Upgrade chrome's OpenSSL to same version Android ships with.

openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c

 /*! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c
  *  \brief Version independent SSL functions.
  */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * This package is an SSL implementation written
  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
  * 
@@ skipping 40 matching lines @@
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  * 
  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  * copied and put under another distribution licence
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  * are met:
  *
  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
  *
  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ skipping 36 matching lines @@
  * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
  * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
  *
  */
 /* ====================================================================
  * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
  * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
  * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
  */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
 
 #ifdef REF_CHECK
 #  include <assert.h>
 #endif
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 #include <openssl/engine.h>
 #endif
 
 const char *SSL_version_str=OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
 
 SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={
         /* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */
         (int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function,
         (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
         ssl_undefined_function,
         (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
         (int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function,
-        (int (*)(SSL *, EVP_MD_CTX *, EVP_MD_CTX *, const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
+        (int (*)(SSL *,  const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
         0,      /* finish_mac_length */
-        (int (*)(SSL *, EVP_MD_CTX *, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
+        (int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
         NULL,   /* client_finished_label */
         0,      /* client_finished_label_len */
         NULL,   /* server_finished_label */
         0,      /* server_finished_label_len */
         (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function
         };
 
 int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
         {
 
@@ skipping 38 matching lines @@
         s->read_ahead=s->ctx->read_ahead;
 #endif
 
         if (s->init_buf != NULL)
                 {
                 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
                 s->init_buf=NULL;
                 }
 
         ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+        ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+        ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
 
         s->first_packet=0;
 
 #if 1
         /* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if
          * so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */
         if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method))
                 {
                 s->method->ssl_free(s);
                 s->method=s->ctx->method;
                 if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
                         return(0);
                 }
         else
 #endif
                 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
         return(1);
         }
 
 /** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */
-int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_METHOD *meth)
+int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,const SSL_METHOD *meth)
         {
         STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
 
         ctx->method=meth;
 
         sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&(ctx->cipher_list),
-                &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
+                &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
+                meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
         if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0))
                 {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
                 return(0);
                 }
         return(1);
         }
 
 SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
         {
@@ skipping 45 matching lines @@
         s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback;
         s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg;
         s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode;
 #if 0
         s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth;
 #endif
         s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length;
         OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
         memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
         s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback;
+        s->session_creation_enabled=1;
         s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id;
 
         s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
         if (!s->param)
                 goto err;
         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
 #if 0
         s->purpose = ctx->purpose;
         s->trust = ctx->trust;
 #endif
         s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown;
+        s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
 
         CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
         s->ctx=ctx;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
         s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0;
         s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL;
         s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
         s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
         s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
         s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
         s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL;
         s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
         s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
         CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
         s->initial_ctx=ctx;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
         s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
+# endif
 #endif
+
         s->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
 
         s->method=ctx->method;
 
         if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
                 goto err;
 
         s->references=1;
         s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1;
 
         SSL_clear(s);
 
         CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        s->psk_client_callback=ctx->psk_client_callback;
+        s->psk_server_callback=ctx->psk_server_callback;
+#endif
+
         return(s);
 err:
         if (s != NULL)
                 {
                 if (s->cert != NULL)
                         ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
                 if (s->ctx != NULL)
                         SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
                 OPENSSL_free(s);
                 }
@@ skipping 67 matching lines @@
          * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */
         if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) &&
                         (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
                 {
                 memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0,
                         SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len);
                 r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
                 }
 
         CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-        p = (SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
+        p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
         CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
         return (p != NULL);
         }
 
 int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose)
         {
         return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
         }
 
 int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose)
         {
         return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
         }
 
 int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust)
         {
         return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
         }
 
 int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
         {
         return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
         }
 
+int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+        {
+        return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
+        }
+
+int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+        {
+        return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm);
+        }
+
 void SSL_free(SSL *s)
         {
         int i;
 
         if(s == NULL)
             return;
 
         i=CRYPTO_add(&s->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
 #ifdef REF_PRINT
         REF_PRINT("SSL",s);
@@ skipping 34 matching lines @@
         if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
 
         /* Make the next call work :-) */
         if (s->session != NULL)
                 {
                 ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
                 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
                 }
 
         ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+        ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+        ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
 
         if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
         /* Free up if allocated */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
         if (s->tlsext_hostname)
                 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
         if (s->initial_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+        if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+        if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
         if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
                 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
                                                 X509_EXTENSION_free);
         if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids)
                 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
         if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
                 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
 #endif
+
         if (s->client_CA != NULL)
                 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
 
         if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s);
 
         if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
         if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL)
                 kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
 #endif  /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
         if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
                 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
 #endif
 
         OPENSSL_free(s);
         }
 
 void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s,BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio)
         {
         /* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it
@@ skipping 296 matching lines @@
 /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
 int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl)
         {
         if (ssl == NULL)
                 {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
                 return(0);
                 }
         if (ssl->cert == NULL)
                 {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
                 return 0;
                 }
         if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL)
                 {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
                 return(0);
                 }
         if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
                 {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
@@ skipping 135 matching lines @@
                 return(s->mode|=larg);
         case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
                 return(s->mode &=~larg);
         case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
                 return(s->max_cert_list);
         case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
                 l=s->max_cert_list;
                 s->max_cert_list=larg;
                 return(l);
         case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
+                if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu())
+                        return 0;
+#endif
+
                 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION ||
                     SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
                         {
                         s->d1->mtu = larg;
                         return larg;
                         }
                 return 0;
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+                if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+                        return 0;
+                s->max_send_fragment = larg;
+                return 1;
         case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
                 if (s->s3)
                         return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
                 else return 0;
         default:
                 return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg));
                 }
         }
 
 long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
         {
         switch(cmd)
                 {
         case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
                 s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
                 return 1;
                 
         default:
                 return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp));
                 }
         }
 
-struct lhash_st *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
         {
         return ctx->sessions;
         }
 
 long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
         {
         long l;
 
         switch (cmd)
                 {
@@ skipping 22 matching lines @@
         case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
                 return(ctx->session_cache_size);
         case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
                 l=ctx->session_cache_mode;
                 ctx->session_cache_mode=larg;
                 return(l);
         case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
                 return(ctx->session_cache_mode);
 
         case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER:
-                return(ctx->sessions->num_items);
+                return(lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions));
         case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT:
                 return(ctx->stats.sess_connect);
         case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD:
                 return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
         case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE:
                 return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
         case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT:
                 return(ctx->stats.sess_accept);
         case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD:
                 return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
@@ skipping 10 matching lines @@
         case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL:
                 return(ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
         case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
                 return(ctx->options|=larg);
         case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
                 return(ctx->options&=~larg);
         case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
                 return(ctx->mode|=larg);
         case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
                 return(ctx->mode&=~larg);
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+                if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+                        return 0;
+                ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
+                return 1;
         default:
                 return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg));
                 }
         }
 
 long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
         {
         switch(cmd)
                 {
         case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
@@ skipping 84 matching lines @@
 /** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */
 int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
         {
         STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
         
         sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list,
                 &ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str);
         /* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it
          * was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string
          * (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which
-         * has been disabled). This is not an error as far as 
-         * ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence 
+         * has been disabled). This is not an error as far as
+         * ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
          * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been
          * updated. */
         if (sk == NULL)
                 return 0;
         else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
                 {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
                 return 0;
                 }
         return 1;
@@ skipping 10 matching lines @@
         if (sk == NULL)
                 return 0;
         else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
                 {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
                 return 0;
                 }
         return 1;
         }
 
+/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
+int SSL_set_cipher_lists(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk)
+        {
+        STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list;
+
+        if (sk == NULL)
+                return 0;
+
+        /* Based on end of ssl_create_cipher_list */
+        tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(sk);
+        if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL)
+                {
+                return 0;
+                }
+        if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
+                sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+        s->cipher_list = sk;
+        if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+                sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+        s->cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list;
+        (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(s->cipher_list_by_id,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+
+        sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+        return 1;
+        }
+
 /* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */
 char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len)
         {
         char *p;
         STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
         SSL_CIPHER *c;
         int i;
 
         if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) ||
                 (len < 2))
@@ skipping 17 matching lines @@
                 strcpy(p,c->name);
                 p+=n;
                 *(p++)=':';
                 len-=n+1;
                 }
         p[-1]='\0';
         return(buf);
         }
 
 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
-                             int (*put_cb)(const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *))
+                             int (*put_cb)(const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *))
         {
         int i,j=0;
         SSL_CIPHER *c;
         unsigned char *q;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-        int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx);
+        int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx);
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
 
         if (sk == NULL) return(0);
         q=p;
 
         for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
                 {
                 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-                if ((c->algorithms & SSL_KRB5) && nokrb5)
-                    continue;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */                    
-
+                if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) &&
+                    nokrb5)
+                    continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+                /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
+                if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) &&
+                    s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
+                        continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
                 j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
                 p+=j;
                 }
         /* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise
          * add SCSV if not renegotiating.
          */
         if (p != q && !s->new_session)
                 {
                 static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
                         {
-                        0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+                        0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
                         };
                 j = put_cb ? put_cb(&scsv,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,&scsv,p);
                 p+=j;
 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
                 fprintf(stderr, "SCSV sent by client\n");
 #endif
                 }
 
         return(p-q);
         }
 
 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
                                                STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp)
         {
-        SSL_CIPHER *c;
+        const SSL_CIPHER *c;
         STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
         int i,n;
         if (s->s3)
                 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
 
         n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
         if ((num%n) != 0)
                 {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
                 return(NULL);
@@ skipping 42 matching lines @@
 
         if (skp != NULL)
                 *skp=sk;
         return(sk);
 err:
         if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
                 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
         return(NULL);
         }
 
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 /** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL.
  * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546).
  */
 
 const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type)
         {
         if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
                 return NULL;
 
         return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ?
                 s->session->tlsext_hostname :
                 s->tlsext_hostname;
         }
 
 int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s)
         {
         if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname))
                 return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
         return -1;
         }
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
+ * expected that this function is called from the callback set by
+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb.
+ *
+ * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte
+ * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte
+ * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated.
+ *
+ * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is:
+ *
+ * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the
+ * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection
+ * or have a default application level protocol.
+ *
+ * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the
+ * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the
+ * API that this fallback case was enacted.
+ *
+ * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list
+ * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's
+ * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol
+ * a client should use.
+ *
+ * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised
+ * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2.
+ *
+ * It returns either
+ * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or
+ * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
+ */
+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
+        {
+        unsigned int i, j;
+        const unsigned char *result;
+        int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+        /* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */
+        for (i = 0; i < server_len; )
+                {
+                for (j = 0; j < client_len; )
+                        {
+                        if (server[i] == client[j] &&
+                            memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0)
+                                {
+                                /* We found a match */
+                                result = &server[i];
+                                status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+                                goto found;
+                                }
+                        j += client[j];
+                        j++;
+                        }
+                i += server[i];
+                i++;
+                }
+
+        /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
+        result = client;
+        status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+
+        found:
+        *out = (unsigned char *) result + 1;
+        *outlen = result[0];
+        return status;
+        }
+
+/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's
+ * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't
+ * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL.
+ *
+ * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned
+ * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
+ * provided by the callback.
+ */
+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len)
+        {
+        *data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
+        if (!*data) {
+                *len = 0;
+        } else {
+                *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
+        }
+}
+
+/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a
+ * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
+ * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format.  The list is returned
+ * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will
+ * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to
+ * it.
+ *
+ * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no
+ * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg)
+        {
+        ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
+        ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
+        }
+
+/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
+ * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
+ * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
+ * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's
+ * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can
+ * assume that |in| is syntactically valid.
+ *
+ * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this
+ * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
+ */
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg)
+        {
+        ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
+        ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
+        }
+
+# endif
 #endif
 
-unsigned long SSL_SESSION_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
+static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
         {
         unsigned long l;
 
         l=(unsigned long)
                 ((unsigned int) a->session_id[0]     )|
                 ((unsigned int) a->session_id[1]<< 8L)|
                 ((unsigned long)a->session_id[2]<<16L)|
                 ((unsigned long)a->session_id[3]<<24L);
         return(l);
         }
 
 /* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
  * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
  * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being
  * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session
  * with a matching session ID. */
-int SSL_SESSION_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b)
+static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b)
         {
         if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
                 return(1);
         if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
                 return(1);
         return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length));
         }
 
 /* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring
  * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each
  * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed via
  * ssl.h. */
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(SSL_SESSION_hash, SSL_SESSION *)
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(SSL_SESSION_cmp, SSL_SESSION *)
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
 
-SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth)
+SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
         {
         SSL_CTX *ret=NULL;
-        
+
         if (meth == NULL)
                 {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
                 return(NULL);
                 }
 
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-        if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION))      
-                {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
-                return NULL;
-                }
-#endif
-
         if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0)
                 {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
                 goto err;
                 }
         ret=(SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
         if (ret == NULL)
                 goto err;
 
         memset(ret,0,sizeof(SSL_CTX));
@@ skipping 42 matching lines @@
         ret->default_verify_callback=NULL;
         if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
                 goto err;
 
         ret->default_passwd_callback=0;
         ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL;
         ret->client_cert_cb=0;
         ret->app_gen_cookie_cb=0;
         ret->app_verify_cookie_cb=0;
 
-        ret->sessions=lh_new(LHASH_HASH_FN(SSL_SESSION_hash),
-                        LHASH_COMP_FN(SSL_SESSION_cmp));
+        ret->sessions=lh_SSL_SESSION_new();
         if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err;
         ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new();
         if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err;
 
         ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
                 &ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id,
-                SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
+                meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
         if (ret->cipher_list == NULL
             || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0)
                 {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
                 goto err2;
                 }
 
         ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
         if (!ret->param)
                 goto err;
@@ skipping 15 matching lines @@
                 }
 
         if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
                 goto err;
 
         CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
 
         ret->extra_certs=NULL;
         ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
 
+        ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
         ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0;
         ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL;
         /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */
         if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0)
                 || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0)
                 || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0))
                 ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
 
         ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
         ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;
 
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
         ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0;
         ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0;
+# endif
 #endif
-
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
+        ret->psk_client_callback=NULL;
+        ret->psk_server_callback=NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+        ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT;
+        ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
+        if (!ret->rbuf_freelist)
+                goto err;
+        ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
+        ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0;
+        ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
+        ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
+        if (!ret->wbuf_freelist)
+                {
+                OPENSSL_free(ret->rbuf_freelist);
+                goto err;
+                }
+        ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
+        ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0;
+        ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
         ret->client_cert_engine = NULL;
 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
 #define eng_strx(x)     #x
 #define eng_str(x)      eng_strx(x)
         /* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */
         {
         ENGINE *eng;
         eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
         if (!eng)
@@ skipping 18 matching lines @@
 err2:
         if (ret != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ret);
         return(NULL);
         }
 
 #if 0
 static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp)
     { OPENSSL_free(comp); }
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+static void
+ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list)
+        {
+        SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next;
+        for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next)
+                {
+                next = ent->next;
+                OPENSSL_free(ent);
+                }
+        OPENSSL_free(list);
+        }
+#endif
+
 void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
         {
         int i;
 
         if (a == NULL) return;
 
         i=CRYPTO_add(&a->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
 #ifdef REF_PRINT
         REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX",a);
 #endif
@@ skipping 17 matching lines @@
          * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then
          * free ex_data, then finally free the cache.
          * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].)
          */
         if (a->sessions != NULL)
                 SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a,0);
 
         CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
 
         if (a->sessions != NULL)
-                lh_free(a->sessions);
+                lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);
 
         if (a->cert_store != NULL)
                 X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
         if (a->cipher_list != NULL)
                 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list);
         if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
                 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id);
         if (a->cert != NULL)
                 ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
         if (a->client_CA != NULL)
                 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
         if (a->extra_certs != NULL)
                 sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs,X509_free);
 #if 0 /* This should never be done, since it removes a global database */
         if (a->comp_methods != NULL)
                 sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods,SSL_COMP_free);
 #else
         a->comp_methods = NULL;
 #endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        if (a->psk_identity_hint)
+                OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint);
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
         if (a->client_cert_engine)
                 ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+        if (a->wbuf_freelist)
+                ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist);
+        if (a->rbuf_freelist)
+                ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist);
+#endif
+
         OPENSSL_free(a);
         }
 
 void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb)
         {
         ctx->default_passwd_callback=cb;
         }
 
 void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx,void *u)
         {
@@ skipping 10 matching lines @@
         {
         ctx->verify_mode=mode;
         ctx->default_verify_callback=cb;
         }
 
 void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth)
         {
         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
         }
 
-void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
+void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
         {
         CERT_PKEY *cpk;
         int rsa_enc,rsa_tmp,rsa_sign,dh_tmp,dh_rsa,dh_dsa,dsa_sign;
         int rsa_enc_export,dh_rsa_export,dh_dsa_export;
         int rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp_export,kl;
-        unsigned long mask,emask;
+        unsigned long mask_k,mask_a,emask_k,emask_a;
         int have_ecc_cert, ecdh_ok, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
         int have_ecdh_tmp;
 #endif
         X509 *x = NULL;
         EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL;
-        int signature_nid = 0;
+        int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0;
 
         if (c == NULL) return;
 
         kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
         rsa_tmp=(c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL);
         rsa_tmp_export=(c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL ||
                 (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp)*8 <= kl));
 #else
@@ skipping 19 matching lines @@
         dsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
         cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]);
         dh_rsa=  (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
         dh_rsa_export=(dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
         cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]);
 /* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */
         dh_dsa=  (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
         dh_dsa_export=(dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
         cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
         have_ecc_cert= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
-        mask=0;
-        emask=0;
+        mask_k=0;
+        mask_a=0;
+        emask_k=0;
+        emask_a=0;
+
+        
 
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-        printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
-                rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,
+        printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
+                rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,have_ecdh_tmp,
                 rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa);
 #endif
+        
+        cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]);
+        if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
+                mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
+                mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01;
+        }
+        cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]);
+        if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
+                mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
+                mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94;
+        }
 
         if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign))
-                mask|=SSL_kRSA;
+                mask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
         if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc)))
-                emask|=SSL_kRSA;
+                emask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
 
 #if 0
         /* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */
-        if (    (dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) && 
+        if (    (dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) &&
                 (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
-                mask|=SSL_kEDH;
+                mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
         if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) &&
                 (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
-                emask|=SSL_kEDH;
+                emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
 #endif
 
-        if (dh_tmp_export) 
-                emask|=SSL_kEDH;
+        if (dh_tmp_export)
+                emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
 
         if (dh_tmp)
-                mask|=SSL_kEDH;
+                mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
 
-        if (dh_rsa) mask|=SSL_kDHr;
-        if (dh_rsa_export) emask|=SSL_kDHr;
+        if (dh_rsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHr;
+        if (dh_rsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHr;
 
-        if (dh_dsa) mask|=SSL_kDHd;
-        if (dh_dsa_export) emask|=SSL_kDHd;
+        if (dh_dsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHd;
+        if (dh_dsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHd;
 
         if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign)
                 {
-                mask|=SSL_aRSA;
-                emask|=SSL_aRSA;
+                mask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
+                emask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
                 }
 
         if (dsa_sign)
                 {
-                mask|=SSL_aDSS;
-                emask|=SSL_aDSS;
+                mask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
+                emask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
                 }
 
-        mask|=SSL_aNULL;
-        emask|=SSL_aNULL;
+        mask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
+        emask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-        mask|=SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5;
-        emask|=SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5;
+        mask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
+        mask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
+        emask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
+        emask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
 #endif
 
         /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or
          * ECDSA cipher suites depending on the key usage extension.
          */
         if (have_ecc_cert)
                 {
-                /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
+                /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
                 x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509;
                 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
                 ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
                     (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1;
                 ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
                     (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
                 ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
-                ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? 
+                ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ?
                     EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
                 EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
                 if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
+                        {
                         signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+                        OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
+                        }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
                 if (ecdh_ok)
                         {
-                        if ((signature_nid == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption) ||
-                            (signature_nid == NID_md4WithRSAEncryption) ||
-                            (signature_nid == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption))
+
+                        if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa)
                                 {
-                                mask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aRSA;
+                                mask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
+                                mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
                                 if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
-                                        emask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aRSA;
+                                        {
+                                        emask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
+                                        emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
+                                        }
                                 }
-                        if (signature_nid == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1)
+
+                        if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
                                 {
-                                mask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aECDSA;
+                                mask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
+                                mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
                                 if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
-                                        emask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aECDSA;
+                                        {
+                                        emask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
+                                        emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
+                                        }
                                 }
                         }
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
                 if (ecdsa_ok)
                         {
-                        mask|=SSL_aECDSA;
-                        emask|=SSL_aECDSA;
+                        mask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
+                        emask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
                         }
 #endif
                 }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
         if (have_ecdh_tmp)
                 {
-                mask|=SSL_kECDHE;
-                emask|=SSL_kECDHE;
+                mask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
+                emask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
                 }
 #endif
-        c->mask=mask;
-        c->export_mask=emask;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+        mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+        emask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+        emask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+#endif
+
+        c->mask_k=mask_k;
+        c->mask_a=mask_a;
+        c->export_mask_k=emask_k;
+        c->export_mask_a=emask_a;
         c->valid=1;
         }
 
 /* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */
 #define ku_reject(x, usage) \
         (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
 
-int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHER *cs)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
+int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, const SSL_CIPHER *cs)
         {
-        unsigned long alg = cs->algorithms;
+        unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
         EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
         int keysize = 0;
-        int signature_nid = 0;
+        int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
+
+        alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey;
+        alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;
 
         if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs))
                 {
                 /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */
                 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
                 if (pkey == NULL) return 0;
                 keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
                 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
                 if (keysize > 163) return 0;
                 }
 
         /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
         X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
         if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
+                {
                 signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
-        if (alg & SSL_kECDH) 
+                OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
+                }
+        if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr)
                 {
                 /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
                 if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
                         {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT);
                         return 0;
                         }
-                if (alg & SSL_aECDSA) 
+                if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe)
                         {
                         /* signature alg must be ECDSA */
-                        if (signature_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1)
+                        if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
                                 {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE);
                                 return 0;
                                 }
                         }
-                if (alg & SSL_aRSA)
+                if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHr)
                         {
                         /* signature alg must be RSA */
-                        if ((signature_nid != NID_md5WithRSAEncryption) &&
-                            (signature_nid != NID_md4WithRSAEncryption) &&
-                            (signature_nid != NID_md2WithRSAEncryption))
+
+                        if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa)
                                 {
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE);
                                 return 0;
                                 }
                         }
-                } 
-        else if (alg & SSL_aECDSA)
+                }
+        if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
                 {
                 /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
                 if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
                         {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
                         return 0;
                         }
                 }
 
         return 1;  /* all checks are ok */
         }
 
+#endif
+
 /* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */
 X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s)
         {
-        unsigned long alg,mask,kalg;
+        unsigned long alg_k,alg_a;
         CERT *c;
-        int i,is_export;
+        int i;
 
         c=s->cert;
         ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
-        alg=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
-        is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
-        mask=is_export?c->export_mask:c->mask;
-        kalg=alg&(SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK);
+        
+        alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+        alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
 
-        if (kalg & SSL_kECDH)
+        if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
                 {
-                /* we don't need to look at SSL_kECDHE 
+                /* we don't need to look at SSL_kEECDH
                  * since no certificate is needed for
                  * anon ECDH and for authenticated
-                 * ECDHE, the check for the auth 
+                 * EECDH, the check for the auth
                  * algorithm will set i correctly
                  * NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC
-                 * not an RSA cert but for ECDHE-RSA
+                 * not an RSA cert but for EECDH-RSA
                  * we need an RSA cert. Placing the
                  * checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA
                  * checks ensures the correct cert is chosen.
                  */
                 i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
                 }
-        else if (kalg & SSL_aECDSA)
+        else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
                 {
                 i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
                 }
-        else if (kalg & SSL_kDHr)
+        else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
                 i=SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
-        else if (kalg & SSL_kDHd)
+        else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
                 i=SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
-        else if (kalg & SSL_aDSS)
+        else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
                 i=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
-        else if (kalg & SSL_aRSA)
+        else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
                 {
                 if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL)
                         i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
                 else
                         i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
                 }
-        else if (kalg & SSL_aKRB5)
+        else if (alg_a & SSL_aKRB5)
                 {
                 /* VRS something else here? */
                 return(NULL);
                 }
-        else /* if (kalg & SSL_aNULL) */
+        else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) 
+                i=SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
+        else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
+                i=SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
+        else /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
                 {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                 return(NULL);
                 }
         if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == NULL) return(NULL);
 
         return(c->pkeys[i].x509);
         }
 
-EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
+EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
         {
-        unsigned long alg;
+        unsigned long alg_a;
         CERT *c;
 
-        alg=cipher->algorithms;
+        alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
         c=s->cert;
 
-        if ((alg & SSL_aDSS) &&
+        if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) &&
                 (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
                 return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey);
-        else if (alg & SSL_aRSA)
+        else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
                 {
                 if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
                         return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey);
                 else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
                         return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
                 else
                         return(NULL);
                 }
-        else if ((alg & SSL_aECDSA) &&
+        else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
                  (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
                 return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
-        else /* if (alg & SSL_aNULL) */
+        else /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
                 {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                 return(NULL);
                 }
         }
 
 void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode)
         {
         int i;
 
         /* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it,
          * and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */
         if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return;
 
-        i=s->ctx->session_cache_mode;
+        i=s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
         if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
                 && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
-                    || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,s->session))
-                && (s->ctx->new_session_cb != NULL))
+                    || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx,s->session))
+                && (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL))
                 {
                 CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-                if (!s->ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session))
+                if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session))
                         SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
                 }
 
         /* auto flush every 255 connections */
         if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) &&
                 ((i & mode) == mode))
                 {
                 if (  (((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
-                        ?s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
-                        :s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff)
+                        ?s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
+                        :s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff)
                         {
-                        SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->ctx,(unsigned long)time(NULL));
+                        SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx,(unsigned long)time(NULL));
                         }
                 }
         }
 
-SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
+const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
         {
         return(s->method);
         }
 
-int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s,SSL_METHOD *meth)
+int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
         {
         int conn= -1;
         int ret=1;
 
         if (s->method != meth)
                 {
                 if (s->handshake_func != NULL)
                         conn=(s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect);
 
                 if (s->method->version == meth->version)
@@ skipping 24 matching lines @@
         /* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake
          * etc, where we do encode the error */
         if ((l=ERR_peek_error()) != 0)
                 {
                 if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS)
                         return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
                 else
                         return(SSL_ERROR_SSL);
                 }
 
-        if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_server_random_validation(s))
-                return(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_RANDOM_VALIDATION_PENDING);
-
         if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s))
                 {
                 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
                 if (BIO_should_read(bio))
                         return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
                 else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
                         /* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try
                          * to write to the rbio, and an application program where
                          * rbio and wbio are separate couldn't even know what it
                          * should wait for.
@@ skipping 78 matching lines @@
 /* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so
  * one of these calls will reset it */
 void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s)
         {
         s->server=1;
         s->shutdown=0;
         s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
         s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
         /* clear the current cipher */
         ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+        ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+        ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
         }
 
 void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s)
         {
         s->server=0;
         s->shutdown=0;
         s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
         s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect;
         /* clear the current cipher */
         ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+        ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+        ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
         }
 
 int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s)
         {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return(0);
         }
 
 int ssl_undefined_void_function(void)
         {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return(0);
         }
 
 int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s)
         {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return(0);
         }
 
 SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
         {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return(NULL);
         }
 
+static const char *ssl_get_version(int version)
+        {
+        if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
+                return("TLSv1");
+        else if (version == SSL3_VERSION)
+                return("SSLv3");
+        else if (version == SSL2_VERSION)
+                return("SSLv2");
+        else
+                return("unknown");
+        }
+
 const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
         {
-        if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
-                return("TLSv1");
-        else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
-                return("SSLv3");
-        else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
-                return("SSLv2");
-        else
-                return("unknown");
+                return ssl_get_version(s->version);
+        }
+
+const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+        {
+                return ssl_get_version(s->ssl_version);
+        }
+
+const char* SSL_authentication_method(const SSL* ssl)
+        {
+        if (ssl->cert != NULL && ssl->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+                return SSL_TXT_RSA "_" SSL_TXT_EXPORT;
+        switch (ssl->version)
+                {
+        case SSL2_VERSION:
+                return SSL_TXT_RSA;
+        case SSL3_VERSION:
+        case TLS1_VERSION:
+        case DTLS1_VERSION:
+                return SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+        default:
+                return "UNKNOWN";
+                }
         }
 
 SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
         {
         STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
         X509_NAME *xn;
         SSL *ret;
         int i;
-                 
+        
         if ((ret=SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
             return(NULL);
 
         ret->version = s->version;
         ret->type = s->type;
         ret->method = s->method;
 
         if (s->session != NULL)
                 {
                 /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */
@@ skipping 149 matching lines @@
 
 /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
 EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *s)
         {
         if (s->cert != NULL)
                 return(s->cert->key->privatekey);
         else
                 return(NULL);
         }
 
-SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
         {
         if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
                 return(s->session->cipher);
         return(NULL);
         }
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
         {
         return NULL;
         }
@@ skipping 57 matching lines @@
 void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
         {
         if (s->bbio == NULL) return;
 
         if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
                 {
                 /* remove buffering */
                 s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
 #ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids adding one more preprocessor symbol */
                 assert(s->wbio != NULL);
-#endif  
+#endif
         }
         BIO_free(s->bbio);
         s->bbio=NULL;
         }
         
 void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode)
         {
         ctx->quiet_shutdown=mode;
         }
 
@@ skipping 64 matching lines @@
 #endif
 
 void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
         void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val))
         {
         ssl->info_callback=cb;
         }
 
 /* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned
    function pointer.  */
-void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/) 
+void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/)
         {
         return ssl->info_callback;
         }
 
 int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl)
         {
         return(ssl->state);
         }
 
 void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long arg)
@@ skipping 100 matching lines @@
 #endif
 
 /*!
  * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys.
  * \param ctx the SSL context.
  * \param dh the callback
  */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
 void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
-                                                        int keylength))
+                                                        int keylength))
         {
         SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
         }
 
 void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
-                                                int keylength))
+                                                int keylength))
         {
         SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
         }
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
 void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
-                                                        int keylength))
+                                                                int keylength))
         {
         SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
         }
 
 void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
-                                                int keylength))
+                                                        int keylength))
         {
         SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
         }
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint)
+        {
+        if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                return 0;
+                }
+        if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+                OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+        if (identity_hint != NULL)
+                {
+                ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+                if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+                        return 0;
+                }
+        else
+                ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+        return 1;
+        }
+
+int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint)
+        {
+        if (s == NULL)
+                return 0;
+
+        if (s->session == NULL)
+                return 1; /* session not created yet, ignored */
+
+        if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
+                {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                return 0;
+                }
+        if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+                OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+        if (identity_hint != NULL)
+                {
+                s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+                if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+                        return 0;
+                }
+        else
+                s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+        return 1;
+        }
+
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
+                return NULL;
+        return(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+        }
+
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s)
+        {
+        if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
+                return NULL;
+        return(s->session->psk_identity);
+        }
+
+void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s,
+    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+                       char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
+                       unsigned int max_psk_len))
+        {
+        s->psk_client_callback = cb;
+        }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
+                       char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
+                       unsigned int max_psk_len))
+        {
+        ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
+        }
+
+void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s,
+    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+                       unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
+        {
+        s->psk_server_callback = cb;
+        }
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+    unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
+                       unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
+        {
+        ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
+        }
+#endif
 
 void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
         {
         SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
         }
 void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
         {
         SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
         }
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
- * expected that this function is called from the callback set by
- * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb.
- *
- * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte
- * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte
- * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated.
- *
- * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is:
- *
- * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the
- * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection
- * or have a default application level protocol.
- *
- * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the
- * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the
- * API that this fallback case was enacted.
- *
- * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list
- * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's
- * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol
- * a client should use.
- *
- * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised
- * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2.
- *
- * It returns either
- * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or
- * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
- */
-int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
-        {
-        unsigned int i, j;
-        const unsigned char *result;
-        int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
-
-        /* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */
-        for (i = 0; i < server_len; )
-                {
-                for (j = 0; j < client_len; )
-                        {
-                        if (server[i] == client[j] &&
-                            memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0)
-                                {
-                                /* We found a match */
-                                result = &server[i];
-                                status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
-                                goto found;
-                                }
-                        j += client[j];
-                        j++;
-                        }
-                i += server[i];
-                i++;
-                }
-
-        /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
-        result = client;
-        status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
-
-        found:
-        *out = (unsigned char *) result + 1;
-        *outlen = result[0];
-        return status;
-        }
-
-/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's
- * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't
- * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL.
- *
- * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned
- * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
- * provided by the callback.
- */
-void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len)
-        {
-        *data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
-        if (!*data) {
-                *len = 0;
-        } else {
-                *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
-        }
-}
-
-/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a
- * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
- * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format.  The list is returned
- * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will
- * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to
- * it.
- *
- * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no
- * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */
-void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg)
-        {
-        ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
-        ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
-        }
-
-/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
- * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
- * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
- * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's
- * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can
- * assume that |in| is syntactically valid.
- *
- * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this
- * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
- */
-void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg)
-        {
-        ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
-        ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
-        }
-
-/* SSL_CTX_set_snap_start_orbit sets the orbit value which will be echoed back
- * to the client and enables Snap Start for this context.
- *
- * An orbit value can be used to spatially partition the state needed to support
- * Snap Start. See the comments above SSL_set_suggested_server_random_validity
- * (below).  */
-void SSL_CTX_set_snap_start_orbit(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char orbit[8])
-        {
-        memcpy(ctx->snap_start_orbit, orbit, sizeof(ctx->snap_start_orbit));
-        ctx->snap_start_orbit_valid = 1;
-        }
-
-/* Once SSL_accept has returned with SSL_SERVER_RANDOM_VALIDATE, then one can
- * call this function in order to get the client's suggested server random
- * value. */
-void SSL_get0_suggested_server_random(const SSL* s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *length)
-        {
-        if (!s->s3->snap_start_requested)
-                {
-                *data = NULL;
-                *length = 0;
-                return;
-                }
-        *length = 32;
-        *data = s->s3->server_random;
-        }
-
-/* SSL_set_suggested_server_random_validity passes judgement on a
- * client-suggested random value (obtained from
- * SSL_get0_suggested_server_random). Rejecting the value triggers a recovery,
- * while accepting the value /may/ result in a successful Snap Start, as long
- * as the client predicted the handshake correctly.
- *
- * In order to accept a random value the user must ensure that it has NEVER
- * been used before by this server, or any server configured with any of the
- * same certificates. It may reject more if necessary.
- *
- * The first four bytes of the random value contain a timestamp (UNIX seconds
- * since the epoch) which can be used to manage a time window.  Additionally,
- * the following eight bytes contain the orbit which which can also bound the
- * state required if geographically separate servers share certificates.
- *
- * It's recommended that the time window have a maximum size, independent of
- * the resources available, in order to prevent an attacker from arbitrarily
- * delaying a Snap Start handshake.
- */
-void SSL_set_suggested_server_random_validity(SSL *s, char is_valid)
-        {
-        if (is_valid)
-                s->s3->server_random_suggestion_valid = 1;
-        else
-                ssl3_snap_start_reset_for_recovery(s);
-        }
-
-#endif
-
 int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s)
         {
         return (!s->server &&                 /* cutthrough only applies to clients */
                 !s->hit &&                        /* full-handshake */
                 s->version >= SSL3_VERSION &&
                 s->s3->in_read_app_data == 0 &&   /* cutthrough only applies to write() */
                 (SSL_get_mode((SSL*)s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) &&  /* cutthrough enabled */
                 SSL_get_cipher_bits(s, NULL) >= 128 &&                      /* strong cipher choosen */
                 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 &&                 /* not a renegotiation handshake */
                 (s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A ||                 /* ready to write app-data*/
                         s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A));
         }
 
+/* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
+ * vairable, freeing  EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if
+ * any. If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md
+ * Returns newly allocated ctx;
+ */
+
+EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash,const EVP_MD *md) 
+{
+        ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
+        *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+        if (md) EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash,md,NULL);
+        return *hash;
+}
+void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash) 
+{
+
+        if (*hash) EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
+        *hash=NULL;
+}
+
 #if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
 #include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c"
 #endif
 
 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER,
+                                    ssl_cipher_id);
+