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| 1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */ |
| 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| 3 * All rights reserved. |
| 4 * |
| 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| 8 * |
| 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| 15 * |
| 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| 17 * the code are not to be removed. |
| 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| 22 * |
| 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 25 * are met: |
| 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| 40 * |
| 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 52 * |
| 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| 57 */ |
| 58 /* ==================================================================== |
| 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| 60 * |
| 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 63 * are met: |
| 64 * |
| 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 67 * |
| 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| 71 * distribution. |
| 72 * |
| 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| 77 * |
| 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| 82 * |
| 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| 86 * |
| 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| 88 * acknowledgment: |
| 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| 91 * |
| 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 104 * ==================================================================== |
| 105 * |
| 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| 109 * |
| 110 */ |
| 111 |
| 112 #include <stdio.h> |
| 113 #include <errno.h> |
| 114 #define USE_SOCKETS |
| 115 #include "ssl_locl.h" |
| 116 #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| 117 #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
| 118 |
| 119 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
| 120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); |
| 121 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); |
| 122 |
| 123 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) |
| 124 { |
| 125 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase |
| 126 * packet by another n bytes. |
| 127 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified |
| 128 * by s->packet and s->packet_length. |
| 129 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf |
| 130 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) |
| 131 */ |
| 132 int i,len,left; |
| 133 long align=0; |
| 134 unsigned char *pkt; |
| 135 SSL3_BUFFER *rb; |
| 136 |
| 137 if (n <= 0) return n; |
| 138 |
| 139 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf); |
| 140 if (rb->buf == NULL) |
| 141 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) |
| 142 return -1; |
| 143 |
| 144 left = rb->left; |
| 145 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 |
| 146 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| 147 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); |
| 148 #endif |
| 149 |
| 150 if (!extend) |
| 151 { |
| 152 /* start with empty packet ... */ |
| 153 if (left == 0) |
| 154 rb->offset = align; |
| 155 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) |
| 156 { |
| 157 /* check if next packet length is large |
| 158 * enough to justify payload alignment... */ |
| 159 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; |
| 160 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA |
| 161 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128) |
| 162 { |
| 163 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted |
| 164 * and its length field is insane, we can |
| 165 * only be led to wrong decision about |
| 166 * whether memmove will occur or not. |
| 167 * Header values has no effect on memmove |
| 168 * arguments and therefore no buffer |
| 169 * overrun can be triggered. */ |
| 170 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left); |
| 171 rb->offset = align; |
| 172 } |
| 173 } |
| 174 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; |
| 175 s->packet_length = 0; |
| 176 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ |
| 177 } |
| 178 |
| 179 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets |
| 180 * because the read operation returns the whole packet |
| 181 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */ |
| 182 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
| 183 { |
| 184 if (left > 0 && n > left) |
| 185 n = left; |
| 186 } |
| 187 |
| 188 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ |
| 189 if (left >= n) |
| 190 { |
| 191 s->packet_length+=n; |
| 192 rb->left=left-n; |
| 193 rb->offset+=n; |
| 194 return(n); |
| 195 } |
| 196 |
| 197 /* else we need to read more data */ |
| 198 |
| 199 len = s->packet_length; |
| 200 pkt = rb->buf+align; |
| 201 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer: |
| 202 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet', |
| 203 * 'left' extra ones at the end */ |
| 204 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */ |
| 205 { |
| 206 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left); |
| 207 s->packet = pkt; |
| 208 rb->offset = len + align; |
| 209 } |
| 210 |
| 211 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */ |
| 212 { |
| 213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 214 return -1; |
| 215 } |
| 216 |
| 217 if (!s->read_ahead) |
| 218 /* ignore max parameter */ |
| 219 max = n; |
| 220 else |
| 221 { |
| 222 if (max < n) |
| 223 max = n; |
| 224 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) |
| 225 max = rb->len - rb->offset; |
| 226 } |
| 227 |
| 228 while (left < n) |
| 229 { |
| 230 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf |
| 231 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to |
| 232 * len+max if possible) */ |
| 233 |
| 234 clear_sys_error(); |
| 235 if (s->rbio != NULL) |
| 236 { |
| 237 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
| 238 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left); |
| 239 } |
| 240 else |
| 241 { |
| 242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); |
| 243 i = -1; |
| 244 } |
| 245 |
| 246 if (i <= 0) |
| 247 { |
| 248 rb->left = left; |
| 249 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && |
| 250 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) !=
DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
| 251 if (len+left == 0) |
| 252 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); |
| 253 return(i); |
| 254 } |
| 255 left+=i; |
| 256 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because |
| 257 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as oppo
sed |
| 258 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */ |
| 259 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_B
AD_VER) |
| 260 { |
| 261 if (n > left) |
| 262 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ |
| 263 } |
| 264 } |
| 265 |
| 266 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ |
| 267 rb->offset += n; |
| 268 rb->left = left - n; |
| 269 s->packet_length += n; |
| 270 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| 271 return(n); |
| 272 } |
| 273 |
| 274 /* Call this to get a new input record. |
| 275 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error |
| 276 * or non-blocking IO. |
| 277 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in |
| 278 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record |
| 279 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data |
| 280 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes |
| 281 */ |
| 282 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ |
| 283 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) |
| 284 { |
| 285 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al; |
| 286 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1; |
| 287 SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
| 288 SSL_SESSION *sess; |
| 289 unsigned char *p; |
| 290 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| 291 short version; |
| 292 int mac_size; |
| 293 int clear=0; |
| 294 size_t extra; |
| 295 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0; |
| 296 unsigned char *mac = NULL; |
| 297 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 |
| 298 long align=SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD; |
| 299 #else |
| 300 long align=0; |
| 301 #endif |
| 302 |
| 303 rr= &(s->s3->rrec); |
| 304 sess=s->session; |
| 305 |
| 306 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) |
| 307 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; |
| 308 else |
| 309 extra=0; |
| 310 if (!(SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS) && |
| 311 extra && !s->s3->init_extra) |
| 312 { |
| 313 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER |
| 314 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */ |
| 315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 316 return -1; |
| 317 } |
| 318 |
| 319 again: |
| 320 /* check if we have the header */ |
| 321 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || |
| 322 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) |
| 323 { |
| 324 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); |
| 325 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */ |
| 326 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY; |
| 327 |
| 328 p=s->packet; |
| 329 |
| 330 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ |
| 331 rr->type= *(p++); |
| 332 ssl_major= *(p++); |
| 333 ssl_minor= *(p++); |
| 334 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor; |
| 335 n2s(p,rr->length); |
| 336 #if 0 |
| 337 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); |
| 338 #endif |
| 339 |
| 340 /* Lets check version */ |
| 341 if (!s->first_packet) |
| 342 { |
| 343 if (version != s->version) |
| 344 { |
| 345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION
_NUMBER); |
| 346 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)) |
| 347 /* Send back error using their minor ver
sion number :-) */ |
| 348 s->version = (unsigned short)version; |
| 349 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
| 350 goto f_err; |
| 351 } |
| 352 } |
| 353 |
| 354 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) |
| 355 { |
| 356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER)
; |
| 357 goto err; |
| 358 } |
| 359 |
| 360 /* If we receive a valid record larger than the current buffer s
ize, |
| 361 * allocate some memory for it. |
| 362 */ |
| 363 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - align
) |
| 364 { |
| 365 if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->rbuf.buf, rr->length + SSL
3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + align))==NULL) |
| 366 { |
| 367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILUR
E); |
| 368 goto err; |
| 369 } |
| 370 s->s3->rbuf.buf=p; |
| 371 s->s3->rbuf.len=rr->length + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + ali
gn; |
| 372 s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]); |
| 373 } |
| 374 |
| 375 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) |
| 376 { |
| 377 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
| 378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LON
G); |
| 379 goto f_err; |
| 380 } |
| 381 |
| 382 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ |
| 383 } |
| 384 |
| 385 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ |
| 386 |
| 387 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) |
| 388 { |
| 389 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ |
| 390 i=rr->length; |
| 391 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1); |
| 392 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */ |
| 393 /* now n == rr->length, |
| 394 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */ |
| 395 } |
| 396 |
| 397 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ |
| 398 |
| 399 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, |
| 400 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet |
| 401 */ |
| 402 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
| 403 |
| 404 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' |
| 405 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which |
| 406 * need to be copied into rr->data by either |
| 407 * the decryption or by the decompression |
| 408 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer, |
| 409 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ |
| 410 |
| 411 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] |
| 412 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ |
| 413 |
| 414 /* check is not needed I believe */ |
| 415 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra) |
| 416 { |
| 417 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
| 418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| 419 goto f_err; |
| 420 } |
| 421 |
| 422 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ |
| 423 rr->data=rr->input; |
| 424 |
| 425 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); |
| 426 if (enc_err <= 0) |
| 427 { |
| 428 if (enc_err == 0) |
| 429 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */ |
| 430 goto err; |
| 431 |
| 432 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding |
| 433 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case). |
| 434 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform |
| 435 * the MAC computation anyway. */ |
| 436 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; |
| 437 } |
| 438 |
| 439 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
| 440 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length); |
| 441 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1
)%16)?' ':'\n'); } |
| 442 printf("\n"); |
| 443 #endif |
| 444 |
| 445 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ |
| 446 if ( (sess == NULL) || |
| 447 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) || |
| 448 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL)) |
| 449 clear=1; |
| 450 |
| 451 if (!clear) |
| 452 { |
| 453 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ |
| 454 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); |
| 455 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0); |
| 456 |
| 457 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size) |
| 458 { |
| 459 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext
anyway) */ |
| 460 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
| 461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LO
NG); |
| 462 goto f_err; |
| 463 #else |
| 464 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; |
| 465 #endif |
| 466 } |
| 467 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the ta
il) */ |
| 468 if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size) |
| 469 { |
| 470 rr->length -= mac_size; |
| 471 mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; |
| 472 } |
| 473 else |
| 474 { |
| 475 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC
*/ |
| 476 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */ |
| 477 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); |
| 479 goto f_err; |
| 480 #else |
| 481 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; |
| 482 rr->length = 0; |
| 483 #endif |
| 484 } |
| 485 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0); |
| 486 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) !=
0) |
| 487 { |
| 488 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; |
| 489 } |
| 490 } |
| 491 |
| 492 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac) |
| 493 { |
| 494 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS
1.0, |
| 495 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption |
| 496 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, |
| 497 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this |
| 498 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */ |
| 499 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; |
| 500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECO
RD_MAC); |
| 501 goto f_err; |
| 502 } |
| 503 |
| 504 /* r->length is now just compressed */ |
| 505 if (s->expand != NULL) |
| 506 { |
| 507 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra) |
| 508 { |
| 509 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
| 510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO
_LONG); |
| 511 goto f_err; |
| 512 } |
| 513 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) |
| 514 { |
| 515 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; |
| 516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); |
| 517 goto f_err; |
| 518 } |
| 519 } |
| 520 |
| 521 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra) |
| 522 { |
| 523 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
| 524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| 525 goto f_err; |
| 526 } |
| 527 |
| 528 rr->off=0; |
| 529 /* So at this point the following is true |
| 530 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record |
| 531 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record |
| 532 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte |
| 533 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment |
| 534 * after use :-). |
| 535 */ |
| 536 |
| 537 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ |
| 538 s->packet_length=0; |
| 539 |
| 540 /* just read a 0 length packet */ |
| 541 if (rr->length == 0) goto again; |
| 542 |
| 543 #if 0 |
| 544 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); |
| 545 #endif |
| 546 |
| 547 return(1); |
| 548 |
| 549 f_err: |
| 550 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| 551 err: |
| 552 return(ret); |
| 553 } |
| 554 |
| 555 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) |
| 556 { |
| 557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| 558 int i; |
| 559 SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
| 560 |
| 561 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec); |
| 562 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp, |
| 563 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length); |
| 564 if (i < 0) |
| 565 return(0); |
| 566 else |
| 567 rr->length=i; |
| 568 rr->data=rr->comp; |
| 569 #endif |
| 570 return(1); |
| 571 } |
| 572 |
| 573 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) |
| 574 { |
| 575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| 576 int i; |
| 577 SSL3_RECORD *wr; |
| 578 |
| 579 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec); |
| 580 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data, |
| 581 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, |
| 582 wr->input,(int)wr->length); |
| 583 if (i < 0) |
| 584 return(0); |
| 585 else |
| 586 wr->length=i; |
| 587 |
| 588 wr->input=wr->data; |
| 589 #endif |
| 590 return(1); |
| 591 } |
| 592 |
| 593 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' |
| 594 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. |
| 595 */ |
| 596 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) |
| 597 { |
| 598 const unsigned char *buf=buf_; |
| 599 unsigned int tot,n,nw; |
| 600 int i; |
| 601 unsigned int max_plain_length; |
| 602 |
| 603 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| 604 tot=s->s3->wnum; |
| 605 s->s3->wnum=0; |
| 606 |
| 607 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) |
| 608 { |
| 609 i=s->handshake_func(s); |
| 610 if (i < 0) return(i); |
| 611 if (i == 0) |
| 612 { |
| 613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILUR
E); |
| 614 return -1; |
| 615 } |
| 616 } |
| 617 |
| 618 n=(len-tot); |
| 619 for (;;) |
| 620 { |
| 621 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_M
ODE_SMALL_BUFFERS)) |
| 622 max_plain_length = SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PLAIN_LENGTH; |
| 623 else |
| 624 max_plain_length = s->max_send_fragment; |
| 625 |
| 626 if (n > max_plain_length) |
| 627 nw = max_plain_length; |
| 628 else |
| 629 nw=n; |
| 630 |
| 631 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); |
| 632 if (i <= 0) |
| 633 { |
| 634 s->s3->wnum=tot; |
| 635 return i; |
| 636 } |
| 637 |
| 638 if ((i == (int)n) || |
| 639 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && |
| 640 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) |
| 641 { |
| 642 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty
fragment |
| 643 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */ |
| 644 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; |
| 645 |
| 646 return tot+i; |
| 647 } |
| 648 |
| 649 n-=i; |
| 650 tot+=i; |
| 651 } |
| 652 } |
| 653 |
| 654 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
| 655 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) |
| 656 { |
| 657 unsigned char *p,*plen; |
| 658 int i,mac_size,clear=0; |
| 659 int prefix_len=0; |
| 660 long align=0; |
| 661 SSL3_RECORD *wr; |
| 662 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf); |
| 663 SSL_SESSION *sess; |
| 664 |
| 665 if (wb->buf == NULL) |
| 666 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) |
| 667 return -1; |
| 668 |
| 669 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written |
| 670 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ |
| 671 if (wb->left != 0) |
| 672 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len)); |
| 673 |
| 674 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ |
| 675 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) |
| 676 { |
| 677 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); |
| 678 if (i <= 0) |
| 679 return(i); |
| 680 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ |
| 681 } |
| 682 |
| 683 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) |
| 684 return 0; |
| 685 |
| 686 wr= &(s->s3->wrec); |
| 687 sess=s->session; |
| 688 |
| 689 if ( (sess == NULL) || |
| 690 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || |
| 691 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) |
| 692 clear=1; |
| 693 |
| 694 if (clear) |
| 695 mac_size=0; |
| 696 else |
| 697 { |
| 698 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); |
| 699 if (mac_size < 0) |
| 700 goto err; |
| 701 } |
| 702 |
| 703 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
*/ |
| 704 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) |
| 705 { |
| 706 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites |
| 707 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ |
| 708 |
| 709 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_D
ATA) |
| 710 { |
| 711 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment'
set; |
| 712 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragm
ent |
| 713 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later |
| 714 * together with the actual payload) */ |
| 715 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); |
| 716 if (prefix_len <= 0) |
| 717 goto err; |
| 718 |
| 719 if (prefix_len > |
| 720 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) |
| 721 { |
| 722 /* insufficient space */ |
| 723 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
); |
| 724 goto err; |
| 725 } |
| 726 } |
| 727 |
| 728 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; |
| 729 } |
| 730 |
| 731 /* resize if necessary to hold the data. */ |
| 732 if (len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD > wb->len) |
| 733 { |
| 734 if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(wb->buf, len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVER
HEAD))==NULL) |
| 735 { |
| 736 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 737 goto err; |
| 738 } |
| 739 wb->buf = p; |
| 740 wb->len = len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD; |
| 741 } |
| 742 |
| 743 if (create_empty_fragment) |
| 744 { |
| 745 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 |
| 746 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, |
| 747 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so |
| 748 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can |
| 749 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */ |
| 750 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| 751 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); |
| 752 #endif |
| 753 p = wb->buf + align; |
| 754 wb->offset = align; |
| 755 } |
| 756 else if (prefix_len) |
| 757 { |
| 758 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len; |
| 759 } |
| 760 else |
| 761 { |
| 762 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 |
| 763 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| 764 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); |
| 765 #endif |
| 766 p = wb->buf + align; |
| 767 wb->offset = align; |
| 768 } |
| 769 |
| 770 /* write the header */ |
| 771 |
| 772 *(p++)=type&0xff; |
| 773 wr->type=type; |
| 774 |
| 775 *(p++)=(s->version>>8); |
| 776 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; |
| 777 |
| 778 /* field where we are to write out packet length */ |
| 779 plen=p; |
| 780 p+=2; |
| 781 |
| 782 /* lets setup the record stuff. */ |
| 783 wr->data=p; |
| 784 wr->length=(int)len; |
| 785 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf; |
| 786 |
| 787 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into |
| 788 * wr->data */ |
| 789 |
| 790 /* first we compress */ |
| 791 if (s->compress != NULL) |
| 792 { |
| 793 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) |
| 794 { |
| 795 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); |
| 796 goto err; |
| 797 } |
| 798 } |
| 799 else |
| 800 { |
| 801 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length); |
| 802 wr->input=wr->data; |
| 803 } |
| 804 |
| 805 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input |
| 806 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length. |
| 807 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */ |
| 808 |
| 809 if (mac_size != 0) |
| 810 { |
| 811 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1) < 0) |
| 812 goto err; |
| 813 wr->length+=mac_size; |
| 814 wr->input=p; |
| 815 wr->data=p; |
| 816 } |
| 817 |
| 818 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ |
| 819 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1); |
| 820 |
| 821 /* record length after mac and block padding */ |
| 822 s2n(wr->length,plen); |
| 823 |
| 824 /* we should now have |
| 825 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is |
| 826 * wr->length long */ |
| 827 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ |
| 828 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| 829 |
| 830 if (create_empty_fragment) |
| 831 { |
| 832 /* we are in a recursive call; |
| 833 * just return the length, don't write out anything here |
| 834 */ |
| 835 return wr->length; |
| 836 } |
| 837 |
| 838 /* now let's set up wb */ |
| 839 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; |
| 840 |
| 841 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write re
tries later */ |
| 842 s->s3->wpend_tot=len; |
| 843 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf; |
| 844 s->s3->wpend_type=type; |
| 845 s->s3->wpend_ret=len; |
| 846 |
| 847 /* we now just need to write the buffer */ |
| 848 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len); |
| 849 err: |
| 850 return -1; |
| 851 } |
| 852 |
| 853 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ |
| 854 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
| 855 unsigned int len) |
| 856 { |
| 857 int i; |
| 858 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf); |
| 859 |
| 860 /* XXXX */ |
| 861 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) |
| 862 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && |
| 863 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) |
| 864 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) |
| 865 { |
| 866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); |
| 867 return(-1); |
| 868 } |
| 869 |
| 870 for (;;) |
| 871 { |
| 872 clear_sys_error(); |
| 873 if (s->wbio != NULL) |
| 874 { |
| 875 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; |
| 876 i=BIO_write(s->wbio, |
| 877 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]), |
| 878 (unsigned int)wb->left); |
| 879 } |
| 880 else |
| 881 { |
| 882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); |
| 883 i= -1; |
| 884 } |
| 885 if (i == wb->left) |
| 886 { |
| 887 wb->left=0; |
| 888 wb->offset+=i; |
| 889 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && |
| 890 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) !=
DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
| 891 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); |
| 892 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| 893 return(s->s3->wpend_ret); |
| 894 } |
| 895 else if (i <= 0) { |
| 896 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || |
| 897 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { |
| 898 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the wh
ole |
| 899 point in using a datagram service */ |
| 900 wb->left = 0; |
| 901 } |
| 902 return(i); |
| 903 } |
| 904 wb->offset+=i; |
| 905 wb->left-=i; |
| 906 } |
| 907 } |
| 908 |
| 909 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. |
| 910 * 'type' is one of the following: |
| 911 * |
| 912 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) |
| 913 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) |
| 914 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) |
| 915 * |
| 916 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first |
| 917 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). |
| 918 * |
| 919 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as |
| 920 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really |
| 921 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. |
| 922 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store |
| 923 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol |
| 924 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): |
| 925 * Change cipher spec protocol |
| 926 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored |
| 927 * Alert protocol |
| 928 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) |
| 929 * Handshake protocol |
| 930 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have |
| 931 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages |
| 932 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers |
| 933 * Application data protocol |
| 934 * none of our business |
| 935 */ |
| 936 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) |
| 937 { |
| 938 int al,i,j,ret; |
| 939 unsigned int n; |
| 940 SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
| 941 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL; |
| 942 |
| 943 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ |
| 944 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) |
| 945 return(-1); |
| 946 |
| 947 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HAND
SHAKE) && type) || |
| 948 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) |
| 949 { |
| 950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 951 return -1; |
| 952 } |
| 953 |
| 954 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) |
| 955 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ |
| 956 { |
| 957 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; |
| 958 unsigned char *dst = buf; |
| 959 unsigned int k; |
| 960 |
| 961 /* peek == 0 */ |
| 962 n = 0; |
| 963 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) |
| 964 { |
| 965 *dst++ = *src++; |
| 966 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; |
| 967 n++; |
| 968 } |
| 969 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ |
| 970 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) |
| 971 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; |
| 972 return n; |
| 973 } |
| 974 |
| 975 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
*/ |
| 976 |
| 977 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) |
| 978 { |
| 979 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ |
| 980 i=s->handshake_func(s); |
| 981 if (i < 0) return(i); |
| 982 if (i == 0) |
| 983 { |
| 984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
); |
| 985 return(-1); |
| 986 } |
| 987 } |
| 988 start: |
| 989 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| 990 |
| 991 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record |
| 992 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data |
| 993 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read |
| 994 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ |
| 995 rr = &(s->s3->rrec); |
| 996 |
| 997 /* get new packet if necessary */ |
| 998 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) |
| 999 { |
| 1000 ret=ssl3_get_record(s); |
| 1001 if (ret <= 0) return(ret); |
| 1002 } |
| 1003 |
| 1004 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ |
| 1005 |
| 1006 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, |
| 1007 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ |
| 1008 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) |
| 1009 { |
| 1010 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| 1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
); |
| 1012 goto f_err; |
| 1013 } |
| 1014 |
| 1015 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away |
| 1016 * (even in 'peek' mode) */ |
| 1017 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) |
| 1018 { |
| 1019 rr->length=0; |
| 1020 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| 1021 return(0); |
| 1022 } |
| 1023 |
| 1024 |
| 1025 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE *
/ |
| 1026 { |
| 1027 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we |
| 1028 * are doing a handshake for the first time */ |
| 1029 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && |
| 1030 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) |
| 1031 { |
| 1032 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| 1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
); |
| 1034 goto f_err; |
| 1035 } |
| 1036 |
| 1037 if (len <= 0) return(len); |
| 1038 |
| 1039 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) |
| 1040 n = rr->length; |
| 1041 else |
| 1042 n = (unsigned int)len; |
| 1043 |
| 1044 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n); |
| 1045 if (!peek) |
| 1046 { |
| 1047 rr->length-=n; |
| 1048 rr->off+=n; |
| 1049 if (rr->length == 0) |
| 1050 { |
| 1051 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; |
| 1052 rr->off=0; |
| 1053 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) |
| 1054 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); |
| 1055 } |
| 1056 } |
| 1057 return(n); |
| 1058 } |
| 1059 |
| 1060 |
| 1061 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake |
| 1062 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ |
| 1063 |
| 1064 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, |
| 1065 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. |
| 1066 */ |
| 1067 { |
| 1068 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; |
| 1069 unsigned char *dest = NULL; |
| 1070 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; |
| 1071 |
| 1072 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
| 1073 { |
| 1074 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; |
| 1075 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; |
| 1076 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; |
| 1077 } |
| 1078 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) |
| 1079 { |
| 1080 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; |
| 1081 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; |
| 1082 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; |
| 1083 } |
| 1084 |
| 1085 if (dest_maxlen > 0) |
| 1086 { |
| 1087 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest
' */ |
| 1088 if (rr->length < n) |
| 1089 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ |
| 1090 |
| 1091 /* now move 'n' bytes: */ |
| 1092 while (n-- > 0) |
| 1093 { |
| 1094 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; |
| 1095 rr->length--; |
| 1096 } |
| 1097 |
| 1098 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) |
| 1099 goto start; /* fragment was too small */ |
| 1100 } |
| 1101 } |
| 1102 |
| 1103 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAK
E; |
| 1104 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. |
| 1105 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ |
| 1106 |
| 1107 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ |
| 1108 if ((!s->server) && |
| 1109 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && |
| 1110 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && |
| 1111 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) |
| 1112 { |
| 1113 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; |
| 1114 |
| 1115 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || |
| 1116 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || |
| 1117 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) |
| 1118 { |
| 1119 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); |
| 1121 goto f_err; |
| 1122 } |
| 1123 |
| 1124 if (s->msg_callback) |
| 1125 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3-
>handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| 1126 |
| 1127 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && |
| 1128 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && |
| 1129 !s->s3->renegotiate) |
| 1130 { |
| 1131 ssl3_renegotiate(s); |
| 1132 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) |
| 1133 { |
| 1134 i=s->handshake_func(s); |
| 1135 if (i < 0) return(i); |
| 1136 if (i == 0) |
| 1137 { |
| 1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_H
ANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| 1139 return(-1); |
| 1140 } |
| 1141 |
| 1142 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) |
| 1143 { |
| 1144 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ah
ead left? */ |
| 1145 { |
| 1146 BIO *bio; |
| 1147 /* In the case where we try to r
ead application data, |
| 1148 * but we trigger an SSL handsha
ke, we return -1 with |
| 1149 * the retry option set. Otherw
ise renegotiation may |
| 1150 * cause nasty problems in the b
locking world */ |
| 1151 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
| 1152 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); |
| 1153 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); |
| 1154 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); |
| 1155 return(-1); |
| 1156 } |
| 1157 } |
| 1158 } |
| 1159 } |
| 1160 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, |
| 1161 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked
for */ |
| 1162 goto start; |
| 1163 } |
| 1164 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't |
| 1165 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. |
| 1166 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) |
| 1167 */ |
| 1168 if (s->server && |
| 1169 SSL_is_init_finished(s) && |
| 1170 !s->s3->send_connection_binding && |
| 1171 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && |
| 1172 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && |
| 1173 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && |
| 1174 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && |
| 1175 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) |
| 1176 |
| 1177 { |
| 1178 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/ |
| 1179 rr->length = 0; |
| 1180 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); |
| 1181 goto start; |
| 1182 } |
| 1183 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) |
| 1184 { |
| 1185 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; |
| 1186 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; |
| 1187 |
| 1188 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; |
| 1189 |
| 1190 if (s->msg_callback) |
| 1191 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->ale
rt_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| 1192 |
| 1193 if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
| 1194 cb=s->info_callback; |
| 1195 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
| 1196 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; |
| 1197 |
| 1198 if (cb != NULL) |
| 1199 { |
| 1200 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; |
| 1201 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); |
| 1202 } |
| 1203 |
| 1204 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */ |
| 1205 { |
| 1206 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; |
| 1207 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) |
| 1208 { |
| 1209 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
| 1210 return(0); |
| 1211 } |
| 1212 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested |
| 1213 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with |
| 1214 * a fatal alert because if application tried to |
| 1215 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and |
| 1216 * expects it to succeed. |
| 1217 * |
| 1218 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we |
| 1219 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on. |
| 1220 */ |
| 1221 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) |
| 1222 { |
| 1223 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIAT
ION); |
| 1225 goto f_err; |
| 1226 } |
| 1227 } |
| 1228 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */ |
| 1229 { |
| 1230 char tmp[16]; |
| 1231 |
| 1232 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| 1233 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; |
| 1234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + ale
rt_descr); |
| 1235 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr); |
| 1236 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp); |
| 1237 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
| 1238 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); |
| 1239 return(0); |
| 1240 } |
| 1241 else |
| 1242 { |
| 1243 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); |
| 1245 goto f_err; |
| 1246 } |
| 1247 |
| 1248 goto start; |
| 1249 } |
| 1250 |
| 1251 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutd
own */ |
| 1252 { |
| 1253 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| 1254 rr->length=0; |
| 1255 return(0); |
| 1256 } |
| 1257 |
| 1258 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) |
| 1259 { |
| 1260 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know |
| 1261 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ |
| 1262 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || |
| 1263 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) |
| 1264 { |
| 1265 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPE
C); |
| 1267 goto f_err; |
| 1268 } |
| 1269 |
| 1270 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ |
| 1271 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) |
| 1272 { |
| 1273 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| 1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
| 1275 goto f_err; |
| 1276 } |
| 1277 |
| 1278 rr->length=0; |
| 1279 |
| 1280 if (s->msg_callback) |
| 1281 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPE
C, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| 1282 |
| 1283 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1; |
| 1284 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) |
| 1285 goto err; |
| 1286 else |
| 1287 goto start; |
| 1288 } |
| 1289 |
| 1290 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ |
| 1291 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) |
| 1292 { |
| 1293 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && |
| 1294 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) |
| 1295 { |
| 1296 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and |
| 1297 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting |
| 1298 * protocol violations): */ |
| 1299 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server) |
| 1300 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT |
| 1301 :SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
| 1302 #else |
| 1303 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
| 1304 #endif |
| 1305 s->new_session=1; |
| 1306 } |
| 1307 i=s->handshake_func(s); |
| 1308 if (i < 0) return(i); |
| 1309 if (i == 0) |
| 1310 { |
| 1311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
); |
| 1312 return(-1); |
| 1313 } |
| 1314 |
| 1315 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) |
| 1316 { |
| 1317 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ |
| 1318 { |
| 1319 BIO *bio; |
| 1320 /* In the case where we try to read application
data, |
| 1321 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1
with |
| 1322 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiatio
n may |
| 1323 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ |
| 1324 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
| 1325 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); |
| 1326 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); |
| 1327 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); |
| 1328 return(-1); |
| 1329 } |
| 1330 } |
| 1331 goto start; |
| 1332 } |
| 1333 |
| 1334 switch (rr->type) |
| 1335 { |
| 1336 default: |
| 1337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS |
| 1338 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */ |
| 1339 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) |
| 1340 { |
| 1341 rr->length = 0; |
| 1342 goto start; |
| 1343 } |
| 1344 #endif |
| 1345 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| 1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
| 1347 goto f_err; |
| 1348 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: |
| 1349 case SSL3_RT_ALERT: |
| 1350 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: |
| 1351 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception |
| 1352 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that |
| 1353 * should not happen when type != rr->type */ |
| 1354 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| 1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1356 goto f_err; |
| 1357 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: |
| 1358 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, |
| 1359 * but have application data. If the library was |
| 1360 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data |
| 1361 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data |
| 1362 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started), |
| 1363 * we will indulge it. |
| 1364 */ |
| 1365 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && |
| 1366 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && |
| 1367 (( |
| 1368 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && |
| 1369 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && |
| 1370 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) |
| 1371 ) || ( |
| 1372 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && |
| 1373 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && |
| 1374 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) |
| 1375 ) |
| 1376 )) |
| 1377 { |
| 1378 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; |
| 1379 return(-1); |
| 1380 } |
| 1381 else |
| 1382 { |
| 1383 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| 1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
| 1385 goto f_err; |
| 1386 } |
| 1387 } |
| 1388 /* not reached */ |
| 1389 |
| 1390 f_err: |
| 1391 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| 1392 err: |
| 1393 return(-1); |
| 1394 } |
| 1395 |
| 1396 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) |
| 1397 { |
| 1398 int i; |
| 1399 const char *sender; |
| 1400 int slen; |
| 1401 |
| 1402 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) |
| 1403 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; |
| 1404 else |
| 1405 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; |
| 1406 |
| 1407 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) |
| 1408 { |
| 1409 if (s->session == NULL) |
| 1410 { |
| 1411 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ |
| 1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIV
ED_EARLY); |
| 1413 return (0); |
| 1414 } |
| 1415 |
| 1416 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; |
| 1417 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0); |
| 1418 } |
| 1419 |
| 1420 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i)) |
| 1421 return(0); |
| 1422 |
| 1423 /* we have to record the message digest at |
| 1424 * this point so we can get it before we read |
| 1425 * the finished message */ |
| 1426 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) |
| 1427 { |
| 1428 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; |
| 1429 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; |
| 1430 } |
| 1431 else |
| 1432 { |
| 1433 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; |
| 1434 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; |
| 1435 } |
| 1436 |
| 1437 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
| 1438 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); |
| 1439 |
| 1440 return(1); |
| 1441 } |
| 1442 |
| 1443 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) |
| 1444 { |
| 1445 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ |
| 1446 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); |
| 1447 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) |
| 1448 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protoc
ol_version alerts */ |
| 1449 if (desc < 0) return -1; |
| 1450 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ |
| 1451 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) |
| 1452 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); |
| 1453 |
| 1454 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; |
| 1455 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level; |
| 1456 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc; |
| 1457 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ |
| 1458 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); |
| 1459 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written |
| 1460 * some time in the future */ |
| 1461 return -1; |
| 1462 } |
| 1463 |
| 1464 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) |
| 1465 { |
| 1466 int i,j; |
| 1467 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; |
| 1468 |
| 1469 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0; |
| 1470 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); |
| 1471 if (i <= 0) |
| 1472 { |
| 1473 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; |
| 1474 } |
| 1475 else |
| 1476 { |
| 1477 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. |
| 1478 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, |
| 1479 * we will not worry too much. */ |
| 1480 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) |
| 1481 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); |
| 1482 |
| 1483 if (s->msg_callback) |
| 1484 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->sen
d_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| 1485 |
| 1486 if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
| 1487 cb=s->info_callback; |
| 1488 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
| 1489 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; |
| 1490 |
| 1491 if (cb != NULL) |
| 1492 { |
| 1493 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1]; |
| 1494 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j); |
| 1495 } |
| 1496 } |
| 1497 return(i); |
| 1498 } |
| OLD | NEW |
|---|
Chromium Code Reviews
Issue 9254031:
Upgrade chrome's OpenSSL to same version Android ships with. (Closed)
Base URL: http://src.chromium.org/svn/trunk/deps/third_party/openssl/