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Issue 9254031: Upgrade chrome's OpenSSL to same version Android ships with. (Closed) Base URL: http://src.chromium.org/svn/trunk/deps/third_party/openssl/
Patch Set: '' Created 8 years, 11 months ago
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1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #endif
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169 #endif
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
171
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
173
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
175 {
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
178 else
179 return(NULL);
180 }
181
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
183 ssl3_accept,
184 ssl_undefined_function,
185 ssl3_get_server_method)
186
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
188 {
189 BUF_MEM *buf;
190 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
192 int ret= -1;
193 int new_state,state,skip=0;
194
195 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
196 ERR_clear_error();
197 clear_sys_error();
198
199 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
200 cb=s->info_callback;
201 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
202 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
203
204 /* init things to blank */
205 s->in_handshake++;
206 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
207
208 if (s->cert == NULL)
209 {
210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
211 return(-1);
212 }
213
214 for (;;)
215 {
216 state=s->state;
217
218 switch (s->state)
219 {
220 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
221 s->new_session=1;
222 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
223
224 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
225 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
226 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
227 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
228
229 s->server=1;
230 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
231
232 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
233 {
234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
235 return -1;
236 }
237 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
238
239 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
240 {
241 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
242 {
243 ret= -1;
244 goto end;
245 }
246 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
247 {
248 ret= -1;
249 goto end;
250 }
251 s->init_buf=buf;
252 }
253
254 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
255 {
256 ret= -1;
257 goto end;
258 }
259
260 s->init_num=0;
261 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
262
263 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
264 {
265 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
266 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :- )
267 */
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
269
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
272 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
273 }
274 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
275 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGO TIATION))
276 {
277 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
278 * client that doesn't support secure
279 * renegotiation.
280 */
281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RE NEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
282 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE _FAILURE);
283 ret = -1;
284 goto end;
285 }
286 else
287 {
288 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
289 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
290 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
291 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
292 }
293 break;
294
295 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
296 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
297
298 s->shutdown=0;
299 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
300 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
301 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
302 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
303 s->init_num=0;
304
305 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
306 break;
307
308 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
309 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
310 break;
311
312 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
313 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
314 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
315
316 s->shutdown=0;
317 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
318 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
319
320 s->new_session = 2;
321 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
322 s->init_num=0;
323 break;
324
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
326 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
327 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
328 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
330 if (s->hit)
331 {
332 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
333 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
334 else
335 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
336 }
337 #else
338 if (s->hit)
339 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
340 #endif
341 else
342 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
343 s->init_num=0;
344 break;
345
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
348 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
349 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
350 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
351 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL _kPSK)
352 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL _aKRB5))
353 {
354 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
355 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
357 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
358 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
359 else
360 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
361 }
362 else
363 {
364 skip = 1;
365 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
366 }
367 #else
368 }
369 else
370 skip=1;
371
372 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
373 #endif
374 s->init_num=0;
375 break;
376
377 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
378 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
379 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
380
381 /* clear this, it may get reset by
382 * send_server_key_exchange */
383 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
385 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
386 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
387 )
388 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary R SA key
389 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
390 * (handshake may fail as clients are not requir ed to
391 * be able to handle this) */
392 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
393 else
394 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
395
396
397 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
398 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
399 *
400 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
401 *
402 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
403 * message only if the cipher suite is either
404 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
405 * server certificate contains the server's
406 * public key for key exchange.
407 */
408 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
409 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
410 * hint if provided */
411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
412 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
413 #endif
414 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
415 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
416 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
417 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
418 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
419 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY _RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
420 )
421 )
422 )
423 )
424 {
425 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
426 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
427 }
428 else
429 skip=1;
430
431 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
432 s->init_num=0;
433 break;
434
435 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
436 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
437 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
438 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
439 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
440 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
441 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
442 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
443 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
444 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 d rafts
445 * and in RFC 2246): */
446 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aN ULL) &&
447 /* ... except when the application insists on v erification
448 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts th is for SSL 3) */
449 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_C ERT)) ||
450 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
451 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKR B5)
452 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
453 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
454 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_ kPSK))
455 {
456 /* no cert request */
457 skip=1;
458 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
459 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
460 }
461 else
462 {
463 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
464 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
465 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
466 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
467 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
468 #else
469 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
470 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
471 #endif
472 s->init_num=0;
473 }
474 break;
475
476 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
477 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
478 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
479 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
480 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
481 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
482 s->init_num=0;
483 break;
484
485 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
486
487 /* This code originally checked to see if
488 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
489 * and then flushed. This caused problems
490 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
491 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
492 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
493 * still exist. So instead we just flush
494 * unconditionally.
495 */
496
497 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
498 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
499 {
500 ret= -1;
501 goto end;
502 }
503 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
504
505 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
506 break;
507
508 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
509 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
510 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
511 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
512 if (ret <= 0)
513 goto end;
514 if (ret == 2)
515 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
516 else {
517 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
518 {
519 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
520 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
521 }
522 s->init_num=0;
523 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
524 }
525 break;
526
527 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
528 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
529 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
530 if (ret <= 0)
531 goto end;
532 if (ret == 2)
533 {
534 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
535 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
536 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
537 * message is not sent.
538 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
539 * the client uses its key from the certificate
540 * for key exchange.
541 */
542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
543 s->init_num = 0;
544 }
545 else
546 {
547 int offset=0;
548 int dgst_num;
549
550 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
551 s->init_num=0;
552
553 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
554 * a client cert, it can be verified
555 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVeri fy
556 * should be generalized. But it is next step
557 */
558 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
559 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
560 return -1;
561 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_nu m++)
562 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
563 {
564 int dgst_size;
565
566 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify _mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify _md[offset]));
567 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3- >handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
568 if (dgst_size < 0)
569 {
570 ret = -1;
571 goto end;
572 }
573 offset+=dgst_size;
574 }
575 }
576 break;
577
578 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
579 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
580
581 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
582 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
583 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
584
585 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
586 s->init_num=0;
587 break;
588
589 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
590 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
591 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
592 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
593 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
595 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
596 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
597 else if (s->hit)
598 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
599 #else
600 if (s->hit)
601 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
602 #endif
603 else
604 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
605 s->init_num=0;
606 break;
607
608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
609 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
610 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
611 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
612 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
613 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
614 s->init_num=0;
615 break;
616
617 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
618 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
619 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
620 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
621 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
622 s->init_num=0;
623 break;
624
625 #endif
626
627 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
628 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
629
630 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
631 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
632 { ret= -1; goto end; }
633
634 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
635 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
636
637 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
638 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
639 s->init_num=0;
640
641 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
642 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
643 {
644 ret= -1;
645 goto end;
646 }
647
648 break;
649
650 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
651 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
652 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
653 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
654 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
655 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
656 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
657 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
658 if (s->hit)
659 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
660 else
661 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
662 s->init_num=0;
663 break;
664
665 case SSL_ST_OK:
666 /* clean a few things up */
667 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
668
669 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
670 s->init_buf=NULL;
671
672 /* remove buffering on output */
673 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
674
675 s->init_num=0;
676
677 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a He lloRequest */
678 {
679 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unle ss
680 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
681
682 s->new_session=0;
683
684 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
685
686 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
687 /* s->server=1; */
688 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
689
690 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
691 }
692
693 ret = 1;
694 goto end;
695 /* break; */
696
697 default:
698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
699 ret= -1;
700 goto end;
701 /* break; */
702 }
703
704 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
705 {
706 if (s->debug)
707 {
708 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
709 goto end;
710 }
711
712
713 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
714 {
715 new_state=s->state;
716 s->state=state;
717 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
718 s->state=new_state;
719 }
720 }
721 skip=0;
722 }
723 end:
724 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
725
726 s->in_handshake--;
727 if (cb != NULL)
728 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
729 return(ret);
730 }
731
732 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
733 {
734 unsigned char *p;
735
736 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
737 {
738 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
739 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
740 *(p++)=0;
741 *(p++)=0;
742 *(p++)=0;
743
744 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
745 /* number of bytes to write */
746 s->init_num=4;
747 s->init_off=0;
748 }
749
750 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
751 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
752 }
753
754 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
755 {
756 int ok;
757 long n;
758
759 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
760 * negotiation. */
761 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
762 {
763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTART S);
764 return -1;
765 }
766
767 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
768 * so permit appropriate message length */
769 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
770 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
771 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
772 -1,
773 s->max_cert_list,
774 &ok);
775 if (!ok) return((int)n);
776 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
777 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
778 {
779 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
780 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too muc h.) */
781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
782 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
783 {
784 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
785 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
786 }
787 #endif
788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
789 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
790 {
791 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
792 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
793 }
794 #endif
795 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
796 return 2;
797 }
798 return 1;
799 }
800
801 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
802 {
803 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
804 unsigned int cookie_len;
805 long n;
806 unsigned long id;
807 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
808 SSL_CIPHER *c;
809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
810 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
811 #endif
812 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
813
814 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
815 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
816 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
817 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
818 * TLSv1.
819 */
820 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
821 {
822 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
823 }
824 s->first_packet=1;
825 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
826 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
827 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
828 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
829 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
830 &ok);
831
832 if (!ok) return((int)n);
833 s->first_packet=0;
834 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
835
836 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
837 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
838 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
839 p+=2;
840
841 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
842 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
843 {
844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
845 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
846 {
847 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote v ersion number */
848 s->version = s->client_version;
849 }
850 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
851 goto f_err;
852 }
853
854 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
855 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
856 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
857 */
858 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
859 {
860 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
861
862 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
863 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
864
865 if (cookie_length == 0)
866 return 1;
867 }
868
869 /* load the client random */
870 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
871 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
872
873 /* get the session-id */
874 j= *(p++);
875
876 s->hit=0;
877 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
878 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
879 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
880 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
881 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new application s
882 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
883 * an earlier library version)
884 */
885 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_REN EGOTIATION)))
886 {
887 if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
888 {
889 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
890 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT _BE_CREATED);
891 goto err;
892 }
893 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
894 goto err;
895 }
896 else
897 {
898 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
899 if (i == 1)
900 { /* previous session */
901 s->hit=1;
902 }
903 else if (i == -1)
904 goto err;
905 else /* i == 0 */
906 {
907 if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
908 {
909 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE _FAILURE);
910 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION _MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
911 goto err;
912 }
913 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
914 goto err;
915 }
916 }
917
918 p+=j;
919
920 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
921 {
922 /* cookie stuff */
923 cookie_len = *(p++);
924
925 /*
926 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
927 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
928 * does not cause an overflow.
929 */
930 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
931 {
932 /* too much data */
933 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATC H);
935 goto f_err;
936 }
937
938 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
939 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
940 cookie_len > 0)
941 {
942 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
943
944 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
945 {
946 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd _cookie,
947 cookie_len) == 0)
948 {
949 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
951 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
952 goto f_err;
953 }
954 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
955 }
956 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
957 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* de fault verification */
958 {
959 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
961 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
962 goto f_err;
963 }
964
965 ret = 2;
966 }
967
968 p += cookie_len;
969 }
970
971 n2s(p,i);
972 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
973 {
974 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
975 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
977 goto f_err;
978 }
979 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
980 {
981 /* not enough data */
982 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
983 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
984 goto f_err;
985 }
986 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
987 == NULL))
988 {
989 goto err;
990 }
991 p+=i;
992
993 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
994 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
995 {
996 j=0;
997 id=s->session->cipher->id;
998
999 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1000 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1001 #endif
1002 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1003 {
1004 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1005 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1006 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1007 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1008 #endif
1009 if (c->id == id)
1010 {
1011 j=1;
1012 break;
1013 }
1014 }
1015 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1016 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1017 */
1018 #if 0
1019 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_ BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1020 {
1021 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1022 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1023 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1024 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1025 * enabled, though. */
1026 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1027 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1028 {
1029 s->session->cipher = c;
1030 j = 1;
1031 }
1032 }
1033 #endif
1034 if (j == 0)
1035 {
1036 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1037 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1038 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER _MISSING);
1040 goto f_err;
1041 }
1042 }
1043
1044 /* compression */
1045 i= *(p++);
1046 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1047 {
1048 /* not enough data */
1049 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1051 goto f_err;
1052 }
1053 q=p;
1054 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1055 {
1056 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1057 }
1058
1059 p+=i;
1060 if (j >= i)
1061 {
1062 /* no compress */
1063 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIE D);
1065 goto f_err;
1066 }
1067
1068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1069 /* TLS extensions*/
1070 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1071 {
1072 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1073 {
1074 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1076 goto f_err;
1077 }
1078 }
1079 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLS EXT);
1081 goto err;
1082 }
1083
1084 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1085 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1086 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1087 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1088 {
1089 unsigned long Time;
1090 unsigned char *pos;
1091 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1092 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1093 l2n(Time,pos);
1094 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1095 {
1096 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1097 goto f_err;
1098 }
1099 }
1100
1101 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1102 {
1103 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1104
1105 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1106 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->sessi on->master_key_length,
1107 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1108 {
1109 s->hit=1;
1110 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1111 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1112
1113 ciphers=NULL;
1114
1115 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1116 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_ciph er(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1117 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1118 {
1119 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHAR ED_CIPHER);
1121 goto f_err;
1122 }
1123
1124 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1125
1126 if (s->cipher_list)
1127 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1128
1129 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1130 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1131
1132 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1133 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->cip hers);
1134 }
1135 }
1136 #endif
1137
1138 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1139 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1140 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1141 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1143 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1144 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1145 {
1146 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1147 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1148 /* Can't disable compression */
1149 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1150 {
1151 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_CO MPRESSION);
1153 goto f_err;
1154 }
1155 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1156 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1157 {
1158 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1159 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1160 {
1161 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1162 break;
1163 }
1164 }
1165 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1166 {
1167 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRES SION_ALGORITHM);
1169 goto f_err;
1170 }
1171 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1172 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1173 {
1174 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1175 break;
1176 }
1177 if (m >= i)
1178 {
1179 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRE SSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1181 goto f_err;
1182 }
1183 }
1184 else if (s->hit)
1185 comp = NULL;
1186 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1187 { /* See if we have a match */
1188 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1189
1190 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1191 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1192 {
1193 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1194 v=comp->id;
1195 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1196 {
1197 if (v == q[o])
1198 {
1199 done=1;
1200 break;
1201 }
1202 }
1203 if (done) break;
1204 }
1205 if (done)
1206 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1207 else
1208 comp=NULL;
1209 }
1210 #else
1211 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1212 * using compression.
1213 */
1214 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1215 {
1216 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSIO N);
1218 goto f_err;
1219 }
1220 #endif
1221
1222 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1223 * pick a cipher */
1224
1225 if (!s->hit)
1226 {
1227 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1228 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1229 #else
1230 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1231 #endif
1232 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1233 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1234 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1235 if (ciphers == NULL)
1236 {
1237 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASS ED);
1239 goto f_err;
1240 }
1241 ciphers=NULL;
1242 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1243 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1244
1245 if (c == NULL)
1246 {
1247 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHE R);
1249 goto f_err;
1250 }
1251 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1252 }
1253 else
1254 {
1255 /* Session-id reuse */
1256 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1257 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1258 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1259 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1260
1261 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1262 {
1263 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1264 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1265 {
1266 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1267 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1268 nc=c;
1269 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1270 ec=c;
1271 }
1272 if (nc != NULL)
1273 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1274 else if (ec != NULL)
1275 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1276 else
1277 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1278 }
1279 else
1280 #endif
1281 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1282 }
1283
1284 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1285 goto f_err;
1286
1287 /* we now have the following setup.
1288 * client_random
1289 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1290 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1291 * compression - basically ignored right now
1292 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1293 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1294 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1295 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1296 */
1297
1298 if (ret < 0) ret=1;
1299 if (0)
1300 {
1301 f_err:
1302 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1303 }
1304 err:
1305 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1306 return(ret);
1307 }
1308
1309 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1310 {
1311 unsigned char *buf;
1312 unsigned char *p,*d;
1313 int i,sl;
1314 unsigned long l;
1315 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1316 unsigned long Time;
1317 #endif
1318
1319 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1320 {
1321 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1322 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1323 p=s->s3->server_random;
1324 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1325 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1326 l2n(Time,p);
1327 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1328 return -1;
1329 #endif
1330 /* Do the message type and length last */
1331 d=p= &(buf[4]);
1332
1333 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1334 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1335
1336 /* Random stuff */
1337 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1338 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1339
1340 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1341 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1342 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1343 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1344 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1345 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1346 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1347 *
1348 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1349 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1350 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1351 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1352 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1353 * is unaffected.
1354 */
1355 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1356 && !s->hit)
1357 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1358
1359 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1360 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1361 {
1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERRO R);
1363 return -1;
1364 }
1365 *(p++)=sl;
1366 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1367 p+=sl;
1368
1369 /* put the cipher */
1370 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1371 p+=i;
1372
1373 /* put the compression method */
1374 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1375 *(p++)=0;
1376 #else
1377 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1378 *(p++)=0;
1379 else
1380 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1381 #endif
1382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1383 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1384 {
1385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TL SEXT);
1386 return -1;
1387 }
1388 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_ LENGTH)) == NULL)
1389 {
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR );
1391 return -1;
1392 }
1393 #endif
1394 /* do the header */
1395 l=(p-d);
1396 d=buf;
1397 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1398 l2n3(l,d);
1399
1400 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1401 /* number of bytes to write */
1402 s->init_num=p-buf;
1403 s->init_off=0;
1404 }
1405
1406 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1407 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1408 }
1409
1410 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1411 {
1412 unsigned char *p;
1413
1414 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1415 {
1416 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1417
1418 /* do the header */
1419 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1420 *(p++)=0;
1421 *(p++)=0;
1422 *(p++)=0;
1423
1424 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1425 /* number of bytes to write */
1426 s->init_num=4;
1427 s->init_off=0;
1428 }
1429
1430 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1431 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1432 }
1433
1434 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1435 {
1436 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1437 unsigned char *q;
1438 int j,num;
1439 RSA *rsa;
1440 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1441 unsigned int u;
1442 #endif
1443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1444 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1445 #endif
1446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1447 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1448 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1449 int encodedlen = 0;
1450 int curve_id = 0;
1451 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1452 #endif
1453 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1454 unsigned char *p,*d;
1455 int al,i;
1456 unsigned long type;
1457 int n;
1458 CERT *cert;
1459 BIGNUM *r[4];
1460 int nr[4],kn;
1461 BUF_MEM *buf;
1462 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1463
1464 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1465 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1466 {
1467 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1468 cert=s->cert;
1469
1470 buf=s->init_buf;
1471
1472 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1473 n=0;
1474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1475 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1476 {
1477 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1478 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1479 {
1480 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1481 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1482 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cip her));
1483 if(rsa == NULL)
1484 {
1485 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHAN GE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1487 goto f_err;
1488 }
1489 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1490 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1491 }
1492 if (rsa == NULL)
1493 {
1494 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R _MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1496 goto f_err;
1497 }
1498 r[0]=rsa->n;
1499 r[1]=rsa->e;
1500 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1501 }
1502 else
1503 #endif
1504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1505 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1506 {
1507 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1508 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1509 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1510 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1511 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cip her));
1512 if (dhp == NULL)
1513 {
1514 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R _MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1516 goto f_err;
1517 }
1518
1519 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1520 {
1521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_ R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1522 goto err;
1523 }
1524
1525 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1526 {
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R _DH_LIB);
1528 goto err;
1529 }
1530
1531 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1532 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1533 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1534 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1535 {
1536 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1537 {
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1539 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1540 goto err;
1541 }
1542 }
1543 else
1544 {
1545 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1546 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1547 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1548 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1549 {
1550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHAN GE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1551 goto err;
1552 }
1553 }
1554 r[0]=dh->p;
1555 r[1]=dh->g;
1556 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1557 }
1558 else
1559 #endif
1560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1561 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1562 {
1563 const EC_GROUP *group;
1564
1565 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1566 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1567 {
1568 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1569 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1570 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cip her));
1571 }
1572 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1573 {
1574 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R _MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1576 goto f_err;
1577 }
1578
1579 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1580 {
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_ R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1582 goto err;
1583 }
1584
1585 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1586 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1587 {
1588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R _ECDH_LIB);
1589 goto err;
1590 }
1591 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1592 {
1593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R _ECDH_LIB);
1594 goto err;
1595 }
1596
1597 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1598 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1599 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1600 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1601 {
1602 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1603 {
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,E RR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1605 goto err;
1606 }
1607 }
1608
1609 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1610 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1611 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1612 {
1613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R _ECDH_LIB);
1614 goto err;
1615 }
1616
1617 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1618 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1619 {
1620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R _ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1621 goto err;
1622 }
1623
1624 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1625 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1626 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1627 */
1628 if ((curve_id =
1629 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)) )
1630 == 0)
1631 {
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R _UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1633 goto err;
1634 }
1635
1636 /* Encode the public key.
1637 * First check the size of encoding and
1638 * allocate memory accordingly.
1639 */
1640 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1641 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1642 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1643 NULL, 0, NULL);
1644
1645 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1646 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1647 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1648 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1649 {
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R _MALLOC_FAILURE);
1651 goto err;
1652 }
1653
1654
1655 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1656 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1657 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1658 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1659
1660 if (encodedlen == 0)
1661 {
1662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R _ECDH_LIB);
1663 goto err;
1664 }
1665
1666 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1667
1668 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1669 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1670 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1671 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1672 * structure.
1673 */
1674 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1675
1676 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1677 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1678 */
1679 r[0]=NULL;
1680 r[1]=NULL;
1681 r[2]=NULL;
1682 r[3]=NULL;
1683 }
1684 else
1685 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1687 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1688 {
1689 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identi ty hint*/
1690 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1691 }
1692 else
1693 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1694 {
1695 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN _KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1697 goto f_err;
1698 }
1699 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1700 {
1701 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1702 n+=2+nr[i];
1703 }
1704
1705 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1706 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1707 {
1708 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1709 == NULL)
1710 {
1711 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1712 goto f_err;
1713 }
1714 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1715 }
1716 else
1717 {
1718 pkey=NULL;
1719 kn=0;
1720 }
1721
1722 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1723 {
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1725 goto err;
1726 }
1727 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1728 p= &(d[4]);
1729
1730 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1731 {
1732 s2n(nr[i],p);
1733 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1734 p+=nr[i];
1735 }
1736
1737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1738 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1739 {
1740 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) cur ves.
1741 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1742 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1743 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1744 * the actual encoded point itself
1745 */
1746 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1747 p += 1;
1748 *p = 0;
1749 p += 1;
1750 *p = curve_id;
1751 p += 1;
1752 *p = encodedlen;
1753 p += 1;
1754 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1755 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1756 encodedlen);
1757 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1758 encodedPoint = NULL;
1759 p += encodedlen;
1760 }
1761 #endif
1762
1763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1764 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1765 {
1766 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1767 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1768 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s-> ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1769 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1770 }
1771 #endif
1772
1773 /* not anonymous */
1774 if (pkey != NULL)
1775 {
1776 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1777 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1779 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1780 {
1781 q=md_buf;
1782 j=0;
1783 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1784 {
1785 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1786 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL) ;
1787 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client _random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1788 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server _random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1789 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1790 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1791 (unsigned int *)&i);
1792 q+=i;
1793 j+=i;
1794 }
1795 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1796 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1797 {
1798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHAN GE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1799 goto err;
1800 }
1801 s2n(u,p);
1802 n+=u+2;
1803 }
1804 else
1805 #endif
1806 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1807 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1808 {
1809 /* lets do DSS */
1810 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1811 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0] ),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1812 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0] ),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1813 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1814 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1815 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1816 {
1817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHAN GE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1818 goto err;
1819 }
1820 s2n(i,p);
1821 n+=i+2;
1822 }
1823 else
1824 #endif
1825 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1826 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1827 {
1828 /* let's do ECDSA */
1829 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1830 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0] ),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1831 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0] ),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1832 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1833 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1834 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1835 {
1836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHAN GE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1837 goto err;
1838 }
1839 s2n(i,p);
1840 n+=i+2;
1841 }
1842 else
1843 #endif
1844 {
1845 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1846 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R _UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1848 goto f_err;
1849 }
1850 }
1851
1852 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1853 l2n3(n,d);
1854
1855 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1856 * it off */
1857 s->init_num=n+4;
1858 s->init_off=0;
1859 }
1860
1861 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1862 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1863 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1864 f_err:
1865 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1866 err:
1867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1868 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1869 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1870 #endif
1871 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1872 return(-1);
1873 }
1874
1875 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1876 {
1877 unsigned char *p,*d;
1878 int i,j,nl,off,n;
1879 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1880 X509_NAME *name;
1881 BUF_MEM *buf;
1882
1883 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1884 {
1885 buf=s->init_buf;
1886
1887 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1888
1889 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1890 p++;
1891 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1892 d[0]=n;
1893 p+=n;
1894 n++;
1895
1896 off=n;
1897 p+=2;
1898 n+=2;
1899
1900 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1901 nl=0;
1902 if (sk != NULL)
1903 {
1904 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1905 {
1906 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1907 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1908 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1909 {
1910 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUE ST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1911 goto err;
1912 }
1913 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1914 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1915 {
1916 s2n(j,p);
1917 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1918 n+=2+j;
1919 nl+=2+j;
1920 }
1921 else
1922 {
1923 d=p;
1924 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1925 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1926 n+=j;
1927 nl+=j;
1928 }
1929 }
1930 }
1931 /* else no CA names */
1932 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1933 s2n(nl,p);
1934
1935 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1936 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1937 l2n3(n,d);
1938
1939 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1940 * it off */
1941
1942 s->init_num=n+4;
1943 s->init_off=0;
1944 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1945 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1946
1947 /* do the header */
1948 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1949 *(p++)=0;
1950 *(p++)=0;
1951 *(p++)=0;
1952 s->init_num += 4;
1953 #endif
1954
1955 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1956 }
1957
1958 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1959 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1960 err:
1961 return(-1);
1962 }
1963
1964 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1965 {
1966 int i,al,ok;
1967 long n;
1968 unsigned long alg_k;
1969 unsigned char *p;
1970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1971 RSA *rsa=NULL;
1972 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1973 #endif
1974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1975 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
1976 DH *dh_srvr;
1977 #endif
1978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1979 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
1980 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1981
1982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1983 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1984 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1985 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1986 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1987 #endif
1988
1989 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1990 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1991 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1992 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1993 2048, /* ??? */
1994 &ok);
1995
1996 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1997 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1998
1999 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2000
2001 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2002 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2003 {
2004 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2005 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2006 {
2007 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2008 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2009 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2010 * be sent already */
2011 if (rsa == NULL)
2012 {
2013 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2015 goto f_err;
2016
2017 }
2018 }
2019 else
2020 {
2021 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2022 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2023 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2024 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2025 {
2026 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2028 goto f_err;
2029 }
2030 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
2031 }
2032
2033 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2034 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2035 {
2036 n2s(p,i);
2037 if (n != i+2)
2038 {
2039 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2040 {
2041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANG E,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2042 goto err;
2043 }
2044 else
2045 p-=2;
2046 }
2047 else
2048 n=i;
2049 }
2050
2051 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2052
2053 al = -1;
2054
2055 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2056 {
2057 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2058 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_R SA_DECRYPT); */
2059 }
2060
2061 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2062 {
2063 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version nu mber as the
2064 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (stran gely, the
2065 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH cipher suites).
2066 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2067 * version instead if the server does not support the re quested
2068 * protocol version.
2069 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clie nts. */
2070 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2071 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->versio n & 0xff))))
2072 {
2073 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2074 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL _R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2075
2076 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenb acher's attack
2077 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits t he version
2078 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2079 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to so me ciphertext
2080 * made up by the adversary is properly formatte d except
2081 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid s uch attacks,
2082 * we should treat this just like any other decr yption error. */
2083 }
2084 }
2085
2086 if (al != -1)
2087 {
2088 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead a s countermeasure
2089 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA p adding
2090 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2091 ERR_clear_error();
2092 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2093 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2094 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2095 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_ bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2096 goto err;
2097 }
2098
2099 s->session->master_key_length=
2100 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2101 s->session->master_key,
2102 p,i);
2103 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2104 }
2105 else
2106 #endif
2107 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2108 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2109 {
2110 n2s(p,i);
2111 if (n != i+2)
2112 {
2113 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2114 {
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2116 goto err;
2117 }
2118 else
2119 {
2120 p-=2;
2121 i=(int)n;
2122 }
2123 }
2124
2125 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2126 {
2127 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_T O_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2129 goto f_err;
2130 }
2131 else
2132 {
2133 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2134 {
2135 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2137 goto f_err;
2138 }
2139 else
2140 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2141 }
2142
2143 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2144 if (pub == NULL)
2145 {
2146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2147 goto err;
2148 }
2149
2150 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2151
2152 if (i <= 0)
2153 {
2154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2155 BN_clear_free(pub);
2156 goto err;
2157 }
2158
2159 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2160 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2161
2162 BN_clear_free(pub);
2163 pub=NULL;
2164 s->session->master_key_length=
2165 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2166 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2167 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2168 }
2169 else
2170 #endif
2171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2172 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2173 {
2174 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2175 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2176 krb5_data authenticator;
2177 krb5_data enc_pms;
2178 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2179 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2180 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2181 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2182 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2183 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2184 int padl, outl;
2185 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2186 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2187
2188 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2189
2190 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2191
2192 n2s(p,i);
2193 enc_ticket.length = i;
2194
2195 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2196 {
2197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2198 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2199 goto err;
2200 }
2201
2202 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2203 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2204
2205 n2s(p,i);
2206 authenticator.length = i;
2207
2208 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2209 {
2210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2211 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2212 goto err;
2213 }
2214
2215 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2216 p+=authenticator.length;
2217
2218 n2s(p,i);
2219 enc_pms.length = i;
2220 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2221 p+=enc_pms.length;
2222
2223 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2224 ** after decryption
2225 */
2226 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2227 {
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2229 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2230 goto err;
2231 }
2232
2233 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2234 enc_pms.length + 6))
2235 {
2236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2237 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2238 goto err;
2239 }
2240
2241 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2242 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2243 {
2244 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2245 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2246 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2247 if (kssl_err.text)
2248 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2249 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2251 kssl_err.reason);
2252 goto err;
2253 }
2254
2255 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2256 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2257 */
2258 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2259 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2260 {
2261 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2262 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2263 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2264 if (kssl_err.text)
2265 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2266 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2268 kssl_err.reason);
2269 goto err;
2270 }
2271
2272 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2273 {
2274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2275 goto err;
2276 }
2277
2278 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2279 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2280 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2281
2282 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2283 if (enc == NULL)
2284 goto err;
2285
2286 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2287
2288 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2289 {
2290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2291 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2292 goto err;
2293 }
2294 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2295 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.l ength))
2296 {
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2298 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2299 goto err;
2300 }
2301 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2302 {
2303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2304 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2305 goto err;
2306 }
2307 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2308 {
2309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2310 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2311 goto err;
2312 }
2313 outl += padl;
2314 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2315 {
2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2317 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2318 goto err;
2319 }
2320 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->clien t_version & 0xff))))
2321 {
2322 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2323 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely , the
2324 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuit es).
2325 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes inste ad of
2326 * the protocol version.
2327 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2328 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerb eros cipher)
2329 */
2330 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2331 {
2332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2333 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2334 goto err;
2335 }
2336 }
2337
2338 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2339
2340 s->session->master_key_length=
2341 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2342 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2343
2344 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2345 {
2346 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2347 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2348 {
2349 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2350 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->c lient_princ,len);
2351 }
2352 }
2353
2354
2355 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2356 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2357 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2358 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2359 */
2360 }
2361 else
2362 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2363
2364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2365 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2366 {
2367 int ret = 1;
2368 int field_size = 0;
2369 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2370 const EC_GROUP *group;
2371 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2372
2373 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2374 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2375 {
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2377 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2378 goto err;
2379 }
2380
2381 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2382 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2383 {
2384 /* use the certificate */
2385 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2386 }
2387 else
2388 {
2389 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2390 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2391 */
2392 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2393 }
2394
2395 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2396 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2397
2398 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2399 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2400 {
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2402 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2403 goto err;
2404 }
2405
2406 /* Let's get client's public key */
2407 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2408 {
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2410 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2411 goto err;
2412 }
2413
2414 if (n == 0L)
2415 {
2416 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2417
2418 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2419 {
2420 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R _MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2422 goto f_err;
2423 }
2424 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2425 == NULL) ||
2426 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2427 {
2428 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2429 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2430 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2431 * never executed. When that support is
2432 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2433 * received in the certificate is
2434 * authorized for key agreement.
2435 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2436 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2437 * group.
2438 */
2439 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2441 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2442 goto f_err;
2443 }
2444
2445 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2446 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0 )
2447 {
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2449 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2450 goto err;
2451 }
2452 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2453 }
2454 else
2455 {
2456 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2457 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2458 */
2459 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2460 {
2461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2462 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2463 goto err;
2464 }
2465
2466 /* Get encoded point length */
2467 i = *p;
2468 p += 1;
2469 if (n != 1 + i)
2470 {
2471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2472 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2473 goto err;
2474 }
2475 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2476 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2477 {
2478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2479 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2480 goto err;
2481 }
2482 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2483 * currently, so set it to the start
2484 */
2485 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2486 }
2487
2488 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2489 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2490 if (field_size <= 0)
2491 {
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2493 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2494 goto err;
2495 }
2496 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecd h, NULL);
2497 if (i <= 0)
2498 {
2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2500 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2501 goto err;
2502 }
2503
2504 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2505 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2506 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2507 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2508 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2509 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2510
2511 /* Compute the master secret */
2512 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2513 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2514
2515 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2516 return (ret);
2517 }
2518 else
2519 #endif
2520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2521 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2522 {
2523 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2524 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2525 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2526 int psk_err = 1;
2527 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2528
2529 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2530
2531 n2s(p,i);
2532 if (n != i+2)
2533 {
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2535 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2536 goto psk_err;
2537 }
2538 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2539 {
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2541 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2542 goto psk_err;
2543 }
2544 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2545 {
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2547 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2548 goto psk_err;
2549 }
2550
2551 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2552 * string for the callback */
2553 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2554 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2555 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2556 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2557 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2558
2559 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2560 {
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2562 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2563 goto psk_err;
2564 }
2565 else if (psk_len == 0)
2566 {
2567 /* PSK related to the given identity not found * /
2568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2569 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2570 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2571 goto psk_err;
2572 }
2573
2574 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2575 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2576 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2577 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len) ;
2578 s2n(psk_len, t);
2579 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2580 t+=psk_len;
2581 s2n(psk_len, t);
2582
2583 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2584 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2585 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2586 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2587 {
2588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2589 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2590 goto psk_err;
2591 }
2592
2593 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2594 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2595 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_i dentity_hint);
2596 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2597 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2598 {
2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2600 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2601 goto psk_err;
2602 }
2603
2604 s->session->master_key_length=
2605 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2606 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, p re_ms_len);
2607 psk_err = 0;
2608 psk_err:
2609 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2610 if (psk_err != 0)
2611 goto f_err;
2612 }
2613 else
2614 #endif
2615 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2616 {
2617 int ret = 0;
2618 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2619 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2620 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2621 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2622 unsigned long alg_a;
2623
2624 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2625 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2626 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2627 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2628 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2629 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2630
2631 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2632 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2633 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same t ype, maybe
2634 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2635 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely va lid to use
2636 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2637 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2638 if (client_pub_pkey)
2639 {
2640 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pu b_pkey) <= 0)
2641 ERR_clear_error();
2642 }
2643 /* Decrypt session key */
2644 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2645 {
2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2647 goto gerr;
2648 }
2649 if (p[1] == 0x81)
2650 {
2651 start = p+3;
2652 inlen = p[2];
2653 }
2654 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2655 {
2656 start = p+2;
2657 inlen = p[1];
2658 }
2659 else
2660 {
2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2662 goto gerr;
2663 }
2664 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,s tart,inlen) <=0)
2665
2666 {
2667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2668 goto gerr;
2669 }
2670 /* Generate master secret */
2671 s->session->master_key_length=
2672 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2673 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret, 32);
2674 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2675 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PE ER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2676 ret = 2;
2677 else
2678 ret = 1;
2679 gerr:
2680 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2681 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2682 if (ret)
2683 return ret;
2684 else
2685 goto err;
2686 }
2687 else
2688 {
2689 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2691 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2692 goto f_err;
2693 }
2694
2695 return(1);
2696 f_err:
2697 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2698 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_E CDH)
2699 err:
2700 #endif
2701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2702 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2703 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2704 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2705 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2706 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2707 #endif
2708 return(-1);
2709 }
2710
2711 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2712 {
2713 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2714 unsigned char *p;
2715 int al,ok,ret=0;
2716 long n;
2717 int type=0,i,j;
2718 X509 *peer;
2719
2720 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2721 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2722 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2723 -1,
2724 514, /* 514? */
2725 &ok);
2726
2727 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2728
2729 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2730 {
2731 peer=s->session->peer;
2732 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2733 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2734 }
2735 else
2736 {
2737 peer=NULL;
2738 pkey=NULL;
2739 }
2740
2741 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2742 {
2743 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2744 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2745 {
2746 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_M ESSAGE);
2748 goto f_err;
2749 }
2750 ret=1;
2751 goto end;
2752 }
2753
2754 if (peer == NULL)
2755 {
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED) ;
2757 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2758 goto f_err;
2759 }
2760
2761 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2762 {
2763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNIN G_CERTIFICATE);
2764 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2765 goto f_err;
2766 }
2767
2768 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2769 {
2770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2771 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2772 goto f_err;
2773 }
2774
2775 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2776 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2777 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2778 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2779 * signature without length field */
2780 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2781 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2782 {
2783 i=64;
2784 }
2785 else
2786 {
2787 n2s(p,i);
2788 n-=2;
2789 if (i > n)
2790 {
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH) ;
2792 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2793 goto f_err;
2794 }
2795 }
2796 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2797 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2798 {
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2800 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2801 goto f_err;
2802 }
2803
2804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2805 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2806 {
2807 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2808 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2809 pkey->pkey.rsa);
2810 if (i < 0)
2811 {
2812 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT) ;
2814 goto f_err;
2815 }
2816 if (i == 0)
2817 {
2818 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATUR E);
2820 goto f_err;
2821 }
2822 }
2823 else
2824 #endif
2825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2826 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2827 {
2828 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2829 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2830 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2831 if (j <= 0)
2832 {
2833 /* bad signature */
2834 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATUR E);
2836 goto f_err;
2837 }
2838 }
2839 else
2840 #endif
2841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2842 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2843 {
2844 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2845 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2846 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2847 if (j <= 0)
2848 {
2849 /* bad signature */
2850 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2852 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2853 goto f_err;
2854 }
2855 }
2856 else
2857 #endif
2858 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_ 2001)
2859 { unsigned char signature[64];
2860 int idx;
2861 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
2862 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2863 if (i!=64) {
2864 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
2865 }
2866 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
2867 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
2868 }
2869 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_veri fy_md,32);
2870 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2871 if (j<=0)
2872 {
2873 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2875 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2876 goto f_err;
2877 }
2878 }
2879 else
2880 {
2881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2882 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2883 goto f_err;
2884 }
2885
2886
2887 ret=1;
2888 if (0)
2889 {
2890 f_err:
2891 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2892 }
2893 end:
2894 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2895 return(ret);
2896 }
2897
2898 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2899 {
2900 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2901 X509 *x=NULL;
2902 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2903 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2904 unsigned char *d;
2905 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2906
2907 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2908 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
2909 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
2910 -1,
2911 s->max_cert_list,
2912 &ok);
2913
2914 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2915
2916 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2917 {
2918 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2919 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2920 {
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_ NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2922 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2923 goto f_err;
2924 }
2925 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 li st */
2926 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2927 {
2928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_ DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2929 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2930 goto f_err;
2931 }
2932 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2933 return(1);
2934 }
2935
2936 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2937 {
2938 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYP E);
2940 goto f_err;
2941 }
2942 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2943
2944 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2945 {
2946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2947 goto err;
2948 }
2949
2950 n2l3(p,llen);
2951 if (llen+3 != n)
2952 {
2953 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2955 goto f_err;
2956 }
2957 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2958 {
2959 n2l3(p,l);
2960 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2961 {
2962 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENG TH_MISMATCH);
2964 goto f_err;
2965 }
2966
2967 q=p;
2968 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2969 if (x == NULL)
2970 {
2971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB) ;
2972 goto err;
2973 }
2974 if (p != (q+l))
2975 {
2976 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2977 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENG TH_MISMATCH);
2978 goto f_err;
2979 }
2980 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2981 {
2982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FA ILURE);
2983 goto err;
2984 }
2985 x=NULL;
2986 nc+=l+3;
2987 }
2988
2989 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2990 {
2991 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2992 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2993 {
2994 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIF ICATES_RETURNED);
2996 goto f_err;
2997 }
2998 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2999 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3000 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3001 {
3002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_ NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3003 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3004 goto f_err;
3005 }
3006 }
3007 else
3008 {
3009 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3010 if (i <= 0)
3011 {
3012 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIF ICATE_RETURNED);
3014 goto f_err;
3015 }
3016 }
3017
3018 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3019 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3020 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3021 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3022
3023 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3024 * when we arrive here. */
3025 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3026 {
3027 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3028 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3029 {
3030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_F AILURE);
3031 goto err;
3032 }
3033 }
3034 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3035 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3036 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3037 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3038 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3039
3040 sk=NULL;
3041
3042 ret=1;
3043 if (0)
3044 {
3045 f_err:
3046 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3047 }
3048 err:
3049 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3050 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3051 return(ret);
3052 }
3053
3054 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3055 {
3056 unsigned long l;
3057 X509 *x;
3058
3059 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3060 {
3061 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3062 if (x == NULL)
3063 {
3064 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3065 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3066 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3067 {
3068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ INTERNAL_ERROR);
3069 return(0);
3070 }
3071 }
3072
3073 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3074 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3075 s->init_num=(int)l;
3076 s->init_off=0;
3077 }
3078
3079 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3080 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3081 }
3082 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3083 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3084 {
3085 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3086 {
3087 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3088 int len, slen;
3089 unsigned int hlen;
3090 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3091 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3092 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3093 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3094 unsigned char key_name[16];
3095
3096 /* get session encoding length */
3097 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3098 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3099 * too long
3100 */
3101 if (slen > 0xFF00)
3102 return -1;
3103 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3104 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3105 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3106 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3107 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3108 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3109 */
3110 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3111 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3112 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3113 return -1;
3114 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
3115 if (!senc)
3116 return -1;
3117 p = senc;
3118 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3119
3120 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3121 /* do the header */
3122 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3123 /* Skip message length for now */
3124 p += 3;
3125 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3126 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3127 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3128 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3129 * from parent ctx.
3130 */
3131 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3132 {
3133 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3134 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3135 {
3136 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3137 return -1;
3138 }
3139 }
3140 else
3141 {
3142 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3143 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3144 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3145 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3146 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3147 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3148 }
3149 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
3150 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3151 p += 2;
3152 /* Output key name */
3153 macstart = p;
3154 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3155 p += 16;
3156 /* output IV */
3157 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3158 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3159 /* Encrypt session data */
3160 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3161 p += len;
3162 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3163 p += len;
3164 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3165
3166 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3167 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3168 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3169
3170 p += hlen;
3171 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3172 /* Total length */
3173 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3174 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3175 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3176 p += 4;
3177 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3178
3179 /* number of bytes to write */
3180 s->init_num= len;
3181 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3182 s->init_off=0;
3183 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3184 }
3185
3186 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3187 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3188 }
3189
3190 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3191 {
3192 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3193 {
3194 unsigned char *p;
3195 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3196 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3197 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3198 * + (ocsp response)
3199 */
3200 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3201 return -1;
3202
3203 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3204
3205 /* do the header */
3206 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3207 /* message length */
3208 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3209 /* status type */
3210 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3211 /* length of OCSP response */
3212 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3213 /* actual response */
3214 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3215 /* number of bytes to write */
3216 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3217 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3218 s->init_off = 0;
3219 }
3220
3221 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3222 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3223 }
3224 #endif
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