| OLD | NEW |
|---|
| (Empty) | |
| 1 /* ssl/d1_pkt.c */ |
| 2 /* |
| 3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu |
| 4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. |
| 5 */ |
| 6 /* ==================================================================== |
| 7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| 8 * |
| 9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 11 * are met: |
| 12 * |
| 13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| 14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 15 * |
| 16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| 18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| 19 * distribution. |
| 20 * |
| 21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| 22 * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| 23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| 25 * |
| 26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| 27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| 28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| 29 * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| 30 * |
| 31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| 32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| 33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| 34 * |
| 35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| 36 * acknowledgment: |
| 37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| 39 * |
| 40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| 41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| 43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| 44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| 45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| 46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| 47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| 49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| 50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| 51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 52 * ==================================================================== |
| 53 * |
| 54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| 55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| 56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| 57 * |
| 58 */ |
| 59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| 60 * All rights reserved. |
| 61 * |
| 62 * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| 63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| 64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| 65 * |
| 66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| 67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| 68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| 69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| 70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| 71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| 72 * |
| 73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| 74 * the code are not to be removed. |
| 75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| 76 * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| 77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| 78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| 79 * |
| 80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 82 * are met: |
| 83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| 84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| 87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| 88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| 89 * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| 90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| 91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| 92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| 93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| 94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| 95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| 96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| 97 * |
| 98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| 99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| 101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| 102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| 103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| 104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| 106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| 107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| 108 * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 109 * |
| 110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| 111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| 112 * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| 113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| 114 */ |
| 115 |
| 116 #include <stdio.h> |
| 117 #include <errno.h> |
| 118 #define USE_SOCKETS |
| 119 #include "ssl_locl.h" |
| 120 #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| 121 #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
| 122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h> |
| 123 #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| 124 |
| 125 /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */ |
| 126 static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2) |
| 127 { int ret,sat,brw,i; |
| 128 |
| 129 if (sizeof(long) == 8) do |
| 130 { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1}; |
| 131 long l; |
| 132 |
| 133 if (is_endian.little) break; |
| 134 /* not reached on little-endians */ |
| 135 /* following test is redundant, because input is |
| 136 * always aligned, but I take no chances... */ |
| 137 if (((size_t)v1|(size_t)v2)&0x7) break; |
| 138 |
| 139 l = *((long *)v1); |
| 140 l -= *((long *)v2); |
| 141 if (l>128) return 128; |
| 142 else if (l<-128) return -128; |
| 143 else return (int)l; |
| 144 } while (0); |
| 145 |
| 146 ret = (int)v1[7]-(int)v2[7]; |
| 147 sat = 0; |
| 148 brw = ret>>8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */ |
| 149 if (ret & 0x80) |
| 150 { for (i=6;i>=0;i--) |
| 151 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i]; |
| 152 sat |= ~brw; |
| 153 brw >>= 8; |
| 154 } |
| 155 } |
| 156 else |
| 157 { for (i=6;i>=0;i--) |
| 158 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i]; |
| 159 sat |= brw; |
| 160 brw >>= 8; |
| 161 } |
| 162 } |
| 163 brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */ |
| 164 |
| 165 if (sat&0xff) return brw | 0x80; |
| 166 else return brw + (ret&0xFF); |
| 167 } |
| 168 |
| 169 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, |
| 170 int len, int peek); |
| 171 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); |
| 172 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); |
| 173 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, |
| 174 unsigned int *is_next_epoch); |
| 175 #if 0 |
| 176 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, |
| 177 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset); |
| 178 #endif |
| 179 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q, |
| 180 unsigned char *priority); |
| 181 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s); |
| 182 static void dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s); |
| 183 |
| 184 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */ |
| 185 static int |
| 186 dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item) |
| 187 { |
| 188 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; |
| 189 |
| 190 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; |
| 191 |
| 192 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) |
| 193 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); |
| 194 |
| 195 s->packet = rdata->packet; |
| 196 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length; |
| 197 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); |
| 198 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); |
| 199 |
| 200 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */ |
| 201 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6); |
| 202 |
| 203 return(1); |
| 204 } |
| 205 |
| 206 |
| 207 static int |
| 208 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority) |
| 209 { |
| 210 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; |
| 211 pitem *item; |
| 212 |
| 213 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */ |
| 214 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100) |
| 215 return 0; |
| 216 |
| 217 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA)); |
| 218 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata); |
| 219 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) |
| 220 { |
| 221 if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata); |
| 222 if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item); |
| 223 |
| 224 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 225 return(0); |
| 226 } |
| 227 |
| 228 rdata->packet = s->packet; |
| 229 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length; |
| 230 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); |
| 231 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); |
| 232 |
| 233 item->data = rdata; |
| 234 |
| 235 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */ |
| 236 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) |
| 237 { |
| 238 OPENSSL_free(rdata); |
| 239 pitem_free(item); |
| 240 return(0); |
| 241 } |
| 242 |
| 243 s->packet = NULL; |
| 244 s->packet_length = 0; |
| 245 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); |
| 246 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); |
| 247 |
| 248 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) |
| 249 { |
| 250 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 251 OPENSSL_free(rdata); |
| 252 pitem_free(item); |
| 253 return(0); |
| 254 } |
| 255 |
| 256 return(1); |
| 257 } |
| 258 |
| 259 |
| 260 static int |
| 261 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue) |
| 262 { |
| 263 pitem *item; |
| 264 |
| 265 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q); |
| 266 if (item) |
| 267 { |
| 268 dtls1_copy_record(s, item); |
| 269 |
| 270 OPENSSL_free(item->data); |
| 271 pitem_free(item); |
| 272 |
| 273 return(1); |
| 274 } |
| 275 |
| 276 return(0); |
| 277 } |
| 278 |
| 279 |
| 280 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
|
| 281 * yet */ |
| 282 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \ |
| 283 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ |
| 284 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds)) |
| 285 |
| 286 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed *
/ |
| 287 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \ |
| 288 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ |
| 289 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds)) |
| 290 |
| 291 static int |
| 292 dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s) |
| 293 { |
| 294 pitem *item; |
| 295 |
| 296 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q); |
| 297 if (item) |
| 298 { |
| 299 /* Check if epoch is current. */ |
| 300 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) |
| 301 return(1); /* Nothing to do. */ |
| 302 |
| 303 /* Process all the records. */ |
| 304 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) |
| 305 { |
| 306 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s); |
| 307 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s)) |
| 308 return(0); |
| 309 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds), |
| 310 s->s3->rrec.seq_num); |
| 311 } |
| 312 } |
| 313 |
| 314 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records |
| 315 * have been processed */ |
| 316 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch; |
| 317 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1; |
| 318 |
| 319 return(1); |
| 320 } |
| 321 |
| 322 |
| 323 #if 0 |
| 324 |
| 325 static int |
| 326 dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s) |
| 327 { |
| 328 pitem *item; |
| 329 PQ_64BIT priority = |
| 330 (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) | |
| 331 ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off); |
| 332 |
| 333 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating, |
| 334 nothing buffered */ |
| 335 return 0; |
| 336 |
| 337 |
| 338 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records); |
| 339 if (item && item->priority == priority) |
| 340 { |
| 341 /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be |
| 342 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without |
| 343 * buffering */ |
| 344 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; |
| 345 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records); |
| 346 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; |
| 347 |
| 348 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) |
| 349 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); |
| 350 |
| 351 s->packet = rdata->packet; |
| 352 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length; |
| 353 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); |
| 354 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); |
| 355 |
| 356 OPENSSL_free(item->data); |
| 357 pitem_free(item); |
| 358 |
| 359 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */ |
| 360 return(1); |
| 361 } |
| 362 |
| 363 return 0; |
| 364 } |
| 365 |
| 366 #endif |
| 367 |
| 368 static int |
| 369 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) |
| 370 { |
| 371 int i,al; |
| 372 int clear=0; |
| 373 int enc_err; |
| 374 SSL_SESSION *sess; |
| 375 SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
| 376 unsigned int mac_size; |
| 377 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| 378 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0; |
| 379 |
| 380 |
| 381 rr= &(s->s3->rrec); |
| 382 sess = s->session; |
| 383 |
| 384 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, |
| 385 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet |
| 386 */ |
| 387 rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
| 388 |
| 389 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' |
| 390 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which |
| 391 * need to be copied into rr->data by either |
| 392 * the decryption or by the decompression |
| 393 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer, |
| 394 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ |
| 395 |
| 396 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] |
| 397 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ |
| 398 |
| 399 /* check is not needed I believe */ |
| 400 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) |
| 401 { |
| 402 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
| 403 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LON
G); |
| 404 goto f_err; |
| 405 } |
| 406 |
| 407 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ |
| 408 rr->data=rr->input; |
| 409 |
| 410 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); |
| 411 if (enc_err <= 0) |
| 412 { |
| 413 /* To minimize information leaked via timing, we will always |
| 414 * perform all computations before discarding the message. |
| 415 */ |
| 416 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; |
| 417 } |
| 418 |
| 419 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
| 420 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length); |
| 421 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1
)%16)?' ':'\n'); } |
| 422 printf("\n"); |
| 423 #endif |
| 424 |
| 425 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ |
| 426 if ( (sess == NULL) || |
| 427 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) || |
| 428 (s->read_hash == NULL)) |
| 429 clear=1; |
| 430 |
| 431 if (!clear) |
| 432 { |
| 433 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ |
| 434 int t; |
| 435 t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); |
| 436 OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); |
| 437 mac_size=t; |
| 438 |
| 439 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size) |
| 440 { |
| 441 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext
anyway) */ |
| 442 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
| 443 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_T
OO_LONG); |
| 444 goto f_err; |
| 445 #else |
| 446 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; |
| 447 #endif |
| 448 } |
| 449 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the ta
il) */ |
| 450 if (rr->length < mac_size) |
| 451 { |
| 452 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */ |
| 453 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 454 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
); |
| 455 goto f_err; |
| 456 #else |
| 457 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; |
| 458 #endif |
| 459 } |
| 460 rr->length-=mac_size; |
| 461 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0); |
| 462 if (i < 0 || memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0) |
| 463 { |
| 464 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; |
| 465 } |
| 466 } |
| 467 |
| 468 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac) |
| 469 { |
| 470 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ |
| 471 rr->length = 0; |
| 472 s->packet_length = 0; |
| 473 goto err; |
| 474 } |
| 475 |
| 476 /* r->length is now just compressed */ |
| 477 if (s->expand != NULL) |
| 478 { |
| 479 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) |
| 480 { |
| 481 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
| 482 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGT
H_TOO_LONG); |
| 483 goto f_err; |
| 484 } |
| 485 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) |
| 486 { |
| 487 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; |
| 488 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSIO
N); |
| 489 goto f_err; |
| 490 } |
| 491 } |
| 492 |
| 493 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) |
| 494 { |
| 495 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
| 496 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| 497 goto f_err; |
| 498 } |
| 499 |
| 500 rr->off=0; |
| 501 /* So at this point the following is true |
| 502 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record |
| 503 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record |
| 504 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte |
| 505 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment |
| 506 * after use :-). |
| 507 */ |
| 508 |
| 509 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ |
| 510 s->packet_length=0; |
| 511 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of recor
d. */ |
| 512 return(1); |
| 513 |
| 514 f_err: |
| 515 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| 516 err: |
| 517 return(0); |
| 518 } |
| 519 |
| 520 |
| 521 /* Call this to get a new input record. |
| 522 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error |
| 523 * or non-blocking IO. |
| 524 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in |
| 525 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record |
| 526 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data |
| 527 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes |
| 528 */ |
| 529 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */ |
| 530 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) |
| 531 { |
| 532 int ssl_major,ssl_minor; |
| 533 int i,n; |
| 534 SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
| 535 unsigned char *p = NULL; |
| 536 unsigned short version; |
| 537 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; |
| 538 unsigned int is_next_epoch; |
| 539 |
| 540 rr= &(s->s3->rrec); |
| 541 |
| 542 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the |
| 543 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */ |
| 544 dtls1_process_buffered_records(s); |
| 545 |
| 546 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */ |
| 547 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s)) |
| 548 return 1; |
| 549 |
| 550 /* get something from the wire */ |
| 551 again: |
| 552 /* check if we have the header */ |
| 553 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || |
| 554 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) |
| 555 { |
| 556 n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); |
| 557 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */ |
| 558 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */ |
| 559 |
| 560 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ |
| 561 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) |
| 562 { |
| 563 s->packet_length = 0; |
| 564 goto again; |
| 565 } |
| 566 |
| 567 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY; |
| 568 |
| 569 p=s->packet; |
| 570 |
| 571 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */ |
| 572 rr->type= *(p++); |
| 573 ssl_major= *(p++); |
| 574 ssl_minor= *(p++); |
| 575 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor; |
| 576 |
| 577 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ |
| 578 n2s(p,rr->epoch); |
| 579 |
| 580 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6); |
| 581 p+=6; |
| 582 |
| 583 n2s(p,rr->length); |
| 584 |
| 585 /* Lets check version */ |
| 586 if (!s->first_packet) |
| 587 { |
| 588 if (version != s->version) |
| 589 { |
| 590 /* unexpected version, silently discard */ |
| 591 rr->length = 0; |
| 592 s->packet_length = 0; |
| 593 goto again; |
| 594 } |
| 595 } |
| 596 |
| 597 if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) |
| 598 { |
| 599 /* wrong version, silently discard record */ |
| 600 rr->length = 0; |
| 601 s->packet_length = 0; |
| 602 goto again; |
| 603 } |
| 604 |
| 605 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) |
| 606 { |
| 607 /* record too long, silently discard it */ |
| 608 rr->length = 0; |
| 609 s->packet_length = 0; |
| 610 goto again; |
| 611 } |
| 612 |
| 613 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ |
| 614 } |
| 615 |
| 616 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ |
| 617 |
| 618 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) |
| 619 { |
| 620 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ |
| 621 i=rr->length; |
| 622 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1); |
| 623 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */ |
| 624 |
| 625 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ |
| 626 if ( n != i) |
| 627 { |
| 628 rr->length = 0; |
| 629 s->packet_length = 0; |
| 630 goto again; |
| 631 } |
| 632 |
| 633 /* now n == rr->length, |
| 634 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length *
/ |
| 635 } |
| 636 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ |
| 637 |
| 638 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */ |
| 639 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); |
| 640 if ( bitmap == NULL) |
| 641 { |
| 642 rr->length = 0; |
| 643 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ |
| 644 goto again; /* get another record */ |
| 645 } |
| 646 |
| 647 /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. |
| 648 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is |
| 649 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed, |
| 650 * since they arrive from different connections and |
| 651 * would be dropped unnecessarily. |
| 652 */ |
| 653 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && |
| 654 *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && |
| 655 !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) |
| 656 { |
| 657 rr->length = 0; |
| 658 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */ |
| 659 goto again; /* get another record */ |
| 660 } |
| 661 |
| 662 /* just read a 0 length packet */ |
| 663 if (rr->length == 0) goto again; |
| 664 |
| 665 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), |
| 666 * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it |
| 667 * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer |
| 668 * anything while listening. |
| 669 */ |
| 670 if (is_next_epoch) |
| 671 { |
| 672 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) |
| 673 { |
| 674 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->s
eq_num); |
| 675 } |
| 676 rr->length = 0; |
| 677 s->packet_length = 0; |
| 678 goto again; |
| 679 } |
| 680 |
| 681 if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) |
| 682 { |
| 683 rr->length = 0; |
| 684 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ |
| 685 goto again; /* get another record */ |
| 686 } |
| 687 |
| 688 dtls1_clear_timeouts(s); /* done waiting */ |
| 689 return(1); |
| 690 |
| 691 } |
| 692 |
| 693 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. |
| 694 * 'type' is one of the following: |
| 695 * |
| 696 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) |
| 697 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) |
| 698 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) |
| 699 * |
| 700 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first |
| 701 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). |
| 702 * |
| 703 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as |
| 704 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really |
| 705 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. |
| 706 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store |
| 707 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol |
| 708 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): |
| 709 * Change cipher spec protocol |
| 710 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored |
| 711 * Alert protocol |
| 712 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) |
| 713 * Handshake protocol |
| 714 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have |
| 715 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages |
| 716 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers |
| 717 * Application data protocol |
| 718 * none of our business |
| 719 */ |
| 720 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) |
| 721 { |
| 722 int al,i,j,ret; |
| 723 unsigned int n; |
| 724 SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
| 725 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL; |
| 726 |
| 727 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ |
| 728 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) |
| 729 return(-1); |
| 730 |
| 731 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */ |
| 732 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && |
| 733 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) || |
| 734 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) |
| 735 { |
| 736 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 737 return -1; |
| 738 } |
| 739 |
| 740 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */ |
| 741 if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek))) |
| 742 return ret; |
| 743 |
| 744 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
*/ |
| 745 |
| 746 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) |
| 747 { |
| 748 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ |
| 749 i=s->handshake_func(s); |
| 750 if (i < 0) return(i); |
| 751 if (i == 0) |
| 752 { |
| 753 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILUR
E); |
| 754 return(-1); |
| 755 } |
| 756 } |
| 757 |
| 758 start: |
| 759 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| 760 |
| 761 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record |
| 762 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data |
| 763 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read |
| 764 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ |
| 765 rr = &(s->s3->rrec); |
| 766 |
| 767 /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet, |
| 768 * so process data buffered during the last handshake |
| 769 * in advance, if any. |
| 770 */ |
| 771 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0) |
| 772 { |
| 773 pitem *item; |
| 774 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q); |
| 775 if (item) |
| 776 { |
| 777 dtls1_copy_record(s, item); |
| 778 |
| 779 OPENSSL_free(item->data); |
| 780 pitem_free(item); |
| 781 } |
| 782 } |
| 783 |
| 784 /* Check for timeout */ |
| 785 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0) |
| 786 goto start; |
| 787 |
| 788 /* get new packet if necessary */ |
| 789 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) |
| 790 { |
| 791 ret=dtls1_get_record(s); |
| 792 if (ret <= 0) |
| 793 { |
| 794 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret); |
| 795 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */ |
| 796 if (ret <= 0) |
| 797 return(ret); |
| 798 else |
| 799 goto start; |
| 800 } |
| 801 } |
| 802 |
| 803 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ |
| 804 |
| 805 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, |
| 806 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ |
| 807 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) |
| 808 { |
| 809 /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished. |
| 810 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so |
| 811 * buffer the application data for later processing rather |
| 812 * than dropping the connection. |
| 813 */ |
| 814 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num)
; |
| 815 rr->length = 0; |
| 816 goto start; |
| 817 } |
| 818 |
| 819 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away |
| 820 * (even in 'peek' mode) */ |
| 821 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) |
| 822 { |
| 823 rr->length=0; |
| 824 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| 825 return(0); |
| 826 } |
| 827 |
| 828 |
| 829 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE *
/ |
| 830 { |
| 831 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we |
| 832 * are doing a handshake for the first time */ |
| 833 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && |
| 834 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) |
| 835 { |
| 836 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| 837 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAK
E); |
| 838 goto f_err; |
| 839 } |
| 840 |
| 841 if (len <= 0) return(len); |
| 842 |
| 843 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) |
| 844 n = rr->length; |
| 845 else |
| 846 n = (unsigned int)len; |
| 847 |
| 848 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n); |
| 849 if (!peek) |
| 850 { |
| 851 rr->length-=n; |
| 852 rr->off+=n; |
| 853 if (rr->length == 0) |
| 854 { |
| 855 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; |
| 856 rr->off=0; |
| 857 } |
| 858 } |
| 859 return(n); |
| 860 } |
| 861 |
| 862 |
| 863 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake |
| 864 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ |
| 865 |
| 866 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, |
| 867 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. |
| 868 */ |
| 869 { |
| 870 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0; |
| 871 unsigned char *dest = NULL; |
| 872 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; |
| 873 |
| 874 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
| 875 { |
| 876 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment; |
| 877 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment; |
| 878 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; |
| 879 } |
| 880 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) |
| 881 { |
| 882 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment); |
| 883 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment; |
| 884 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len; |
| 885 } |
| 886 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */ |
| 887 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) |
| 888 { |
| 889 /* Application data while renegotiating |
| 890 * is allowed. Try again reading. |
| 891 */ |
| 892 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) |
| 893 { |
| 894 BIO *bio; |
| 895 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; |
| 896 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); |
| 897 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
| 898 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); |
| 899 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); |
| 900 return(-1); |
| 901 } |
| 902 |
| 903 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */ |
| 904 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| 905 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
| 906 goto f_err; |
| 907 } |
| 908 |
| 909 if (dest_maxlen > 0) |
| 910 { |
| 911 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello |
| 912 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */ |
| 913 if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen) |
| 914 { |
| 915 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE |
| 916 /* |
| 917 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while |
| 918 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this |
| 919 * non-existing alert... |
| 920 */ |
| 921 FIX ME |
| 922 #endif |
| 923 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; |
| 924 rr->length = 0; |
| 925 goto start; |
| 926 } |
| 927 |
| 928 /* now move 'n' bytes: */ |
| 929 for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) |
| 930 { |
| 931 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++]; |
| 932 rr->length--; |
| 933 } |
| 934 *dest_len = dest_maxlen; |
| 935 } |
| 936 } |
| 937 |
| 938 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHA
KE; |
| 939 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. |
| 940 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ |
| 941 |
| 942 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ |
| 943 if ((!s->server) && |
| 944 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && |
| 945 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && |
| 946 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) |
| 947 { |
| 948 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0; |
| 949 |
| 950 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || |
| 951 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || |
| 952 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) |
| 953 { |
| 954 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 955 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); |
| 956 goto err; |
| 957 } |
| 958 |
| 959 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */ |
| 960 |
| 961 if (s->msg_callback) |
| 962 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, |
| 963 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback
_arg); |
| 964 |
| 965 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && |
| 966 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && |
| 967 !s->s3->renegotiate) |
| 968 { |
| 969 ssl3_renegotiate(s); |
| 970 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) |
| 971 { |
| 972 i=s->handshake_func(s); |
| 973 if (i < 0) return(i); |
| 974 if (i == 0) |
| 975 { |
| 976 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_
HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| 977 return(-1); |
| 978 } |
| 979 |
| 980 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) |
| 981 { |
| 982 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ah
ead left? */ |
| 983 { |
| 984 BIO *bio; |
| 985 /* In the case where we try to r
ead application data, |
| 986 * but we trigger an SSL handsha
ke, we return -1 with |
| 987 * the retry option set. Otherw
ise renegotiation may |
| 988 * cause nasty problems in the b
locking world */ |
| 989 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
| 990 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); |
| 991 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); |
| 992 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); |
| 993 return(-1); |
| 994 } |
| 995 } |
| 996 } |
| 997 } |
| 998 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, |
| 999 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked
for */ |
| 1000 goto start; |
| 1001 } |
| 1002 |
| 1003 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) |
| 1004 { |
| 1005 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0]; |
| 1006 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1]; |
| 1007 |
| 1008 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0; |
| 1009 |
| 1010 if (s->msg_callback) |
| 1011 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, |
| 1012 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg
); |
| 1013 |
| 1014 if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
| 1015 cb=s->info_callback; |
| 1016 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
| 1017 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; |
| 1018 |
| 1019 if (cb != NULL) |
| 1020 { |
| 1021 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; |
| 1022 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); |
| 1023 } |
| 1024 |
| 1025 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */ |
| 1026 { |
| 1027 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; |
| 1028 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) |
| 1029 { |
| 1030 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
| 1031 return(0); |
| 1032 } |
| 1033 #if 0 |
| 1034 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */ |
| 1035 /* now check if it's a missing record */ |
| 1036 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) |
| 1037 { |
| 1038 unsigned short seq; |
| 1039 unsigned int frag_off; |
| 1040 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]); |
| 1041 |
| 1042 n2s(p, seq); |
| 1043 n2l3(p, frag_off); |
| 1044 |
| 1045 dtls1_retransmit_message(s, |
| 1046
dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0), |
| 1047
frag_off, &found); |
| 1048 if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s)) |
| 1049 { |
| 1050 /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL
_in_init(s)); */ |
| 1051 /* requested a message not yet sent, |
| 1052 send an alert ourselves */ |
| 1053 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, |
| 1054 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSA
GE); |
| 1055 } |
| 1056 } |
| 1057 #endif |
| 1058 } |
| 1059 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */ |
| 1060 { |
| 1061 char tmp[16]; |
| 1062 |
| 1063 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| 1064 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; |
| 1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + al
ert_descr); |
| 1066 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr); |
| 1067 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp); |
| 1068 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
| 1069 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); |
| 1070 return(0); |
| 1071 } |
| 1072 else |
| 1073 { |
| 1074 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 1075 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); |
| 1076 goto f_err; |
| 1077 } |
| 1078 |
| 1079 goto start; |
| 1080 } |
| 1081 |
| 1082 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutd
own */ |
| 1083 { |
| 1084 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| 1085 rr->length=0; |
| 1086 return(0); |
| 1087 } |
| 1088 |
| 1089 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) |
| 1090 { |
| 1091 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr; |
| 1092 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| 1093 |
| 1094 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr); |
| 1095 |
| 1096 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
| 1097 ccs_hdr_len = 3; |
| 1098 |
| 1099 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know |
| 1100 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ |
| 1101 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */ |
| 1102 if ( (rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) || |
| 1103 (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) |
| 1104 { |
| 1105 i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SP
EC); |
| 1107 goto err; |
| 1108 } |
| 1109 |
| 1110 rr->length=0; |
| 1111 |
| 1112 if (s->msg_callback) |
| 1113 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPE
C, |
| 1114 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| 1115 |
| 1116 /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake |
| 1117 * messages are still missing, so just drop it. |
| 1118 */ |
| 1119 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok) |
| 1120 { |
| 1121 goto start; |
| 1122 } |
| 1123 |
| 1124 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0; |
| 1125 |
| 1126 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1; |
| 1127 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) |
| 1128 goto err; |
| 1129 |
| 1130 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */ |
| 1131 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); |
| 1132 |
| 1133 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
| 1134 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; |
| 1135 |
| 1136 goto start; |
| 1137 } |
| 1138 |
| 1139 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ |
| 1140 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && |
| 1141 !s->in_handshake) |
| 1142 { |
| 1143 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; |
| 1144 |
| 1145 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */ |
| 1146 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr); |
| 1147 if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) |
| 1148 { |
| 1149 rr->length = 0; |
| 1150 goto start; |
| 1151 } |
| 1152 |
| 1153 /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the |
| 1154 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED. |
| 1155 */ |
| 1156 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) |
| 1157 { |
| 1158 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s); |
| 1159 rr->length = 0; |
| 1160 goto start; |
| 1161 } |
| 1162 |
| 1163 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && |
| 1164 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) |
| 1165 { |
| 1166 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and |
| 1167 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting |
| 1168 * protocol violations): */ |
| 1169 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server) |
| 1170 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT |
| 1171 :SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
| 1172 #else |
| 1173 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
| 1174 #endif |
| 1175 s->new_session=1; |
| 1176 } |
| 1177 i=s->handshake_func(s); |
| 1178 if (i < 0) return(i); |
| 1179 if (i == 0) |
| 1180 { |
| 1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILUR
E); |
| 1182 return(-1); |
| 1183 } |
| 1184 |
| 1185 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) |
| 1186 { |
| 1187 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ |
| 1188 { |
| 1189 BIO *bio; |
| 1190 /* In the case where we try to read application
data, |
| 1191 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1
with |
| 1192 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiatio
n may |
| 1193 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ |
| 1194 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
| 1195 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); |
| 1196 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); |
| 1197 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); |
| 1198 return(-1); |
| 1199 } |
| 1200 } |
| 1201 goto start; |
| 1202 } |
| 1203 |
| 1204 switch (rr->type) |
| 1205 { |
| 1206 default: |
| 1207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS |
| 1208 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */ |
| 1209 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) |
| 1210 { |
| 1211 rr->length = 0; |
| 1212 goto start; |
| 1213 } |
| 1214 #endif |
| 1215 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| 1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
| 1217 goto f_err; |
| 1218 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: |
| 1219 case SSL3_RT_ALERT: |
| 1220 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: |
| 1221 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception |
| 1222 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that |
| 1223 * should not happen when type != rr->type */ |
| 1224 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| 1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1226 goto f_err; |
| 1227 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: |
| 1228 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, |
| 1229 * but have application data. If the library was |
| 1230 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data |
| 1231 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data |
| 1232 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started), |
| 1233 * we will indulge it. |
| 1234 */ |
| 1235 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && |
| 1236 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && |
| 1237 (( |
| 1238 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && |
| 1239 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && |
| 1240 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) |
| 1241 ) || ( |
| 1242 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && |
| 1243 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && |
| 1244 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) |
| 1245 ) |
| 1246 )) |
| 1247 { |
| 1248 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; |
| 1249 return(-1); |
| 1250 } |
| 1251 else |
| 1252 { |
| 1253 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| 1254 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
| 1255 goto f_err; |
| 1256 } |
| 1257 } |
| 1258 /* not reached */ |
| 1259 |
| 1260 f_err: |
| 1261 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| 1262 err: |
| 1263 return(-1); |
| 1264 } |
| 1265 |
| 1266 int |
| 1267 dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) |
| 1268 { |
| 1269 int i; |
| 1270 |
| 1271 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) |
| 1272 { |
| 1273 i=s->handshake_func(s); |
| 1274 if (i < 0) return(i); |
| 1275 if (i == 0) |
| 1276 { |
| 1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSH
AKE_FAILURE); |
| 1278 return -1; |
| 1279 } |
| 1280 } |
| 1281 |
| 1282 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) |
| 1283 { |
| 1284 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_DTLS_MESSA
GE_TOO_BIG); |
| 1285 return -1; |
| 1286 } |
| 1287 |
| 1288 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len); |
| 1289 return i; |
| 1290 } |
| 1291 |
| 1292 |
| 1293 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake |
| 1294 * is started. */ |
| 1295 static int |
| 1296 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, |
| 1297 int len, int peek) |
| 1298 { |
| 1299 |
| 1300 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) |
| 1301 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ |
| 1302 { |
| 1303 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment; |
| 1304 unsigned char *dst = buf; |
| 1305 unsigned int k,n; |
| 1306 |
| 1307 /* peek == 0 */ |
| 1308 n = 0; |
| 1309 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) |
| 1310 { |
| 1311 *dst++ = *src++; |
| 1312 len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--; |
| 1313 n++; |
| 1314 } |
| 1315 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ |
| 1316 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++) |
| 1317 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; |
| 1318 return n; |
| 1319 } |
| 1320 |
| 1321 return 0; |
| 1322 } |
| 1323 |
| 1324 |
| 1325 |
| 1326 |
| 1327 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' |
| 1328 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. |
| 1329 */ |
| 1330 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len) |
| 1331 { |
| 1332 int i; |
| 1333 |
| 1334 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); |
| 1335 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| 1336 i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0); |
| 1337 return i; |
| 1338 } |
| 1339 |
| 1340 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
int create_empty_fragment) |
| 1341 { |
| 1342 unsigned char *p,*pseq; |
| 1343 int i,mac_size,clear=0; |
| 1344 int prefix_len = 0; |
| 1345 SSL3_RECORD *wr; |
| 1346 SSL3_BUFFER *wb; |
| 1347 SSL_SESSION *sess; |
| 1348 int bs; |
| 1349 |
| 1350 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written |
| 1351 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ |
| 1352 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) |
| 1353 { |
| 1354 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */ |
| 1355 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len)); |
| 1356 } |
| 1357 |
| 1358 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ |
| 1359 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) |
| 1360 { |
| 1361 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); |
| 1362 if (i <= 0) |
| 1363 return(i); |
| 1364 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ |
| 1365 } |
| 1366 |
| 1367 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) |
| 1368 return 0; |
| 1369 |
| 1370 wr= &(s->s3->wrec); |
| 1371 wb= &(s->s3->wbuf); |
| 1372 sess=s->session; |
| 1373 |
| 1374 if ( (sess == NULL) || |
| 1375 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || |
| 1376 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) |
| 1377 clear=1; |
| 1378 |
| 1379 if (clear) |
| 1380 mac_size=0; |
| 1381 else |
| 1382 { |
| 1383 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); |
| 1384 if (mac_size < 0) |
| 1385 goto err; |
| 1386 } |
| 1387 |
| 1388 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */ |
| 1389 #if 0 |
| 1390 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
*/ |
| 1391 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done |
| 1392 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VE
R) |
| 1393 { |
| 1394 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites |
| 1395 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) |
| 1396 */ |
| 1397 |
| 1398 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_D
ATA) |
| 1399 { |
| 1400 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment'
set; |
| 1401 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragm
ent |
| 1402 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later |
| 1403 * together with the actual payload) */ |
| 1404 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1)
; |
| 1405 if (prefix_len <= 0) |
| 1406 goto err; |
| 1407 |
| 1408 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_P
ACKET_SIZE) |
| 1409 { |
| 1410 /* insufficient space */ |
| 1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERRO
R); |
| 1412 goto err; |
| 1413 } |
| 1414 } |
| 1415 |
| 1416 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; |
| 1417 } |
| 1418 #endif |
| 1419 p = wb->buf + prefix_len; |
| 1420 |
| 1421 /* write the header */ |
| 1422 |
| 1423 *(p++)=type&0xff; |
| 1424 wr->type=type; |
| 1425 |
| 1426 *(p++)=(s->version>>8); |
| 1427 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; |
| 1428 |
| 1429 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */ |
| 1430 pseq=p; |
| 1431 p+=10; |
| 1432 |
| 1433 /* lets setup the record stuff. */ |
| 1434 |
| 1435 /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC. |
| 1436 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck). |
| 1437 */ |
| 1438 if ( s->enc_write_ctx && |
| 1439 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
)) |
| 1440 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher); |
| 1441 else |
| 1442 bs = 0; |
| 1443 |
| 1444 wr->data=p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */ |
| 1445 wr->length=(int)len; |
| 1446 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf; |
| 1447 |
| 1448 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into |
| 1449 * wr->data */ |
| 1450 |
| 1451 /* first we compress */ |
| 1452 if (s->compress != NULL) |
| 1453 { |
| 1454 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) |
| 1455 { |
| 1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); |
| 1457 goto err; |
| 1458 } |
| 1459 } |
| 1460 else |
| 1461 { |
| 1462 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length); |
| 1463 wr->input=wr->data; |
| 1464 } |
| 1465 |
| 1466 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input |
| 1467 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length. |
| 1468 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */ |
| 1469 |
| 1470 if (mac_size != 0) |
| 1471 { |
| 1472 if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1) < 0) |
| 1473 goto err; |
| 1474 wr->length+=mac_size; |
| 1475 } |
| 1476 |
| 1477 /* this is true regardless of mac size */ |
| 1478 wr->input=p; |
| 1479 wr->data=p; |
| 1480 |
| 1481 |
| 1482 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ |
| 1483 if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */ |
| 1484 { |
| 1485 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs); |
| 1486 /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for |
| 1487 * the rest of randomness */ |
| 1488 wr->length += bs; |
| 1489 } |
| 1490 |
| 1491 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1); |
| 1492 |
| 1493 /* record length after mac and block padding */ |
| 1494 /* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || |
| 1495 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */ |
| 1496 |
| 1497 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */ |
| 1498 |
| 1499 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq); |
| 1500 |
| 1501 /* XDTLS: ?? */ |
| 1502 /* else |
| 1503 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */ |
| 1504 |
| 1505 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6); |
| 1506 pseq+=6; |
| 1507 s2n(wr->length,pseq); |
| 1508 |
| 1509 /* we should now have |
| 1510 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is |
| 1511 * wr->length long */ |
| 1512 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ |
| 1513 wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| 1514 |
| 1515 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */ |
| 1516 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */ |
| 1517 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) |
| 1518 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length, |
| 1519 *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]))); |
| 1520 #endif |
| 1521 |
| 1522 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])); |
| 1523 |
| 1524 if (create_empty_fragment) |
| 1525 { |
| 1526 /* we are in a recursive call; |
| 1527 * just return the length, don't write out anything here |
| 1528 */ |
| 1529 return wr->length; |
| 1530 } |
| 1531 |
| 1532 /* now let's set up wb */ |
| 1533 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; |
| 1534 wb->offset = 0; |
| 1535 |
| 1536 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write re
tries later */ |
| 1537 s->s3->wpend_tot=len; |
| 1538 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf; |
| 1539 s->s3->wpend_type=type; |
| 1540 s->s3->wpend_ret=len; |
| 1541 |
| 1542 /* we now just need to write the buffer */ |
| 1543 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len); |
| 1544 err: |
| 1545 return -1; |
| 1546 } |
| 1547 |
| 1548 |
| 1549 |
| 1550 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) |
| 1551 { |
| 1552 int cmp; |
| 1553 unsigned int shift; |
| 1554 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence; |
| 1555 |
| 1556 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num); |
| 1557 if (cmp > 0) |
| 1558 { |
| 1559 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8); |
| 1560 return 1; /* this record in new */ |
| 1561 } |
| 1562 shift = -cmp; |
| 1563 if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8) |
| 1564 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */ |
| 1565 else if (bitmap->map & (1UL<<shift)) |
| 1566 return 0; /* record previously received */ |
| 1567 |
| 1568 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8); |
| 1569 return 1; |
| 1570 } |
| 1571 |
| 1572 |
| 1573 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) |
| 1574 { |
| 1575 int cmp; |
| 1576 unsigned int shift; |
| 1577 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence; |
| 1578 |
| 1579 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num); |
| 1580 if (cmp > 0) |
| 1581 { |
| 1582 shift = cmp; |
| 1583 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8) |
| 1584 bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL; |
| 1585 else |
| 1586 bitmap->map = 1UL; |
| 1587 memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num,seq,8); |
| 1588 } |
| 1589 else { |
| 1590 shift = -cmp; |
| 1591 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8) |
| 1592 bitmap->map |= 1UL<<shift; |
| 1593 } |
| 1594 } |
| 1595 |
| 1596 |
| 1597 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) |
| 1598 { |
| 1599 int i,j; |
| 1600 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; |
| 1601 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
| 1602 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0]; |
| 1603 |
| 1604 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0; |
| 1605 |
| 1606 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf)); |
| 1607 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0]; |
| 1608 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1]; |
| 1609 |
| 1610 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE |
| 1611 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) |
| 1612 { |
| 1613 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr); |
| 1614 #if 0 |
| 1615 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg *
/ |
| 1616 |
| 1617 else |
| 1618 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */ |
| 1619 #endif |
| 1620 |
| 1621 #if 0 |
| 1622 fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hd
r.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq); |
| 1623 #endif |
| 1624 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr); |
| 1625 } |
| 1626 #endif |
| 1627 |
| 1628 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0); |
| 1629 if (i <= 0) |
| 1630 { |
| 1631 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; |
| 1632 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */ |
| 1633 } |
| 1634 else |
| 1635 { |
| 1636 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL |
| 1637 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE |
| 1638 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAG
E |
| 1639 #endif |
| 1640 ) |
| 1641 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); |
| 1642 |
| 1643 if (s->msg_callback) |
| 1644 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->sen
d_alert, |
| 1645 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| 1646 |
| 1647 if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
| 1648 cb=s->info_callback; |
| 1649 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
| 1650 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; |
| 1651 |
| 1652 if (cb != NULL) |
| 1653 { |
| 1654 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1]; |
| 1655 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j); |
| 1656 } |
| 1657 } |
| 1658 return(i); |
| 1659 } |
| 1660 |
| 1661 |
| 1662 static DTLS1_BITMAP * |
| 1663 dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch) |
| 1664 { |
| 1665 |
| 1666 *is_next_epoch = 0; |
| 1667 |
| 1668 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */ |
| 1669 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch) |
| 1670 return &s->d1->bitmap; |
| 1671 |
| 1672 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */ |
| 1673 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) && |
| 1674 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || |
| 1675 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) |
| 1676 { |
| 1677 *is_next_epoch = 1; |
| 1678 return &s->d1->next_bitmap; |
| 1679 } |
| 1680 |
| 1681 return NULL; |
| 1682 } |
| 1683 |
| 1684 #if 0 |
| 1685 static int |
| 1686 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority, |
| 1687 unsigned long *offset) |
| 1688 { |
| 1689 |
| 1690 /* alerts are passed up immediately */ |
| 1691 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || |
| 1692 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) |
| 1693 return 0; |
| 1694 |
| 1695 /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway. |
| 1696 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up |
| 1697 * immediately) */ |
| 1698 if ( SSL_in_init(s)) |
| 1699 { |
| 1700 unsigned char *data = rr->data; |
| 1701 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */ |
| 1702 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || |
| 1703 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) |
| 1704 { |
| 1705 unsigned short seq_num; |
| 1706 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; |
| 1707 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr; |
| 1708 |
| 1709 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
| 1710 { |
| 1711 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr); |
| 1712 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq; |
| 1713 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off; |
| 1714 } |
| 1715 else |
| 1716 { |
| 1717 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr); |
| 1718 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq; |
| 1719 *offset = 0; |
| 1720 } |
| 1721 |
| 1722 /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a |
| 1723 * retransmit of something we happened to previously |
| 1724 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently
*/ |
| 1725 if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq) |
| 1726 return 0; |
| 1727 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && |
| 1728 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq && |
| 1729 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off) |
| 1730 return 0; |
| 1731 else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq && |
| 1732 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC || |
| 1733 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.fra
g_off)) |
| 1734 return 0; |
| 1735 else |
| 1736 { |
| 1737 *priority = seq_num; |
| 1738 return 1; |
| 1739 } |
| 1740 } |
| 1741 else /* unknown record type */ |
| 1742 return 0; |
| 1743 } |
| 1744 |
| 1745 return 0; |
| 1746 } |
| 1747 #endif |
| 1748 |
| 1749 void |
| 1750 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw) |
| 1751 { |
| 1752 unsigned char *seq; |
| 1753 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence); |
| 1754 |
| 1755 if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ) |
| 1756 { |
| 1757 seq = s->s3->read_sequence; |
| 1758 s->d1->r_epoch++; |
| 1759 memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BIT
MAP)); |
| 1760 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP)); |
| 1761 } |
| 1762 else |
| 1763 { |
| 1764 seq = s->s3->write_sequence; |
| 1765 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequ
ence)); |
| 1766 s->d1->w_epoch++; |
| 1767 } |
| 1768 |
| 1769 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes); |
| 1770 } |
| 1771 |
| 1772 |
| 1773 static void |
| 1774 dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s) |
| 1775 { |
| 1776 memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0x00, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st)); |
| 1777 } |
| OLD | NEW |
|---|
Chromium Code Reviews
Issue 9254031:
Upgrade chrome's OpenSSL to same version Android ships with. (Closed)
Base URL: http://src.chromium.org/svn/trunk/deps/third_party/openssl/