 0);
+        }
+
+long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
+        {
+        long l;
+
+        switch (cmd)
+                {
+        case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
+                return(s->read_ahead);
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
+                l=s->read_ahead;
+                s->read_ahead=larg;
+                return(l);
+
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
+                s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
+                return 1;
+
+        case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
+                return(s->options|=larg);
+        case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
+                return(s->options&=~larg);
+        case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
+                return(s->mode|=larg);
+        case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
+                return(s->mode &=~larg);
+        case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+                return(s->max_cert_list);
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+                l=s->max_cert_list;
+                s->max_cert_list=larg;
+                return(l);
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
+                if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu())
+                        return 0;
+
+                if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION ||
+                    SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+                        {
+                        s->d1->mtu = larg;
+                        return larg;
+                        }
+                return 0;
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+                if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+                        return 0;
+                s->max_send_fragment = larg;
+                return 1;
+        case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
+                if (s->s3)
+                        return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
+                else return 0;
+        default:
+                return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg));
+                }
+        }
+
+long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
+        {
+        switch(cmd)
+                {
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
+                s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
+                return 1;
+                
+        default:
+                return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp));
+                }
+        }
+
+LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+        return ctx->sessions;
+        }
+
+long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
+        {
+        long l;
+
+        switch (cmd)
+                {
+        case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
+                return(ctx->read_ahead);
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
+                l=ctx->read_ahead;
+                ctx->read_ahead=larg;
+                return(l);
+                
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
+                ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg;
+                return 1;
+
+        case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+                return(ctx->max_cert_list);
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+                l=ctx->max_cert_list;
+                ctx->max_cert_list=larg;
+                return(l);
+
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
+                l=ctx->session_cache_size;
+                ctx->session_cache_size=larg;
+                return(l);
+        case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
+                return(ctx->session_cache_size);
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
+                l=ctx->session_cache_mode;
+                ctx->session_cache_mode=larg;
+                return(l);
+        case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
+                return(ctx->session_cache_mode);
+
+        case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER:
+                return(lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions));
+        case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT:
+                return(ctx->stats.sess_connect);
+        case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD:
+                return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
+        case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE:
+                return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
+        case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT:
+                return(ctx->stats.sess_accept);
+        case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD:
+                return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
+        case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE:
+                return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
+        case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT:
+                return(ctx->stats.sess_hit);
+        case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT:
+                return(ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);
+        case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES:
+                return(ctx->stats.sess_miss);
+        case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS:
+                return(ctx->stats.sess_timeout);
+        case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL:
+                return(ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
+        case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
+                return(ctx->options|=larg);
+        case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
+                return(ctx->options&=~larg);
+        case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
+                return(ctx->mode|=larg);
+        case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
+                return(ctx->mode&=~larg);
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+                if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+                        return 0;
+                ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
+                return 1;
+        default:
+                return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg));
+                }
+        }
+
+long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
+        {
+        switch(cmd)
+                {
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
+                ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
+                return 1;
+
+        default:
+                return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,cmd,fp));
+                }
+        }
+
+int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b)
+        {
+        long l;
+
+        l=a->id-b->id;
+        if (l == 0L)
+                return(0);
+        else
+                return((l > 0)?1:-1);
+        }
+
+int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER * const *ap,
+                        const SSL_CIPHER * const *bp)
+        {
+        long l;
+
+        l=(*ap)->id-(*bp)->id;
+        if (l == 0L)
+                return(0);
+        else
+                return((l > 0)?1:-1);
+        }
+
+/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
+ * preference */
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        if (s != NULL)
+                {
+                if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
+                        {
+                        return(s->cipher_list);
+                        }
+                else if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
+                        (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL))
+                        {
+                        return(s->ctx->cipher_list);
+                        }
+                }
+        return(NULL);
+        }
+
+/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
+ * algorithm id */
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s)
+        {
+        if (s != NULL)
+                {
+                if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+                        {
+                        return(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+                        }
+                else if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
+                        (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL))
+                        {
+                        return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id);
+                        }
+                }
+        return(NULL);
+        }
+
+/** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */
+const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s,int n)
+        {
+        SSL_CIPHER *c;
+        STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+        if (s == NULL) return(NULL);
+        sk=SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+        if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n))
+                return(NULL);
+        c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,n);
+        if (c == NULL) return(NULL);
+        return(c->name);
+        }
+
+/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */
+int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
+        {
+        STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+        
+        sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list,
+                &ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str);
+        /* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it
+         * was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string
+         * (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which
+         * has been disabled). This is not an error as far as
+         * ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
+         * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been
+         * updated. */
+        if (sk == NULL)
+                return 0;
+        else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+                return 0;
+                }
+        return 1;
+        }
+
+/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
+int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str)
+        {
+        STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+        
+        sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list,
+                &s->cipher_list_by_id,str);
+        /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
+        if (sk == NULL)
+                return 0;
+        else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+                return 0;
+                }
+        return 1;
+        }
+
+/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
+int SSL_set_cipher_lists(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk)
+        {
+        STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list;
+
+        if (sk == NULL)
+                return 0;
+
+        /* Based on end of ssl_create_cipher_list */
+        tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(sk);
+        if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL)
+                {
+                return 0;
+                }
+        if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
+                sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+        s->cipher_list = sk;
+        if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+                sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+        s->cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list;
+        (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(s->cipher_list_by_id,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+
+        sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+        return 1;
+        }
+
+/* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */
+char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len)
+        {
+        char *p;
+        STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+        SSL_CIPHER *c;
+        int i;
+
+        if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) ||
+                (len < 2))
+                return(NULL);
+
+        p=buf;
+        sk=s->session->ciphers;
+        for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
+                {
+                int n;
+
+                c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
+                n=strlen(c->name);
+                if (n+1 > len)
+                        {
+                        if (p != buf)
+                                --p;
+                        *p='\0';
+                        return buf;
+                        }
+                strcpy(p,c->name);
+                p+=n;
+                *(p++)=':';
+                len-=n+1;
+                }
+        p[-1]='\0';
+        return(buf);
+        }
+
+int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
+                             int (*put_cb)(const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *))
+        {
+        int i,j=0;
+        SSL_CIPHER *c;
+        unsigned char *q;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+        int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+        if (sk == NULL) return(0);
+        q=p;
+
+        for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
+                {
+                c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+                if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) &&
+                    nokrb5)
+                    continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+                /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
+                if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) &&
+                    s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
+                        continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+                j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
+                p+=j;
+                }
+        /* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise
+         * add SCSV if not renegotiating.
+         */
+        if (p != q && !s->new_session)
+                {
+                static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
+                        {
+                        0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+                        };
+                j = put_cb ? put_cb(&scsv,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,&scsv,p);
+                p+=j;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+                fprintf(stderr, "SCSV sent by client\n");
+#endif
+                }
+
+        return(p-q);
+        }
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
+                                               STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp)
+        {
+        const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+        STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+        int i,n;
+        if (s->s3)
+                s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
+
+        n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
+        if ((num%n) != 0)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
+                return(NULL);
+                }
+        if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
+                sk=sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
+        else
+                {
+                sk= *skp;
+                sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
+                }
+
+        for (i=0; i<num; i+=n)
+                {
+                /* Check for SCSV */
+                if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+                        (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+                        (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff)))
+                        {
+                        /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
+                        if (s->new_session)
+                                {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
+                                ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 
+                                goto err;
+                                }
+                        s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
+                        p += n;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+                        fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
+#endif
+                        continue;
+                        }
+
+                c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
+                p+=n;
+                if (c != NULL)
+                        {
+                        if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk,c))
+                                {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                                goto err;
+                                }
+                        }
+                }
+
+        if (skp != NULL)
+                *skp=sk;
+        return(sk);
+err:
+        if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
+                sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
+        return(NULL);
+        }
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+/** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL.
+ * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546).
+ */
+
+const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type)
+        {
+        if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
+                return NULL;
+
+        return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ?
+                s->session->tlsext_hostname :
+                s->tlsext_hostname;
+        }
+
+int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname))
+                return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
+        return -1;
+        }
+#endif
+
+static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
+        {
+        unsigned long l;
+
+        l=(unsigned long)
+                ((unsigned int) a->session_id[0]     )|
+                ((unsigned int) a->session_id[1]<< 8L)|
+                ((unsigned long)a->session_id[2]<<16L)|
+                ((unsigned long)a->session_id[3]<<24L);
+        return(l);
+        }
+
+/* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
+ * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
+ * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being
+ * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session
+ * with a matching session ID. */
+static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b)
+        {
+        if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
+                return(1);
+        if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
+                return(1);
+        return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length));
+        }
+
+/* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring
+ * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each
+ * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed via
+ * ssl.h. */
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+        {
+        SSL_CTX *ret=NULL;
+
+        if (meth == NULL)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
+                return(NULL);
+                }
+
+        if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
+                goto err;
+                }
+        ret=(SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
+        if (ret == NULL)
+                goto err;
+
+        memset(ret,0,sizeof(SSL_CTX));
+
+        ret->method=meth;
+
+        ret->cert_store=NULL;
+        ret->session_cache_mode=SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
+        ret->session_cache_size=SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
+        ret->session_cache_head=NULL;
+        ret->session_cache_tail=NULL;
+
+        /* We take the system default */
+        ret->session_timeout=meth->get_timeout();
+
+        ret->new_session_cb=0;
+        ret->remove_session_cb=0;
+        ret->get_session_cb=0;
+        ret->generate_session_id=0;
+
+        memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats));
+
+        ret->references=1;
+        ret->quiet_shutdown=0;
+
+/*      ret->cipher=NULL;*/
+/*      ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
+        ret->master_key=NULL;
+        ret->key_arg=NULL;
+        ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
+
+        ret->info_callback=NULL;
+
+        ret->app_verify_callback=0;
+        ret->app_verify_arg=NULL;
+
+        ret->max_cert_list=SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
+        ret->read_ahead=0;
+        ret->msg_callback=0;
+        ret->msg_callback_arg=NULL;
+        ret->verify_mode=SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+#if 0
+        ret->verify_depth=-1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */
+#endif
+        ret->sid_ctx_length=0;
+        ret->default_verify_callback=NULL;
+        if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
+                goto err;
+
+        ret->default_passwd_callback=0;
+        ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL;
+        ret->client_cert_cb=0;
+        ret->app_gen_cookie_cb=0;
+        ret->app_verify_cookie_cb=0;
+
+        ret->sessions=lh_SSL_SESSION_new();
+        if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err;
+        ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new();
+        if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err;
+
+        ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
+                &ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id,
+                meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
+        if (ret->cipher_list == NULL
+            || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
+                goto err2;
+                }
+
+        ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+        if (!ret->param)
+                goto err;
+
+        if ((ret->rsa_md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES);
+                goto err2;
+                }
+        if ((ret->md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES);
+                goto err2;
+                }
+        if ((ret->sha1=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES);
+                goto err2;
+                }
+
+        if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
+                goto err;
+
+        CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
+
+        ret->extra_certs=NULL;
+        ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+
+        ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+        ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0;
+        ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL;
+        /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */
+        if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0)
+                || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0)
+                || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0))
+                ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
+
+        ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
+        ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;
+
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
+        ret->psk_client_callback=NULL;
+        ret->psk_server_callback=NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+        ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT;
+        ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
+        if (!ret->rbuf_freelist)
+                goto err;
+        ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
+        ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0;
+        ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
+        ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
+        if (!ret->wbuf_freelist)
+                {
+                OPENSSL_free(ret->rbuf_freelist);
+                goto err;
+                }
+        ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
+        ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0;
+        ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+        ret->client_cert_engine = NULL;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
+#define eng_strx(x)     #x
+#define eng_str(x)      eng_strx(x)
+        /* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */
+        {
+        ENGINE *eng;
+        eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
+        if (!eng)
+                {
+                ERR_clear_error();
+                ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+                eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
+                }
+        if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng))
+                ERR_clear_error();
+        }
+#endif
+#endif
+        /* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely
+         * deployed might change this.
+         */
+        ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
+
+        return(ret);
+err:
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+err2:
+        if (ret != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ret);
+        return(NULL);
+        }
+
+#if 0
+static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp)
+    { OPENSSL_free(comp); }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+static void
+ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list)
+        {
+        SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next;
+        for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next)
+                {
+                next = ent->next;
+                OPENSSL_free(ent);
+                }
+        OPENSSL_free(list);
+        }
+#endif
+
+void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
+        {
+        int i;
+
+        if (a == NULL) return;
+
+        i=CRYPTO_add(&a->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+        REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX",a);
+#endif
+        if (i > 0) return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+        if (i < 0)
+                {
+                fprintf(stderr,"SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n");
+                abort(); /* ok */
+                }
+#endif
+
+        if (a->param)
+                X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);
+
+        /*
+         * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
+         * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed
+         * after the sessions were flushed.
+         * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
+         * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then
+         * free ex_data, then finally free the cache.
+         * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].)
+         */
+        if (a->sessions != NULL)
+                SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a,0);
+
+        CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
+
+        if (a->sessions != NULL)
+                lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);
+
+        if (a->cert_store != NULL)
+                X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
+        if (a->cipher_list != NULL)
+                sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list);
+        if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+                sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id);
+        if (a->cert != NULL)
+                ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
+        if (a->client_CA != NULL)
+                sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
+        if (a->extra_certs != NULL)
+                sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs,X509_free);
+#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it removes a global database */
+        if (a->comp_methods != NULL)
+                sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods,SSL_COMP_free);
+#else
+        a->comp_methods = NULL;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        if (a->psk_identity_hint)
+                OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+        if (a->client_cert_engine)
+                ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+        if (a->wbuf_freelist)
+                ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist);
+        if (a->rbuf_freelist)
+                ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist);
+#endif
+
+        OPENSSL_free(a);
+        }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb)
+        {
+        ctx->default_passwd_callback=cb;
+        }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx,void *u)
+        {
+        ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata=u;
+        }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg)
+        {
+        ctx->app_verify_callback=cb;
+        ctx->app_verify_arg=arg;
+        }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
+        {
+        ctx->verify_mode=mode;
+        ctx->default_verify_callback=cb;
+        }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth)
+        {
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+        }
+
+void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
+        {
+        CERT_PKEY *cpk;
+        int rsa_enc,rsa_tmp,rsa_sign,dh_tmp,dh_rsa,dh_dsa,dsa_sign;
+        int rsa_enc_export,dh_rsa_export,dh_dsa_export;
+        int rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp_export,kl;
+        unsigned long mask_k,mask_a,emask_k,emask_a;
+        int have_ecc_cert, ecdh_ok, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+        int have_ecdh_tmp;
+#endif
+        X509 *x = NULL;
+        EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL;
+        int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0;
+
+        if (c == NULL) return;
+
+        kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        rsa_tmp=(c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL);
+        rsa_tmp_export=(c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL ||
+                (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp)*8 <= kl));
+#else
+        rsa_tmp=rsa_tmp_export=0;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        dh_tmp=(c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL);
+        dh_tmp_export=(c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL ||
+                (dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp)*8 <= kl));
+#else
+        dh_tmp=dh_tmp_export=0;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+        have_ecdh_tmp=(c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL);
+#endif
+        cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+        rsa_enc= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+        rsa_enc_export=(rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
+        cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]);
+        rsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+        cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]);
+        dsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+        cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]);
+        dh_rsa=  (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+        dh_rsa_export=(dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
+        cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]);
+/* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */
+        dh_dsa=  (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+        dh_dsa_export=(dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
+        cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
+        have_ecc_cert= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
+        mask_k=0;
+        mask_a=0;
+        emask_k=0;
+        emask_a=0;
+
+        
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+        printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
+                rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,have_ecdh_tmp,
+                rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa);
+#endif
+        
+        cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]);
+        if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
+                mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
+                mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01;
+        }
+        cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]);
+        if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
+                mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
+                mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94;
+        }
+
+        if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign))
+                mask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
+        if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc)))
+                emask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
+
+#if 0
+        /* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */
+        if (    (dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) &&
+                (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
+                mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
+        if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) &&
+                (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
+                emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
+#endif
+
+        if (dh_tmp_export)
+                emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
+
+        if (dh_tmp)
+                mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
+
+        if (dh_rsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHr;
+        if (dh_rsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHr;
+
+        if (dh_dsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHd;
+        if (dh_dsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHd;
+
+        if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign)
+                {
+                mask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
+                emask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
+                }
+
+        if (dsa_sign)
+                {
+                mask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
+                emask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
+                }
+
+        mask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
+        emask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+        mask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
+        mask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
+        emask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
+        emask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
+#endif
+
+        /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or
+         * ECDSA cipher suites depending on the key usage extension.
+         */
+        if (have_ecc_cert)
+                {
+                /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
+                x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509;
+                X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+                ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
+                    (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1;
+                ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
+                    (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
+                ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+                ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ?
+                    EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
+                EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
+                if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
+                        {
+                        signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+                        OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
+                        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+                if (ecdh_ok)
+                        {
+
+                        if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa)
+                                {
+                                mask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
+                                mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
+                                if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
+                                        {
+                                        emask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
+                                        emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
+                                        }
+                                }
+
+                        if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
+                                {
+                                mask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
+                                mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
+                                if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
+                                        {
+                                        emask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
+                                        emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
+                                        }
+                                }
+                        }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+                if (ecdsa_ok)
+                        {
+                        mask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
+                        emask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
+                        }
+#endif
+                }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+        if (have_ecdh_tmp)
+                {
+                mask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
+                emask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
+                }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+        mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+        emask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+        emask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+#endif
+
+        c->mask_k=mask_k;
+        c->mask_a=mask_a;
+        c->export_mask_k=emask_k;
+        c->export_mask_a=emask_a;
+        c->valid=1;
+        }
+
+/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */
+#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
+        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
+int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, const SSL_CIPHER *cs)
+        {
+        unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
+        EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+        int keysize = 0;
+        int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
+
+        alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey;
+        alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;
+
+        if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs))
+                {
+                /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */
+                pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+                if (pkey == NULL) return 0;
+                keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
+                EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+                if (keysize > 163) return 0;
+                }
+
+        /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
+        X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+        if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
+                {
+                signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+                OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
+                }
+        if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr)
+                {
+                /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
+                if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
+                        {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+                        return 0;
+                        }
+                if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe)
+                        {
+                        /* signature alg must be ECDSA */
+                        if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
+                                {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE);
+                                return 0;
+                                }
+                        }
+                if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHr)
+                        {
+                        /* signature alg must be RSA */
+
+                        if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa)
+                                {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE);
+                                return 0;
+                                }
+                        }
+                }
+        if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
+                {
+                /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
+                if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
+                        {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
+                        return 0;
+                        }
+                }
+
+        return 1;  /* all checks are ok */
+        }
+
+#endif
+
+/* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */
+X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s)
+        {
+        unsigned long alg_k,alg_a;
+        CERT *c;
+        int i;
+
+        c=s->cert;
+        ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+        
+        alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+        alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+        if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
+                {
+                /* we don't need to look at SSL_kEECDH
+                 * since no certificate is needed for
+                 * anon ECDH and for authenticated
+                 * EECDH, the check for the auth
+                 * algorithm will set i correctly
+                 * NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC
+                 * not an RSA cert but for EECDH-RSA
+                 * we need an RSA cert. Placing the
+                 * checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA
+                 * checks ensures the correct cert is chosen.
+                 */
+                i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+                }
+        else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
+                {
+                i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+                }
+        else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
+                i=SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
+        else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
+                i=SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
+        else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
+                i=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+        else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+                {
+                if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL)
+                        i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+                else
+                        i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
+                }
+        else if (alg_a & SSL_aKRB5)
+                {
+                /* VRS something else here? */
+                return(NULL);
+                }
+        else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) 
+                i=SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
+        else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
+                i=SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
+        else /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return(NULL);
+                }
+        if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == NULL) return(NULL);
+
+        return(c->pkeys[i].x509);
+        }
+
+EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
+        {
+        unsigned long alg_a;
+        CERT *c;
+
+        alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
+        c=s->cert;
+
+        if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) &&
+                (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
+                return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey);
+        else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+                {
+                if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
+                        return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey);
+                else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
+                        return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
+                else
+                        return(NULL);
+                }
+        else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
+                 (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
+                return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
+        else /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return(NULL);
+                }
+        }
+
+void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode)
+        {
+        int i;
+
+        /* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it,
+         * and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */
+        if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return;
+
+        i=s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
+        if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
+                && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
+                    || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx,s->session))
+                && (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL))
+                {
+                CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+                if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session))
+                        SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+                }
+
+        /* auto flush every 255 connections */
+        if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) &&
+                ((i & mode) == mode))
+                {
+                if (  (((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
+                        ?s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
+                        :s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff)
+                        {
+                        SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx,(unsigned long)time(NULL));
+                        }
+                }
+        }
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
+        {
+        return(s->method);
+        }
+
+int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+        {
+        int conn= -1;
+        int ret=1;
+
+        if (s->method != meth)
+                {
+                if (s->handshake_func != NULL)
+                        conn=(s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect);
+
+                if (s->method->version == meth->version)
+                        s->method=meth;
+                else
+                        {
+                        s->method->ssl_free(s);
+                        s->method=meth;
+                        ret=s->method->ssl_new(s);
+                        }
+
+                if (conn == 1)
+                        s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_connect;
+                else if (conn == 0)
+                        s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_accept;
+                }
+        return(ret);
+        }
+
+int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int i)
+        {
+        int reason;
+        unsigned long l;
+        BIO *bio;
+
+        if (i > 0) return(SSL_ERROR_NONE);
+
+        /* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake
+         * etc, where we do encode the error */
+        if ((l=ERR_peek_error()) != 0)
+                {
+                if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS)
+                        return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+                else
+                        return(SSL_ERROR_SSL);
+                }
+
+        if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s))
+                {
+                bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+                if (BIO_should_read(bio))
+                        return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
+                else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
+                        /* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try
+                         * to write to the rbio, and an application program where
+                         * rbio and wbio are separate couldn't even know what it
+                         * should wait for.
+                         * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly
+                         * (so that we have SSL_want_read(s) instead of
+                         * SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same,
+                         * this test works around that bug; so it might be safer
+                         * to keep it. */
+                        return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
+                else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio))
+                        {
+                        reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
+                        if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
+                                return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
+                        else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
+                                return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
+                        else
+                                return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */
+                        }
+                }
+
+        if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s))
+                {
+                bio=SSL_get_wbio(s);
+                if (BIO_should_write(bio))
+                        return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
+                else if (BIO_should_read(bio))
+                        /* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */
+                        return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
+                else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio))
+                        {
+                        reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
+                        if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
+                                return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
+                        else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
+                                return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
+                        else
+                                return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+                        }
+                }
+        if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s))
+                {
+                return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP);
+                }
+
+        if (i == 0)
+                {
+                if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
+                        {
+                        /* assume it is the socket being closed */
+                        return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
+                        }
+                else
+                        {
+                        if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) &&
+                                (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY))
+                                return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
+                        }
+                }
+        return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+        }
+
+int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s)
+        {
+        int ret=1;
+
+        if (s->handshake_func == NULL)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE,SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
+                return(-1);
+                }
+
+        s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s);
+
+        if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
+                {
+                ret=s->handshake_func(s);
+                }
+        return(ret);
+        }
+
+/* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so
+ * one of these calls will reset it */
+void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s)
+        {
+        s->server=1;
+        s->shutdown=0;
+        s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
+        s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
+        /* clear the current cipher */
+        ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+        ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+        ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+        }
+
+void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s)
+        {
+        s->server=0;
+        s->shutdown=0;
+        s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
+        s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect;
+        /* clear the current cipher */
+        ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+        ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+        ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+        }
+
+int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s)
+        {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return(0);
+        }
+
+int ssl_undefined_void_function(void)
+        {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return(0);
+        }
+
+int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return(0);
+        }
+
+SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
+        {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return(NULL);
+        }
+
+static const char *ssl_get_version(int version)
+        {
+        if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
+                return("TLSv1");
+        else if (version == SSL3_VERSION)
+                return("SSLv3");
+        else if (version == SSL2_VERSION)
+                return("SSLv2");
+        else
+                return("unknown");
+        }
+
+const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
+        {
+                return ssl_get_version(s->version);
+        }
+
+const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+        {
+                return ssl_get_version(s->ssl_version);
+        }
+
+const char* SSL_authentication_method(const SSL* ssl)
+        {
+        if (ssl->cert != NULL && ssl->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+                return SSL_TXT_RSA "_" SSL_TXT_EXPORT;
+        switch (ssl->version)
+                {
+        case SSL2_VERSION:
+                return SSL_TXT_RSA;
+        case SSL3_VERSION:
+        case TLS1_VERSION:
+        case DTLS1_VERSION:
+                return SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+        default:
+                return "UNKNOWN";
+                }
+        }
+
+SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
+        {
+        STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
+        X509_NAME *xn;
+        SSL *ret;
+        int i;
+        
+        if ((ret=SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
+            return(NULL);
+
+        ret->version = s->version;
+        ret->type = s->type;
+        ret->method = s->method;
+
+        if (s->session != NULL)
+                {
+                /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */
+                SSL_copy_session_id(ret,s);
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                /* No session has been established yet, so we have to expect
+                 * that s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later --
+                 * they should not both point to the same object,
+                 * and thus we can't use SSL_copy_session_id. */
+
+                ret->method->ssl_free(ret);
+                ret->method = s->method;
+                ret->method->ssl_new(ret);
+
+                if (s->cert != NULL)
+                        {
+                        if (ret->cert != NULL)
+                                {
+                                ssl_cert_free(ret->cert);
+                                }
+                        ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert);
+                        if (ret->cert == NULL)
+                                goto err;
+                        }
+                                
+                SSL_set_session_id_context(ret,
+                        s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
+                }
+
+        ret->options=s->options;
+        ret->mode=s->mode;
+        SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret,SSL_get_max_cert_list(s));
+        SSL_set_read_ahead(ret,SSL_get_read_ahead(s));
+        ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback;
+        ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg;
+        SSL_set_verify(ret,SSL_get_verify_mode(s),
+                SSL_get_verify_callback(s));
+        SSL_set_verify_depth(ret,SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+        ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id;
+
+        SSL_set_info_callback(ret,SSL_get_info_callback(s));
+        
+        ret->debug=s->debug;
+
+        /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */
+        if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data))
+                goto err;
+
+        /* setup rbio, and wbio */
+        if (s->rbio != NULL)
+                {
+                if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio,(char *)&ret->rbio))
+                        goto err;
+                }
+        if (s->wbio != NULL)
+                {
+                if (s->wbio != s->rbio)
+                        {
+                        if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio,(char *)&ret->wbio))
+                                goto err;
+                        }
+                else
+                        ret->wbio=ret->rbio;
+                }
+        ret->rwstate = s->rwstate;
+        ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake;
+        ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func;
+        ret->server = s->server;
+        ret->new_session = s->new_session;
+        ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown;
+        ret->shutdown=s->shutdown;
+        ret->state=s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, though */
+        ret->rstate=s->rstate;
+        ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf, ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, ret->init_off */
+        ret->hit=s->hit;
+
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param);
+
+        /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */
+        if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
+                {
+                if ((ret->cipher_list=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL)
+                        goto err;
+                }
+        if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+                if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id))
+                        == NULL)
+                        goto err;
+
+        /* Dup the client_CA list */
+        if (s->client_CA != NULL)
+                {
+                if ((sk=sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL) goto err;
+                ret->client_CA=sk;
+                for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
+                        {
+                        xn=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
+                        if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk,i,X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL)
+                                {
+                                X509_NAME_free(xn);
+                                goto err;
+                                }
+                        }
+                }
+
+        if (0)
+                {
+err:
+                if (ret != NULL) SSL_free(ret);
+                ret=NULL;
+                }
+        return(ret);
+        }
+
+void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
+        {
+        if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
+                {
+                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
+                OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
+                s->enc_read_ctx=NULL;
+                }
+        if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
+                {
+                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
+                OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
+                s->enc_write_ctx=NULL;
+                }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+        if (s->expand != NULL)
+                {
+                COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
+                s->expand=NULL;
+                }
+        if (s->compress != NULL)
+                {
+                COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
+                s->compress=NULL;
+                }
+#endif
+        }
+
+/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
+X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        if (s->cert != NULL)
+                return(s->cert->key->x509);
+        else
+                return(NULL);
+        }
+
+/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
+EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *s)
+        {
+        if (s->cert != NULL)
+                return(s->cert->key->privatekey);
+        else
+                return(NULL);
+        }
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
+                return(s->session->cipher);
+        return(NULL);
+        }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
+        {
+        return NULL;
+        }
+const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
+        {
+        return NULL;
+        }
+#else
+
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
+        {
+        if (s->compress != NULL)
+                return(s->compress->meth);
+        return(NULL);
+        }
+
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
+        {
+        if (s->expand != NULL)
+                return(s->expand->meth);
+        return(NULL);
+        }
+#endif
+
+int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push)
+        {
+        BIO *bbio;
+
+        if (s->bbio == NULL)
+                {
+                bbio=BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+                if (bbio == NULL) return(0);
+                s->bbio=bbio;
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                bbio=s->bbio;
+                if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
+                        s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+                }
+        (void)BIO_reset(bbio);
+/*      if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */
+        if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio,1))
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+                return(0);
+                }
+        if (push)
+                {
+                if (s->wbio != bbio)
+                        s->wbio=BIO_push(bbio,s->wbio);
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                if (s->wbio == bbio)
+                        s->wbio=BIO_pop(bbio);
+                }
+        return(1);
+        }
+
+void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
+        {
+        if (s->bbio == NULL) return;
+
+        if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
+                {
+                /* remove buffering */
+                s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids adding one more preprocessor symbol */
+                assert(s->wbio != NULL);
+#endif
+        }
+        BIO_free(s->bbio);
+        s->bbio=NULL;
+        }
+        
+void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode)
+        {
+        ctx->quiet_shutdown=mode;
+        }
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+        return(ctx->quiet_shutdown);
+        }
+
+void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode)
+        {
+        s->quiet_shutdown=mode;
+        }
+
+int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        return(s->quiet_shutdown);
+        }
+
+void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode)
+        {
+        s->shutdown=mode;
+        }
+
+int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        return(s->shutdown);
+        }
+
+int SSL_version(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        return(s->version);
+        }
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)
+        {
+        return(ssl->ctx);
+        }
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx)
+        {
+        if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
+                return ssl->ctx;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+                ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
+#endif
+        if (ssl->cert != NULL)
+                ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
+        ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+        CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+        if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
+                SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
+        ssl->ctx = ctx;
+        return(ssl->ctx);
+        }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+        return(X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store));
+        }
+
+int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
+                const char *CApath)
+        {
+        return(X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store,CAfile,CApath));
+        }
+#endif
+
+void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
+        void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val))
+        {
+        ssl->info_callback=cb;
+        }
+
+/* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned
+   function pointer.  */
+void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/)
+        {
+        return ssl->info_callback;
+        }
+
+int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl)
+        {
+        return(ssl->state);
+        }
+
+void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long arg)
+        {
+        ssl->verify_result=arg;
+        }
+
+long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl)
+        {
+        return(ssl->verify_result);
+        }
+
+int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+                         CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+        {
+        return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp,
+                                new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+        }
+
+int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg)
+        {
+        return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
+        }
+
+void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s,int idx)
+        {
+        return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
+        }
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+                             CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+        {
+        return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp,
+                                new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+        }
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg)
+        {
+        return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
+        }
+
+void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s,int idx)
+        {
+        return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
+        }
+
+int ssl_ok(SSL *s)
+        {
+        return(1);
+        }
+
+X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+        {
+        return(ctx->cert_store);
+        }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509_STORE *store)
+        {
+        if (ctx->cert_store != NULL)
+                X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
+        ctx->cert_store=store;
+        }
+
+int SSL_want(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        return(s->rwstate);
+        }
+
+/*!
+ * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys.
+ * \param ctx the SSL context.
+ * \param cb the callback
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
+                                                          int is_export,
+                                                          int keylength))
+    {
+    SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb);
+    }
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
+                                                  int is_export,
+                                                  int keylength))
+    {
+    SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb);
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DOXYGEN
+/*!
+ * \brief The RSA temporary key callback function.
+ * \param ssl the SSL session.
+ * \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite.
+ * \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size
+ * of the required key in bits.
+ * \return the temporary RSA key.
+ * \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback
+ */
+
+RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keylength)
+    {}
+#endif
+
+/*!
+ * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys.
+ * \param ctx the SSL context.
+ * \param dh the callback
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+                                                        int keylength))
+        {
+        SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
+        }
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+                                                int keylength))
+        {
+        SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
+        }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+                                                                int keylength))
+        {
+        SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
+        }
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
+                                                        int keylength))
+        {
+        SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
+        }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint)
+        {
+        if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                return 0;
+                }
+        if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+                OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+        if (identity_hint != NULL)
+                {
+                ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+                if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+                        return 0;
+                }
+        else
+                ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+        return 1;
+        }
+
+int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint)
+        {
+        if (s == NULL)
+                return 0;
+
+        if (s->session == NULL)
+                return 1; /* session not created yet, ignored */
+
+        if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                return 0;
+                }
+        if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+                OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+        if (identity_hint != NULL)
+                {
+                s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+                if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+                        return 0;
+                }
+        else
+                s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+        return 1;
+        }
+
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
+                return NULL;
+        return(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+        }
+
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
+                return NULL;
+        return(s->session->psk_identity);
+        }
+
+void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s,
+    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+                       char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
+                       unsigned int max_psk_len))
+        {
+        s->psk_client_callback = cb;
+        }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+                       char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
+                       unsigned int max_psk_len))
+        {
+        ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
+        }
+
+void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s,
+    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+                       unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
+        {
+        s->psk_server_callback = cb;
+        }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+                       unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
+        {
+        ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
+        }
+#endif
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+        {
+        SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
+        }
+void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+        {
+        SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
+        }
+
+int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        return (!s->server &&                 /* cutthrough only applies to clients */
+                !s->hit &&                        /* full-handshake */
+                s->version >= SSL3_VERSION &&
+                s->s3->in_read_app_data == 0 &&   /* cutthrough only applies to write() */
+                (SSL_get_mode((SSL*)s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) &&  /* cutthrough enabled */
+                SSL_get_cipher_bits(s, NULL) >= 128 &&                      /* strong cipher choosen */
+                s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 &&                 /* not a renegotiation handshake */
+                (s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A ||                 /* ready to write app-data*/
+                        s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A));
+        }
+
+/* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
+ * vairable, freeing  EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if
+ * any. If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md
+ * Returns newly allocated ctx;
+ */
+
+EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash,const EVP_MD *md) 
+{
+        ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
+        *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+        if (md) EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash,md,NULL);
+        return *hash;
+}
+void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash) 
+{
+
+        if (*hash) EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
+        *hash=NULL;
+}
+
+#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
+#include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c"
+#endif
+
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER,
+                                    ssl_cipher_id);
+